

Julius Caesar

THE CIVIL WAR BOOK III



Edited with an Introduction, Translation & Commentary
by

J. M. Carter

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Aris & Phillips — Warminster — England

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FOREWORD

The purpose of this edition is to aid the understanding of Caesar's work and its relation to the history of the time by providing a commentary which although primarily historical in scope necessarily touches frequently upon questions of literary composition and textual authenticity. It is designed for students, at any level, of Latin and ancient history who have some knowledge of the history and institutions of Rome. Sophisticated readers will I trust find enough of interest in it to offset any irritation they may feel at being told on occasion things they have long known. The commentary, being keyed to the English translation, is intended to be accessible and intelligible to those who may know little or no Latin, except of course where the discussion concerns linguistic matters. The discipline of making sense of an obviously corrupt Latin text (see p. 18), which in many places poses difficulties to which no generally agreed solutions exist, has led me to constitute a new text which I hope may be nearer to what Caesar actually wrote than any of the current editions.

Like its companion and predecessor, my commentary on Civil War, Books I & II, this volume owes much to many friends and colleagues with whom it has been my good fortune to work for many years in posts at Royal Holloway in the University of London and at Ormond College in the University of Melbourne. I am grateful for discussion on points of detail with Stephen Usher and Michael Winterbottom, and for a comprehensive revision and rescue service from Malcolm Willcock, the general editor of this series, without whose attentions this book would lack much of whatever accuracy and consistency it may have. But my greatest debt, as before, remains to my wife for her patience, understanding, and encouragement, and it is to her that I affectionately dedicate it.

J.M.C.

Bath

May 1993

INTRODUCTION

*References in bold type are to the *Bellum Civile*, and if without Book number, to Book III. In the case of modern authors, see the Bibliography which follows this introduction.*

The third book of Caesar's *Bellum Civile* covers the year 48 B.C. It begins, in fact, a few days before Caesar entered on the long-desired second consulship which his enemies had tried so hard to prevent him holding, and it breaks off some time in October. The situation at the outset of the book is this: Caesar has returned from Spain, after forcing the Pompeian generals Afranius and Petreius to surrender and disband Pompey's best legions, and has secured his control of Gaul by bringing to a successful conclusion the siege of Massilia which has been going on meanwhile. Previously he had driven Pompey out of Italy in a campaign of astonishing rapidity beginning with his famous crossing of the Rubicon early in January and ending at Brundisium in March. A shortage of ships (still a problem in 48) and an unwillingness to leave Italy open to attack by Pompey's seven legions in Spain had decided him not to follow Pompey to Greece for the moment but to consolidate his position in Italy and the western provinces. These matters are related in Books I - II.22. The remainder of Book II is concerned with the defeat of Curio in Africa, which caused the loss of two legions, but hardly affected the general picture, since at least one and probably both of these legions would have had to remain in the province in the event of Curio's success.

So at the beginning of 48 Caesar was ready to cross the Adriatic and face Pompey himself. The narrative stays mostly with Caesar (apart from chapters 20 - 40). He made a surprise crossing to Epirus late in the autumn (January by the official calendar but November by the sun), secured possession of some of the coastal towns, spent the winter months encamped opposite Pompey waiting for reinforcements to arrive from Italy in the face of a naval blockade, and, when they at last did so, undertook (although outnumbered) the desperate enterprise of besieging Pompey in his camp on the coast just south of Dyrrachium. He was outmanoeuvred, and sustained a

serious defeat while trying to save the situation. Forced to withdraw, he opted to cross the Pindus range to find food for his men and join up with some of his other forces, and took up a position in southern Thessaly near Pharsalus. Pompey came up with him, and eventually decided to offer battle - something he had steadfastly refused to do up to this point. Caesar countered the threat posed by his opponent's vast superiority in numbers, particularly in cavalry, and won a notable victory. Some of Pompey's associates who fled westwards lived to continue the struggle another day. Pompey himself, with others, made his way to Egypt, where he hoped the young king Ptolemy XIII would support him in gratitude for services rendered to his father. But the king's advisers, probably rightly, judged that Pompey would be less of a problem if he were dead, and murdered him. Caesar arrived in pursuit a few days later, with only a few troops, but immediately became embroiled in the struggle that was going on between Ptolemy XIII and his sister Cleopatra for the Egyptian throne. At this point, with Caesar fighting to defend himself from military attack in the palace quarter of Alexandria, the story comes to a stop.

The most striking feature of the third book of the *Bellum Civile* is this abrupt ending. Caesar surely did not intend his final chapter to be the last. Why did he not go on? And was the work published before or after his death? Views differ, but since the case is more fully argued in the Introduction to Books I & II (pp. 16-18), it will be sufficient to restate the conclusion reached there: that Caesar most probably wrote Book III at some time (or times) during 48 B.C. and the subsequent winter, which he spent in Egypt with Cleopatra (not omitting a Nile cruise); and that his changed political attitude thereafter, and a new sense of what was relevant in a world in which he had become an autocrat, caused him to lose interest in a work which he had undertaken in order to portray himself as the true upholder of the Republic and to damn his enemies, in spite of their claims, as its corrupters. Found amongst his papers after his death, the fragmentary *Bellum Civile* was published, presumably on the initiative of the consuls Antony and Dolabella, in time to allow Hirtius, before his death in April 43, to provide a link between the two Caesarian accounts in the shape of Book VIII of the *Bellum Gallicum*. Hirtius may also have written the *Bellum Alexandrinum*, which takes the story of the *Bellum Civile* on from the end of our present text, but the case is not proven.

Caesar's chief concern in the *Bellum Civile* is with his own self-representation, to which the picture of his enemies serves as a kind of counterpoint. These enemies, with one or two exceptions, are more notable for their deficiencies of character than for their military effectiveness.

Laelius and, more surprisingly (see 16.4n.), Bibulus receive tributes, though the latter also stands accused of bloodthirstiness; but virtually all the rest of the cast on Pompey's side are variously grasping, boastful, savage, cowardly, incompetent, self-deluding, vindictive, devious, unscrupulous, and selfish. Pompey himself is condemned chiefly by his association with such men. His two utterances (at 18.4 and 86.2-4) reveal nothing worse than lack of judgment and a preoccupation with his own status, faults which though fatal in a leader are otherwise relatively venial. The oblique and muted nature of this attack on Pompey is certainly due to Caesar's past alliance with him. Since the ancients believed that character was a constant, and that apparent changes in an individual's character were merely the revelation of hitherto hidden traits which had always been present, any ascription by Caesar to Pompey of serious defects would reflect badly on himself. The full weight of Caesar's fire is reserved for Scipio, Pompey's new father-in-law, and above all for the deserter Labienus, who had served Caesar for many years in Gaul but could not stomach his assault on Italy. Labienus is made to bear responsibility for breaking off peace negotiations (19.8), killing prisoners who had once been his fellow-soldiers (71.4), and encouraging Pompey in his fatal decision to give battle at Pharsalus (87).

Conversely, Caesar himself appears as something of a paragon. In the very first chapter of this book he stresses the constitutionality of his position and his proper respect for the authority of the Roman people. It is interesting that, now he is consul, with the republic in his charge, he is capable of taking a repressive attitude to a turbulent magistrate like Caelius (20 - 21) which is very different from the one he took when seizing his pretext for war in January 49. Furthermore, his position as consul is emphasised and validated by being recognised by others at intervals through the narrative (e.g. 12.2, 31.4, 106.4). In the campaign in Epirus and Greece, those who support him do so out of goodwill and respect. Only in the case of Metropolis and the Thessalian cities (81) is fear admitted to be a factor. On the purely military side, he is depicted as the perfect general and commander of men (note that he suppresses the awkward fact that his Ninth legion mutinied at Placentia towards the end of 49 B.C., Suet. *Div. Iul.* 69). He is decisive and acts rapidly, whether to cross the Adriatic at an unexpected season or to seize the chance of battle on the spur of the moment at Pharsalus. He preserves his own men from harm, making the difficult landing below the Ceraunian mountains without losing a single life and suffering (so he says) only 230 casualties at Pharsalus. He refuses even to take enemy life unnecessarily (cf. I.72.3), his side even going so far as to rescue men from the sea in a dangerous storm and send them home (27.2). He has the gift of inspiring devotion and obedience in his troops (6.1, 74.2,

91, 95.1, 97.1), who will endure remarkable privations for him (47.5-48). When things go against him, it is not his own deficiencies or miscalculations as a general, nor any superior qualities of his opponents which are responsible, but luck (68-73, I.52.3) or even the excessive enthusiasm of his troops (BG 7.47-52).

His method of writing (for which see Introduction to Books I & II, sec. V) is a powerful instrument in lulling the reader into accepting what he is being told. The style is low-key, factual, rarely embellished. The third-person narration encourages the illusion that Caesar is but an actor in a tale told by a privileged and omniscient observer. Facts presented within this frame, including on occasion the thoughts and behaviour of Caesar's opponents, acquire an aura of objectivity and necessary truth. The very rapidity of the narrative carries the reader along and leaves him no time for reflection. With rare exceptions this narrative breathes sobriety, detachment, and credibility. The syntax is nearly always simple (or at least clear), the vocabulary limited and direct. Such apparent transparency commands belief.

The subject-matter, too, is narrow in range. As in the *Bellum Gallicum*, the vast bulk of the work is concerned with military operations and diplomatic activity. Even an important factor like the desperate shortage of coin (without which the loyalty of legionaries might waver) is mentioned but once (I.39.3-4, cf. Frederiksen 132). The only real exception in this book is the allusion to the crisis of credit brought on in Rome by the civil war, and the resulting attempt by Caelius to challenge Caesar's authority; and even this episode is told not to illustrate the disruption of economic life and the difficulties caused to innocent people by the struggle, but to show that Caesar's solution to the problem, and the behaviour of the competent magistrates who remained loyal to him, were thoroughly appropriate, fair, and satisfactory - or in other words, that he was a fit person to have charge of the state. Otherwise, the enormous concentration on war and diplomacy repeats what we find in the *Bellum Gallicum*. The reason is that neither work pretends to be History. Rather, they are notes (*commentarii*) for others who might wish to write in this grander genre (see Introduction to I & II, 16-17; Wiseman 1979; Gabba 1981). Caesar's concern lies with what he himself achieved in his capacity as proconsul and consul of the Roman people, and it is this feature of his work which has led to the impression that the *Bellum Gallicum* constitutes a species of report to Rome on how he was discharging his responsibilities in his province. The truth goes deeper, of course. The two works are both a claim to, and a justification of, the honours and position their author attained in his society. This surely, and

not lack of full information, is why the doings of others are normally treated in only as much detail as is necessary to make the main narrative intelligible, and why there is a lack of any overall analysis of strategic and political factors (for instance, the degree of support Pompey might have found if he had chosen to return to Italy instead of pursuing Caesar into Thessaly). When the treatment is fuller, as in the accounts of the siege of Massilia and Domitius Calvinus' operations against Scipio on the Haliacmon, other motives than a desire to give complete information may be at work (see 37-38n.).

An apparently glaring exception to this interpretation is the episode of Curio's disaster in Africa (II.23-44). But although at one level this has nothing to do with Caesar (except in so far as it weakened his position, but that is a point on which he offers no comment), at another level it forms an important part of the overall structure of the *Bellum Civile*. Just as both Books I and III exhibit the pattern of an initial success (the invasion of Italy and the start of the Ilerda campaign in I, the crossing of the Adriatic up to the encirclement of Pompey at Dyrrachium in III), followed by a potentially disastrous setback (floods and famine in I, Pompey's break-out and victory in III), resolved by a decisive victory (over Afranius and Petreius in I, over Pompey in III), so does the work as a whole. This is obscured by its fragmentary state, but it is certain that Caesar either planned or more probably actually wrote an account of the disaster which was suffered by C. Antonius on the island of Curicta, off the Illyrian coast, at about the same time that Curio was defeated in Africa (4.2n.). Its loss has done great damage to a proper appreciation of the construction of the *Bellum Civile*. We may assume that this account was fairly detailed (67.5) and would therefore have possessed considerable solidity and narrative interest, perhaps even sufficient to balance that of the Curio episode. If this is so, we find in the articulation of the whole work precisely the same triple structure (success - failure - success) which can be observed giving shape, drama, and movement to the first and third books individually. The function of the story of Curio's disaster, then, is not primarily to tell us what happened in Africa in 49 B.C. It is to provide a contrast, both between Caesar's previous success in Spain and Curio's failure in Africa simply as dramatic elements¹, and between Caesar the true *imperator* who knows how to secure victory (without bloodshed, as it happens) and Curio the false *imperator* (II.26.1n.)

¹ Cf. G. Sifakis, "The structure of Aristophanic comedy", *JHS* 102 (1992), 130: "No interesting tale of any kind (and certainly no narrative type as such) has ever been known to be without a fight or without difficulties and obstacles, which have to be faced and overcome before matters are allowed to rest."

who in spite of excellent qualities squanders his men's lives in unnecessary defeat.

To achieve this effect, Caesar selected his material and placed his emphases most carefully. How carefully, can be judged by comparing the other ancient sources with Caesar and by considering some of the matters ignored by Caesar. This is not the place to embark on a full analysis, but it is apparent that other versions existed of these events, notably the lost history written by Caesar's officer C. Asinius Pollio, and that a very different picture *could* have been constructed. Dio preserves information about the disposition and operation of other forces in Greece, both before and after Pharsalus, and Caesar himself says something on this topic (56, without giving reasons). The mission of Domitius Calvinus to block Scipio on the Haliacmon was of the highest strategic importance, because if Domitius had failed and Scipio had reached Dyrrachium, Caesar would have been unable both to fight him off and at the same time contain Pompey within his ring of fortifications. Yet Caesar, though he goes into some detail in recounting the encounter between Domitius' and Scipio's forces, ignores the strategic aspect. Another crucially important event, as important potentially as the race in Book I between his army and the Pompeians to reach the pass leading to the Ebro valley from the plain of Ilerda, was the successful junction between himself and Antony in the spring after the latter had at last landed in Epirus with reinforcements from Italy (35). It would have been possible for this episode to have been described at length, and conversely for the long account of the siege at Dyrrachium (in which very little actually happens before Pompey's break-out) to have been considerably truncated. Another portion of the campaign which Caesar treats extraordinarily summarily is his march from Apollonia to Aeginium (78-79). He had a defeated, demoralised, and starving army, and needed to take them as fast as he could over the Pindus range into Thessaly; but all we are told about is the lucky chance by which Domitius Calvinus, whom it was essential for him to meet, heard where he was when messengers sent by both of them had failed to make contact. We do not even know how long this march took him, though other evidence allows a reasonable guess (84.1n.).

An aspect of Caesar's narrative which allows him to order and emphasise events according to his own wishes is the extreme vagueness (at least by our standards) of his chronological indications. He notes the occasional synchronism, as when the news of Caesar's landing in Epirus reaches Scipio at the precise moment when he is about to plunder the great temple at Ephesus (33.1), but he does this, not to establish the date of Scipio's

departure for Greece, but to claim credit for the preservation of the temple treasures from his rapacious and godless opponent. In another case (14.3), he notes a lucky meeting which saved his fleet from destruction. Here his purpose must be to introduce the idea that mere chance can exert a decisive influence on the fortune of war, an idea which he takes up and uses for his own purposes later in the book (68.1, 70.2, 72.2-4n.). But in general temporal relationships remain ill-defined and by implication unimportant, because the chains of cause and effect set out by Caesar have their own logic of development (see Introduction to Books I & II, 24ff.). They require little more than bare indications of 'before' or 'after' or 'as a result' to keep them in motion. In this book the only chronological data he gives us are that he crossed from Brundisium to the Ceraunian coast on Jan. 4th-5th, that Antony followed 'after many months, when winter was far advanced', that he had problems feeding his soldiers at Dyrrachium because the corn was not yet ripe, and that it was very hot at midday on the day of the battle of Pharsalus. From Roman imperial calendars we know that Pharsalus was fought on August 9th (pre-Julian, corresponding to June 7th Julian), from Plutarch and Pliny that Pompey was murdered on September 28th, and from the Epitome of Livy that Caesar arrived at Alexandria on October 2nd. Otherwise all is uncertain, not helped by Suetonius' assertion (*Divus Iulius* 35.1) that Pompey was besieged at Dyrrachium for virtually four months - a statement not possible to reconcile with any remotely plausible assumptions about the date of the end of winter on the Dalmatian coast and the time it would take for Caesar's army to march from Apollonia over the Pindus to Aeginium (see 84.1n.). It is worth noting that Caesar is equally imprecise about the invasion of Italy early in 49, and it is only because we have Cicero's very full correspondence of the time that we can see the extent and effects of Caesar's economy with the truth. If we possessed a contemporary source of like quality to Cicero (whose preserved letters from 48 B.C. are few and relatively uninformative), we might perhaps discover that this chronological vagueness on Caesar's part hides, as it did in Book I (11.4n.), a more serious reshaping of relationships between events than there is any reason to believe at the moment.

What are we to make, then, of Caesar the writer? He was, of course, an apologist, as any man who had committed the act of leading his country's soldiers against his country would have to be. He employed the genre of the *commentarius* (of which we have no other examples, and therefore no idea of Caesar's originality in using it) to deadly effect, so that modern historians of the ancient world have tended to accept his characterisation of his opponents, and even admire him for what he did. Analysis of the type attempted in this commentary, and brutally practised by Rambaud (1966),

reveals the techniques which he employed to convey his point of view, and the values to which he appealed. As a result we can understand his literary construct better, and see how he shaped it to perform its function. But it is important to remember that Caesar is the earliest Latin historian (to adopt the conventional classification) whose work survives in sufficient quantity and coherence to permit proper appreciation. The Romans already had a tradition, both of historical writing and of personal, partisan memoirs like those of Sulla (see Introduction to Books I & II, p.17), which is largely inaccessible to us. We do not know what themes were well-worn, what political platitudes and catchwords were commonly deployed. The idea that the existence or creation of the right relationship with his men is an indicator of a commander's worth and fitness permeates the history of Livy, and it would be surprising if in a militaristic society like that of Rome Caesar had been the first to use it. It is also likely that the selection of material deemed worthy of record was strongly influenced by the Roman commemorative tradition, which celebrated above all moral character, elected office, and specific military achievement. Nor should we forget the kind of claims to excellence which were laid before the Roman electorate by candidates for high office in the late Republic.² It is indeed likely that the *Bellum Gallicum*, published most probably in the winter of 52-51 B.C.,³ constitutes a sort of electoral address to the Roman people. The *Bellum Civile* speaks to the same audience, but under different circumstances (which soon changed so radically, as a result of the writer's own actions, that the need to publish simply disappeared). In evaluating such works it is probably wrong to apply, as a sole criterion, the test of truthfulness. How many political documents can stand such scrutiny? We need not expect literal veracity; but on the other hand we should not see Caesar as the thoroughgoing manipulator who emerges from the pages of Rambaud.

There is one matter, though, where Caesar's *bona fides* has to be questioned. This is the sincerity of his desire for peace, professed in the opening chapters of Book I and again in Book III. It looks very much as if his early negotiations in Book I were a delaying tactic (I.11.1n.) and that he was less than honest about the course of the later attempt (I.26.2n.), perhaps to avoid admitting that it was he who was unwilling to make concessions. In Book III, we find Vibullius sent to Pompey with a fair-sounding but disingenuous proposal to refer the dispute to senate and people at Rome

(10). Overlapping with this is a separate channel of negotiation opened through Libo, which foundered on Caesar's purely military calculation that the truce which would be necessary offered more immediate advantage to his enemies than to himself. It may be significant that he does not see fit to reply to the substance of Libo's points (17.1). There was another attempt to negotiate at the River Apsus (19), and again Caesar leaves us in the dark, in this case as to what was proposed by whom, and where the responsibility lay for the violent end to the parley. Throughout, one has the strong impression that he was willing to settle only on his own terms. The same may have been true of Pompey, indeed probably was. Of such stuff are civil wars made. But the point remains, that here Caesar is almost certainly guilty of real misrepresentation in a matter which was fundamental to his position.

But to conclude more generously: Caesar was undoubtedly a great general, though perhaps not as great as he would have us believe. His real gifts as a commander lay not so much in his tactical opportunism, which could be ill-judged, as in his speed of decision-making and execution and his power of handling his men and inspiring them to astonishing feats of labour and endurance. The picture he has left of his own abilities in this area is persuasive and masterly, and is witness to his equally great talents as a writer. For all the fundamental self-centredness of the account, it has drama, rapidity, passion, and structure. One only needs to turn to his continuators to realise the gulf between artistry and mere competence.

² cf. Cicero, *pro Murena*, 30: 'There are two skills which men may look for in holders of the highest office. One is the general's, the other the orator's. The latter protects the trappings of peace, the former keeps at bay the dangers of war.'

³ See Rambaud 1966, 8-12, for discussion of whether the *BG* was published in separate books or all at once.

THE TEXT

The Latin text has been constituted anew for this edition, on the basis of the readings, as given in Fabre's *apparatus criticus*, of the five principal MSS listed below (on which see V. Brown, *The Textual Transmission of Caesar's Civil War*, Leiden 1972). The reasons, explained more fully in the Introduction to Books I & II, pp. 28-29, are the evidently corrupt state of the single archetype of the *Bellum Civile* which lies behind all five of these MSS, and the lack of any wholly satisfactory modern 'standard' text. It is an indication of the unreliability of the transmission of this work that the present edition contains no fewer than eleven apparently new (and I hope well-justified) conjectures or corrections. These, all discussed in the commentary, are:

1.1	<i>del.</i> Caesar	56(55).4	<i>qui pro</i> Calenus
15.6	Staius	67.5	Pullieno
17.6	rationem	69.1	<i>trsp. re, del.</i> et
32.3	<i>del.</i> cum imperio	69.3	<i>del.</i> X pedum
39.1	<M.> <i>pro</i> <M'.>	99.3	<i>lacuna</i>
56(55).2	<i>add.</i> Fufium		

The selective *apparatus criticus* given here has two purposes: to indicate where the text as printed relies (except in matters of orthography or straightforward correction) on modern conjecture as opposed to the consensus of the MSS, and to present the evidence where the MSS disagree and the choice of reading, or of an emendation, is a matter of dispute or interest. Many passages have been discussed in the Commentary (*v.* Index II, *s.v.* MSS). Emendations have been ascribed to their original authors as reported in the editions listed in the Bibliography or in H. Meusel's *Tabula Coniecturarum*, which appears as an Appendix to his *Lexicon Caesarianum* (Berlin 1887-1893), and lists all conjectures known to him at that date. Further information can be sought in the British Museum Catalogue of Printed Books (for published editions) and in the standard classical bibliographies of J. A. Fabricius (1697); W. Engelmann & E. Preuss, (Leipzig 1882, works from 1700 to 1878); R. Klusmann (Leipzig 1912, works from 1878 to 1896); S. Lambrino (Paris 1951, works from 1896 to 1914); J. Marouzeau (Paris 1927, works from 1914 to 1924); and the volumes of *L'Année Philologique* subsequently. The 12th edition of Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel (see Bibliography) is useful not only for Meusel's critical appendix but also for Oppermann's addenda, including both a review of relevant work between the 11th edition (1906) and 1959, and a table showing where any of

Meusel, Fabre, Klotz, and X (= my Ω , the consensus of the MSS) differ from the rest.

The following designations and editing conventions have been used in this volume:

Manuscripts and Sigla

- S Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Ashburnhamensis 33. Mid tenth century; probably French. Some quaternions out of place.
- M Location as S, Plut. lat. 68.8. Tenth/eleventh century, parts written in the twelfth, with twelfth-century and humanistic corrections; probably Italian. Lacks the first 33 chapters of Book I.
- U Rome, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3324. Eleventh/twelfth century; probably French. Contemporary corrections and marginalia.
- T Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Lat. 5764. Second half of the eleventh century; probably French. Some contemporary corrections.
- V Vienna, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, 95. First half of the twelfth century; perhaps written at Trier. Some contemporary corrections.
- Ω Consensus of SMUTV
- B Consensus of the first hands of MUTV
- Σ Any later MSS
- ed. pr.* First printed edition, Rome 1469 (G. A. Bussi)

Editing conventions

- * indicates suspected corruption in the Latin text (replaces obelus).
- < > enclose additions to the transmitted text (shown by *italics* in the translation).
- [] or { }, normally used to enclose text considered to be spurious, have not been employed. Instead, the offending words have been removed and the fact noted in the *apparatus criticus*.

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Abbreviations

- ANRW *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*
(ed. H. Temporini)
- BC C. Julius Caesar, *Bellum Civile*
- BCH *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*
- BG C. Julius Caesar, *Bellum Gallicum*
- CIL *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*
- HS sestertius (Roman monetary unit of account)
- HSCP *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
- ILLRP *Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae*, ed. A. Degrassi
(2v., Florence, 1965, 1963)
- ILS *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, ed. H. Dessau (Berlin, 1892-1916)
- Ist. Mitt. *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archaeologischen Instituts*
(Istanbuler Abteilung)
- JRS *Journal of Roman Studies*
- K.-H.-M. [Kraner-Hofmann-Meusel, see Editions]
- MRR T. R. S. Broughton, *Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (2v. & Suppl., New York, 1951-60)
- n. note
- OGIS *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*, ed. W. Dittenberger
- OLD *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed. P. G. W. Glare (Oxford, 1982)
- RE *Realencyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, by
A. Pauly, ed. G. Wissowa (Stuttgart, 1893-)
- SIG *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, ed. W. Dittenberger (3rd. ed., 1915-24)

THE CIVIL WAR III

de Bello Civili

C IVLI CAESARIS
DE BELLO CIVILI

LIBER TERTIUS

1. Dictatore habente comitia Caesare consules creantur <C.> Iulius et P. Servilius; is enim erat annus, quo per leges ei consulem fieri liceret. ² his rebus confectis, cum fides tota Italia esset angustior, neque creditae pecuniae solverentur, constituit ut arbitri darentur; per eos fierent aestimationes possessionum et rerum, quanti quaeque earum ante bellum fuisset, atque eae creditoribus traderentur. ³ hoc et ad timorem novarum tabularum tollendum minuendumve, qui fere bella et civiles dissensiones sequi consuevit, et ad debitorum tuendam existimationem esse aptissimum existimavit. ⁴ item praetoribus tribunisque plebis rogationes ad populum ferentibus nonnullos ambitus Pompeia lege damnatos illis temporibus, quibus in urbe praesidia legionum Pompeius habuerat, quae iudicia aliis audientibus iudiciis, aliis sententiam ferentibus singulis diebus erant perfecta, in integrum restituit, qui se illi initio civilis belli obtulerant, si sua opera in bello uti vellet, proinde aestimans ac si usus esset, quoniam sui fecissent potestatem. ⁵ statuerat enim prius hos iudicio populi debere restitui quam suo beneficio videri receptos, ne aut ingratus in referenda gratia aut arrogans in praeripiendo populi beneficio videretur.

2. His rebus et feriis Latinis comitiisque omnibus perficiendis xi dies tribuit dictaturaque se abdicat et ab urbe proficiscitur Brundisiumque pervenit. ² eo legiones xii, equitatum omnem venire

¹ C. Iulius scripsi : Iulius Caesar Ω : C. Iulius Caesar H. J. Müller : ipse Caesar Sauppe

³ minuendumve Dübner : minuendumque Ω

⁴ initio Vascosan : inotio SU : inocio TV : hotio M¹ : otio M²

CAESAR
THE CIVIL WAR

BOOK THREE

1. In his capacity as dictator Caesar held the elections, at which *Gaius* Julius and *Publius* Servilius were elected consuls; this being the year when he was legally permitted to become consul. ² When this business had been completed, he decided to appoint assessors, since credit had become difficult all over Italy and debts were not being paid; they were to make valuations of landed and other property at the prices ruling for individual items before the war, and such property was to be handed over to creditors. ³ He thought this would be the most appropriate measure, both to remove or reduce the fear of a general cancellation of debts, and to protect the value of debtors' assets. ⁴ Also, by means of legislation brought before the people by praetors and tribunes he restored their property in full to some who had been condemned under Pompey's law on electoral corruption at the time that Pompey had legionary forces in the city and trials were being completed each in a single day, with one set of jurors to hear the case and a different set to give the verdict. At the outbreak of the civil war the victims had offered their services to Caesar if he wished to avail himself of them, something which he valued in exactly the same way as if he had taken up the offer, since they had put themselves at his disposal. ⁵ He acted in this way because he had decided that these persons ought to receive restitution by decision of the Roman people before being perceived as restored by his own favour, so that he would not seem either churlish in repaying a kindness or arrogant in usurping the favour of the people.

2. He spent eleven days on this business and on completing all the elections and the celebration of the Latin Festival before abdicating from the dictatorship and travelling from Rome to Brundisium. ² He

iusserat. sed tantum navium repperit ut anguste xx milia legionariorum militum, et equites transportari possent. hoc unum Caesari ad celeritatem conficiendi belli defuit. ³ atque eae ipsae copiae hoc infrequentiores imponuntur, quod multi Galli tot bellis defecerant, longumque iter ex Hispania magnum numerum deminuerat, et gravis autumnus in Apulia circumque Brundisium ex saluberrimis Galliae et Hispaniae regionibus omnem exercitum valetudine temptaverat.

3. Pompeius annum spatium ad comparandas copias nactus, quod vacuum a bello atque ab hoste otiosum fuerat, magnam ex Asia Cycladibusque insulis, Corcyra, Athenis, Ponto, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenice, Aegypto classem coegerat, magnam omnibus locis aedificandam curaverat, ² magnam imperatam Asiae, Syriae, regibusque omnibus et dynastis et tetrarchis et liberis Achaiae populis pecuniam exegerat, magnam societates earum provinciarum quas ipse obtinebat sibi numerare coegerat.

4. Legiones effecerat civium Romanorum viii: v ex Italia quas traduxerat; unam ex Cilicia veteranam, quam factam ex duabus gemellam appellabat; unam ex Creta et Macedonia ex veteranis militibus, qui dimissi a superioribus imperatoribus in his provinciis consederant; duas ex Asia, quas Lentulus consul conscribendas curaverat. ² praeterea magnum numerum ex Thessalia Boeotia Achaia Epiroque supplementi nomine in legiones distribuerat; his Antonianos milites admiscuerat. ³ praeter has exspectabat cum Scipione ex Syria legiones ii. sagittarios Creta, Lacedaemone, ex Ponto atque Syria reliquisque civitatibus iii milia numero habebat, funditorum cohortes sexcenarias ii, equitum vii milia. ex quibus de Gallos Deiotarus adduxerat, et Ariobarzanes ex Cappadocia; ad eundem numerum Cotys ex Thracia dederat et Sadalam filium miserat; ⁴ ex Macedonia cc erant, quibus Rhascypolis praeerat, excellenti virtute; et ex Gabinianis Alexandria, Gallos Germanosque, quos ibi A. Gabinius praesidii causa apud regem Ptolomaeum

had given orders for twelve legions and all his cavalry to assemble there. But he found only as many ships as would permit the tightly packed transport of twenty thousand legionaries and five hundred cavalry. This was the one resource Caesar lacked to finish the war rapidly. ³ Also the military units themselves were under strength at embarkation, since many of the Gauls had deserted from the frequency of campaigning, the long march from Spain had reduced numbers greatly, and the oppressive autumn in Apulia and around Brundisium, coming after the healthiness of the countries of Gaul and Spain, had spread sickness throughout the whole army.

3. Pompey, who had gained the space of a year free from war to gather forces undisturbed by any enemy, had assembled a great fleet from Asia, the Cycladic islands, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, had arranged for another great fleet to be built in all sorts of places, ² had extracted the large amount of money which he demanded from Asia, from Syria, from all the kings, dynasts, and tetrarchs, and from the free communities of Achaia, and had forced the tax companies of the provinces which he himself held to pay him a vast sum.

4. He had put together nine legions of Roman citizens: five which he had brought over from Italy; a veteran one from Cilicia, which was formed from two and called 'twin' by him; one from Crete and Macedonia, composed of individual veterans who had been discharged by previous commanders and settled in these provinces; and two from Asia, raised by the consul Lentulus. ² In addition he had distributed amongst the legions, by way of reinforcement, a large number of men from Thessaly, Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus; with these he had mixed the soldiers who had been serving with Antonius. ³ On top of these he was expecting two legions from Syria with Scipio. He had archers from Crete, Sparta, Pontus, Syria, and the rest of the states to the number of 3,000, two 600-strong cohorts of slingers, and 7,000 cavalry. Of the latter, Deiotarus had brought 600 Gauls, and Ariobarzanes 500 from Cappadocia; Cotys had supplied the same number from Thrace and had sent his son Sadalas; ⁴ from Macedonia there were 200 under Rhascypolis, excellent men; from Alexandria Pompey's son had brought with his fleet 500 Gauls and Germans of the 'Gabinians', the troops Aulus Gabinius had left there as a garrison

2 ² xx milia Σ : xv milia Ω : xxv milia *Glandorp* | transportari *Vascosan* : transportare Ω | equites Σ : milites Ω | unum Caesari *Chacon* : unum inopia navium Caesari Ω

3 ¹ annum *M¹TV* : annum *S* : anni *M²*

4 ¹ Cilicia *Chacon* : Sicilia Ω

² Epiro *M²V* : Epiros *SM¹UT*

³ Gallos *B* : Gallus *S* | Cotys *Chacon* : Cotus Ω | Sadalam *Nic. Heinze* : Sasalam Ω

reliquerat, Pompeius filius cum classe adduxerat; dccc ex servis suis pastorumque suorum <numero> coegerat; ⁵ccc Tarcondarius Castor et Domnilaus ex Gallograecia dederant (horum alter una venerat, alter filium miserat); cc ex Syria a Commageno Antiocho, cui magna Pompeius praemia tribuit, missi erant, in his plerique hippotoxotae. ⁶huc Dardanos, Bessos partim mercennarios, partim imperio aut gratia comparatos, item Macedones, Thessalos ac reliquarum gentium et civitatum adiecerat atque eum quem supra demonstravimus numerum expleverat.

5. Frumenti vim maximam ex Thessalia Asia Aegypto Creta Cyrenis reliquisque regionibus comparaverat. ²hiemare Dyrrachii, Apolloniae omnibusque oppidis maritimis constituerat, ut mare transire Caesarem prohiberet, eiusque rei causa omni ora maritima classem disposuerat. ³praeerat Aegyptiis navibus Pompeius filius, Asiaticis D. Laelius et C. Triarius, Syriacis C. Cassius, Rhodiis C. Marcellus cum C. Coponio, Liburnicae atque Achaicae classi Scribonius Libo et M. Octavius. ⁴toti tamen officio maritimo M. Bibulus praepositus cuncta administrabat; ad hunc summa imperii respiciebat.

6. Caesar ut Brundisium venit, contionatus apud milites, quoniam prope ad finem laborum ac periculorum esset perventum, aequo animo mancipia atque impedimenta in Italia relinquerent, ipsi expediti naves conscenderent, quo maior numerus militum posset imponi, omniaque ex victoria et ex sua liberalitate sperarent, conclamantibus omnibus, imperaret quod vellet, quodcumque imperavisset, se aequo animo esse facturos, n. Nonas Ianuarias naves solvit. ²impositae, ut supra demonstratum est, legiones vii. ³postridie terram attigit. Cerauniorum saxa inter et alia loca periculosa quietam nactus stationem et portus omnes timens, quod teneri ab adversariis arbitrabatur, ad eum locum qui appellabatur Palaeste, omnibus navibus ad unam incolumibus milites exposuit.

7. Erat Orici Lucretius Vespillo et Minucius Rufus cum Asiaticis navibus xviii, quibus iussu D. Laelii praeerant, M. Bibulus cum

⁴ Rhaseopolis *edd.*: Rascip- Ω | numero *add.* Clarke

⁵ ³ Coponio *Glandorp*: Pomponio Ω

⁶ ³ Cerauniorum *Vettori*: Germaniorum STV : Germaniorum MU | arbitrabatur M²: arbitrabantur Ω | Palaeste *Glandorp* (cf. *Lucan* 5.460): Pharsalia Ω

⁷ ¹ praecerant *Manuzio*: praecerat Ω

with King Ptolemy; he himself had conscripted 800 from his slaves and his *body of* shepherds; ⁵300 had been given by Tarcondarius Castor and Domnilaus from Galatia - of whom the one had come in person, the other had sent his son - ; 200, most of them mounted archers, had been sent from Syria by Antiochus of Commagene, whom Pompey rewarded generously. ⁶To these he had added Dardani and Bessi who were partly mercenaries and partly ordered or cajoled into service, likewise Macedonians, Thessalians, and men belonging to other tribes and states, and so had reached the number mentioned above.

5. He had gathered a very large quantity of grain from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and the other regions. ²He had decided to winter at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and all the coastal towns, to prevent Caesar from crossing the sea, and for that reason had disposed his fleet all along the sea coast. ³The Egyptian ships were commanded by Pompey's son, those from Asia by Decimus Laelius and Gaius Triarius, those from Syria by Gaius Cassius, those from Rhodes by Gaius Marcellus assisted by Gaius Coponius, and the Liburnian and Achaean fleet by Scribonius Libo and Marcus Octavius. ⁴But it was Marcus Bibulus who was placed in charge of naval matters and directed everything; in him was vested supreme authority.

6. When Caesar arrived at Brundisium, he addressed the soldiers, saying that as they had almost reached the end of their toils and dangers, they should be happy to leave their slaves and personal belongings in Italy and embark without baggage, to allow a greater number of troops to be carried, and place all their hopes in victory and in his generosity. They all shouted that he should give what orders he liked and they would gladly carry out these orders, and on January 4th he set sail. ²Seven legions, as stated above, were embarked. ³On the next day he made his landfall. Between the rocks of the Ceraunian range and other dangers he found a sheltered anchorage, and because he mistrusted all the harbours, believing them to be held by his opponents, he disembarked his soldiers at a place called Palaeste without the loss of a single ship.

7. At Oricum were stationed Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus with 18 of the Asian ships, placed under their command on Decimus Laelius' orders, and at Corcyra Marcus Bibulus with 110

navibus ex Corcyrae. ² sed neque illi sibi confisi ex portu prodire sunt ausi, cum Caesar omnino XII navis longas praesidio duxisset, in quibus erant constratae IIII, neque Bibulus impeditis navibus dispersisque remigibus satis mature occurrit, quod prius ad continentem visus est Caesar quam rie eius adventu fama omnino in eas regiones perferretur.

8. Expositis militibus naves eadem nocte Brundisium a Caesare remittuntur, ut reliquae legiones equitatusque transportari possent. ² huic officio praepositus erat Fufius Calenus legatus, qui celeritatem in transportandis legionibus adhiberet. sed serius a terra provectae naves neque usae nocturna aura in redeundo offenderunt. ³ Bibulus enim Corcyrae certior factus de adventu Caesaris, sperans alicui se parti onustarum navium occurrere posse inanibus occurrit, et nactus circiter XXX in eas indiligentiae suae ac doloris iracundiam erupit, omnesque incendit eodemque igne nautas dominosque navium interfecit, magnitudine poenae reliquos deterrere sperans. ⁴ hoc confecto negotio a Sasonis ad Orici portum stationes litoraue omnia longe lateque classibus occupavit, custodiisque diligentius dispositis, ipse gravissima hieme in navibus excubans neque ullum laborem aut munus despiciens neque subsidium expectans, si in Caesaris conspectum venire posset,

9. Discessu Libonis ex Illyrico M. Octavius cum iis quas habebat navibus Salonas pervenit. ibi concitatis Dalmatis reliquisque barbaris Issam a Caesaris amicitia avertit. ² conventum Salonis cum neque pollicitationibus neque denuntiatione periculi permovere posset, oppidum oppugnare instituit. est autem oppidum et loci natura et opere <parum> munitum. ³ sed celeriter cives Romani ligneis effectis turribus sese munierunt, et cum essent infirmi ad resistendum propter paucitatem hominum crebris confecti vulneribus, ad extremum auxilium descenderunt servosque omnes puberes liberaverunt et praeseclis omnium mulierum crinibus tormenta effecerunt. ⁴ quorum cognita sententia Octavius quinque castris oppidum circumdedit atque uno tempore obsidione et

² illi *Jurin* : IIII *MTV* : quattuor *U* : hi *S* | IIII *Orsini* : illi *MU* : ille *STV*

³ indiligentiae *Estienne* : diligentiae *Ω* | iracundiam *Faerno* : iracundia *B* : iracundiae *S* | deterrere *MU* : terreri *TV* : om. *S*

⁴ Orici *Σ* : Corici *MTV* : Coryci *U* : Coricy *S* : Curici *Mommsen* |

conspectum *Vascosan* : complexum *Ω*

⁵ Libonis *Paul* : Liburnarum *Ω*

² opere *Chacon* : colle *Ω* | parum *add. Klotz*

ships. ² The former however lacked confidence and did not dare to come out of port, although Caesar had brought as an escort 12 warships in all, 4 of which had an upper deck; while Bibulus, with his ships encumbered and his rowers dispersed, was late in coming to meet him, because Caesar was sighted at the mainland before any report of his arrival could reach the area.

8. Caesar disembarked his men and sent back the ships the same night to Brundisium, so that the rest of the legions and cavalry could be brought over. ² This task was given to his senior officer Fufius Calenus, with the object of accelerating the ferrying across of the legions. But the ships put out from land rather late, and failing to make use of the night breeze, met with disaster on their way back; ³ Bibulus, who had heard at Corcyra about Caesar's arrival and hoped to succeed in meeting some of the ships while they were loaded, met them empty. He fell in with about thirty and vented on them the anger and resentment produced by his own carelessness. He burnt them all, putting the crews and captains to death in the same blaze, in the hope of deterring the rest by the enormity of the penalty. ⁴ This operation complete, he seized with his squadrons the anchorages and all the shoreline from the port of Sason to that of Oricum, placed guard-ships with considerable care, and himself spent nights on board ship in the most severe winter weather, shirking no labour or duty and waiting for no reinforcement, if only he could sight Caesar ...

9. After Libo's departure from Illyricum, Marcus Octavius reached Salonae with the ships he had with him. There, he stirred up the Dalmatians and the other natives and detached Issa from its loyalty to Caesar. ² At Salonae, he could make no impression on the association of Roman citizens, whether by promises or threats, and started to attack the town (which is *inadequately* protected by the nature of its position and by a fortification). ³ But the Roman citizens quickly defended themselves by constructing wooden towers, and since their resistance was weak because of their lack of numbers, and they were enfeebled by the many wounds they suffered, they adopted their last resort, setting free all the adult slaves and cutting off the hair of all the women to make artillery. ⁴ When he discovered their decision, Octavius surrounded the town with five camps and began simultaneously to besiege them and to attack. ⁵ They were prepared

oppugnationibus eos premere coepit. ⁵ illi omnia perpeti parati maxime a re frumentaria laborabant. cui rei missis ad Caesarem legatis auxilium ab eo petebant; reliqua, ut poterant, incommoda per se sustinebant. ⁶ et longo interposito spatio cum diuturnitas oppugnationis neglegentiores Octavianos effecisset, nacti occasionem meridiani temporis discessu eorum pueris mulieribusque in muro dispositis, nequid cotidiana consuetudinis desideraretur, ipsi manu facta cum iis quos nuper maxime liberaverant, in proxima Octavi castra irruerunt. ⁷ his expugnatis eodem impetu altera sunt adorti, inde tertia et quarta et deinceps reliqua, omnibusque eos castris expulerunt et magno numero interfecto reliquos atque ipsum Octavium in naves confugere coegerunt. hic fuit oppugnationis exitus. ⁸ iamque hiems appropinquabat, et tantis detrimentis acceptis Octavius desperata expugnatione oppidi Dyrrachium sese ad Pompeium recepit.

10. Demonstravimus L. Vibullium Rufum, Pompei praefectum, bis in potestatem pervenisse Caesaris atque ab eo esse dimissum, semel ad Corfinium, iterum in Hispania. ² hunc pro suis beneficiis Caesar idoneum iudicaverat, quem cum mandatis ad Cn. Pompeium mitteret, eundemque apud Cn. Pompeium auctoritatem habere intellegebat. ³ erat autem haec summa mandatorum: debere utrumque pertinaciae finem facere et ab armis discedere neque amplius fortunam periclitari. ⁴ satis esse magna utrimque incommoda accepta, quae pro disciplina et praeceptis habere possent, ut reliquos casus timerent: ⁵ illum Italia expulsum amissa Sicilia et Sardinia duabusque Hispaniis et cohortibus <in> Italia atque Hispania civium Romanorum c atque xxx, <se> morte Curionis et detrimento Africani exercitus et Antoni militumque deditione ad Curictam. ⁶ proinde sibi ac rei publicae parcerent, <cum> quantum in bello fortuna posset, iam ipsi incommodis suis satis essent documento. ⁷ hoc unum esse tempus de pace agendi, dum sibi uterque confideret et pares ambo viderentur; si vero alteri paulum modo tribuisset fortuna, non esse usurum condicionibus pacis eum, qui superior videretur, neque fore aequa parte contentum, qui se omnia

to endure every kind of hardship, but were particularly short of grain supplies. On this score they sent a delegation to Caesar asking for help, and put up with their other difficulties in whatever way they could. ⁶ After a long time, when the protracted siege had made Octavius' men rather careless, the besieged took advantage of the midday lull. When their enemies went off duty, they stationed women and children on the walls so as not to make any break with their daily routine, formed themselves into a body with those they had so recently freed, and burst into Octavius' nearest camp. ⁷ They took this and swept on to the next, then to the third and fourth and so to the remaining camp, driving their opponents out from all of them with great loss of life, and forcing the rest, along with Octavius himself, to flee to the ships. This marked the end of the attack on the town. ⁸ Winter was now approaching, and Octavius, despairing after such losses of taking it, withdrew to Pompey at Dyrrachium.

10. We have explained that Lucius Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's, was twice released by Caesar after falling into his hands, once at Corfinium and a second time in Spain. ² On account of the favours he had done him, Caesar thought him a suitable person to send with proposals to Pompey, and he knew that Vibullius carried weight with Pompey. ³ The essence of the proposals was that both of them ought to put an end to their obstinate behaviour and abandon armed struggle and not risk their luck any further. ⁴ It was enough that great losses had been incurred on both sides, which could be read as a lesson and a warning to be afraid of further misfortunes: ⁵ Pompey had been driven out of Italy and lost Sicily and Sardinia, the two Spanish provinces, and 130 cohorts of Roman citizens in Italy and Spain, while Caesar himself had suffered the death of Curio and disaster to his African army, and the surrender of Antonius and his troops at Curicta. ⁶ Accordingly they should have mercy on themselves and their country, because thanks to their reverses they were in their own persons an adequate proof of how great the power of fortune was in war. ⁷ This was the one time to negotiate peace, while they were each confident and appeared to be equally matched; but if fortune tilted even slightly towards one of them, the one who seemed to hold the advantage would have no interest in a negotiated

⁵ cui rei missis *Nipperdey* : cui remis sis S : qui remissis B

⁸ acceptis U : receptis *SMTV* | expugnatione *Vascosan* : oppugnatione Ω
10 ⁵ in *add. Vascosan* | se Σ | et Antoni *Menge* : tanto Ω

⁶ cum *add. Nipperdey*

habiturum confideret. ⁸ condiciones pacis quoniam antea convenire non potuissent, Romae ab senatu et a populo peti debere; ⁹ interesse id rei publicae et ipsis placere oportere. si uterque in contione statim iuravisset se triduo proximo exercitum dimissurum, ¹⁰ depositis armis auxiliisque quibus nunc confiderent, necessario populi senatusque iudicio fore utrumque contentum. ¹¹ haec quo facilius Pompeio probari possent, * *omnes suas terrestres ubicumque copias dimissurum*

11. Vibullius his expositis non minus necessarium esse existimavit de repentino adventu Caesaris Pompeium fieri certiore, uti ad id consilium capere posset, ante quam de mandatis agi inciperetur, atque ideo continuato nocte ac die itinere atque omnibus oppidis anitatis ad celeritatem iumentis ad Pompeium contendit, ut adesse Caesarem nuntiaret. ² Pompeius erat eo tempore in Candavia iterque ex Macedonia in hiberna Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque habebat. sed re nova perturbatus maioribus itineribus Apolloniam petere coepit, ne Caesar orae maritimae civitates occuparet. at ille expositis militibus eodem die Oricum proficiscitur. ³ quo cum venisset, L. Torquatus, qui iussu Pompei oppido praeerat praesidiumque ibi Parthinorum habebat, conatus portis clausis oppidum defendere, ⁴ cum Graecos murum ascendere atque arma capere iuberet, illi autem se contra imperium populi Romani pugnatos negarent, oppidani autem etiam sua sponte Caesarem recipere conarentur, desperatis omnibus auxiliis portas aperuit et se atque oppidum Caesari dedit incolumisque ab eo conservatus est.

12. Recepto Caesar Orico nulla interposita mora Apolloniam proficiscitur. eius adventu audito L. Staberius, qui ibi praeerat, aquam comportare in arcem atque eam munire obsidesque ab Apolloniatis exigere coepit. ² illi vero daturos se negare neque portas consuli praeclusuros neque sibi iudicium sumpturos contra atque omnis Italia populusque Romanus iudicavisset. ³ quorum cognita voluntate clam profugit Apollonia Staberius. illi ad Caesarem

peace, and the one who believed that he was about to take the whole would not be content with a fair share. ⁸ Because they had previously been unable to agree peace terms, these ought to be sought from senate and people at Rome; ⁹ this was in the common interest, and was a course of action which they ought to approve. If each of them were immediately to swear on oath in a public assembly that he would dismiss his army within the next three days, ¹⁰ then when they had laid aside their arms and the support in which they now placed their hopes, they would both have to be content with the verdict of people and senate. ¹¹ To make this proposal more acceptable to Pompey

11. After receiving these instructions, Vibullius considered it of equal importance that Pompey should be informed of Caesar's sudden arrival, so that he could plan for that before negotiations began on the proposals he carried, and he therefore hurried to Pompey to tell him that Caesar was present, not breaking his journey either by night or by day and changing his animals at every town for greater speed. ² Pompey was at that time in Candavia and was on his way from Macedonia to winter quarters in Apollonia and Dyrrachium. Disturbed by the new turn of events, he began to make for Apollonia by forced marches, to stop Caesar seizing the coastal communities. However the latter, after landing his men, set out the same day for Oricum. ³ When he reached it, Lucius Torquatus, to whom Pompey had given charge of the town with a garrison of Parthini, shut the gates and attempted to defend it; ⁴ but when the Greeks were ordered by him to go up on the walls and arm themselves, they declared that they would not fight against the legitimate authority of the Roman people, and as in addition the townspeople were trying of their own accord to admit Caesar, Torquatus, despairing of any help, opened the gates and surrendered himself and the town to Caesar, who spared him unharmed.

12. After taking Oricum, Caesar immediately set out for Apollonia. When Lucius Staberius, who was in command there, heard the news of his approach, he began to carry water up to the citadel and put it in a state of defence and require hostages from the Apollonians. ² But they said they would not give them, nor close their gates against a consul, nor take a decision that went against the judgment of all Italy and the Roman people. ³ On learning their inclinations, Staberius fled secretly from Apollonia, and they sent a

⁹ interesse id rei p. Menge (id interesse Madvig): interea et rei p. Ω : interea e re publica esse Hoffmann :: interpunxi secundum Madvig, ceteris scribentibus ... oportere, si dimissurum. depositis ...

¹¹ totam sententiam del. Hug, lacunam statuit Klotz : vide n. | ubicumque Pluygers : urbiumque Ω

¹¹ ¹ expositis non Nipperdey (cf. Plut. Pomp. 65.3) : expositis Corcyrae non Ω | oppidis Lipse : copiis Ω

¹² ² Italia p.r. iudicavisset Ω

legatos mittunt oppidoque recipiunt. ⁴ hos sequuntur Byllidenses, Amantini et reliquae finitimae civitates totaque Epirus, et legatis ad Caesarem missis quae imperaret facturos pollicentur.

13. At Pompeius cognitis his rebus, quae erant Orici atque Apolloniae gestae, Dyrrachio timens diurnis eo nocturnisque itineribus contendit. ² simul Caesar appropinquare dicebatur, tantusque terror incidit eius exercitui, quod properans noctem die coniunxerat neque iter intermisit, ut paene omnes ex Epiro finitimisque regionibus signa relinquerent, complures arma proicerent, ac fugae simile iter videretur. ³ sed cum prope Dyrrachium Pompeius constitisset castraque metari iussisset, perterritus etiam tum exercitu princeps Labienus procedit iuratque se eum non deserturum eundemque casum subiturum, quemcumque ei fortuna tribuisset. ⁴ hoc idem reliqui iurant legati; hos tribuni militum centurionesque sequuntur, atque idem omnis exercitus iurat. ⁵ Caesar praeoccupato itinere ad Dyrrachium finem properandi facit castraque ad flumen Apsum ponit in finibus Apolloniatis, ut bene merita civitates tutae essent praesidio, ibique reliquarum ex Italia legionum adventum expectare et sub pellibus hiemare constituit. ⁶ hoc idem Pompeius fecit et trans flumen Apsum positus castris eo copias omnes auxiliaque conduxit.

14. Calenus legionibus equitibusque Brundisii in naves impositis, ut erat praeceptum a Caesare, quantam navium facultatem habebat, naves solvit, paulumque a portu progressus litteras a Caesare accepit, quibus est certior factus portus litoraue oronia classibus adversariorum teneri. ² quo cognito se in portum recipit navesque omnes revocat. Ima ex his, quae perseveravit neque imperio Caleni obtemperavit, quod erat sine militibus privatoque consilio administrabatur, delata Oricum atque a Bibulo expugnata est; ³ qui de servis liberisque omnibus ad impuberes supplicium sumit et ad unum interficit. ita in exiguo tempore magnoque casu totius exercitus salus constitit.

delegation to Caesar and admitted him to the town. ⁴ They were followed by the people of Byllis and Amantia and by the rest of the nearby communities and the whole of Epirus, who sent deputations to Caesar and promised to carry out his orders.

13. Pompey, on the other hand, when he learnt what had happened at Oricum and Apollonia, feared for Dyrrachium and marched by day and night to reach it. ² At the same time Caesar was said to be approaching; and such panic struck his army, because in his haste day and night had become one and he had not broken his march, that almost all the men who came from Epirus and the adjacent areas deserted the colours, a number threw their arms away, and the march resembled a rout. ³ But when Pompey had halted near Dyrrachium and given orders for a camp to be laid out, and the army was still terror-stricken, Labienus came forward and took an oath that he would not desert Pompey and would share with him whatever fate had been allotted him by fortune. ⁴ The other senior officers took the same oath; they were followed by the military tribunes and centurions, and the whole army swore in the same terms. ⁵ Now that his march on Dyrrachium had been forestalled, Caesar stopped hurrying and encamped by the river Apsus on the borders of the territory of Apollonia, so that the communities that deserved well of him should be safely protected, and decided to wait there for the arrival of the rest of his legions from Italy, and spend the winter under canvas. ⁶ Pompey did the same, established his camp on the other side of the Apsus, and brought there all his troops and auxiliaries.

14. In accordance with Caesar's instructions, Calenus embarked as many legions and cavalry at Brundisium as was allowed by the number of ships he had, and put to sea. A little way out from port he received a letter from Caesar telling him that the harbours and all the shoreline were held by the enemy fleets. ² As a result of this information he put back into port and recalled all his ships. One of them, which carried on and refused to obey Calenus' authority, because it had no soldiers on board and was being managed privately, made landfall at Oricum and was attacked and taken by Bibulus, ³ who exacted retribution from all, slave and free, down to mere boys, and put them to death to the last man. Thus the preservation of the army turned on a moment of time and a remarkable chance.

13 ² exercitui Σ : exercitus Ω | ex Jurin : in Ω

⁵ ut bene P. Kayser : ut castellis vigiliisque bene Ω

14 ³ in exiguo SV : exiguo MUT

15. Bibulus, ut supra demonstratum est, erat cum classe ad Oricum, et sicuti mari portibusque Caesarem prohibebat, ita ipse omni terra earum regionum prohibebatur. ² praesidiis enim dispositis omnia litora a Caesare tenebantur, neque lignandi atque aquandi neque naves ad terram religandi potestas fiebat. ³ erat res in magna difficultate, summisque angustiis rerum necessariarum premebantur, adeo ut cogerentur sicuti reliquum commeatum ita ligna atque aquam Corcyra navibus onerariis supportare, ⁴ atque etiam uno tempore accidit ut difficilioribus usi tempestatibus ex pellibus, quibus erant tectae naves, nocturnum excipere rorem cogerentur. ⁵ quas tamen difficultates patienter atque aequo animo ferebant, neque sibi nudanda litora et relinquendos portus existimabant. ⁶ sed cum essent in quibus demonstravi angustiis ac se Libo cum Bibulo coniunxisset, loquuntur ambo ex navibus cum M. Acilio et Staio Murco legatis, quorum alter oppidi muris, alter praesidiis terrestribus praeerat: velle se de maximis rebus cum Caesare loqui, si sibi eius facultas detur. ⁷ huc addunt pauca rei confirmandae causa, ut de compositione acturi viderentur. interim postulant ut sint indutiae, atque ab iis impetrant. magnum enim quod adferebant videbatur, et Caesarem id summe sciebant cupere, et profectum aliquid Vibulli mandatis existimabatur.

16. Caesar eo tempore cum legione una profectus ad recipiendas ultiores civitates et rem frumentariam expediendam, qua anguste utebatur, erat ad Buthrotum oppidum <oppositum> Corcyrae. ² ibi certior ab Acilio et Murco per litteras factus de postulatis Libonis et Bibuli legionem relinquit; ipse Oricum revertitur. ³ eo cum venisset, evocantur illi ad colloquium. prodit Libo atque excusat Bibulum, quod is iracundia summa erat inimicitiasque habebat etiam privatas cum Caesare ex aedilitate et praetura conceptas; ob eam causam colloquium vitasse, ne res maximae spei maximaeque utilitatis eius iracundia impedirentur. ⁴ Pompei summam esse ac fuisse semper voluntatem, ut componeretur atque ab armis discederetur; se potestatem eius rei nullam habere, propterea quod de consilii

15. Bibulus, as mentioned above, was with his fleet off Oricum, and just as he prevented Caesar from having access to the sea and the harbours, was himself prevented from landing anywhere in that area. ² Caesar had stationed guard-posts and controlled all the coast, and there was no possibility of taking on board fuel or water or of tying up to shore. ³ Things were extremely difficult, and they laboured under severe shortages of necessities, to such an extent that they were forced to bring fuel and water, just like the rest of their provisions, in merchantmen from Corcyra; ⁴ and it even happened that on one particular occasion in a period of bad weather they were forced to collect the night dew off the leather awnings with which the ships were covered. ⁵ However they endured these difficulties patiently and in good spirits, and did not think that they ought to leave the coast unguarded or move away from the harbours. ⁶ But as they were in the difficulties I have described, when Libo had joined up with Bibulus, they both spoke from their ships with the senior officers Marcus Acilius and Staius Murcus, of whom one was in command of the town defences, the other of the guard-posts on shore: their message was that they wanted to speak to Caesar on matters of the highest importance, if they could have access to him. ⁷ To this they added a few words to reinforce the impression that their business was to discuss a settlement. Meanwhile they asked for a truce, and were successful in obtaining it from Acilius and Murcus. ⁸ For the proposal seemed important, they knew Caesar passionately desired it, and it was thought that something had come of Vibullius' mission.

16. Caesar had at that point set out with one legion to win over the more distant communities and improve his supplies of grain, which were short, and he was at the town of Buthrotum opposite Corcyra. ² On being informed by letter from Acilius and Murcus of the requests made by Libo and Bibulus, he left the legion and himself returned to Oricum. ³ When he arrived, the other side were summoned to a conference. Libo appeared and made excuses for Bibulus, because the latter was in a state of deep anger and in addition had private grounds for enmity towards Caesar, arising from their aedileship and praetorship; his reason for avoiding the conference was the fear that matters of high hope and great advantage might be obstructed by his anger. ⁴ Libo said that Pompey, both now and previously, had always wanted to reach an agreement and bring an end to armed conflict; they themselves possessed no competence in the matter, because by resolution of council they had

15 ¹ cum *ed.pr.* : om. Ω

⁶ M. Acilio Ω : M'. Acilio Orsini | Staio *secutus sum Münzer (RE, s.v. Staius [2])* : Statio Ω | eius SMU : ei T : om. V

16 ¹ oppositum *add. Oudendorp*

³ atque M², Aldo : neque Ω

⁴ Pompei summam Ω : summam suam *Kraner* : Pompeianis summam *Roscher* | se Bücheler : sed Ω

sententia summam belli rerumque omnium Pompeio permiserint, ⁵sed postulatis Caesaris cognitis missuros ad Pompeium, atque illum reliqua per se acturum hortantibus ipsis. interea manerent indutiae, dum ab illo rediri posset, neve alter alteri noceret. huc addit pauca de causa et de copiis auxiliisque suis.

17. Quibus rebus neque tum respondendum Caesar existimavit, neque nunc, ut memoriae prodatur, satis causae putamus. ²postulabat Caesar, ut legatos sibi ad Pompeium sine periculo mittere liceret idque ipsi fore reciperent aut acceptos per se ad eum perducerent. ³quod ad indutias pertineret, sic belli rationem esse divisam, ut illi classe naves auxiliaque sua impedirent, ipse ut aqua terraque eos prohiberet. ⁴si hoc sibi remitti vellent, remitterent ipsi de maritimis custodiis; si illud tenerent, se quoque id retenturum. nihilominus tamen agi posse de compositione, ut haec non remitterentur, neque hanc rem illi esse impedimento. ⁵Libo neque legatos Caesaris recipere neque periculum praestare eorum, sed totam rem ad Pompeium reicere; unum instare de indutiis vehementissimeque contendere. ⁶quem ubi Caesar intellexit praesentis periculi atque inopiae vitandae causa omnem rationem instituisse, neque ullam spem aut condicionem pacis adferre, ad reliquam cogitationem belli sese recepit.

18. Bibulus multos dies terra prohibitus et graviore morbo ex frigore ac labore implicitus, cum neque curari posset neque susceptum officium deserere vellet, vim morbi sustinere non potuit. ²eo mortuo ad neminem unum summa imperii redit, sed separatim suam quisque classem ad arbitrium suum administrabat. ³Vibullius sedato tumultu, quem repentinus Caesaris adventus concitaverat, ubi primum e re visum est, adhibito Libone et L. Lucceio et Theophane, quibuscum communicare de maximis rebus Pompeius consueverat, de mandatis Caesaris agere instituit. ⁴quem ingressum in sermonem Pompeius interpellavit et loqui plura prohibuit: 'quid mihi' inquit 'aut

allowed Pompey control of the war and of all other matters. ⁵But if they could find out Caesar's demands, they would send them to Pompey, and he would take further action through themselves and on their advice. Meanwhile, the truce should stay in force, until a response could come back from him, and neither side should harm the other. To this he added a few words about the matters at issue and about his troops and auxiliaries.

17. On these topics Caesar thought no reply necessary at the time, nor do we consider there is sufficient reason now to set one down in the record. ²Caesar asked that he be permitted to send a delegation to Pompey under a safe-conduct, and that the other side should themselves accept responsibility for that, or that they should receive the delegates and take them to him. ³As for the truce, the balance of the war was so arranged that they were using their fleet to interfere with his ships and support, while he stopped them obtaining water or coming in to land. ⁴If they wanted some relaxation on this score, they could themselves relax their naval blockade; but if they maintained theirs, he would keep his. He said it was still possible, none the less, to negotiate for an agreement even granted that the blockades were not lifted, and the one was not an obstacle to the other. ⁵Libo would neither receive delegates from Caesar nor guarantee their safety, but referred the whole business to Pompey; the truce was the one point he insisted on and pressed for with every effort. ⁶When Caesar realised that Libo had embarked on the whole scheme to escape from his present danger and shortage of supplies, and was not putting forward any hope or terms of peace, he turned back to considering other plans for the war.

18. Bibulus was kept from landing for many days, and fell seriously ill as a result of the cold and his labours. Lacking medical attention, and unwilling to abandon the task he had undertaken, he was unable to withstand the force of the disease. ²After his death, no-one inherited the overall command, but each operated his own fleet as he thought best. ³When the disturbance caused by Caesar's sudden arrival had subsided, Vibullius chose his moment, summoned Libo and Lucius Lucceius and Theophanes, men with whom Pompey habitually discussed matters of the highest importance, and began to discuss Caesar's proposals. ⁴As he was speaking Pompey interrupted him and forbade him to say any more: 'What use', he said, 'are life or citizen rights to me, if I am seen to enjoy them by Caesar's favour?

17 ⁴ illi esse impedimento. Libo *Madvig* : illis esse impedimenti loco Ω

⁶ omnem orationem Ω, *correx*

18 ³ e re visum est *Elberling* : rursus Ω

vita aut civitate opus est, quam beneficio Caesaris habere videbor? cuius rei opinio tolli non poterit, cum in Italiam, ex qua profectus sum reductus existimabor'. ⁵ bello perfecto ab iis Caesar haec facta cognovit, qui sermoni interfuerunt. conatus tamen nihilominus est aliis rationibus per colloquia de pace agere.

19. Inter bina castra Pompei atque Caesaris unum flumea tantum intererat Apsus, crebraque inter se colloquia milites habebant, neque ullum interim telum per pactiones loquentium traiciebatur. ² mittit P. Vatinius legatum ad ripam ipsam fluminis, qui ea quae maxime ad pacem pertinere viderentur ageret, et crebro magna voce pronuntiaret, liceretne civibus ad cives legatos mittere, quod etiam fugitivis ab saltu Pyrenaeo praedonibusque licuisset, praesertim cum id agerent, ne cives cum civibus armis decertarent. ³ multa suppliciter locutus, ut de sua atque omnium salute debebat, silentioque ab utrisque militibus auditus. ⁴ responsum est ab altera parte A. Varronem profiteri se altera die ad colloquium venturum atque una visurum, quemadmodum tuto legati venire et quae vellent exponere possent; certumque ei rei tempus constituitur. ⁵ quo cum esset postero die ventum, magna utrimque multitudo convenit, magnaue erat expectatio eius rei atque omnium animi intenti esse ad pacem videbantur. ⁶ qua ex frequentia T. Labienus prodit, summissa oratione loqui de pace atque altercari cum Vatinio incipit. ⁷ quorum mediam orationem interrumpunt subito undique tela immissa; quae ille obiectus armis militum vitavit; vulnerantur tamen complures, in his Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, centuriones militesque nonnulli. ⁸ tum Labienus: 'desinite ergo de compositione loqui; nam nobis nisi Caesaris capite relato pax esse nulla potest.'

20. Isdem temporibus M. Caelius Rufus praetor causa debitorum suscepta initio magistratus tribunal suum iuxta C. Treboni, praetoris urbani, sellam collocavit, et siquis appellavisset de aestimatione et de solutionibus, quae per arbitrum fierent, ut Caesar praesens constituerat, fore auxilio pollicebatur. ² sed fiebat aequitate decreti et humanitate Treboni, qui his temporibus clementer et moderate ius

That view will be impossible to change, if ever people think I have been brought back ... to Italy, which I left ...'. ⁵ Caesar discovered this after the end of the war from those who had been present at the conversation. However he still tried by other means to negotiate about peace.

19. Between the two camps of Pompey and Caesar there was only the single stream of the river Apsus; the soldiers frequently talked to each other, and by agreement between the participants no missile was thrown across while they were so engaged. ² Caesar sent Publius Vatinius, one of his senior officers, to the very edge of the river to discuss the questions which were considered to be most important for peace, and to ask over and over again at the top of his voice whether Romans were allowed to send delegates to Romans (a thing permitted even to fugitives from the mountain uplands of the Pyrenees and to pirates), especially when their business was to stop a civil war. ³ He spoke at length, in a pleading fashion, as was right in a matter of life and death for himself and them all, and was heard in silence by both groups of soldiers. ⁴ A reply was made from the other side that Aulus Varro promised to attend a conference the next day and examine with Vatinius how delegates could come in safety and present their demands; and a time was settled for this. ⁵ When the hour came the next day, a great crowd converged from both sides, expectation was high, and everyone's hearts seemed to be set on peace. ⁶ From this crowd Titus Labienus came forward and without raising his voice began to speak about peace, and dispute with Vatinus. ⁷ In the middle of this discussion they were interrupted by missiles suddenly thrown from all directions; Labienus, protected by his soldiers' armour, escaped them, but several people were wounded, amongst them Cornelius Balbus, Marcus Plotius, Lucius Tiburtius, and some centurions and ordinary soldiers. ⁸ Then Labienus said: 'Well then, stop talking about peace; there can be no peace for us unless we get Caesar's head.'

20. During this period Marcus Caelius Rufus, one of the praetors, took up the cause of the debtors; at the beginning of his magistracy he set up his tribunal next to the official seat of Gaius Trebonius, the urban praetor, and promised that he would take up the cases of any who appealed against valuations and payments arrived at by assessors according to the system set up by Caesar when he was in Rome. ² But thanks to the fairness of the decree and the humanity of

⁴ *lacunam susp. Kübler*

19 ² *cives legatos F. Hofmann* : cives de pace duos [duo UT] legatos Ω

20 ² *his add. ed.pr.*

dicendum existimabat, ut reperiri non possent a quibus initium appellandi nasceretur. ³ nam fortasse inopiam excusare et calamitatem aut propriam suam aut temporum queri et difficultates auctionandi proponere etiam mediocris est animi; integras vero tenere possessiones, qui se debere fatebantur, cuius animi aut cuius impudentiae est? ⁴ itaque hoc qui postulare reperiebatur nemo, atque ipsis ad quorum commodum pertinebat durior inventus est Caelius. ⁵ et ab hoc profectus initio, ne frustra ingressus turpem causam videretur, legem promulgavit, ut *sexies seni* die sine usuris creditae pecuniae solvantur.

21. Cum resisteret Servilius consul reliquique magistratus et minus opinione sua efficeret, ad hominum excitanda studia sublata priore lege duas promulgavit, unam, qua mercedes habitationum annuas conductoribus donavit, ² aliam tabularum novarum, impetuque multitudinis in C. Trebonium facto et nonnullis vulneratis eum de tribunali deturbavit. ³ de quibus rebus Servilius consul ad senatum rettulit, senatusque Caelium ab re publica removendum censuit. hoc decreto eum consul senatu prohibuit et contionari conantem de rostris deduxit. ⁴ ille ignominia et dolore permotus palam se proficisci ad Caesarem simulavit; clam nuntiis ad Milonem missis, qui Clodio interfecto eo nomine erat damnatus, atque eo in Italiam evocato, quod magnis muneribus datis gladiatoriae familiae reliquias habebat, sibi coniunxit atque eum in Thurinum ad sollicitandos pastores praemisit. ⁵ ipse cum Casilinum venisset unoque tempore signa eius militaria atque arma Capuae essent comprehensa et familia Neapoli visa quae prodicionem oppidi appareret, patefactis consiliis exclusus Capua et periculum veritus, quod conventus arma ceperat atque eum hostis loco habendum existimabat, consilio destitit atque eo itinere sese avertit.

22. Interim Milo, dimissis circum municipia litteris <se> ea quae faceret iussu atque imperio facere Pompei, quae mandata ad se

Trebonius, who thought that under these circumstances the law ought to be applied with kindness and moderation, it happened that nobody could be found to initiate an appeal. ³ Perhaps to make excuses for poverty and to complain of private or public disaster and to allege the difficulties of selling at auction needs no temperament out of the ordinary; but to expect to keep assets untouched, while admitting debts, what sort of temperament and what sort of effrontery does that require? ⁴ As a result no one was found who was prepared to make such a demand, and Caelius was revealed to be too hard on the very people whose interests were at stake. ⁵ And going on from where he had started, to avoid seeming to have wasted his time backing a discreditable cause, he promulgated a law to permit the repayment of a loan free of interest <on its fifth(?) anniversary>.

21. In face of opposition from the consul Servilius and the rest of the magistrates, Caelius achieved less than he had expected and set about winning popular support by withdrawing the first law and promulgating two others, one giving a year's remission of rent to tenants, ² the other cancelling debts; he also made an attack with a mob on Gaius Trebonius and forced him off his dais, injuring several people. ³ Servilius as consul referred the episode to the senate, which passed a motion suspending Caelius from public duties. On the strength of this decree the consul barred him from the senate and dragged him off the Rostra as he was attempting to address a public meeting. ⁴ Mortified by the disgrace, he made a public pretence of going to Caesar; in private he sent messengers to Milo, who after Clodius' murder had been found guilty of that crime, and summoned him to Italy, because Milo still owned the remnants of a troop of gladiators from the great public shows he had put on. He allied himself with him and sent him ahead to the country around Thurii to win over the shepherds. ⁵ He himself arrived at Casilinum, but when at the same moment military standards of his and weapons were seized at Capua, and the gladiators were seen at Naples making ready for the betrayal of the town, his schemes were revealed. He was shut out of Capua, and fearful of the danger, because the association of Roman citizens had armed themselves and considered they should treat him as an enemy, abandoned his plan and took a different route.

22. Milo, meanwhile, circulated letters around the towns saying that he was acting as he was by Pompey's orders and on Pompey's authority, the instructions having been conveyed to him by Vibullius,

⁵ sexies seni dies B : se exisse ne dies S : sexenni die Manuzio : sexies senis diebus Herzog

21 ⁴ eo nomine Scaliger : eius nomine Ω

⁵ prodicionem Kraner : prodicione Ω | appareret F Hofmann :

appareret SM² : apparere B

22 ¹ se add. Kellerbauer

per Vibullium delata essent, quos ex aere alieno laborare arbitrabatur sollicitabat. ² apud quos cum proficere nihil posset, quibusdam solutis ergastulis Compsam in agro Hirpino oppugnare coepit. eo cum a Q. Pedio praetore cum legione <subventum esset>, lapide ictus ex muro perit. ³ et Caelius, profectus ut dictitabat ad Caesarem, pervenit Thurios, ubi cum quosdam eius municipii sollicitaret equitibusque Caesaris Gallis atque Hispanis, qui eo praesidii causa missi erant, pecuniam polliceretur, ab his est interfectus. ⁴ ita magnarum initia rerum, quae occupatione magistratum et <difficultate> temporum sollicitam Italiam habebant, celerem et facilem exitum habuerunt.

23. Libo profectus ab Oricum cum classe cui praeerat navium l. Brundisium venit insulamque quae contra portum Brundisium est occupavit, quod praestare arbitrabatur unum locum, qua necessarius nostris erat egressus, quam omnia litora ac portus custodia clausos tueri. ² hic repentino adventu naves onerarias quasdam nactus incendit et unam frumento onustam abduxit magnumque nostris terrorem iniecit, et noctu militibus ac sagittariis in terram expositis praesidium equitum deiecit et adeo loci opportunitate profecit, uti ad Pompeium litteras mitteret, naves reliquas, si vellet, subduci et refici iuberet; sua classe auxilia sese Caesaris prohibitorium.

24. Erat eo tempore Antonius Brundisii; <is> virtute militum confisus scaphas navium magnarum circiter lx cratibus pluteisque contextit eoque milites delectos imposuit atque eas in litore pluribus locis separatim disposuit navesque triremes duas, quas Brundisii faciendas curaverat per causam exercendorum remigum, ad faucis portus prodire iussit. ² has cum audacius progressas Libo vidisset, sperans intercipi posse quadriremes v ad eas misit. quae cum navibus nostris propinquassent, nostri veterani in portum refugiebant, illi studio incitati incautius sequebantur. ³ iam ex omnibus partibus subito Antonianae scaphae signo dato se in hostes incitaverunt primoque impetu unam ex his quadriremem cum remigibus

and he tried to gain the support of those he thought were in difficulties with debt. ² When he had no success with them, he broke open some slave quarters and began to attack Compsa in the territory of the Hirpini. When a praetor, Quintus Pedius, *came* with a legion to give assistance, Milo was hit by a stone thrown from the wall, and died. ³ Also Caelius, on his way to Caesar, as he maintained, reached Thurii, where after making approaches to some inhabitants of that community and promising money to Caesar's Gallic and Spanish cavalry who had been sent there to protect it, was killed by the latter. ⁴ Thus the stirrings of a great upheaval, which caused anxiety in Italy on account of the concerns of the magistrates and the problems of the times, came to a speedy and easy end.

23. Libo set out from Oricum with a fleet of fifty ships under his command, and on arriving at Brundisium seized the island which lies off the town's port, because he thought it was better to blockade the single place where our forces had to come out, than the entire shoreline and harbours. ² Thanks to his sudden arrival he fell upon and burnt some merchant ships, captured one laden with grain, and created panic on our side. He landed legionaries and archers at night and forced a garrison of cavalry to decamp, and made such good use of the possibilities of the position that he wrote to Pompey to say that, if he wished, Pompey could give orders for the rest of his ships to be hauled out and repaired: with his fleet he himself would stop reinforcements reaching Caesar.

24. At that time Antonius was at Brundisium; trusting in the courage of his troops, he covered about sixty ship's boats with wickerwork and screens, put picked men in them, and stationed them separately on shore in various places; he also ordered two triremes, which he had had built at Brundisium for rowing practice, to appear at the harbour entrance. ² When Libo saw them come out somewhat recklessly, he despatched four quadriremes towards them in the hope of being able to intercept them. When these got near our ships, our veterans turned round and made for harbour, while the others in their enthusiasm followed too incautiously. ³ Then suddenly, when the signal was given, Antonius' boats headed from every direction for the enemy, and in their first attack captured one of the quadriremes with

² Compsam Davis ... Hirpino Glandorp (cf. Vell. 2.68.3): Cosam ... Turino Ω | subventum esset add. Peskett (in comm.), lacunam statuere edd. plerique

³ praesidii Manuzio: praedicandi M: praedandi SUTV

⁴ difficultate add. Nietsche

23 ¹ omnia Nicaise: omnium Ω

² terram SM: terra UTV

24 ¹ is add. Daehn

defensoribusque suis ceperunt, reliquas turpiter refugere coegerunt. ⁴ad hoc detrimentum accessit, ut equitibus per oram maritimam ab Antonio dispositis aquari prohiberentur. qua necessitate et ignominia permotus Libo discessit a Brundisio obsessionemque nostrorum omisit.

25. Multi iam menses erant et hiems praecipitaverat, neque Brundisio naves legionesque ad Caesarem veniebant. ac nonnullae eius rei praetermissae occasiones Caesari videbantur, quod certi saepe flaverant venti, quibus necessario committendum existimabat. ²quantoque eius amplius processerat temporis, tanto erant alacriores ad custodias qui classibus praecerant, maioremque fiduciam prohibendi habebant, et crebris Pompei litteris castigabantur, quoniam primo venientem Caesarem non prohibuissent, ut reliquos eius exercitus impedirent, duriusque cotidie tempus ad transportandum lenioribus ventis expectabant. ³quibus rebus permotus Caesar Brundisium ad suos severius scripsit, nacti idoneum ventum ne occasionem navigandi dimitterent, si vel ad litora Apolloniaticum cursum dirigere atque eo naves eicere possent. ⁴haec a custodiis classium loca maxime vacabant, quod se longius <a>portibus committere non audebant.

26. Illi adhibita audacia et virtute, administrantibus M. Antonio et Fufio Caleno, multum ipsis militibus hortantibus neque ullum periculum pro salute Caesaris recusantibus, nacti Austrum naves solvunt atque altero die Apolloniam praetervehuntur. ²qui cum essent ex continenti visi, Coponius, qui Dyrrachi classi Rhodiae praerat, naves ex portu educit, et cum iam nostris remissiore vento appropinquasset, idem Auster increbruit nostrisque praesidio fuit. ³neque vero ille ob eam causam conatu desistebat, sed labore et perseverantia nautarum et vim tempestatis superari posse sperabat praetervectosque Dyrrachium magna vi venti nihilo setius sequebatur. ⁴nostri usi fortunae beneficio tamen impetum classis timebant, si forte ventus remisisset. nacti portum, qui appellatur Nymphaeum, ultra Lissum milia passuum III, eo naves introduxerunt (qui portus ab Africo tegebatur, ab Austro non erat tutus) leviusque

25 ¹certi Gronov: certe Ω

³si vel Vascosan: sive Ω | eicere Aldo: eligere SUTV: dirigere eligere M

⁴a add. Vossius | audebant V: auferent SMUT

26 ¹Apolloniam Elberling: Apolloniam Dirrachium (Dy- S) Ω

²appropinquasset Vascosan: appropinquassent Ω

its rowers and marines and forced the others to flee ignominiously. ⁴In addition to this loss, they were prevented from obtaining water because Antonius had stationed cavalry along the shore. Driven by necessity and disgrace, Libo departed from Brundisium and gave up blockading us.

25. Many months had now elapsed and winter was far advanced, and still the ships and legions had not come to Caesar from Brundisium. Now Caesar thought that some chances of crossing had been missed, because the steady winds to which he considered it necessary to trust had often blown. ²And the longer the time had gone on, the more attentive were the fleet commanders to the blockade and the greater their confidence of stopping the reinforcement. They were also admonished by frequent letters from Pompey, to the effect that since they had begun by failing to stop Caesar's arrival, they must obstruct the rest of his army; and they daily expected the weather to be more difficult for crossing, with the lighter winds. ³Disturbed by these considerations, Caesar wrote in fairly stern terms to his officers in Brundisium that when the wind went into the right quarter, they should not let slip the opportunity to sail, if they could manage to hold a course right to the coast of the territory of Apollonia and drive the ships ashore there. ⁴This region was mostly clear of blockading ships, because they did not dare to commit themselves too far from harbour.

26. Under the leadership of Marcus Antonius and Fufius Calenus, Caesar's force found daring and courage. The ordinary soldiers themselves gave strong support and balked at no danger to save Caesar. Getting a south wind they set sail and on the next day were carried past Apollonia. ²When they were sighted from the mainland, Coponius, who was in command of the Rhodian fleet at Dyrrachium, led his ships out of harbour and when he was just closing on ours, with the wind dropping, the same south wind came up again and helped us. ³Not that he desisted on that account from his attempt, but hoped that through the effort and determination of his sailors even the force of the storm could be overcome, and followed the ships regardless when they were swept past Dyrrachium by the gale. ⁴Although they benefited from this stroke of fortune, our people none the less feared an attack by the fleet if the wind were to drop. Reaching a port three miles beyond Lissus by the name of Nymphaeum (a port sheltered from the south-west but open to the

tempestatis quam classis periculum aestimaverunt. ⁵ quo simul atque intro est itum, incredibili felicitate Auster, qui per biduum flaverat, in Africum se vertit.

27. Hic subitam commutationem fortunae videre licuit. qui modo sibi timuerant, hos tutissimus portus recipiebat; qui nostris navibus periculum intulerant, de suo timere cogeantur. ² itaque tempore commutato tempestas et nostros texit et naves Rhodias adflixit, ita ut ad unam omnes constrictae numero xvi eliderentur et naufragio interirent, et ex magno remigum propugnatorumque numero pars ad scopulos allisa interficeretur, pars ab nostris detraheretur, quos omnes conservatos Caesar domum remisit.

28. Nostrae naves duae tardius cursu confecto in noctem coniectae, cum ignorarent, quem locum reliquae cepissent, contra Lissum in ancoris constiterunt. ² has scaphis minoribusque navigiis compluribus summissis Otacilius Crassus, qui Lissi praeerat, expugnare parabat; simul de deditione eorum agebat et incolumitatem deditis pollicebatur. ³ harum altera navis cxxx e legione tironum sustulerat, altera ex veterana paulo minus cc. ⁴ hic cognosci licuit, quantum esset hominibus praesidii in animi firmitudine. tirones enim multitudine navium perterriti et salo nausiaque confecti iureiurando accepto nihil iis nocituros hostes se Otacilio dederunt; qui omnes ad eum producti contra religionem iurisiurandi in eius conspectu crudelissime interficiuntur. ⁵ at veteranae legionis milites, item conflictati et tempestatis et sentinae vitiis, neque ex pristina virtute remittendum aliquid putaverunt, et tractandis condicionibus et simulatione deditionis extracto primo noctis tempore gubernatorem in terram navem eicere cogunt, ⁶ ipsi idoneum locum nacti reliquam noctis partem ibi confecerunt et luce prima missis ad eos ab Otacilio equitibus, qui eam partem orae maritimae adservabant, circiter cccc, quique eos armati ex praesidio secuti sunt, se defenderunt et nonnullis eorum interfectis incolumes se ad nostros receperunt.

south), they put their ships in there, considering the weather to be a less serious danger than the fleet. ⁵ The moment they entered, with amazing luck the south wind which had blown for two days swung to the south-west.

27. And now a sudden change of fortune could be observed. Those who had a moment ago been afraid for themselves, found shelter in the safest of ports; while those who had put our ships in danger were forced to fear for their own position. ² So when the conditions changed, the gale not only protected our side, but inflicted such damage on the Rhodian ships that every single one of the sixteen vessels with an upper deck was smashed and lost, and out of a great number of rowers and marines some were dashed against the rocks and killed, and some were picked up by our men; all the survivors were spared and sent home by Caesar.

28. Two of our ships, which had been less swift in completing their passage, were overtaken by night, and as they had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the rest, anchored off Lissus. ² Otacilius Crassus, who was in command at Lissus, sent a collection of ship's boats and smaller vessels against them and made preparations to take them by boarding; at the same time he offered terms of surrender and promised that captives would go unharmed. ³ One of these two ships had embarked 220 men from a legion of recruits, the other slightly fewer than 200 from a veteran legion. ⁴ And here one may recognise how great a defence men possess in resolution of spirit. For the recruits, terrified by the number of boats and exhausted by sea-sickness, accepted on oath that the enemy would do them no harm and surrendered to Otacilius; and they were all paraded in front of him and brutally put to death before his very eyes, contrary to the obligation of the oath. ⁵ But the soldiers from the veteran legion, who had been severely shaken in exactly the same way by the discomforts of the storm and of the ship's bilges, far from thinking it was right to abandon their previous standards of courage, dragged out the first part of the night in discussing terms and feigning surrender, and then forced their helmsman to drive the ship ashore. ⁶ They themselves found a suitable spot to see out the remainder of the night, and when at dawn Otacilius sent against them about 400 cavalry who were guarding that part of the coast, and following them some armed men from the garrison, they fought them off, killed a number of their opponents, and withdrew unharmed to join our forces.

28 ⁴ hic Aldo : his Ω

⁵ item M² : idem Ω | et tractandis Morus : sed tractandis Ω

29. Quo facto conventus civium Romanorum qui Lissum obtinebant, quod oppidum iis antea Caesar attribuerat muniendumque curaverat, Antonium recepit omnibusque rebus iuvit. Otacilius sibi timens <ex> oppido fugit et ad Pompeium pervenit. ² ex<positis> omnibus copiis Antonius, quarum erat summa veteranarum trium legionum uniusque tironum et equitum dccc, plerasque naves in Italiam remittit ad reliquos milites equitesque transportandos, ³ pontones (quod est genus navium Gallicarum) Lissi relinquit, hoc consilio, ut si forte Pompeius vacuum existimans Italiam eo traiecisset exercitum, quae opinio erat edita in vulgus, aliquam Caesar ad insequendum facultatem haberet, nuntiosque ad eum celeriter mittit, quibus regionibus exercitum exposuisset et quid militum transvexisset.

30. Haec eodem fere tempore Caesar atque Pompeius cognoscunt. nam praetervectas Apolloniam Dyrrachiumque naves viderant ipsi, sed quo essent eae delatae, primis diebus ignorabant. ² cognitaque re diversa sibi ambo consilia capiunt: Caesar, ut quam primum se cum Antonio coniungeret, Pompeius, ut venientibus in itinere se opposeret, si imprudentes ex insidiis adoriri posset; ³ eodemque die uterque eorum ex castris stativis a flumine Apso exercitum educunt, Pompeius clam et noctu, Caesar palam atque interdum. ⁴ sed Caesari circuitu maiore iter erat longius, adverso flumine, ut vado transire posset. Pompeius, quia expedito itinere flumen ei transeundum non erat, magnis itineribus ad Antonium contendit, ⁵ atque ubi eum appropinquare cognovit, idoneum locum nactus ibi copias collocavit, suosque omnes castris continuit, ignesque fieri prohibuit, quo occultior esset eius adventus. ⁶ haec ad Antonium statim per Graecos deferuntur. ille missis ad Caesarem nuntiis unum diem sese castris tenuit; altero die ad eum pervenit Caesar. ⁷ cuius adventu cognito Pompeius, ne duobus circumcluderetur exercitibus, ex eo loco discedit omnibusque copiis ad Asparagium Dyrrachinorum pervenit atque ibi idoneo loco castra ponit.

31. His temporibus Scipio detrimentis quibusdam circa montem Amanum acceptis imperatorem se appellaverat. ² quo facto civitatibus tyrannisque magnas imperaverat pecunias, item a

29. After this exploit the association of Roman citizens at Lissus, a town which Caesar had earlier assigned to them and provided with fortifications, received Antonius and gave him every assistance. Otacilius, in fear for himself, fled the town and made his way to Pompey. ² When Antonius had landed all his forces, which totalled three legions of veterans, one of recruits, and eight hundred cavalry, he sent most of the ships back to Italy to bring over the remaining infantry and cavalry, ³ but left the 'pontoons' (a type of Gallic vessel) at Lissus. He wished to ensure that if Pompey, thinking Italy to be empty of troops, should cross over there with his army - which was a commonly held view - Caesar would have some means of pursuing him. He also sent a message with all speed to inform Caesar where he had landed and what forces he had brought across.

30. Caesar and Pompey discovered what had happened at almost the same time. They had themselves seen the ships passing Apollonia and Dyrrachium, but for a day or two did not know where they had come in to land. ² When they found out, they both adopted different plans: Caesar, to join up with Antonius as soon as possible, Pompey, to place himself in the path of the arriving force in an attempt to ambush and attack it unawares. ³ The two of them led their armies from their permanent camps on the Apsus on the same day, Pompey secretly and by night, Caesar openly and by day. ⁴ But Caesar had a longer march, with a more roundabout route upstream to ford the river; Pompey, because his route was clear and he had no river to cross, made towards Antonius with forced marches and when he knew that the latter was approaching found a suitable position, stationed his forces there, kept them all in camp, and banned the lighting of fires so that there should be less evidence of his arrival. ⁶ This was at once reported by the Greeks to Antonius, who sent a message to Caesar and remained in camp for a single day; on the next, Caesar reached him. ⁷ When Pompey heard of his arrival, to avoid being surrounded by two armies he abandoned his position, and marched with all his forces towards Asparagium, in the territory of Dyrrachium, where he encamped in a suitable spot.

31. At this time Scipio had suffered some reverses around the Amanus ranges and styled himself 'Victorious General'. ² After this he had demanded large amounts of money from the city-states and local rulers, likewise exacted from the tax contractors of his province

29 ¹ ex add. Nipperdey

² expositis Achilles Statius : ex Ω

30 ¹ ipsi, sed Krafft : ipsi iter secundum eas terras direxerant, sed Ω

² si Davis : et si (sic M) Ω

publicanis suae provinciae debitam biennii pecuniam exegerat et ab isdem insequentis anni mutuam praeceperat equitesque totius provinciae imperaverat. ³ quibus coactis, finitimis hostibus Parthis post se relictis, qui paulo ante M. Crassum imperatorem interfecerant et M. Bibulum in obsidione habuerant, legiones equitesque ex Syria deduxerat. ⁴ summamque in sollicitudinem ac timorem Parthici belli provincia cum venisset, ac nonnullae militum voces cum audirentur sese, contra hostem si ducerentur, ituros, contra civem et consulem arma non laturos, deductis Pergamum atque in locupletissimas urbes in hiberna legionibus maximas largitiones fecit et confirmandorum militum causa diripiendas his civitates dedit.

32. Interim acerbissime imperatae pecuniae tota provincia exigebantur. multa praeterea generatim ad avaritiam excogitabantur. ² in capita singula servorum ac liberorum tributum imponebatur; columnaria ostiaria frumentum milites arma remiges tormenta vecturae imperabantur; cuius modo rei nomen reperiri poterat, hoc satis esse ad cogendas pecunias videbatur. ³ non solum urbibus, sed paene vicis castellisque singulis singuli praeficiebantur. qui horum quid acerbissime crudelissimeque fecerat, is et vir et civis optimus habebatur. ⁴ erat plena lictorum et apparitorum provincia, differta praefectis atque exactoribus, qui praeter imperatas pecunias suo etiam privato compendio serviebant; dictitabant enim se domo patriaque expulsos omnibus necessariis egere rebus, ut honesta praescriptione rem turpissimam tegerent. ⁵ accedebant ad haec gravissimae usurae, quod in bello plerumque accidere consuevit universis imperatis pecuniis; quibus in rebus prolationem diei donationem esse dicebant. itaque aes alienum provinciae eo biennio multiplicatum est. ⁶ neque minus ob eam causam civibus Romanis eius provinciae, sed in singulos conventus singulasque civitates certae pecuniae imperabantur, mutuasque illas ex senatus consulto exigi dictitabant; publicanis, ut ii sortem fecerant, insequentis anni vectigal promutuum.

the payment owed for a two-year period, and made them advance as a loan the sum due for the following year, and required the whole province to supply cavalry. ³ When these had been raised, he left behind the Parthian enemy on his borders, who not long previously had killed our general Marcus Crassus and put Marcus Bibulus under siege, and led his legions and his cavalry away from Syria. ⁴ Although the province was deeply anxious and afraid of a war with Parthia, and although not a few of the soldiers said that they would go to war if they were led against an enemy, but would not take up arms against a fellow-Roman and a consul, Scipio put the legions into winter quarters in Pergamum and the wealthiest cities, distributed huge bonuses, and to secure the loyalty of the soldiers handed the communities over to them to plunder.

32. Meanwhile the contributions which had been ordered were being exacted with great harshness throughout the province. In addition, many new categories were thought up in the interests of greed. ² A poll tax was levied on every individual, slave and free; imposts were levied on columns and doors, and demands were made for grain, recruits, weapons, rowers, artillery, and transport; if a name could be found for something, that was deemed enough to raise a tax on it. ³ Officials were appointed to take charge not only of each city but of almost every village and little outpost, and those of them who acted with the utmost severity and cruelty were called excellent men and excellent patriots. ⁴ The province was full of lictors and official attendants, and packed with officers and collectors, who in addition to demanding the money officially required acted in the interests of their own pockets: to have a good excuse to cover their disgraceful behaviour, they would say that because they had been driven from their homes and their country they were short of all the necessities of life. ⁵ On top of this came very high rates of interest, the usual result of war when every kind of wealth is requisitioned; in this context, they called a postponement of the settlement date a free gift. And so in these two years the debt of the province was increased many times over. ⁶ Nor were Roman citizens living in the province any less liable on that account: specified sums were required from individual associations and individual communities, under the pretext that these were loans exacted under the terms of a senatorial decree; and from the tax contractors, inasmuch as they had accumulated capital, the sum due for the next year was taken and reckoned as a loan.

32 ³ singulis singuli praeficiebantur *scripsi, v. comm.* : singulis cum imperio praeficiebantur Ω : singulis singuli cum imperio praeficiebantur *Oehler*
⁴ apparitorum *Forchhammer* : imperiorum Ω | praefectis *Aldo* :
 praeceptis Ω
⁶ illas ex senatus consulto *Aldo* : ex illo se consulto Ω | ii sortem
Constans (ap. Fabre) : in sorte M^1 *UTV* : in forte *S* : in Syria M^2

33. Praeterea Ephesi a fano Dianae depositas antiquitus pecunias Scipio tolli iubebat. certaue eius rei die constituta cum in fanum ventum esset adhibitis compluribus ordinis senatorii, quos advocaverat Scipio, litterae ei redduntur a Pompeio, mare transisse cum legionibus Caesarem; properaret ad se cum exercitu venire omniaque posthaberet. ² his litteris acceptis, quos advocaverat dimittit; ipse iter in Macedoniam parare incipit paucisque post diebus est profectus. haec res Ephesiae pecuniae salutem attulit.

34. Caesar Antoni exercitu coniuncto deducta Orico legione, quam tuendae orae maritimae causa posuerat, temptandas sibi provincias longiusque procedendum existimabat; ² et cum ad eum ex Thessalia Aetoliaque legati venissent, qui praesidio misso pollicerentur earum gentium civitates imperata facturas, L. Cassium Longinum cum legione tironum, quae appellabatur xxvii., atque equitibus cc in Thessaliam, item C. Calvisium Sabinum cum cohortibus v paucisque equitibus in Aetoliam misit; maxime eos, quod erant propinquae regiones, de re frumentaria ut providerent, hortatus est. ³ Cn. Domitium Calvinum cum legionibus duabus, xi. et xii., et equitibus d in Macedoniam proficisci iussit; ⁴ cuius provinciae ab ea parte, quae libera appellabatur, Menedemus, princeps earum regionum, missus legatus omnium suorum excellens studium profitebatur.

35. Ex his Calvisius prima adventu summa omnium Aetolorum receptus voluntate praesidiis adversariorum Calydones et Naupactos deiecit omni Aetolia potitus est. ² Cassius in Thessaliam cum legione pervenit. hic cum essent factiones duae, varia voluntate civitatum utebatur: Hegesaretos, veteris homo potentiae, Pompeianis rebus studebat; Petraeus, summae nobilitatis adolescens, suis ac suorum opibus Caesarem inixe iuvabat.

36. Eodemque tempore Domitius in Macedoniam venit; et cum ad eum frequentes civitatum legationes convenire coepissent,

33. In addition, Scipio was in the process of giving orders for the wealth that had been deposited there since ancient times to be taken from the shrine of Diana at Ephesus. He appointed a day for the business and came to the temple accompanied by a number of senators whom he had summoned, when a letter from Pompey was delivered to him with the news that Caesar had crossed the sea with his legions; Scipio must hurry to him with his army and postpone everything else. ² On receipt of the letter he dismissed those he had summoned and himself began to make preparations for a march to Macedonia, and a few days later set out. This saved the treasures of Ephesus.

34. After Caesar had effected his junction with Antonius' army, he withdrew from Oricum the legion he had stationed there to guard the coast, and considered that he ought to try the provinces and advance somewhat further; ² and when delegates came to him from Thessaly and Aetolia, who promised that if protection were sent the communities of those peoples would do his bidding, he sent Lucius Cassius Longinus to Thessaly with a legion of recruits, numbered xxvii., and 200 cavalry, and likewise Gaius Calvisius Sabinus to Aetolia with five cohorts and a few cavalry; and he particularly urged the delegates to make arrangements for his food supplies, because their regions were near. ³ He ordered Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus, with two legions, xi and xii, and 500 cavalry, to set out for Macedonia; and from the area of this province known as 'free', the leading man of the region, Menedemus, came as an envoy to profess the greatest good will on the part of all his adherents.

35. Of these commanders, Calvisius was welcomed enthusiastically on his first arrival by all the Aetolians, and after the enemy garrisons at Calydon and Naupactus had been ejected gained control of the whole of Aetolia. ² Cassius reached Thessaly with his legion. Here there were two factions and in consequence he met with a mixed reception: Hegesaretos, a person of long-established influence, supported the Pompeian cause; Petraeus, a young man of the highest birth, helped Caesar energetically from his own resources and those of his connections.

36. At the same time Domitius entered Macedonia; and as numerous delegations from the communities began to meet him, there came the news, accompanied by much rumour and general

33 ¹ certaue eius rei die *Orsini* : ceteraque eius diei Ω | posthaberet *Aldo* :

post ea quae haberet Ω

34 ² item *Constans* : ire Ω

35 ¹ deiecit *Chacon* : relictis Ω

nuntiatum est adesse Scipionem cum legionibus, magna opinione et fama omnium; nam plerumque in novitate <rem> fama antecedit. ² hic nullo in loco Macedoniae moratus magno impetu contendit ad Domitium, et cum ab eo milia passuum xx afuisset, subito se ad Cassium Longinum in Thessaliam convertit. ³ hoc adeo celeriter fecit ut simul adesse et venire nuntiaretur, et quo iter expeditius faceret, M. Favonium ad flumen Haliacmonem, quod Macedonia a Thessalia dividit, cum cohortibus viii praesidio impedimentis legionum reliquit castellumque ibi muniri iussit. ⁴ eodem tempore equitatus regis Cotyis ad castra Cassi advolavit, qui circum Thessaliam esse consueverat. ⁵ tum timore perterritus Cassius, cognito Scipionis adventu visisque equitibus quos Scipionis esse arbitrabatur, ad montes se convertit qui Thessaliam cingunt atque ex his locis Ambraciam versus iter facere coepit. ⁶ at Scipionem properantem sequi litterae sunt consecutae a M. Favonio, Domitium cum legionibus adesse, neque se praesidium ubi constitutus esset sine auxilio Scipionis tenere posse. ⁷ quibus litteris acceptis consilium Scipio iterque commutat; Cassium sequi desistit, Favonio auxilium ferre contendit. ⁸ itaque die ac nocte continuato itinere ad eum pervenit, tam opportuno tempore, ut simul Domitiani exercitus pulvis cerneretur et primi antecursores Scipionis viderentur. ita Cassio industria Domiti, Favonio Scipionis celeritas salutem adtulit.

37. Scipio biduum castris stativis moratus ad flumen quod inter eum et Domiti castra fluebat, Haliacmonem, tertio die prima luce exercitum vado traducit et castris positus postero die mane copias ante frontem castrorum instruit. ² Domitius tum quoque sibi dubitandum non putavit quin productis legionibus proelio decertaret. sed cum esset inter bina castra campus circiter milium passuum iii, Domitius castris Scipionis aciem suam subiecit, ille a vallo non discedere perseveravit. ³ at tamen aegre retentis Domitianis militibus est factum, ne proelio contenderetur, et maxime quod rivus difficilibus ripis subiectus castris Scipionis progressus nostrorum impediabat. ⁴ quorum studium alacritatemque pugnandi cum cognovisset Scipio, suspicatus fore ut postero die aut invitus dimicare cogeretur, aut

speculation, that Scipio and his legions were near; for when some new development occurs, in most cases rumour outruns the fact. ² Scipio stopped nowhere in Macedonia, but made with great determination for Domitius and when he was only twenty miles from him suddenly turned aside towards Cassius Longinus in Thessaly. ³ This he did so quickly that the news of his arrival came at the same time as the news that he was on the way; also, to ensure faster marches he left Marcus Favonius at the river Haliacmon, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, with eight cohorts to guard the legions' baggage and equipment, and told him to fortify a strongpoint there. ⁴ At the same time Cotys' cavalry, which was usually stationed on the borders of Thessaly, made with all speed towards Cassius' camp. ⁵ Cassius, thoroughly frightened, and having learnt of Scipio's arrival and sighted cavalry which he believed to be Scipio's, turned towards the mountains which ring Thessaly and from this area began a march in the direction of Ambracia. ⁶ As Scipio hurried to follow, a letter from Marcus Favonius caught up with him, saying that Domitius with his legions was near and that he could not keep guard where he had been positioned without Scipio's assistance. ⁷ On receipt of this letter Scipio changed his plan and his direction of march: he ceased to pursue Cassius, and hastened to help Favonius. ⁸ And so, marching by day and night, his arrival was so opportune that the dust of Domitius' army was sighted at the very moment when Scipio's first outriders were seen. Thus Domitius' energy saved Cassius, and Scipio's speed Favonius.

37. For two days Scipio stayed in his fixed camp by the river, the Haliacmon, which flowed between him and Domitius. On the third day he forded the river at dawn with his army, pitched camp, and early on the following day drew up his battle-line in front of his camp. ² Then Domitius too thought he ought not to hesitate to deploy his legions and fight it out. But although there were about *three(?)* miles of level ground between the two camps, Domitius brought his line up under Scipio's camp, while the latter refused to move from his rampart and palisade. ³ However, although Domitius' soldiers could hardly be restrained, the outcome was that there was no engagement, particularly because next to Scipio's camp there was a stream with difficult banks which impeded our troops' advance. ⁴ When Scipio became aware of their enthusiasm and readiness to fight, he suspected that on the next day he would either be forced to fight against his will or incur much disgrace by keeping his forces in camp,

36 ¹ rem add. Oehler

² contendit ed.pr.: tetendit MU: tendit STV

⁴ Cotyis Nipperdey: Cottis Ω

37 ¹ instruit Σ: struit Ω

² iii Loriti: vi Ω: ii Stoffel

magna cum infamia castris se contineret, qui magna exspectatione venisset, temere progressus turpem habuit exitum et noctu ne conclamatis quidem vasis flumen transit atque in eandem partem ex qua venerat redit, ibique prope flumen edito natura loco castra posuit. ⁵ paucis diebus interpositis noctu insidias equitum conlocavit, quo in loco superioribus fere diebus nostri pabulari consueverant; et cum cotidiana consuetudine Q. Varus, praefectus equitum Domiti, venisset, subito illi ex insidiis consurrexerunt. ⁶ sed nostri fortiter impetum eorum tulerunt, celeriterque ad suos quisque ordines redit, atque ultro universi in hostes impetum fecerunt. ⁷ ex his circiter LXXX interfectis, reliquis in fugam coniectis, duobus amissis in castra se receperunt.

38. His rebus gestis Domitius sperans Scipionem ad pugnam elici posse simulavit sese angustiis rei frumentariae adductum castra movere vasisque militari more conclamatis progressus milia passuum in loco idoneo et occulto omnem exercitum equitatumque conlocavit. ² Scipio ad sequendum paratus equitum magnam partem ad explorandum iter Domiti et cognoscendum praemisit. ³ qui cum essent progressi primaeque turmae insidias intravissent, ex fremitu equorum illata suspicione ad suos se recipere coeperunt, quique hos sequebantur, celerem eorum receptum conspicati restiterunt. ⁴ nostri cognitis insidiis, ne frustra reliquos expectarent, duas nacti hostium turmas exceperunt, <quarum perpauci fuga se ad suos receperunt>. in his fuit M. Opimius praefectus equitum. reliquos omnes earum turmarum aut interfecerunt aut captos ad Domitium deduxerunt.

39. Deductis orae maritimae praesidiis Caesar, ut supra demonstratum est, in cohortes Orici oppidi tuendi causa reliquit isdemque custodiam navium longarum tradidit, quas ex Italia traduxerat. huic officio oppidoque <M. Acilius> Caninianus legatus praeerat. ² is naves nostras interiorem in portum post oppidum reduxit et ad terram deligavit faucibusque portus navem onerariam submersam obiecit et huic alteram coniunxit; super quam turrin effectam ad ipsum introitum portus opposuit et militibus complevit tuendamque ad omnis repentinos casus tradidit.

38 ² equitum magnam *Nipperdey*: equitatum magnamque (magnam V) Ω

⁴ cognitis hostium insidiis Ω: post nacti transpos. hostium Menge | quarum perpauci fuga se ad suos receperunt add. *Dübner* (cf. BG 1.53.2-3)

39 ¹ <M. Acilius> Caninianus *scripsi* (v. comm.): Caninianus B: Caninius S: Caninus Σ: Acilius *Faerno*, add. M'. *Achaintre*: <Acilius> Caninus *Meusel*

² portum *Chacon*: partem Ω | quam *Krafft*: quas Ω

and having come with high hopes, and gone too far, he achieved a discreditable result: by night, without even making the signal for breaking camp, he crossed the river and returned to the same area from which he had come, and pitched camp there on a natural height near the river. ⁵ A few days later, he laid a cavalry ambush at night, at a spot where on the preceding days our men had fairly habitually grazed their animals; and when Quintus Varus, Domitius' cavalry commander, appeared according to his normal routine, the enemy suddenly emerged from their ambush. ⁶ But our men resisted their charge bravely, quickly returned each to his own formation, and all together actually made an attack on the enemy. ⁷ After killing about eighty of them and putting the rest to flight, they returned to camp with the loss of two men.

38. As a result of this exploit, Domitius, hoping that Scipio could be drawn into battle, pretended that he was being forced to move camp by a shortage of grain supplies. After giving the military signal to strike camp, he travelled three miles and stationed his whole army and all his cavalry in a suitably concealed spot. ² Scipio, who was ready to follow, sent on the greater part of his cavalry to discover and gain intelligence about Domitius' route. ³ When they had gone forward and the leading squadrons had entered the ambush, their suspicions were aroused by the noise of horses and they began to withdraw, and those who were following them, seeing their rapid retreat, came to a halt. ⁴ The ambush being revealed, our troops, so as not to wait in vain for the rest, caught and cut off two of their squadrons, of whom only a handful managed to flee back to their own side, amongst whom was Marcus Opimius, a cavalry commander. All the other men from these squadrons were either killed or brought as prisoners to Domitius.

39. When Caesar, as mentioned above, withdrew his garrisons from the coast, he left three cohorts at Oricum to guard the town, and placed under their protection the warships he had brought across from Italy. *Marcus Acilius* Caninianus was the senior officer in charge of the town and this task. ² He took our ships into the inner harbour behind the town and made them fast to the shore, and sank a merchant ship to block the way into the port, with another fastened to it; over this he built a tower facing the actual entrance of the port, manned it with soldiers, and made them responsible for keeping it safe against any sudden danger.

40. Quibus cognitis, rebus Cn. Pompeius filius, qui classi Aegyptiae praeerat, ad Oricum venit submersamque navem remulco multisque contendens funibus abduxit atque alteram navem, quae erat ad custodiam ab Acilio posita, pluribus aggressus navibus, in quibus ad libram fecerat turres, ut ex superiori pugnans loco integrosque semper defatigatis summittens et reliquis partibus simul ex terra scalis et classe moenia oppidi temptans, uti adversariorum manus diduceret, labore et multitudine telorum nostros vicit deiectisque defensoribus, qui omnes scaphis excepti refugerunt, eam navem expugnavit. ² eodemque tempore ex altera parte molem tenuit naturalem obiectam, quae paene insulam oppidum effecerat, IIII biremes subiectis scutulis impulsas vectibus in interiorem portum transduxit. ³ ita ex utraque parte naves longas aggressus, quae erant deligatae ad terram atque inanes, IIII ex his abduxit, reliquas incendit. ⁴ hoc confecto negotio D. Laelium ab Asiatica classe abductum reliquit, qui commeatus Byllide atque Amantia importari in oppidum prohiberet. ⁵ ipse Lissum profectus naves onerarias xxx a M. Antonio relictas intra portum aggressus omnes incendit; Lissum expugnare conatus, defendentibus civibus Romanis qui eius conventus erant militibusque quos praesidii causa miserat Caesar, triduum moratus paucis in oppugnatione amissis re infecta inde discessit.

41. Caesar postquam Pompeium ad Asparagium esse cognovit, eodem cum exercitu profectus expugnato in itinere oppido Parthinorum, in quo Pompeius praesidium habebat, tertio die ad Pompeium pervenit iuxtaque eum castra posuit et postridie eductis omnibus copiis acie instructa decernendi potestatem Pompei fecit. ² ubi illum suis locis se tenere animum advertit, reducto in castra exercitu aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit. ³ itaque postero die omnibus copiis magno circuitu difficilli angustoque itinere Dyrrachium profectus est sperans Pompeium aut Dyrrachium compelli aut ab eo intercludi posse, quod omnem commeatum totiusque belli apparatus eo contulisset: ut accidit. ⁴ Pompeius enim primo ignorans eius consilium, quod diverso ab ea regione itinere

40. Hearing of this, Gnaeus Pompeius (the son), who was in command of the Egyptian fleet, came to Oricum and dragged away the sunken ship using a winch, a great number of cables, and much effort. With more of his own ships, on which he had constructed towers to the same level, he attacked the other ship which had been positioned by Acilius to guard the harbour; he fought from a higher position, he constantly replaced tired men with fresh, and he attacked the town walls in the other sectors, both from the land with scaling-ladders and from shipboard, in order to disperse his opponents' fighting units; the result was that on account of his efforts and the number of his missiles he got the better of our men, ejected the defenders, who were all picked up by small boats and made their escape, and took the ship. ² At the same time, on the other side, he occupied the natural mole which makes the town almost an island and dragged four biremes across to the inner harbour by putting them on rollers and using levers. ³ Making his attack in this manner from both directions on the warships, which were tied up to shore and unmanned, he towed away four of them and burnt the rest. ⁴ This matter dealt with, he took Decimus Laelius from the Asian fleet and left him to stop supplies from Byllis and Amantia being taken into the town. ⁵ He himself sailed towards Lissus, where he attacked and burnt all thirty merchant ships which had been left in the port by Marcus Antonius; he tried to storm Lissus, which was defended by the Roman citizens of the local association and by troops sent by Caesar to defend it, but after staying for three days and losing a few men in the attack departed without attaining his objective.

41. After Caesar had found out that Pompey was near Asparagium, he set out in that direction with his army and having taken on the way a town of the Parthini in which Pompey had a garrison, reached Pompey on the third day. He made camp close to him, and on the following day led all his forces out, drew up his line of battle, and offered Pompey the chance of a decisive engagement. ² When he realised that the latter was going to stay put, he led his army back to camp and judged that he ought to adopt a different plan. ³ So on the next day he set out with his whole force for Dyrrachium by a difficult, narrow, and very roundabout route, hoping that he could either compel Pompey to make for Dyrrachium or cut him off from it, because he had gathered all his supplies and material there for the whole conduct of the war. ⁴ Pompey, not knowing Caesar's plan, and seeing him set out in a different direction, at first

40 ¹ abduxit *Davis* : adduxit Ω | ad libram Ω : altiores *Chacon* | deiectisque

Aldo : defectisque Ω

³ abduxit *V* : adduxit *SMUT*

⁴ prohiberet *Dinter* : prohibebat Ω

41 ¹ die ad Pompeium *Forchhammer* : die Macedoniam ad Pompeium Ω | fecit *B* : dedit *S*

profectum videbat, angustis rei frumentariae compulsum discessisse existimabat; postea per exploratores certior factus postero die castra movit breviori itinere se occurrere ei posse sperans. ⁵ quod fore suspicatus Caesar militesque adhortatus ut aequo animo laborem ferrent, parva parte noctis itinere intermisso mane Dyrrachium venit, cum primum agmen Pompei procul cerneretur, atque ibi castra posuit.

42. Pompeius interclusus Dyrrachio, ubi propositum tenere non potuit, secundo usus consilio edito loco, qui appellatur Petra aditumque habet navibus mediocrem atque eas a quibusdam protegit ventis, castra communit. ² eo partem navium longarum convenire, frumentum commeatumque ab Asia atque omnibus regionibus quas tenebat comportari imperat. ³ Caesar longius bellum ductum iri existimans et de Italicis commeatibus desperans, quod tanta diligentia omnia litora a Pompeianis tenebantur classesque ipsius quas hieme in Sicilia Gallia Italia fecerat morabantur, in Epirum rei frumentariae causa Q. Tillium et L. Canuleium legatos misit, quodque hae regiones aberant longius, locis certis horrea constituit vecturasque frumenti finitimis civitatibus discripsit. ⁴ item Lisso Parthinisque et omnibus castellis, quod esset frumenti, conquiri iussit. ⁵ id erat perexiguum cum ipsius agri natura, quod sunt loca aspera ac montuosa ac plerumque frumento utuntur importato, tum quod Pompeius haec providerat et superioribus diebus praedae loco Parthinos habuerat frumentumque omne conquisitum spoliatis effossisque eorum domibus per equites in Petram comportarat.

43. Quibus rebus cognitis Caesar consilium capit ex loci natura. erant enim circum castra Pompei permulti editi atque asperi colles. hos primum praesidiis tenuit castellaque ibi communiit. ² inde, ut loci cuiusque natura ferebat, ex castello in castellum perducta munitione circumvallare Pompeium instituit, ³ haec spectans, quod angusta re frumentaria utebatur, quodque Pompeius multitudine equitum valebat, quo minore periculo undique frumentum commeatumque exercitui supportare posset, simul uti pabulatione Pompeium

thought that he had been forced to withdraw by a shortage of food; but on receipt of later intelligence from scouts, he struck camp the next day, expecting that on account of his shorter route he would be able to meet Caesar. ⁵ Caesar, suspecting that this would be the case, encouraged his soldiers to endure hardship without complaint and after breaking his march for a small part of the night reached Dyrrachium early in the morning, to see Pompey's advance guard in the distance, and pitched camp there.

42. Cut off from Dyrrachium and unable to do as he had intended, Pompey fell back on the plan of fortifying a camp on an eminence, called Petra, which had a passable anchorage for ships and sheltered them from some winds. ² He gave orders for a part of his war fleet to gather there, and for grain and supplies to be brought from Asia and all the areas which he controlled. ³ Caesar thought that the war was going to be further prolonged, and despaired of receiving provisions from Italy, because the whole coast was being guarded so attentively by the Pompeians, and his own fleets, which he had built in the winter in Sicily, Gaul and Italy, were slow in coming. He therefore sent Quintus Tillius and Lucius Canuleius as senior officers to Epirus to arrange grain supplies, and because these regions were rather far away he set up granaries in particular spots and informed the surrounding communities of the deliveries of grain they were to make. ⁴ He also ordered what grain there might be at Lissus, amongst the Parthini, and in all the little outposts to be sought out and collected. ⁵ The quantity of this was extremely small, both because of the nature of the land, since the ground is rough and mountainous and they mostly use imported corn, and also because Pompey had foreseen this and in the preceding days had plundered the Parthini, looted and dug out their homes, and used his cavalry to carry in to Petra the grain he had gathered.

43. Once he had discovered these facts, Caesar based his plan on the nature of the terrain. Around Pompey's camp there was a large number of steep, rough hills. These he first seized, garrisoned and strengthened with forts. ² Then, by making an earthwork from fort to fort as the lie of the land dictated in each case, he began to wall Pompey in. ³ His objectives were as follows: because he was short of provisions, and because Pompey's strength lay in the number of his cavalry, to make it less dangerous for himself to bring in corn and supplies for his army from any direction; at the same time to cut off

42 ³ legatos V: legatum SMUT

⁵ providerat Aldo: providebat Ω | in Petram Bücheler: in porta SMUV:
importa T: in petra Σ

43 ³ haec ... (482) iaciebant om. S | spectans Vascosan: exspectans B

prohiberet equitatumque eius ad rem gerendam inutilem efficeret, tertio ut auctoritatem qua ille maxime apud exterarum nationes niti videbatur minueret, cum fama per orbem terrarum percrebuisset illum a Caesare obsideri neque audere proelio dimicare.

44. Pompeius neque a mari Dyrrachioque discedere volebat, quod omnem apparatus belli, tela arma tormenta ibi conlocaverat frumentumque exercitui navibus supportabat, neque munitiones Caesaris prohibere poterat, nisi proelio decertare vellet; quod eo tempore statuerat faciendum non esse. ² relinquebatur ut extremam rationem belli sequens quam plurimos colles occuparet et quam latissimas regiones praesidiis teneret Caesarisque copias quam maxime posset distineret; idque accidit. ³ castellis enim *xxiiii* effectis *xv* milia passuum circuitu amplexus hoc spatio pabulabatur; multaque erant intra eum locum manu sata, quibus interim iumenta pasceret. ⁴ atque ut nostri perpetuas munitiones habebant perductas ex castellis in proxima castella, ne quo loco erumperent Pompeiani ac nostros post tergum adorirentur, ita illi interiore spatio perpetuas munitiones efficiebant, ne quem locum nostri intrare atque ipsos a tergo circumvenire possent. ⁵ sed illi operibus vincebant, quod et numero militum praestabant et interiore spatio minorem circuitum habebant. ⁶ quaecumque erant loca Caesari capienda, etsi prohibere Pompeius totis copiis et dimicare non constituerat, tamen suis locis sagittarios funditoresque mittebat, quorum magnum habebat numerum; ⁷ multique ex nostris vulnerabantur magnusque incesserat timor sagittarum, atque omnes fere milites aut ex coactis aut ex centonibus aut ex coriis tunicas aut tegimenta fecerant quibus tela vitarent.

45. In occupandis praesidiis magna vi uterque nitebatur: Caesar, ut quam angustissime Pompeium contineret, Pompeius, ut quam plurimos colles quam maximo circuitu occuparet; crebraque ob eam causam proelia fiebant. ² in his cum legio Caesaris nona praesidium quoddam occupavisset et munire coepisset, huic loco propinquum et contrarium collem Pompeius occupavit nostrosque opere prohibere coepit; ³ et cum una ex parte prope aequum aditum haberet, primum

Pompey from grazing and render his cavalry operationally ineffective; and thirdly to undermine the authority which his opponent seemed to enjoy, especially with foreign nations, when the whole world came to hear that he was under siege from Caesar and did not dare fight him on the field of battle.

44. Pompey had no wish to leave the coast and Dyrrachium, because he had placed there all his war equipment, missiles, weapons, and artillery, and was supplying his army with grain by ship, neither was he able to stop Caesar's earthworks unless he were willing to engage in battle - a thing which he had decided not to do at that time. ² It remained for him to adopt his final military expedient: seize first as many hills as possible, hold with garrisons as wide an area as possible, and stretch Caesar's forces as far as he possibly could; and that happened. ³ He succeeded in setting up 24 forts embracing a circuit of 15 miles, and in this space was able to get grazing; there were also many cultivated crops in the area, on which for the time being the pack animals could feed. ⁴ And just as our men had continuous fortifications leading from each fort to the next, so that the Pompeians could not break through anywhere and attack them from the rear, so were the Pompeians making continuous fortifications on the inner side, so that our men could not enter at any point and get round behind them. ⁵ But the enemy were having the better of it with the earthworks, because they not only possessed more men but also, being on the interior, had a shorter circuit. ⁶ Whatever spots Caesar had to occupy, although Pompey had decided not to stop him by an engagement with his full forces, he none the less, in the right places, used to send archers and slingers, of whom he had a large number. ⁷ Many of our men were being wounded, the arrows had spread terror, and almost all the soldiers had made tunics or coverings out of felt, quilts, or hides to avoid the missiles.

45. In seizing strongpoints both sides expended great efforts: Caesar, to hem Pompey in as much as he could, Pompey, to occupy as many hills as possible with as extended a circuit as possible; and for that reason there were frequent engagements. ² One of these occurred when Caesar's Ninth legion had occupied a particular strongpoint and begun to fortify it, while Pompey occupied a hill near to and opposite this and started to prevent our men working; ³ and since it had an almost level approach on one side he interfered with the fortifications first by stationing archers and slingers around and

44 ⁴ habebant *Morus* : videbant *B* | ne quo *M*² : neque *B* | adorirentur ita *Faerno* : adorirantur timebant ita *B*

⁵ habebant. quaecumque *Bentley* : habebant. quae cum *B* : habebant quam quae *Krafft*

45 ¹ nitebatur *Σ* : videbatur *B*

sagittariis funditoribusque circumiectis, postea levis armaturae magna multitudo missa tormentisque prolatis munitiones impediēbat, neque erat facile nostris uno tempore propugnare et munire. ⁴ Caesar cum suis ex omnibus partibus vulnerari videret, recipere se iussit et loco excedere. erat per declivē receptus. ⁵ illi autem hoc acius instabant neque regredi nostros patiebantur, quod timore adducti locum relinquere videbantur. ⁶ dicitur eo tempore glorians apud suos Pompeius dixisse, non recusare se, quin nullius usus imperator existimaretur, si sine maximo detrimento legiones Caesaris sese receperint inde, quo temere essent progressae.

46. Caesar receptui suorum timens crates ad extremum tumultum contra hostem proferri et adversas locari, intra has mediocri latitudine fossam tectis militibus obduci iussit locumque in omnis partes quam maxime impediri. ² ipse idoneis locis funditores instruxit, ut praesidio nostris se recipientibus essent. his rebus completis legionem reduci iussit. ³ Pompeiani hoc insolentius atque audacius nostros premere et instare coeperunt, cratesque pro munitione obiectas propulerunt ut fossas transcenderent. ⁴ quod cum animadvertisset Caesar, veritus ne non reducti sed deiecti viderentur maiusque detrimentum caperetur, a medio fere spatio suos per Antonium, qui ei legioni praeerat, cohortatus tuba signum dari atque in hostes impetum fieri iussit. ⁵ milites legionis nonae subito conspirati pila coniecerunt et ex inferiore loco adversus clivum incitati cursu praecipites Pompeianos egerunt et terga vertere coegerunt; quibus ad recipiendum crates disiectae longurique obiecti et institutae fossae magno impedimento fuerunt. ⁶ nostri vero, qui satis habebant sine detrimento discedere, compluribus interfectis, v omnino suorum amissis quietissime se receperunt pauloque citra eum locum aliis comprehensis collibus munitiones perfecerunt.

47. Erat nova et inusitata belli ratio cum tot castellorum numero tantoque spatio et tantis munitionibus et toto obsidionis genere, tum etiam reliquis rebus. ² nam quicumque alterum obsidere conati sunt, percussos atque infirmos hostes adorti aut proelio superatos aut

then by sending forward a great crowd of light-armed troops and bringing up artillery; and it was no easy task for our men to fight in defence of their position and at the same time fortify it. ⁴ When Caesar saw his men being wounded from every side, he ordered them to withdraw and leave the place. The way back was by a downward slope. ⁵ Our opponents then pressed on all the more eagerly and did not allow our men to retreat, because they thought it was fear that was making them abandon their position. ⁶ It is said that Pompey at that moment, boasting in front of his associates, said that he was prepared to be considered an incompetent general if Caesar's legions managed to withdraw without severe loss from the point to which they had foolhardily advanced.

46. Apprehensive about his men's retreat, Caesar gave orders for wicker bundles to be brought up and mounted facing the enemy at the very end of the hill, and for a trench of moderate width to be dug behind them, with the soldiers protected; the ground was also, as far as possible, to be obstructed in every direction. ² He himself stationed slingers in suitable positions to cover our men as they retreated. When all this was done, he ordered the withdrawal of the legion. ³ At this the Pompeians began to press upon our men and assail them more insolently and boldly, and knocked over the bundles that had been put up in front of the fortification, so that they could cross the trenches. ⁴ When Caesar saw this, he was afraid it would seem that his soldiers had been, not withdrawn, but driven away, and that a worse reverse would be sustained. So from about midway he gave a message of encouragement to his men through Antonius, who was commanding the legion, and ordered the signal to be sounded on the trumpet for an attack on the enemy. ⁵ Suddenly united by resolve the soldiers of the Ninth legion hurled their throwing-spears and charging up against the slope from their lower position drove the Pompeians headlong and compelled them to turn tail; and their retreat was greatly impeded by the overthrown bundles and poles in their path and the beginnings of the trenches. ⁶ On the other hand, our men, who were satisfied to retreat without harm after killing several opponents and losing five altogether of their own number, withdrew very soberly and after seizing some other hills a little beyond finished their fortification works.

47. The type of warfare was new and unprecedented, on account of the large number of forts, the big distances involved, the extent of the fortifications, and the whole nature of the siege. There were other reasons also. ² For whenever people have tried to besiege others, they have attacked a weak and shaken enemy and held down

⁴ receptus *ed.pr.* : receptum B

46 ² legionem *Faerno* : legiones B

⁵ clivum *Estienne* : pilum B | disiectae *Kraner* : directae MV : directae U : derete T | obiecti *ed.pr.* : obiecti B

⁶ *sc add. ed.pr.*

aliqua offensione permotos continuerunt, cum ipsi numero equitum militumque praestarent; causa autem obsidionis haec fere esse consuevit, ut frumento hostes prohiberent. ³ at tum integras atque incolumes copias Caesar inferiore militum numero continebat, cum illi omnium rerum copia abundarent; cotidie enim magnus undique navium numerus conveniebat, quae commeatum supportarent, neque ullus flare ventus poterat quin aliqua ex parte secundum cursum haberent. ⁴ ipse autem consumptis omnibus longe lateque frumentis summis erat in angustiis. ⁵ sed tamen haec singulari patientia milites ferebant. recordabantur enim eadem se superiore anno in Hispania perpressos labore et patientia maximum bellum confecisse; meminerant ad Alesiam magnam inopiam perpressos, multo etiam maiorem ad Avaricum, maximarum se gentium victores discessisse. ⁶ non illis hordeum cum daretur, non legumina recusabant; pecus vero, cuius rei summa erat ex Epiro copia, magno in honore habebant.

48. Est etiam genus radices inventum ab iis qui fuerant in operibus, quod appellatur chara, quod admixtum lacte multum inopiam levabat. ² eius erat magna copia. ex hoc effectos panes, cum in colloquiis Pompeiani famem nostris obiectarent, vulgo in eos iaciebant, ut spem eorum minuerent.

49. Iamque frumenta maturescere incipiebant atque ipsa spes inopiam sustentabat, quod celeriter se habituros copiam confidebant; crebraeque voces militum in vigiliis colloquiisque audiebantur prius se cortice ex arboribus victuros, quam Pompeium e manibus dimissuros. ² libenter etiam ex perfugis cognoscebant equos eorum tolerari, reliqua vero iumenta interisse; uti autem ipsos valetudine non bona cum angustiis loci et odore taetro ex multitudine cadaverum et cotidianis laboribus, insuetos operum, tum aquae summa inopia adfectos. ³ omnia enim flumina atque omnes rivos, qui ad mare pertinebant, Caesar aut averterat aut magnis operibus obstruxerat, atque ut erant loca montuosa et aspera, angustias vallium

men who have been defeated in battle or thrown into disarray by some misfortune, while they themselves have had numerical superiority in cavalry and infantry; and usually the reason for the siege has been to prevent the enemy from getting food. ³ But in this case Caesar was holding down sound, intact forces with an inferior number of troops, while his opponents had plentiful supplies of everything; every day a great number of ships came in from every direction to bring supplies, and no wind could blow that was not favourable for some. ⁴ He himself, though, was in extreme difficulties, because the grain from far and wide had been consumed. ⁵ None the less the soldiers bore this with remarkable patience. They remembered that in the previous year in Spain they had endured similar privations and by patient toil had brought a most important campaign to an end; they recalled that by enduring great scarcity at Alesia, and much worse at Avaricum, they had come away the victors over mighty peoples. ⁶ Not when they were given barley, not when they were given pulses did they refuse them; but meat, of which there was plenty in Epirus, they particularly appreciated.

48. There is also a kind of root, which was found by those who were stationed on the fortifications, which is called 'chara' and when mixed with milk was a great relief to their hunger. ² Of this there was a great quantity. Our men made loaves of it, and when in verbal exchanges with the Pompeians they were taunted with being hungry, they threw these in handfuls at them to undermine their hopes.

49. And now the crops were beginning to ripen and hope herself sustained them in their privations, because they were sure they would soon have plenty; and the soldiers were often heard to say on watch and in conversation that they would rather live off bark from the trees than let Pompey slip out of their hands. ² They also learnt with satisfaction from deserters that their opponents' horses were being allowed to live, but that the remainder, the draught animals, had been killed; and that the men were in poor health not only because of the confined space, the foul odour from the number of dead bodies, and the daily labours to which they were unused, but also on account of an extremely serious shortage of water. ³ Caesar had either diverted or blocked with dykes every river and every stream which ran towards the sea, and where the ground was steep and rough had blocked the narrow parts of the valleys with stakes driven into the ground around which he heaped earth to hold back the water. ⁴ His

47 ³ haberent Σ : haberet B

⁵ magnam inopiam V : magnam se inopiam MUT

48 ¹ in operibus F.Kindscher : valeribus B : ab oleribus Ramorino : in alaribus Constans | ... levabat. eius ... Vielhaber : ... levabat. id ad similitudinem panis efficiebant. eius ... B

² ut spem his verbis redit S (v. 43.3)

49 ³ et aspera, angustias vallium sublicis Paul : et ad specus (adspectus S) angustiae vallium has sublicis Ω | contineret TV : continerent SMU

publicis in terram demissis praesepserat terramque aggrasserat, ut aquam contineret. ⁴ ita illi necessario loca sequi demissa ac palustria et puteos fodere cogeantur atque hunc laborem ad cotidiana opera addebant; qui tamen fontes a quibusdam praesidiis aberant longius et celeriter aestibus exarescebant. at Caesaris exercitus <cum> optima valetudine summaque aquae copia utebatur, tum commeatus omni genere praeter frumentum abundabat; quibus cotidie melius succurrere tempus maioremque spem maturitate frumentorum proponi videbant.

50. In novo genere belli novae ab utrisque bellandi rationes reperiebantur. illi cum animum advertissent ex ignibus nocte cohortes nostras ad munitiones excubare, silentio aggressi universas inter multitudinem sagittas coiciebant et se confestim ad suos recipiebant. ² quibus rebus nostri usu docti haec reperiebant remedia, ut alio loco ignes facerent *

51. Interim certior factus P. Sulla, quem discedens castris praefecerat Caesar, auxilio cohorti venit cum legionibus duabus; cuius adventu facile sunt repulsi Pompeiani. ² neque vero conspectum aut impetum nostrorum tulerunt, primisque deiectis reliqui se verterunt et loco cesserunt. ³ sed insequentis nostros, ne longius prosequerentur, Sulla revocavit. at plerique existimant, si acrius insequi voluisset, bellum eo die potuisse finiri. cuius consilium reprehendendum non videtur. ⁴ aliae enim sunt legati partes atque imperatoris; alter omnia agere ad praescriptum, alter libere ad summam rerum consulere debet. ⁵ Sulla a Caesare castris relictus liberatis suis hoc fuit contentus neque proelio decertare voluit, quae res tamen fortasse aliquem reciperet casum, ne imperatorias sibi partes sumpsisse videretur. ⁶ Pompeianis magnam res ad receptum difficultatem adferebat. nam ex iniquo progressi loco in summo constiterant; si per declive sese reciperent, nostros ex superiore insequentes loco verebantur; neque multum ad solis occasum temporis supererat; spe enim conficiendi negotii prope in noctem rem deduxerant. ⁷ ita necessario atque ex tempore capto consilio Pompeius tumulum quendam occupavit, qui tantum aberat a nostro castello, ut telum tormento missum adigi non posset. hoc consedit loco atque eum communivit omnesque ibi copias continuit.

opponents were thus of necessity forced to hunt out places that were low-lying and marshy and dig wells, and this work was additional to their daily tasks; but these sources of water were a fair distance from some of the outposts and used to dry up easily in periods of hot weather. ⁵ Caesar's army on the other hand *not only* enjoyed excellent health and an abundance of water, but also had plenty of supplies of every kind except grain; for them the passing of time offered more assistance every day, and they saw their hopes growing greater as the crops ripened.

50. In this new sort of war, new methods of fighting were invented by both sides. When the Pompeians noticed from the fires that at night our cohorts passed the night near the fortifications, they approached in silence, discharged their arrows all together into the mass of men, and hastily retired to their own lines. ² Taught by experience, our men found the following answers to such attacks, namely to make their fires in one place.

51. In the meanwhile, Publius Sulla, whom Caesar on departure had put in command of the camp, came with two legions to the help of the cohort; and his arrival easily repulsed the Pompeians. ² They failed to stand firm against our men, either when they appeared or when they attacked, and after the front rank had been dislodged the others turned round and retreated. ³ But Sulla recalled our men from the pursuit to stop them carrying it too far. Now many people think that if he had been willing to pursue the enemy more vigorously, the war could have been ended that day. But his decision ought not to be criticised. ⁴ A senior officer's role is one thing, a general's another: the former ought to act entirely in accordance with his orders, the latter ought to take decisions flexibly with an eye on the overall picture. ⁵ Left at the camp by Caesar, once he had saved the men of his own side Sulla was content with this and had no wish to fight a full battle, an action which might bring the risk of seeming to play the part of general himself. ⁶ The situation put the Pompeians in great difficulty with their retreat. They had left an inferior position and had halted on top of high ground; if they retreated downhill, they were afraid of our men pursuing them from above; also there was little time left before sunset, because in the hope of bringing the operation to a successful conclusion they had prolonged the struggle almost until nightfall. ⁷ Thus forced to improvise a plan, Pompey seized a small isolated hill which was far enough away from our fort to be out of range of an artillery missile. He settled down in this spot, fortified it, and gathered all his forces there.

⁵ cum add. Dinter | succurrere Oudendorp : subter(r)ere Ω
⁵⁰ ² lacunam statuit Manuzio, supplevitque alio excubarent
⁵¹ ⁶ magnam Σ : magna Ω

52. Eodem tempore duobus praeterea locis pugnatum est; nam plura castella Pompeius pariter distinendae manus causa temptaverat, ne ex proximis praesidiis succurri posset. ² uno loco Volcaci² Tullus impetum legionis sustinuit cohortibus tribus atque eam loco depulit; altero Germani munitiones nostras egressi compluribus interfectis sese ad suos incolumes receperunt.

53. Ita uno die sex proeliis factis, tribus ad Dyrrachium, tribus ad munitiones, cum horum omnium ratio haberetur, ad duo milia numero ex Pompeianis cecidisse reperiēbamus, evocatos centurionesque complures; in eo fuit numero Valerius Flaccus, L. filius eius qui praetor Asiam obtinuerat; signaque sunt militaria sex relata. ² nostri non amplius xx omnibus sunt proeliis desiderati. ³ sed in castello nemo fuit omnino militum quin vulneraretur, quattuorque ex una cohorte centuriones oculos amiserunt. ⁴ et cum laboris sui periculique testimonium adferre vellent, milia sagittarum circiter xxx in castellum coniecta Caesari renumeraverunt, scutoque ad eum relato Scaevae centurionis inventa sunt in eo foramina cxx. ⁵ quem Caesar, ut erat de se meritis et de re publica, donatum milibus cc <nummum> ab octavis ordinibus ad primum pilum se traducere pronuntiavit (eius enim ope castellum magna ex parte conservatum esse constabat) cohortemque postea duplici stipendio, frumento, veste, cibariis militaribusque donis amplissimè donavit.

54. Pompeius noctu magnis additis munitionibus reliquis diebus turres extruxit et in altitudinem pedum xv effectis operibus vineis eam partem castrorum obtexit, ² et quinque intermissis diebus alteram noctem subnubilam nactus obstructis omnibus castrorum portis et <.....> ad impediendum obiectis tertia inita vigilia silentio exercitum eduxit et se in antiquas munitiones recepit.

55(56). Omnibus deinceps diebus Caesar exercitum in aciem aequum in locum produxit, si Pompeius proelio decertare vellet, ut paene castris Pompei legiones subiceret; tantumque a vallo eius

52. In addition there was fighting at the same time in two other places. For Pompey had made simultaneous attacks on a number of forts in order to stretch our manpower and ensure that help would not be available from the adjoining forts. ² In one of these two places Volcaci² Tullus with three cohorts withstood the attack of a legion and forced it to give ground, in the other some Germans went forward from the fortifications and after killing several of the enemy retired unharmed to their own lines.

53. So six engagements took place on a single day, three at Dyrrachium and three at the lines of fortification, and when the tally was made of all of these we found that about two thousand of the Pompeians had fallen, including a fair number of re-enlisted men and centurions (one of their number being a Valerius Flaccus, son of that Lucius who had been governor of Asia); six military standards were also captured. ² Of our own men, no more than twenty were lost in all the engagements. ³ But in the fort there was not one man who was unwounded, and four centurions from a single cohort lost eyes. ⁴ Wanting to provide proof of their exertions and the extent of their danger, they counted out for Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had been fired at the fort, and when he was brought the shield of the centurion Scaeva a hundred and twenty holes were found in it. ⁵ To him Caesar gave 200,000 sesterces for his services to himself and to the state, and declared that he was promoting him from centurion in the eighth cohort to leading centurion of the legion (for it was agreed that it was largely due to him that the fort had been saved), and he afterwards rewarded the cohort generously with double pay, grain, clothing, and rations, and military decorations.

54. Pompey added large-scale fortifications at night, and on the following days constructed towers; then having raised his earthworks to a height of fifteen feet, he shielded that side of his camp with protective screens. ² Five days later he took advantage of another somewhat overcast night and having blocked all the gates of the camp and put in the way to impede the enemy, at the start of the third watch silently led his army out and retired to his old fortifications.

55(56). Every day thereafter Caesar led his army forward in battle order on to level ground, to give Pompey the opportunity of a decisive battle, and as a result brought his legions up almost under

52 ² Volcaci² Σ: Volcatus Ω

53 ⁴ cxx Σ, cf. Suet. Div. Iul. 68.4: CCXX STV: CCXXX MU

⁵ nummum E.Hoffmann: atque Ω | veste cibariis Cuias: vespeciaris Ω

54 ² et ad impediendum obiectis Ω, lacunam vel corruptelam statuerunt plerique edd.

prima acies aberat, uti ne telum tormento adigi posset. ² Pompeius autem, ut famam opinionemque hominum teneret, sic pro castris exercitum constituebat, ut tertia acies vallum contingeret, omnis quidem instructus exercitus telis ex vallo proiectis protegi posset.

56(55). Aetolia, Acarnania, Amphilochis per Cassium Longinum et Calvisium Sabinum, ut demonstravimus, receptis temptandam sibi Achaia ac paulo longius progrediendum existimabat Caesar. ² itaque eo Q. <Fufium> Calenum misit eique Sabinum et Cassium cum cohortibus adiungit. ³ quorum cognito adventu Rutilius Lupus, qui Achaia missus a Pompeio obtinebat, Isthmum praemunire instituit, ut Achaia Fufium prohiberet; ⁴ qui Delphos, Thebas et Orchomenum voluntate ipsarum civitatum recepit, nonnullas urbes per vim expugnavit, reliquas civitates circummissis legationibus amicitiae Caesaris conciliare studebat. in his rebus fere erat Fufius occupatus.

57. Haec cum in Achaia atque apud Dyrrachium gererentur Scipionemque in Macedoniam venisse constaret, non oblitus pristini instituti Caesar mittit ad eum A. Clodium, suum atque illius familiarem, quem ab illo traditum initio et commendatum in suorum necessariorum numero habere instituerat. ² huic dat litteras mandataque ad eum, quorum haec erat summa: sese omnia de pace expertum nihil adhuc arbitrari vitio factum eorum quos esse auctores eius rei voluisset, quod sua mandata perferre non opportuno tempore ad Pompeium vererentur. ³ Scipionem ea esse auctoritate, ut non solum libere, quae probasset, exponere, sed etiam ex magna parte compellare atque errantem regere posset; praeesse autem suo nomine exercitui, ut praeter auctoritatem vires quoque ad coercendum haberet. ⁴ quod si fecisset, quietem Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperii uni omnes acceptam relatuuros. ⁵ haec ad eum mandata Clodius refert ac primis diebus, ut videbatur, libenter auditis, reliquis ad colloquium non admittitur castigato Scipione a Favonio, ut postea confecto bello reperiēbamus, infectaque re sese ad Caesarem recepit.

Pompey's camp; and his front line was only far enough away from the ramparts to be out of range of artillery missiles. ² Pompey, on the other hand, to preserve his public reputation, drew his army up in front of his camp, but in such a way that his third line touched the ramparts, and indeed the whole army could be protected by missiles thrown down from there.

56(55). Having won Aetolia, Acarnania, and Amphilochi, as explained, through Cassius Longinus and Calvisius Sabinus, Caesar considered that he ought to attempt Achaia and make a little further progress. ² He therefore sent Quintus *Fufius* Calenus in that direction and added Sabinus and Cassius with their cohorts to his force. ³ When he heard of their approach, Rutilius Lupus, who had been sent by Pompey to administer Achaia, began to build defensive works across the Isthmus to keep Fufius out of Achaia; ⁴ the latter received control of Delphi and of Thebes and Orchomenus by the wish of the communities themselves, took some cities by force, and sent delegations round the other states in an attempt to win them over to Caesar's side. This was the general nature of Fufius' activities.

57. While these operations were taking place in Achaia and at Dyrrachium, and when it was accepted that Scipio had reached Macedonia, Caesar, not forgetting his original policy, sent Aulus Clodius to him; this man was a friend of both himself and Scipio, and Caesar had been in the habit of regarding him as one of his circle after Scipio had initially recommended and passed him on. ² Caesar gave him a letter and a message for Scipio, of which this was the gist: he himself had tried everything to obtain peace, but considered that it was the fault of the people he had wanted to be its agents that nothing had been done, because they had been afraid of delivering his message to Pompey at an inopportune time. ³ But Scipio had enough authority not only to explain freely the course of action he favoured, but also to a great extent to chide and bring back to the right path a man who was going astray; furthermore he commanded an army in his own right, so that in addition to moral authority he also possessed the power to coerce. ⁴ If he were to do this, everyone would give him alone the credit for bringing calm to Italy, peace to the provinces, and safety to the empire. ⁵ Clodius gave him this message, and was apparently listened to willingly for a day or two; but subsequently, when Favonius had rebuked Scipio (as we found out when the war was over), he was not admitted to any discussions and went back to Caesar without achieving his purpose.

55 ¹ telum tormento Σ: telo tormentove Ω

² proiectis T: abiectis SMUV

56 ² eo Q. *Dübner*: eoque B: eo ST² | Fufium *addidi* (v.comm.)

⁴ qui *scripsi*: Calenus Ω

57 ¹ A. *add.* Markland (cf. 90.1 *infra*)

³ compellare SMUT: compellere V

⁴ imperii *Vascon*: imperio Ω

58. Caesar quo facilius equitatum Pompeianum ad Dyrrachium contineret et pabulatione prohiberet, aditus duos, quos esse angustos demonstravimus, magnis operibus praemunivit castellaque his locis posuit. ² Pompeius ubi nihil profici equitatu cognovit, paucis intermissis diebus rursus eum navibus ad se intra munitiones recepit. ³ erat summa inopia pabuli, adeo ut foliis ex arboribus strictis et teneris harundinum radicibus contusis equos alerent; frumenta enim quae fuerant intra munitiones sata consumpserant. ⁴ cogeantur Corcyra atque Acarnania longo interiecto navigationis spatio pabulum supportare, quoque erat eius rei minor copia, hordeo adaugere atque his rationibus equitatum tolerare. ⁵ sed postquam non modo hordeum pabulumque omnibus locis herbaeque desectae, sed etiam frons ex arboribus deficiebat, corruptis equis macie conandum sibi aliquid Pompeius de eruptione existimavit.

59. Erant apud Caesarem in equitum numero Allobroges duo fratres, Roucillus et Egus, Adbucilli filii, qui principatum in civitate multis annis obtinuerat, singulari virtute homines, quorum opera Caesar omnibus Gallicis bellis optima fortissimaque erat usus. ² his domi ob has causas amplissimos magistratus mandaverat atque eos extra ordinem in senatum legendos curaverat, agrosque in Gallia ex hostibus captos praemiaque rei pecuniariae magna tribuerat locupletesque ex egentibus fecerat. ³ hi propter virtutem non solum apud Caesarem in honore erant, sed etiam apud exercitum cari habebantur; sed freti amicitia Caesaris et stulta ac barbara arrogantia elati despiciebant suos stipendiumque equitum fraudabant et praedam omnem domum avertabant. ⁴ quibus illi rebus permoti universi Caesarem adierunt palamque de eorum iniuriis sunt questi et ad cetera addiderunt falsum ab iis equitum numerum deferri, quorum stipendium averterent.

60. Caesar neque tempus illud animadversionis esse existimans et multa virtuti eorum concedens rem totam distulit; illos secreto castigavit, quod quaestui equites haberent, monuitque ut ex sua amicitia omnia expectarent et ex praeteritis suis officiis reliqua

58. So that Caesar could more easily contain the Pompeian cavalry at Dyrrachium and stop them going out to graze, he built large earthworks by the two approaches, which we have explained were narrow, and sited forts at these spots. ² When Pompey realised that no advantage was being gained by his cavalry, after a few days he brought them back again by ship inside his fortifications. ³ There was an extreme shortage of fodder, so much so that they kept the horses alive by stripping leaves off the trees and mashing the soft roots of reeds; for they had eaten the crops which had been planted inside the fortifications. ⁴ They were forced to bring in fodder a great distance by sea from Corcyra and Acarnania, and as the supply of it was reduced, to supplement it with barley, and support the cavalry by these shifts. ⁵ But when not only the barley, and the fodder from all sources, and the plants they reaped, but even the leaves from the trees ran out, and the horses had become weak with emaciation, Pompey thought he must make some attempt to break out.

59. There were on Caesar's side among the cavalry two brothers from the Allobroges, Roucillus and Egus, sons of Adbucillus, who had over many years held the headship of his people. They were men of outstanding courage, of whose splendid and valiant assistance Caesar had made use in all his campaigns in Gaul. ² For these reasons Caesar had given them the highest offices at home and seen that they were appointed to their senate outside the ordinary procedures; he had given them land in Gaul captured from his enemies, and great rewards in the form of money, and transformed them from paupers into rich men. ³ On account of their courage they were not only honoured by Caesar, but also popular with the rest of the army; however, relying on their friendship with Caesar and carried away by a foolish and uncivilised arrogance they were treating their own people with contempt, cheating the horsemen over pay, and diverting all the booty back home. ⁴ Disturbed by this, their men came in a body to Caesar and complained openly about the injustices inflicted by the pair, and added to their other grievances the charge that they had made false returns of the number of cavalymen in order to appropriate their pay.

60. Not considering this the time to punish them, and making considerable allowances for their courage, Caesar adjourned the whole business; privately, he reprimanded them for treating their cavalry as a source of profit, and advised them to expect everything

58 ⁴ quoque Ω : quodque Σ

⁵ frons Cellarius : fructus Ω

59 ¹ Egus Ω : Accus Holder

sperarent. ² magnam tamen haec res illis offensionem et contemptionem ad omnes adtulit, idque ita esse cum ex aliorum obiectationibus tum etiam ex domestico iudicio atque animi conscientia intellegebant. ³ quo pudore adducti et fortasse non se liberari, sed in aliud tempus reservari arbitrati discedere ab nobis et novam temptare fortunam novasque amicitias experiri constituerunt. ⁴ et cum paucis colloqui clientibus suis, quibus tantum facinus committere audebant, primum conati sunt praefectum equitum C. Volusenum interficere (ut postea bello confecto cognitum est), ut cum munere aliquo perfugisse ad Pompeium viderentur; ⁵ postquam id difficilius visum est neque facultas perficiendi dabatur, quam maximas potuerunt pecunias mutuati, proinde ac <si> suis satisfacere et fraudata restituere vellent, multis coemptis equis ad Pompeium transierunt cum iis quos sui consilii participes habebant.

61. Quos Pompeius, quod erant honesto loco nati et instructi liberaliter magnoque comitatu et multis iumentis venerant virique fortes habebantur et in honore apud Caesarem fuerant, quodque novum <id> et praeter consuetudinem acciderat, omnia sua praesidia circumduxit atque ostentavit. ² nam ante id tempus nemo aut miles aut eques a Caesare ad Pompeium transierat, cum paene cotidie a Pompeio ad Caesarem perfugerent, vulgo vero universi in Epiro atque Aetolia conscripti milites earumque regionum omnium quae a Caesare tenebantur. ³ sed hi cognitis omnibus rebus, seu quid in munitionibus perfectum non erat, seu quid a peritioribus rei militaris desiderari videbatur, temporibusque rerum et spatiis locorum et custodiarum varia diligentia animadversa, prout cuiusque eorum qui negotiis praeerant aut natura aut studium ferebat, haec ad Pompeium omnia detulerunt.

62. Quibus ille cognitis eruptionisque iam ante capto consilio, ut demonstratum est, tegimenta galeis milites ex viminibus facere atque aggerem iubet comportare. ² his paratis rebus magnum numerum levis armaturae et sagittariorum aggeremque omnem noctu in scaphas et naves actuarias imponit, et de media nocte cohortes LX ex maximis castris praesidiisque deductas ad eam partem munitionum ducit quae pertinebat ad mare longissimeque a maximis castris Caesaris aberat. ³ eodem naves quas demonstravimus aggere et levis

of his friendship and to base their hopes for the future on his past kindnesses. ² However this affair brought them dislike and contempt from all, a state of affairs which they realised not only from the taunts of others, but also from their own judgment and consciences. ³ Impelled by the disgrace, and perhaps thinking that they were not being allowed to go free, but were being held over for another time, they decided to leave us and try new fortunes and new friendships. ⁴ Conferring with a few of their dependants to whom they dared entrust such a crime, they first tried to kill the cavalry commander Gaius Volusenus (as was afterwards discovered at the end of the war), so that they would not appear to have deserted to Pompey without bringing him some gift; ⁵ but when that seemed too difficult and no opportunity of carrying it out arose, they borrowed as much money as they could, as if they wanted to satisfy their men and pay back what they had misappropriated, bought a large number of horses, and deserted to Pompey with their accomplices.

61. Because they were well-born and lavishly equipped and had come with a great retinue and many draught animals, and were considered men of valour and had been honoured by Caesar, and because this was a new and abnormal event, Pompey took them round and displayed them to all his outposts. ² Before that time no-one, whether footsoldier or cavalryman, had abandoned Caesar for Pompey, while almost every day they deserted Pompey for Caesar, but commonly these were the soldiers conscripted in Epirus and Aetolia and from all the regions controlled by Caesar, who came over *en masse*. ³ But these men knew everything; they knew if there was something unfinished on the fortifications, or if something was thought by the military experts to be lacking, and they had observed the times things happened, and distances between sites, and the varying watchfulness of the guards according to the character and the enthusiasm of the man in charge in each case. All this information they presented to Pompey.

62. Having learnt this, and having previously decided, as has been mentioned, on an attempt to break out, he ordered his troops to make wicker coverings for their helmets and gather together filling material. ² When these preparations were complete, after dark he embarked a great number of light-armed troops and archers and all the material in small boats and merchant ships, and at about midnight led sixty cohorts drawn from his main camp and outposts towards that

60 ⁵ si *add. Paul*

61 ¹ id *add. Meusel*

³ detulerunt S: detulerant B

armaturae militibus completas, quasque ad Dyrrachium naves longas habebat, mittit et quid a quoque fieri velit praecipit. ⁴ ad eas munitiones Caesar Lentulum Marcellinum quaestorem cum legione viii. positum habebat. huic, quod valetudine minus commoda utebatur, Fulvium Postumum adiutorem summiserat.

63. Erat eo loco fossa pedum xv et vallum contra hostem in altitudinem pedum x, tantundemque eius valli agger in latitudinem patebat. ab eo intermisso spatio pedum dc alter conversus in contrariam partem erat vallus humilior paulo munitione. ² hoc enim superioribus diebus timens Caesar, ne navibus nostri circumvenirentur, duplicem eo loco fecerat vallum, ut si ancipiti proelio dimicaretur, posset resisti. ³ sed operum magnitudo et continens omnium dierum labor, quod milia passuum in circuitu xvii munitione erat complexus, perficiendi spatium non dabat. ⁴ itaque contra mare transversum vallum, qui has duas munitiones coniungeret, nondum perfecerat. ⁵ quae res nota erat Pompeio, delata per Allobroges perfugas, magnumque nostris attulit incommodum. ⁶ nam uti ad mare nostrae cohortes excubuerant, accessere subito prima luce Pompeiani; simul navibus circumvecti milites in exteriorum vallum tela iaciebant, fossaeque aggere complebantur, et legionarii interioris munitionis defensores scalis admotis tormentis cuiusque generis telisque terrebant, magnaque multitudo sagittariorum ab utraque parte circumfundebatur. ⁷ multum autem ab ictu lapidum (quod unum nostris erat telum) viminea tegimenta galeis imposita defendebant. ⁸ itaque cum omnibus rebus nostri premerentur atque aegre resisterent, animadversum est vitium munitionis, quod supra demonstratum est, atque inter duos vallos, qua perfectum opus non erat, per mare navibus expositi in aversos nostros impetum fecerunt atque ex utraque munitione deiectos terga vertere coegerunt.

62 ³ velit MU : vellit T² : vellet ST¹V | praecipit SMU : praecepit TV

63 ¹ pedum xv ed.pr. : pedes xv Ω | latitudinem ed.pr. : altitudinem Ω

³ xvii SMT : x et vii V : xviii U

⁴ coniungeret Chacon : contingeret Ω

⁵ attulit ed.pr. : attulerat Ω

⁶ cohortes excubuerant Klotz : cohortes nona leg. (vel. sim.) excubuerant Ω |

Pompeiani simul Nipperdey : Pompeiani exercitus adventus extitit simul Ω

⁸ expositi in aversos Faerno : expositis in adversos Ω

part of the fortifications which adjoined the sea and was furthest away from Caesar's main camp. ³ He despatched to the same place the ships which as we explained were loaded with material and light-armed troops, and also the warships which he had at Dyrrachium, and gave instructions as to what he wanted done by each. ⁴ Caesar had the quaestor Lentulus Marcellinus posted at these fortifications with the Ninth legion; as he was not in good health, he had sent Fulvius Postumus to assist him.

63. At that spot, facing the enemy, there was a ditch fifteen feet wide and a bank and palisade ten feet high; the earth bank of this fortification had the same measurement in breadth, and after an interval of 150 feet there was another palisade facing the opposite direction with a slightly lower earthwork. ² The reason was Caesar's fear during the preceding days, that our men would be outflanked from the sea, and he had constructed a double fortification there so that if there were to be fighting on both sides there would be some possibility of resistance. ³ But the scale of the earthworks and the non-stop daily labour, because he had extended the circuit of his fortifications seventeen miles, had not allowed time for them to be finished. ⁴ And so he had not yet completed the transverse bank and palisade facing the sea which was to join up these lines of fortification. ⁵ This fact was known to Pompey, having been reported by the Allobrogan deserters, and caused a great setback for our men. ⁶ For when our cohorts had taken up their night stations by the sea, at dawn the Pompeians suddenly approached; at the same time the soldiers who had been transported round in the ships launched their missiles at the outer palisade, the ditches started to be filled in with material, the legionaries brought up ladders and with artillery and missiles of various kinds struck fear into the defenders of the inner line of fortification, and a great mass of archers was deployed on both fronts. ⁷ Furthermore the wicker coverings which the Pompeians had attached to their helmets gave them considerable protection from the impact of stones, which were the only missiles available to us. ⁸ And so, when our men were under every sort of pressure and were barely holding their own, attention was given to the defect in the fortifications explained above, and men were put ashore from ships between the two palisades, where the work was not finished; they took our men in rear, cleared them from both lines of fortification, and forced them to flee.

64. Hoc tumultu nuntiato Marcellinus cohortes ... subsidio nostris laborantibus summittit ex castris, quae fugientes conspicatae neque illos suo adventu confirmare potuerunt neque ipsae hostium impetum tulerunt. ² itaque quodcumque addebatur subsidii, id corruptum timore fugientium terrorem et periculum augebat; hominum enim multitudine receptus impediabatur. ³ in eo proelio cum gravi vulnere esset adfectus aquilifer et a viribus deficeretur, conspicatus equites nostros 'hanc ego', inquit, 'et vivus multos per annos magna diligentia defendi et nunc moriens eadem fide Caesari restituo. nolite, obsecro, committere, quod ante in exercitu Caesaris non accidit, ut rei militaris dedecus admittatur, incolumemque ad eum deferre.' ⁴ hoc casu aquila conservatur omnibus primae cohortis centurionibus interfectis praeter principem priorem.

65. Iamque Pompeiani magna caede nostrorum castris Marcellini appropinquabant non mediocri terrore illato reliquis cohortibus, et M. Antonius qui proximum locum praesidiorum tenebat, ea re nuntiata cum cohortibus xii descendens ex loco superiore cernebatur. cuius adventus Pompeianos compressit nostrosque firmavit, ut se ex maximo timore colligerent. ² neque multo post Caesar significatione per castella fumo facta, ut erat superioris temporis consuetudo, deductis quibusdam cohortibus ex praesidiis eodem venit. ³ qui cognito detrimento cum animadvertisset Pompeium extra munitiones egressum, secundum mare ut libere pabulari posset nec minus aditum navibus haberet, commutata ratione belli, quoniam propositum non tenuerat, castra iuxta Pompeium munire iussit.

66. Qua perfecta munitione animadversum est ab speculatoribus Caesaris, cohortes quasdam, quod instar legionis videretur, esse post silvam et in vetera castra duci. ² castrorum hic situs erat: superioribus diebus nona Caesaris legio cum se obiecisset Pompeianis copiis atque opere, ut demonstravimus, circummuniret, castra eo loco posuit. ³ haec silvam quandam contingebant neque longius a mari passibus ccc aberant. ⁴ post, mutato consilio quibusdam de causis, Caesar paulo ultra eum locum castra transtulit, paucisque intermissis diebus eadem haec Pompeius occupaverat, et, quod eo loco plures erat

64. On the news of this emergency, Marcellinus sent ... cohorts from the camp to help our struggling forces. When they came in sight of the fugitives they were unable to steady them by their arrival, nor did they themselves stand up to the enemy attack. ² Thus whatever reinforcement was provided, it was undermined by the fugitives' fear and contributed to the panic and danger, the retreat being hampered by the mass of men. ³ In that engagement the legionary standard-bearer was seriously wounded, and as his strength ebbed, he caught sight of our cavalry and said: 'This eagle, when I was alive, I defended assiduously for many years, and now as I die I give it back to Caesar with the same trust. Do not, I beg you, allow to occur what has never before happened in Caesar's army and suffer a military disgrace, but take this safe to him.' ⁴ By this chance the eagle was saved when all the centurions of the first cohort had been killed except the *princeps prior*.

65. By now the Pompeians, inflicting heavy casualties on our men, were approaching Marcellinus' camp and making the remaining cohorts extremely apprehensive, and Marcus Antonius, who held the neighbouring guard-station, had received the news and was seen coming down with twelve cohorts from higher ground. His arrival checked the Pompeians and encouraged our men to recover from their panic. ² Not much later, after a smoke signal had been made from fort to fort, as had previously been the practice, Caesar arrived on the spot with a number of cohorts he had taken from the garrisons of the forts. ³ When he learnt the extent of the reverse and saw that Pompey had got outside the fortifications, so that he could freely graze his animals along the coast without losing access by ship, Caesar changed his tactics, as he had failed to achieve his aim, and gave orders to fortify a camp next to Pompey.

66. When these fortifications were complete, it was observed by Caesar's scouts that some cohorts, amounting apparently to a legion, were behind a wood and being led to an old camp. ² This was the arrangement of the camp. When on the preceding days Caesar's Ninth legion had blocked Pompey's forces and was completing their encirclement with earthworks, as we have explained, it had encamped at this spot. ³ The camp adjoined a wood and was no more than 300 yards from the sea. ⁴ Later, having changed his plans for certain reasons, Caesar moved his camp a little further away. After a few days' interval Pompey had taken possession of this same site, and

64 ¹ *numerus cohortium vidit deesse Jurin (qui tres supplevit) | ex castris quae Held : ex castrisque Ω*

² *subsidii V: subsidio SMUT*

65 ³ *castra iuxta Pompeium | castra, quae habent Ω post egressum, trsp. Forchhammer*

legiones habiturus, relicto interiore vallo maiorem adiecerat munitionem. ⁵ ita minora castra inclusa maioribus castelli atque arcis locum obtinebant. ⁶ item ab angulo castrorum sinistro munitionem ad flumen perduxerat circiter passus cccc, quo liberius ac sine periculo milites aquarentur. ⁷ sed is quoque mutato consilio quibusdam de causis, quas commemorari necesse non est, eo loco excesserat. ita complures dies <inania> manserant castra; munitiones quidem omnes integrae erant.

67. Eo signa legionis illata speculatores Caesari renuntiarunt. hoc idem visum ex superioribus quibusdam castellis confirmaverunt. is locus aberat <a> novis Pompei castris circiter passus quingentos. ² hanc legionem sperans Caesar se opprimere posse et cupiens eius diei detrimentum sarcire reliquit in opere cohortes duas, quae speciem munitionis praeberent; ³ ipse diverso itinere, quam potuit occultissime, reliquas cohortes, numero xxxiii, in quibus erat legio nona multis amissis centurionibus deminutoque militum numero, ad legionem Pompei castraque minora duplici acie eduxit. ⁴ neque eum prima opinio fefellit. nam et pervenit priusquam Pompeius sentire posset, et tametsi erant munitiones castrorum magnae, tamen sinistro cornu, ubi erat ipse, celeriter aggressus Pompeianos ex vallo deturbavit. ⁵ erat obiectus portis ericius. hic paulisper est pugnatum, cum irrumpere nostri conarentur, illi castra defenderent, fortissimeque Tito Pullieno, cuius opera proditum exercitum C. Antoni demonstravimus, eo loco propugnante. ⁶ sed tamen nostri virtute vicerunt excisoque ericio primo in maiora castra, post etiam in castellum, quod erat inclusum maioribus castris, irruperunt, quod eo pulsa legio sese receperat; nonnullos ibi repugnantes interfecerunt.

68. Sed fortuna, quae plurimum potest cum in reliquis rebus tum praecipue in bello, parvis momentis magnas rerum commutationes efficit; ut tum accidit. ² munitionem, quam pertinere a castris ad flumen supra demonstravimus, dextri Caesaris cornus cohortes

because he intended to accommodate a greater number of legions there, had added a more extensive fortification, leaving the inner ramparts in being. ⁵ Thus the smaller camp was contained within the larger and functioned as a fort and strongpoint. ⁶ Pompey had also built a fortification about 400 yards long from the left-hand corner of the camp across to a stream, so that his men could get water more easily and without danger. ⁷ But he too, changing his plans for reasons which it is unnecessary to detail, had left the place. Thus the camp had remained *empty* for several days; but all the system of defence was intact.

67. Caesar's lookouts reported that the legionary standards had been carried in there. They confirmed that the same thing had been seen from some of the higher forts. The place was about five hundred yards from Pompey's new camp. ² Hoping to be able to crush this legion, and wanting to remedy that day's defeat, Caesar left two cohorts busy on earthworks, to give the impression that fortification was in progress; ³ he himself led the remainder of his cohorts, to the number of thirty-three, amongst them the Ninth legion, reduced in numbers and with many of its centurions missing, by a roundabout way and as unobtrusively as possible in double line towards Pompey's legion and the smaller camp. ⁴ His initial thoughts were proved right, because he arrived before Pompey was able to observe him, and, although the fortifications of the camp were substantial, he none the less swiftly attacked on the left wing, where he himself was, and dislodged the Pompeians from the rampart. ⁵ A "hedgehog" had been put to block the gates. Here there was a struggle for a little while, while our men were trying to break in and the opposition were defending the camp; the resistance in this area was led by Titus Pullienus, by whose agency, as we have shown, Gaius Antonius' army had been betrayed. ⁶ But nevertheless our troops' courage brought them victory; they cut out the "hedgehog" and burst first into the bigger camp and then also into the fort which was incorporated in it, because that was where the beaten legion had withdrawn; and there they killed some of the enemy who were fighting back.

68. But luck, universally powerful but particularly so in war, brings about great changes of circumstance by slight adjustments of her balance; as then occurred. ² Being ignorant of the ground, the cohorts of Caesar's right wing, in their search for a gate, followed the

66 ⁷ inania add. Madvig

67 ¹ signa . . . illata Chacon; signo . . . illato Ω | a add. ed.pr.

⁵ Tito STV : T. MU | Pullieno scripsi (v. comm.): Pulcione SMUV :

Pulione T : Pullone Schneider (cf. BG 5.44).

68 ² cornus U : cornu SMTV

ignorantia loci sunt secutae, cum portam quaerere castrorumque eam munitionem esse arbitrarentur. ³ quod cum esset animadversum, coniunctam esse flumini, prorutis munitionibus defendente nullo transcenderunt, omnisque noster equitatus eas cohortes est secutus.

69. Interim Pompeius hac <re> satis longa interiecta mora nuntiata v legiones ab opere deductas subsidio suis duxit; eodemque tempore equitatus eius nostris equitibus appropinquabat, et acies instructa a nostris qui castra occupaverant cernebatur, omniaque sunt subito mutata. ² Pompeiana legio celeris spe subsidii confirmata ab decumana porta resistere conabatur atque ultro in nostros impetum faciebat. equitatus Caesaris, quod angusto itinere per aggeres ascendebat, receptui suo timens initium fugae faciebat. ³ dextrum cornu, quod erat a sinistro seclusum, terrore equitum animadverso, ne intra munitionem opprimeretur ea parte quam prouerat sese recipiebat, ac plerique ex his, ne in angustias inciderent, munitionis se in fossas praecipitabant, primisque oppressis reliqui per horum corpora salutem sibi atque exitum pariebant. ⁴ sinistro cornu milites cum ex vallo Pompeium adesse et suos fugere cernerent, veriti ne angustis intercluderentur, cum extra et intus hostem haberent, eodem quo venerant receptu sibi consulebant, omniaque erant tumultus timoris fugae plena, adeo ut, cum Caesar signa fugientium manu prenderet et consistere iuberet, alii *dimissis equis eundem cursum confugerent*, alii ex metu etiam signa dimitterent, neque quisquam omnino consisteret.

70. His tantis malis haec subsidia succurrebant, quominus omnis deleteretur exercitus, quod Pompeius insidias timens, credo quod haec praeter spem acciderant eius qui paulo ante ex castris fugientis suos conspexerat, munitionibus appropinquare aliquamdiu non audebat,

³ coniunctam S : coniuncta B

69 ¹ hac satis longa interiecta mora et re nuntiata Ω, *correx*i (v. *comm.*) : v legiones . . . deductas *Nipperdey* : .v. (.v.^{1a} TV) legione . . . deducta (-am MU) Ω

² celeris *Faerno* : celeri Ω | conabatur *Estienne* : conatur Ω

³ ea *Faerno* : ex Ω | prouerat *Chacon* : proruebat Ω | munitionis *scripsi* :

X pedom munitionis (-ones T¹) Ω : X pedom munitione *Nipperdey* |

praecipitabant *Manuzio* : praecipitant Ω

⁴ receptu Σ : receptui Ω

dimissis equis eundem (eodem S) cursum confugerent Ω | admissis equis

Faerno : demissis equis *Oehler* : demissi sequentis *Weber* :: eodem cursu

Miller :: conficerent *ed.pr.* | dimitterent SUTV : amitterent M

fortification which as we explained above led from the camp to a stream, thinking it was the fortification of the camp. ³ But when they realised that it connected with the stream, they broke down the fortifications, there being no defenders, and all our cavalry followed these cohorts.

69. In the meantime Pompey, having received the news of this event after a somewhat long delay, withdrew his five legions from their work of fortification and led them to the relief of his men; his cavalry was approaching ours at the same time as his battle formation was sighted by those of our troops who had seized the camp, and the whole situation was suddenly altered. ² The Pompeian legion, heartened by the hope of swift relief, tried to resist from the rear gate of the camp and actually made an attack on our men. Caesar's cavalry, because they were making their way up through the ramparts by a narrow path, were afraid they might not be able to retreat and began the flight. ³ The right wing, which was separated from the left, noticed the terror of the cavalry, and began to withdraw at the point where they had destroyed the fortifications, so that they should not be overwhelmed inside them. Not a few of them, to avoid the narrow opening, jumped down into the ditches of the fortifications, where the first men in were crushed and the rest used their bodies to provide a way out to safety for themselves. ⁴ On the left wing, when the soldiers saw from the rampart that Pompey had arrived and their own men were in flight, they became afraid of being cut off in a confined space, as they had the enemy both outside and inside them. They attempted to save themselves by a retreat in the direction from which they had come, and there was such confusion, panic, and flight all around that although Caesar seized the standards of his fleeing men and ordered them to halt, some *abandoned their horses and ran off together in the same direction*, others in their fear even abandoned the standards, and not a single man halted.

70. In this disastrous situation, the factors which contributed to prevent the destruction of the entire army were that Pompey, afraid of an ambush, I think because events had turned out contrary to his expectations after he had seen his own men fleeing from the camp shortly beforehand, did not dare for some time to approach the fortifications; and that his cavalry were slowed down in their pursuit

equitesque eius angustiis - atque his a Caesaris militibus occupatis - ad insequendum tardabantur. ² ita parvae res magnum in utramque partem momentum habuerunt. munitiones enim a castris ad flumen perductae expugnatis iam castris Pompei prope iam expeditam Caesaris victoriam interpellaverunt, eadem res celeritate insequentium tardata nostris salutem attulit.

71. Duobus his unius diei proeliis Caesar desideravit milites DCCCLX et notos equites Romanos <T.??> Tuticanum Gallum, senatoris filium, C. Felginatem Placentia, A. Granium Puteolis, M. Sacrativirum Capua tribunos militum, et centuriones xxxii ² (sed horum omnium pars magna in fossis munitionibusque et fluminis ripis oppressa suorum in terrore ac fuga sine ullo vulnere interiit), signaque sunt militaria amissa xxxii. ³ Pompeius eo proelio imperator est appellatus. hoc nomen obtinuit atque ita se postea salutari passus, sed in litteris numquam ascribere est solitus, neque in fascibus insignia laureae praetulit. ⁴ at Labienus cum ab eo impetravisset, ut sibi captivos tradi iuberet, omnes productos ostentationis ut videbatur causa, quo maior perfugae fides haberetur, commilitones appellans et magna verborum contumelia interrogans, solerentne veterani milites fugere, in omnium conspectu interfecit.

72. His rebus tantum fiducia ac spiritus Pompeianis accessit, ut non de ratione belli cogitarent, sed vicisse iam sibi viderentur. ² non illi paucitatem nostrorum militum, non iniquitatem loci atque angustias praeoccupatis castris et ancipitem terrorem intra extraque munitiones, non abscisum in duas partes exercitum, cum altera alteri auxilium ferre non posset, causae fuisse cogitabant. ³ non ad haec addebant non concursu acri facto, non proelio dimicatum, sibi ipsos multitudine atque angustiis maius attulisse detrimentum quam ab hoste acceperant. ⁴ non denique communes belli casus recordabantur, quam parvulae saepe causae vel falsae suspicionis vel terroris repentini vel obiectae religionis magna detrimenta intulissent,

70 ¹ angustiis *Nipperdey* : angustis portis Ω

² prope iam *Vossius* : propriam Ω

71 ¹ Romanos Tuticanum *Nipperdey* : Romanos flegmatem (Flec- V, Fleginatem S) Tuticanum Ω | T. coniecit *Meusel* (in comm.) | c. felginatem S : C. Fleginatem *edd.* : flegmatem (flec- TV) B | tr(ibun') mil(itum) et T(V) : tr (trib M) mil L et SMU : tribunos militum v *Klotz*

³ numquam *Madvig* : quas Ω | ascribere *Müller* : scribere Ω

⁴ productos *Estienne* : reductos B : que ductos S

72 ³ concursu *Moro* : ex concursu Ω | acri *ed.pr.* : agri Ω

by the narrow gaps which were in any case already occupied by Caesar's infantry. ² And so a trivial matter tipped the balance strongly in each direction: the fortifications which had been extended from the camp to the stream interfered with the victory which Caesar had all but won after storming the Pompeian camp, and the same thing saved our men by slowing down their pursuers.

71. In these two battles fought on a single day Caesar lost 960 legionaries and the military tribunes *Titus?* Tuticanus Gallus, a senator's son, Gaius Felginas from Placentia, Aulus Granus from Puteoli, and Marcus Sacrativir from Capua, who were all four prominent Roman knights, and 32 centurions ² (but a large proportion of all these perished in the ditches and on the fortifications and the banks of the stream, quite unwounded but overwhelmed by the panic-stricken flight of their fellows), and 32 military standards were lost. ³ The battle earned Pompey a salutation as 'Victorious General'. He accepted the title and allowed himself to be so greeted afterwards, but never adopted the practice of putting it at the head of his letters, nor wreathed his rods of office with laurel. ⁴ Labienus, on the other hand, succeeded in getting Pompey to order the prisoners to be handed over to him, and apparently in order to make a show and create more confidence in himself, deserver that he was, when they had all been brought forward he addressed them as 'fellow-soldiers', asked them in the most insulting fashion whether veteran soldiers usually ran away, and publicly put them to death.

72. These events put such confidence and courage into the Pompeians that they did not reflect on the nature of the struggle, but considered themselves to have won already. ² They did not recognise as causes either the small numbers of our men, or the difficult terrain and restricted passage arising from the previous occupation of the camp, and the fear of attack from within and without the fortifications, or the fact that the army had been cut in two and neither portion could help the other. ³ Beyond this, they failed to consider that the fighting had taken place neither when line had fiercely charged line, nor in pitched battle, and that our men because of their numbers and the lack of room had inflicted more harm on themselves than they had suffered at the hands of the enemy. ⁴ And finally they did not remind themselves of the everyday accidents of war, how reasons which are frequently trifling - mistaken suspicion, or sudden alarm, or religious scruple - have caused great disasters, or

quotiens vel ducis vitio vel culpa tribuni in exercitu esset offensum, sed proinde ac si virtute vicissent neque ulla commutatio rerum posset accidere, per orbem terrarum fama ac litteris victoriam eius diei concelebrabant.

73. Caesar ab superioribus consiliis depulsus omnem sibi commutandam belli rationem existimavit. ² itaque uno tempore praesidiis omnibus deductis et oppugnatione dimissa coactoque in unum locum exercitu contionem apud milites habuit hortatusque est ne ea quae accidissent graviter ferrent, neve his rebus terrentur multisque secundis proeliis unum adversum et id mediocre opponerent. ³ habendam fortunae gratiam, quod Italiam sine aliquo vulnere cepissent, quod duas Hispanias bellicosissimorum hominum peritissimis atque exercitatissimis ducibus pacavissent, quod finitimas frumentariasque provincias in potestatem redegissent; denique recordari debere qua felicitate inter medias hostium classes, oppletis non solum portibus sed etiam litoribus, omnes incolumes essent transportati. ⁴ si non omnia caderent secunda, fortunam esse industria sublevandam. quod esset acceptum detrimenti, cuiusvis potius quam suae culpa debere tribui. ⁵ locum se aequum ad dimicandum dedisse, potius se esse hostium castris, expulisse ac superasse pugnantes. sed sive ipsorum perturbatio sive error aliquis sive etiam fortuna partem iam praesentemque victoriam interpellavisset, dandam omnibus operam, ut acceptum incommodum virtute sarciretur. ⁶ quod si esset factum, <futurum> ut detrimentum in bonum verteret, uti ad Gergoviam accidisset, atque ei, qui ante dimicare timuissent, ultro se proelio offerrent.

74. Hac habita contione nonnullos signiferos ignominia notavit ac loco movit. ² exercitui quidem omni tantus incessit ex incommodo dolor tantumque studium infamiae sarcindae, ut nemo aut tribuni aut centurionis imperium desideraret et sibi quisque etiam poenae loco graviores imposeret labores simulque omnes arderent cupiditate pugnandi, cum superioris etiam ordinis nonnulli ratione permoti manendum eo loco et rem proelio committendam existimarent. ³ contra ea Caesar neque satis militibus perterritis confidebat

how often an army has come to grief through the shortcomings of a commander or the fault of a tribune; but just as if they had triumphed by their own courage and no change of fortune could occur, they made that day's victory famous, by letter and by word of mouth, to the whole world.

73. As his previous plans had been thwarted, Caesar thought he ought to change his entire plan of campaign. ² He therefore withdrew all his garrisons simultaneously and abandoned the siege. Gathering the army together, he addressed his men and encouraged them not to be downhearted at what had happened or to be demoralised by these events and allow one defeat, and that not serious, to stand against their many victories. ³ They should be grateful to their luck because they had taken Italy without loss of any kind, had imposed peace on the two Spains with their extremely warlike population led by highly experienced and practised generals, and had brought under their own control the nearby provinces and their supplies of grain; finally they ought to remember the happy chance by which they had all been brought safe across from Italy, through hostile fleets, when not only the harbours but even the beaches had been packed with the enemy. ⁴ If not everything was going well, luck needed to be helped along by their own efforts. The blame for such loss as they had incurred ought to be attributed to anything or anyone but themselves. ⁵ They had offered level ground for a battle, they had taken possession of an enemy camp, they had driven their opponents out and got the better of them in combat. But whether it was their own disarray, or some mistake, or indeed luck which had intervened to rob them of a victory which had seemed to be already in their hands, they must all strive to redeem by their courage the defeat they had suffered. ⁶ If they did this, *the result would be* that their loss would turn to profit, as had happened at Gergovia, and their opponents, men who had previously been afraid to fight, would offer battle of their own accord.

74. After delivering this address he formally reprimanded some standard-bearers and demoted them. ² Indeed the whole army was so hurt by defeat and so eager to restore their reputation, that nobody waited for orders from an officer or a centurion and each of them, by way of punishment, voluntarily undertook even harder labour; at the same time they all longed to fight, while even some of the higher ranks, not without reason, thought the right policy was to stay there and seek a result by battle. ³ Caesar disagreed; he had little

73 ⁵ se aequum *Vettori* : secum *SMUT* : se eis *V* | error *B* : terror *S*

⁶ futurum *add. Meusel*

spatiumque interponendum ad recreandos animos putabat, <et> relictis munitionibus magnopere rei frumentariae timebat.

75. Itaque nulla interposita mora sauciorum modo et aegrorum habita ratione impedimenta omnia silentio prima nocte ex castris Apolloniam praemisit ac conquirere ante iter confectum vetuit. his una legio missa praesidio est. ² his explicitis rebus, duas in castris legiones retinuit, reliquas de quarta vigilia compluribus portis eductas eodem itinere praemisit parvoque spatio intermisso, ut et militare institutum servaretur et quam serissime eius profectio cognosceretur, conclamari iussit statimque egressus et novissimum agmen consecutus celeriter ex conspectu castrorum discessit. ³ neque vero Pompeius cognito consilio eius moram ullam ad insequendum intulit, sed eadem spectans, si itinere impedito perterritos deprehendere posset, exercitum e castris eduxit equitatumque praemisit ad novissimum agmen demorandum, neque consequi potuit, quod multum expedito itinere antecesserat Caesar. ⁴ sed cum ventum esset ad flumen Genusum, quod ripis erat impeditis, consecutus equitatus novissimos proelio detinebat. ⁵ huic suos Caesar equites opposuit expeditosque antesignanos admiscuit cccc, qui tantum profecerunt, ut equestri proelio commisso pellerent omnes compluresque interficerent ipsique incolumes se ad agmen reciperent.

76. Confecto iusto itinere eius diei quod proposuerat Caesar, traductoque exercitu flumen Genusum veteribus suis in castris contra Asparagium consedit militesque omnes intra vallum castrorum continuit equitatumque per causam pabulandi emissum confestim decumana porta in castra se recipere iussit. ² simili ratione Pompeius confecto eius diei itinere in suis veteribus castris ad Asparagium consedit. ³ eius milites, quod ab opere integris munitionibus vacabant, alii lignandi pabulandique causa longius progrediebantur, alii, quod subito consilium profectionis ceperant magna parte impedimentorum et sarcinarum relictis ad haec repetenda invitati propinquitate superiorum castrorum depositis in contubernio armis

confidence in his demoralised troops and thought they needed time to regain their courage, *and* he was very concerned about his food supplies now that he had moved away from the fortifications.

75. And so without any delay, apart from that required to attend to the sick and wounded, he silently sent ahead at the beginning of the night all the baggage and equipment from his camp to Apollonia, forbidding anyone to rest before the march was finished. One legion was sent to escort the train. ² When this operation was complete, he made two legions stay in the camp but brought the remainder out before dawn by a number of gates and sent them the same way. Shortly afterwards, to observe military routine and ensure that his departure should be discovered as late as possible, he ordered the signal for breaking camp to be given, then immediately emerged and swiftly disappeared out of sight of the camp in pursuit of the rear of his column. ³ When he realised Caesar's plan, Pompey had no hesitation in following, and bearing the same consideration in mind, that is the possibility of catching demoralised troops encumbered on their march, he led his army out of camp and sent his cavalry ahead to slow down Caesar's rearguard; but he was unable to catch up with the latter, because Caesar had had a long start and was marching without equipment. ⁴ But when they reached the river Genusus, the banks of which were difficult, the cavalry caught up with the rearmost troops and delayed them in fighting. ⁵ Against them Caesar sent his own horse, reinforced by four hundred light-armed front-line troops, and they were so successful that as a result of the cavalry engagement that took place they drove all the enemy off, killing a number of them, and themselves withdrew without loss to rejoin the column of march.

76. After completing the normal march which he intended for that day, and getting his army across the river Genusus, Caesar halted for the night in his old camp facing Asparagium. He kept all his infantry inside the fortifications and ordered his cavalry, which had been sent out as though to forage, to withdraw rapidly into camp by the rear gate. ² Likewise Pompey halted in his old camp at Asparagium when his day's march was done. ³ Some of his soldiers, who were free from entrenchment work because the fortifications were intact, went rather far afield in search of firewood and fodder, while others, because the decision to march had been sudden and they had left most of their baggage and possessions behind, were tempted by the nearness of their previous camp to deposit their arms

74 ³ *et add. Jurin*

75 ¹ *ac U : et M : haec STV*

² *serissime Scaliger : suetissime Q*

76 ¹ *in castris MUV : castris ST*

vallum relinquebant. ⁴ quibus ad sequendum impeditis Caesar, quod fore providerat, meridiano fere tempore signo profectionis dato exercitum educit duplicatoque eius diei itinere viii milia passuum ex eo loco procedit; quod facere Pompeius discessu militum non potuit.

77. Postero die Caesar similiter praemissis prima nocte impedimentis de quarta vigilia ipse egreditur, ut siqua esset imposita dimicandi necessitas, subitum casum expedito exercitu subiret. hoc idem reliquis fecit diebus. ² quibus rebus perfectum est, ut altissimis fluminibus atque impeditissimis itineribus nullum acciperet incommodum. ³ Pompeius enim, primi diei mora illata et reliquorum dierum frustra labore suscepto, cum se magnis itineribus extenderet et praegressos consequi cuperet, quarta die finem sequendi fecit atque aliud sibi consilium capiendum existimavit.

78. Caesari ad saucios deponendos, stipendium exercitui dandum, socios confirmandos, praesidium urbibus relinquendum necesse erat adire Apolloniam. ² sed his rebus tantum temporis tribuit, quantum erat properanti necesse. timens Domitio, ne adventu Pompei praeoccuparetur, ad eum omni celeritate et studio incitatus ferebatur. ³ totius autem rei consilium his rationibus explicabat, ut si Pompeius eodem contenderet, abductum illum a mari atque ab iis copiis quas Dyrrachii comparaverat, frumento ac commeatu, abstractum pari condicione belli secum decertare cogeret; si in Italiam transiret, coniuncto exercitu cum Domitio per Illyricum Italiae subsidio proficisceretur; si Apolloniam Oricumque oppugnare et se omni maritima ora excludere conaretur, obsessio Scipione necessario illum suis auxilium ferre cogeret. ⁴ itaque praemissis nuntiis ad Cn. Domitium Caesar scripsit et quid fieri vellet ostendit, praesidioque Apolloniae cohortibus iii, Lissi una, iii Orici relictis quique erant ex vulneribus aegri depositis, per Epirum atque Athamaniam iter facere coepit. ⁵ Pompeius quoque de Caesaris consilio coniectura iudicans ad Scipionem properandum sibi existimabat; si Caesar iter illo haberet, ut subsidium Scipioni ferret, si ab ora maritima Oricumque discedere nollet, quod legiones equitatumque ex Italia expectaret, ipse ut omnibus copiis Domitium aggrediretur.

in their tents and abandon the defences. ⁴ They were thus hindered from following, as Caesar had foreseen would be the case, when at about midday he gave the signal to leave camp, led his army out, and by repeating the day's march proceeded eight miles further; this Pompey was unable to do because of the absence of his soldiers.

77. On the following day Caesar, in the same way, sent his baggage and equipment on ahead as soon as night had fallen and himself left camp before dawn, so that if circumstances compelled him to fight, he could respond to the emergency with his army ready for battle. He did the same on the subsequent days. ² By these means he was successful in avoiding any loss or defeat although the rivers were very deep and the way very obstructed. ³ The reason was that Pompey, after incurring the first day's delay and undertaking the effort of the following days without result, although he pressed on with forced marches and very much wanted to catch up with the men ahead, called off the chase on the fourth day and judged that he ought to adopt a different plan.

78. Caesar had to go to Apollonia to leave the wounded, pay his troops, rally his allies, and put garrisons in the towns. ² But he gave these matters only as much time as a man in haste was forced to; he was anxious about Domitius, fearful that Pompey might succeed in reaching him first, and hurried with all speed and energy in his direction. ³ Caesar's whole strategy depended on the following considerations: if Pompey made for the same area, he would be drawn away from the sea and separated from the supplies of grain and provisions he had collected at Dyrrachium, and be forced to fight Caesar on equal terms; if he crossed to Italy, Caesar could join forces with Domitius and go to the help of Italy by way of Illyricum; and if he attempted to attack Apollonia and Oricum and keep Caesar out of the whole coastal area, by blockading Scipio Caesar would of necessity compel him to come to the aid of his own forces. ⁴ Caesar therefore sent messengers ahead to Domitius with written instructions about what he wanted done; then he garrisoned Apollonia with four cohorts, Lissus with one, and Oricum with three, and after leaving the wounded, began to make his way through Epirus and Athamania. ⁵ Pompey too, guessing what Caesar's plan would be, was of the view that he ought to hurry to Scipio; if Caesar were to march there, he could support Scipio; but if Caesar were unwilling to leave the coast and Oricum, because he was expecting legions and cavalry from Italy, he could himself attack Domitius with his entire force.

78 ³ sc Aldo : si Ω

⁵ Athamaniam Drumann (cf. Plut. Pomp. 66) : acarnaniam SMU :
acarniam T : acharniam V

79. His de causis uterque eorum celeritati studebat, et suis ut esset auxilio, <et> ad opprimendos adversarios ne occasione temporis deesset. ²sed Caesarem Apollonia a directo itinere averterat; Pompeius per Candaviam iter in Macedoniam expeditum habebat. ³accessit etiam ex improvise aliud incommodum, quod Domitius <cum> dies complures castris Scipionis castra collata habuisset, rei frumentariae causa ab eo discesserat et Heracliam quae est subiecta Candaviae iter fecerat, ut ipsa fortuna illum obicere Pompeio videretur. haec ad id tempus Caesar ignorabat. ⁴simul a Pompeio litteris per omnes provincias civitatesque dimissis de proelio ad Dyrrachium facto, latius inflatusque multo quam res erat gesta fama percrebruerat pulsum fugere Caesarem paene omnibus copiis amissis. haec itinera infesta reddiderat, haec civitates nonnullas ab eius amicitia avertebat. ⁵quibus accidit rebus, ut pluribus dimissi itineribus a Caesare ad Domitium et a Domitio ad Caesarem nulla ratione iter conficere possent. ⁶sed Allobroges, Roucilli atque Egi familiares, quos per fugisse ad Pompeium demonstravimus, conspicati in itinere exploratores Domiti, seu pristina sua consuetudine, quod una in Gallia bella gesserant, seu gloria elati, cuncta, ut erant acta, exposuerunt et Caesaris profectionem, adventum Pompei docuerunt. ⁷a quibus Domitius certior factus vix III horarum spatio antecedens hostium beneficio periculum vitavit et ad Aeginium, quod est obiectum oppositumque Thessaliae, Caesari venienti occurrit.

80. Coniuncto exercitu Caesar Gomphos pervenit, quod est oppidum primum Thessaliae venientibus ab Epiro; quae gens paucis ante mensibus ultro ad Caesarem legatos miserat, ut suis omnibus facultatibus uteretur, praesidiumque ab eo militum petierat. ²sed eo fama iam praecurrerat, quam supra docuimus, de proelio Dyrrachino, quod multis auxerat partibus. ³itaque Androstenes, praetor Thessaliae, cum se victoriae Pompei comitem esse mallet quam socium Caesaris in rebus adversis, omnem ex agris multitudinem servorum ac liberorum in oppidum cogit portasque praeccludit et ad Scipionem Pompeiumque nuntios mittit, ut sibi subsidio veniant: se

79. For these reasons each of them made all speed, intending on the one hand to help his own side *and on the other* not to let slip the chance of defeating the enemy. ²But while Caesar had been diverted from the direct route by his visit to Apollonia, Pompey had an easy journey to Macedonia through Candavia. ³On top of this came another, unforeseen, setback: *although* Domitius had been encamped alongside Scipio for a number of days, he had moved away from him to find supplies of food, and had taken his force to Heraclia, which is on the borders of Candavia, so that fortune herself seemed to be putting him in Pompey's path. These facts were unknown to Caesar at this stage. ⁴At the same time Pompey had sent letters to all the provinces and communities about the battle at Dyrrachium, and a wildly exaggerated rumour had spread, that Caesar had been routed and was fleeing with the loss of nearly all his men. This news had not only made the journey dangerous, but was even turning some communities against him. ⁵And so it happened that although messengers were sent off by several routes from Caesar to Domitius and from Domitius to Caesar, they were totally unable to reach their destination. ⁶But some Allobroges, companions of Roucillus and Egus, who as we explained above had deserted to Pompey, caught sight as they rode along of Domitius' scouts, and whether from old acquaintance, because they had fought together in Gaul, or from elation over their great achievement, recounted the whole story of what had happened, and told them that Caesar had left and that Pompey was about to appear. ⁷The scouts brought the news to Domitius, who with a start of barely four hours avoided danger, thanks to the enemy, and met Caesar as he arrived in the neighbourhood of Aeginium, a town which faces Thessaly and blocks it off.

80. With his forces united, Caesar went on to Gomphi, which is the first town in Thessaly as you come from Epirus; the people had of their own accord sent a delegation to Caesar a few months beforehand to invite him to make use of all the help they could give, and they had asked him for soldiers to protect them. ²But he was preceded there by the rumour we have mentioned above about the battle at Dyrrachium, which it had grossly exaggerated. ³So Androstenes, the chief magistrate of Thessaly, preferring to associate himself with Pompey in victory than to be Caesar's ally in adversity, gathered the whole rural population, slave and free, inside the town, barred the gates, and sent messengers to Scipio and Pompey

79 ¹ et add. Aldo

³ cum add. Paul | Heracliam Cellarius : Heracliam Senticam Q

⁵ dimissi Rhellican : dimissis Q

⁷ obiectum B : abiectum S

80 ² auxerat S : auxerant B

confidere munitionibus oppidi, si celeriter succurratur; longinquam oppugnationem sustinere non posse. ⁴ Scipio discessu exercituum ab Dyrrachio cognito Larisam legiones adduxerat; Pompeius nondum Thessaliae appropinquabat. ⁵ Caesar, castris munitis, scalas musculosque ad repentinam oppugnationem fieri et crates parari iussit. ⁶ quibus rebus effectis, cohortatus milites docuit quantum usum haberet ad sublevandam omnium rerum inopiam potiri oppido pleno atque opulento, simul reliquis civitatibus huius urbis exemplo inferre terrorem et id fieri celeriter, priusquam auxilia concurrerent. ⁷ itaque usus singulari militum studio eodem quo venerat die post horam nonam oppidum altissimis moenibus oppugnare aggressus ante solis occasum expugnavit et ad diripiendum militibus concessit statimque ab oppido castra movit et Metropolim venit, sic ut nuntios expugnati oppidi famamque antecederet.

81. Metropolitae primum eodem usu consilio, isdem permoti rumoribus, portas clausurunt murosque armatis compleverunt, sed postea casu civitatis Gomphensis cognito ex captivis, quos Caesar ad murum producendos curaverat, portas aperuerunt. ² quibus diligentissime conservatis, collata fortuna Metropolitum cum casu Gomphensium nulla Thessaliae fuit civitas praeter Larisaeos, qui magnis exercitibus Scipionis tenebantur, quin Caesari parerent atque imperata facerent. ³ ille idoneum locum in agris nactus <ad frumentorum commeatus>, quae prope iam matura erant, ibi adventum expectare Pompei eoque omnem belli rationem conferre constituit.

82. Pompeius paucis post diebus in Thessalam pervenit contionatusque apud cunctum exercitum suis agit gratias, Scipionis milites cohortatur, ut parta iam victoria praedae ac praemiorum velint esse participes, receptisque omnibus in una castra legionibus suum cum Scipione honorem partitur classicumque apud eum cani et alterum illi iubet praetorium tendi. ² auctis copiis Pompei duobusque magnis exercitibus coniunctis, pristina omnium confirmatur opinio et spes victoriae augetur, adeo ut quidquid intercederet temporis id morari redditum in Italiam videretur, et siquando quid Pompeius

to come to his rescue, saying that he was confident of the town's defences, if help came quickly, but they could not withstand a lengthy assault. ⁴ Scipio, hearing that the armies had left Dyrrachium, had brought his legions to Larisa; Pompey however was not yet near to Thessaly. ⁵ Caesar fortified a camp, then gave orders for ladders and mantlets to be constructed, and fascines to be prepared, for an immediate attack. ⁶ When these were ready, he fired the soldiers' enthusiasm by pointing out how advantageous it would be for the alleviation of their desperate needs to capture a rich and well-provisioned town, and at the same time to terrify the remaining communities by its example, and to have this happen quickly, before help could arrive. ⁷ And so, thanks to the remarkable efforts of his soldiers, on the same day that he arrived, he attacked in the middle of the afternoon and took by assault before sunset a town with imposingly high walls, handed it over to his soldiers to plunder, and immediately moved camp away from the town and came to Metropolis, so that he arrived there before the news or the rumour of its storming.

81. The people of Metropolis were at first of the same way of thinking, being swayed by the same rumours. They shut their gates and manned the walls, but later, when they heard of the fate of Gomphi from prisoners whom Caesar had had brought forward to the foot of the wall, they opened the gates. ² Caesar was most careful to see that they suffered no harm, and apart from Larisa, which was occupied by substantial forces of Scipio's, there was no state in Thessaly which on comparing what had happened to Gomphi with the good fortune of Metropolis did not submit to Caesar and carry out his orders. ³ He took up a position in farmland convenient for securing supplies of corn, now nearly ripe, and decided to wait for Pompey there and make this the centre of his whole campaign.

82. A few days later Pompey reached Thessaly. Addressing the whole army, he expressed his gratitude to his own men and urged on Scipio's soldiers, now that victory was theirs, to share in the booty and the rewards. He brought all the legions into a single camp and shared the honours with Scipio, ordering the bugle to be sounded in his area too, and a second commander's tent to be pitched. ² Now that Pompey's forces were augmented and two great armies united, the opinion previously held by them all was confirmed and their hopes of victory increased, so much so that any intervening time appeared

81 ¹ Gomphensis *Chacon* : comprehensis *SM*¹, del. *M*² : compressis *UT* :
compreste *V*

³ ad frumentorum commeatus *add. Bücheler*

tardius aut consideratius faceret, unius esse negotium diei, sed illum delectari imperio et consulares praetoriosque servorum habere numero dicerent. ³ iamque inter se palam de praemiis ac de sacerdotiis contendebant in annosque consulatum definiebant, alii domos bonaque eorum qui in castris erant Caesaris petebant; ⁴ magnaque inter eos in consilio fuit controversia, oporteretne Lucili Hirri, quod is a Pompeio ad Parthos missus esset, proximis comitiis praetoris absentis rationem haberi, cum eius necessarii fidem implorarent Pompei, praestaret quod proficiscenti recepisset, ne per eius auctoritatem deceptus videretur, reliqui in labore pari ac periculo ne unus omnes antecederet recusarent.

83. Iam de sacerdotio Caesaris Domitius, Scipio Spintherque Lentulus cotidianis contentione ad gravissimas verborum contumelias palam descenderunt, cum Lentulus aetatis honorem ostentaret, Domitius urbanam gratiam dignitatemque iactaret, Scipio adfinitate Pompei confideret. ² postulavit etiam L. Afranium proditoris exercitus Acutius Rufus apud Pompeium, quod <neglegenter bellum> gestum in Hispania diceret. ³ et L. Domitius in consilio dixit placere sibi bello confecto ternas tabellas dari ad iudicandum iis qui ordinis essent senatorii belloque una cum ipsis interfuisent, sententiasque de singulis ferrent, qui Romae remansissent quique intra praesidia Pompei fuissent neque operam in re militari praestitissent: unam fore tabellam, qua liberandos omni periculo censerent, alteram, qua capitis damnarent, tertiam, qua pecunia multarent. ⁴ postremo omnes aut de honoribus suis aut de praemiis pecuniae aut de persequendis inimicitiis agebant, neque quibus rationibus superare possent, sed quemadmodum uti victoria deberent cogitabant.

84. Re frumentaria praeparata confirmatisque militibus et satis longo spatio temporis a Dyrrachinis proeliis intermisso, quo satis perspectum habere militum <animum> videretur, temptandum Caesar existimavit quidnam Pompeius propositi aut voluntatis ad

simply to delay their return to Italy, and whenever Pompey acted a little slowly or cautiously, they said that although the business needed no more than a day, he took pleasure in exercising command and liked to count among his slaves men who had been consuls and praetors. ³ Some were already openly competing among themselves for rewards and priesthods, and allocating consulships for years ahead, and others were asking for the houses and property of those who were in Caesar's camp; ⁴ they also had a great dispute in council about whether Lucilius Hirrus, because he had been sent by Pompey on a mission to Parthia, should be permitted to be a candidate *in absentia* at the next praetorian elections - his friends begging Pompey to vindicate the trust placed in him when Hirrus was leaving, so as not to give the impression that the latter had been deceived by his word, the others jibbing at special treatment for one man when the trouble and the danger were the same for all.

83. By now Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther in their daily quarrelling over Caesar's priesthood had sunk to open and serious insult: Lentulus made much of the honour due to his seniority, Domitius boasted of his position and popularity in Rome, and Scipio relied on his relationship to Pompey. ² Acutius Rufus even demanded that Lucius Afranius be brought before Pompey on a charge of betraying his army, on the grounds that he had *been negligent* in conducting *the war* in Spain. ³ Furthermore, Lucius Domitius said in council that after the end of the war he favoured giving three voting tablets to those who were members of the senatorial order and had taken part in the war on their side, and that they should give their verdict on each person who had stayed in Rome or had been with Pompey's various forces but failed to lend support in the field: one tablet would be for those they thought should be free of all danger, one for those on whom they would pass a capital sentence, and one for those they would fine. ⁴ In short, all of them were concerned either with office, or monetary reward, or pursuit of their private enemies, and thought not about how they could achieve victory, but how they ought to use it.

84. Now that he had secured supplies of grain and his soldiers had recovered their strength, and a sufficient interval had elapsed since the battles at Dyrrachium for him to consider that he could reliably judge the troops' *morale*, Caesar decided to test Pompey's intention, or willingness, to fight. ² So he led his army out of camp

82 ⁴ Lucili Hirri *Nipperdey*: luci (L V) hirri (hy- MV) B: lurrichi S
recepisset SM¹UT: precepisset M²V

83 ² neglegenter bellum *add. Klotz*: quod ... diceret *del. Gruter post Chacon*
³ tabellam qua ... qua ... qua ... *Oudendorp*: qui ... qui ... qui ... M²TV:
qui ... in ... qui ... SM¹U

⁴ neque *Meusel*: nec M²V: ne SM¹UT

84 ¹ animum *add. Σ* | temptandum Caesar existimavit M²: temptandum
existimavit SM¹UTV

dimicandum haberet. ² itaque ex castris exercitum eduxit aciemque instruxit, primum suis locis pauloque a castris Pompei longius, continentibus vero diebus ut progredere a castris suis collibusque Pompeianis aciem subiceret. quae res in dies confirmationem eius exercitum efficiebat. ³ superius tamen institutum in equitibus, quod demonstravimus, servabat, ut quoniam numero multis partibus esset inferior, adulescentes atque expeditos ex antesignanis electis ad pernecitatem armis inter equites proeliari iuberet, qui cotidiana consuetudine usum quoque eius generis proeliorum perciperent. ⁴ his erat rebus effectum, ut equitum mille etiam apertioribus locis vi milium Pompeianorum impetum, cum adesset usus, sustinere auderent, neque magnopere eorum multitudine terrentur. ⁵ namque etiam per eos dies proelium secundum equestre fecit atque unum Allobrogem ex duobus, quos perfugisse ad Pompeium supra docuimus, cum quibusdam interfecit.

85. Pompeius, qui castra in colle habebat, ad infimas radices montis aciem instruebat, semper, ut videbatur, expectans, si iniquis locis Caesar se subiceret. ² Caesar nulla ratione ad pugnam elici posse Pompeium existimans hanc sibi commodissimam belli rationem iudicavit, uti castra ex eo loco moveret semperque esset in itineribus, haec spectans, ut movendis castris pluribusque adeundis locis commodiore re frumentaria uteretur, simulque in itinere ut aliquam occasionem dimicandi nancisceretur et insolitum ad laborem Pompei exercitum cotidianis itineribus defatigaret. ³ his constitutis rebus, signo iam profectionis dato tabernaculisque detensis animum adversum est paulo ante extra cotidianam consuetudinem longius a vallo esse aciem Pompei progressam, ut non iniquo loco posse dimicari videretur. ⁴ tum Caesar apud suos, cum iam esset agmen in portis, 'differendum est' inquit 'iter in praesentia nobis et de proelio cogitandum, sicut semper depoposcimus. animo sumus ad dimicandum parati; non facile occasionem postea reperiemus.' confestimque expeditas copias educit.

86. Pompeius quoque, ut postea cognitum est, suorum omnium hortatu statuerat proelio decertare. namque etiam in consilio superioribus diebus dixerat, priusquam concurrerent acies, fore uti

and formed it up for battle, at first on his home ground and at a good distance from Pompey's camp, but as the days went by in such a way as to progress forward from his own camp and draw up his line close under the hills where the Pompeians were. This action made his army daily more confident of itself. ³ He adhered however to his previous practice, as explained, with the cavalry: since he was greatly inferior in numbers, he ordered young, lightly-equipped men from his front-line troops, armed with weapons chosen in the interests of speed, to fight among the cavalry, so that by daily practice they became experienced in this sort of fighting also. ⁴ By these means the result was achieved that even on the more open sort of ground his thousand cavalry, as they were trained, would dare to stand up to the charge of seven thousand Pompeians without being much terrified of their numbers. ⁵ To prove it, during this very period he carried out a successful cavalry engagement, and killed among others one of the two Allobroges who as we noted above had deserted to Pompey.

85. Pompey, whose camp was on a hill, was in the habit of drawing up his battle-line at the very bottom of the slope, always, it seemed, waiting to see whether Caesar would accept the disadvantage of the ground. ² Caesar, believing that there was no means of tempting Pompey to battle, judged that his best plan of campaign was to shift his camp away and always be on the march. He had it in mind that by moving from camp to camp and coming to more places he would find provisioning easier; at the same time he might get some chance of a battle while *en route*, and by marching every day he would exhaust Pompey's army, which was unused to hard work. ³ In consequence of this decision, the signal for departure had already been given and the tents struck, when it was observed that Pompey's line had shortly beforehand advanced further from his defences than was his daily custom, so that it appeared possible to fight without one side having the advantage of the slope. ⁴ Then Caesar, although his column of march was already at the gates, said to his companions 'We must put off the march for the moment and think about a battle, as we have always wanted. We are mentally prepared to fight; we shall not easily get the chance again.' And hurriedly he led his forces out in battle order.

86. Pompey too, as was learnt later, had decided to settle matters by a battle, on the urging of all his advisers. He had even said in council within the preceding few days that Caesar's army would be

³ electis ad *Nipperdey*: electis milites ad Ω

⁵ unum S: unum M¹UT: vincum M²: egum V

85 ² Caesar M², *om. cell.* | spectans *Vascosan*: sperans Ω | frumentaria (-c M¹, -ae T) re SM²UV: *trsp. Nipperdey*

⁴ sumus B: sivi S: simus *Manuzio*

exercitus Caesaris pelleretur. ² id cum essent plerique admirati, 'scio me' inquit 'paene incredibilem rem polliceri; sed rationem consilii mei accipite, quo firmiore animo in proelium prodeatis. ³ persuasi equitibus nostris, idque mihi facturos confirmaverunt, ut cum propius sit accessum, dextrum Caesaris cornu ab latere aperto aggredierentur et circumventa ab tergo acie prius perturbatum exercitum pellerent, quam a nobis telum in hostem iaceretur. ⁴ ita sine periculo legionum et paene sine vulnere bellum conficiemus. id autem difficile non est, cum tantum equitatu valeamus.' ⁵ simul denuntiavit, ut essent animo parati in posterum, et quoniam fieret dimicandi potestas, ut saepe rogativissent, ne suam neu reliquorum opinionem fallerent.

87. Hunc Labienus excepit et, cum Caesaris copias despiceret, Pompei consilium summis laudibus efferret, 'noli', inquit, 'existimare, Pompei, hunc esse exercitum, qui Galliam Germaniamque devicerit. ² omnibus interfui proeliis neque temere incognitam rem pronuntio. perexigua pars illius exercitus superest; magna pars deperiit, quod accidere tot proeliis fuit necesse, multos autumnii pestilentia in Italia consumpsit, multi domum discesserunt, multi sunt relictii in continenti. ³ an non audistis ex iis qui per causam valetudinis remanserunt cohortes esse Brundisii factas? ⁴ hae copiae quas videtis, ex dilectibus horum annorum in citeriore Gallia sunt relectae, et plerique sunt ex colonis Transpadanis. ac tamen, quod fuit roboris, duobus proeliis Dyrrachinis interiit.' ⁵ haec cum dixisset, iuravit se nisi victorem in castra non reversurum, reliquosque ut idem facerent hortatus est. ⁶ hoc laudans Pompeius idem iuravit; nec vero ex reliquis fuit quisquam qui iurare dubitaret. ⁷ haec cum facta sunt in consilio, magna spe et laetitia omnium discessum est; ac iam animo victoriam praecipiebant, quod de re tanta et a tam perito Imperatore nihil frustra confirmari videbatur.

88. Caesar cum Pompei castris appropinquasset, ad hunc modum aciem eius instructam animum advertit. ² erant in sinistro cornu legiones duae traditae a Caesare initio dissensionis ex senatus consulto, quarum una prima, altera tertia appellabatur. in eo loco

routed before the battle-lines met. ² When there was general astonishment at this, he said 'I know I am promising something almost incredible; but here is the logic of my plan, so that you can go out to battle in better heart. ³ I have convinced our cavalry of this, and they have confirmed that they will do it, namely attack Caesar's right wing on its open flank when the armies are nearly upon each other; they will outflank his line, take it in rear, throw his army into confusion, and rout it before a single weapon of ours is hurled at the enemy. ⁴ In this way we shall finish off the war without any danger to our legions and virtually without bloodshed. This is really not difficult, as we are so strong in cavalry.' ⁵ At the same time he instructed them to be mentally ready for the next day and, since the opportunity of fighting now existed, as they had often repeatedly asked, not to disappoint the hopes held both by themselves and by the rest.

87. Labienus spoke next, and because he had a low opinion of Caesar's forces enthusiastically praised Pompey's plan: 'Do not think, Pompey', he said, 'that this is the army which conquered Gaul and Germany. ² I took part in all the battles and my view is not put forward without thought or based on facts beyond my knowledge. A very small fraction of that army remains; a large proportion has died, which was bound to occur given the number of battles, many fell victim to disease in the autumn in Italy, many have gone home, and many were left behind on embarkation. ³ Or did you not hear that cohorts were put together at Brundisium from men who had stayed behind because they were sick? ⁴ These forces you see have been reconstituted from the levies of recent years in Cisalpine Gaul, and a good number of them are Transpadane settlers.' ⁵ With these words, he swore not to return to camp unless victory was theirs, and urged the rest to do the same. ⁶ Praising him for this, Pompey took an oath in the same terms; and not one of the rest hesitated to do likewise. ⁷ After these proceedings in council were complete, they separated with high hopes and much cheerfulness; and they imagined they had already secured victory, because they thought it impossible in a matter of such importance and from a general of such experience to receive assurances that were groundless.

88. On drawing close to Pompey's camp, Caesar saw that his line of battle was arranged as follows. ² On the left wing were the two legions handed over by Caesar at the beginning of the quarrel in accordance with a decree of the senate; one of these was called the First, the other the Third. This was where Pompey placed himself.

86 ⁵ rogativissent *Morus* : cogitavissent Ω | ne suam neu *Landgraf* : ne usu manu Ω

87 ³ audistis Σ : exaudistis Ω

⁴ colonis *SMUT* : coloniis *V*

ipse erat Pompeius. ³ mediam aciem Scipio cum legionibus Syriacis tenebat. Ciliciensis legio coniuncta cum cohortibus Hispanis, quas traductas ab Afranio docuimus, in dextro cornu erant collocatae. ⁴ has firmissimas se habere Pompeius existimabat. reliquas inter aciem mediam cornuaque interiecerat numeroque cohortes expleverat. ⁵ haec erant milia XLV, evocatorum circiter duo, quae ex beneficiariis superiorum exercituum ad eum convenerant; quae tota acie disperserat. reliquas cohortis VII castris propinquisque castellis praesidio disposuerat. ⁶ dextrum cornu eius rivus quidam impeditis ripis muniebat; quam ob causam cunctum equitatum, sagittarios funditoresque omnes sinistro cornu obiecerat.

89. Caesar superius institutum servans X. legionem in dextro cornu, nonam in sinistro collocaverat, tametsi erat Dyrrachinis proeliis vehementer attenuata, et huic sic adiunxit octavam ut paene unam ex duabus efficeret, atque alteram alteri praesidio esse iusserat. ² cohortes in acie LXXX constitutas habebat, quae summa erat milium XXII; cohortes VII castris praesidio reliquerat. ³ sinistro cornu Antonium, dextro P. Sullam, mediae aciei Cn. Domitium praeposuerat. ipse contra Pompeium constitit. ⁴ simul his rebus animadversis quas demonstravimus, timens ne a multitudine equitum dextrum cornu circumveniretur, celeriter ex tertia acie singulas cohortes detraxit atque ex his quartam instituit equitatuque opposuit et quid fieri vellet ostendit, monuitque eius diei victoriam in earum cohortium virtute constare. ⁵ simul tertiae aciei imperavit ne iniussu suo concurrerent; se cum id fieri vellet, vexillo signum daturum.

90. Exercitum cum militari more ad pugnam cohortaretur suaeque in eum perpetui temporis officia praedicaret, in primis commemoravit testibus se militibus uti posse quanto studio pacem petisset, quae per Vatinius in colloquiis, quae per Aulum Clodium cum Scipione egisset, quibus modis ad Oricum cum Libone de mittendis legatis contendisset. ² neque se umquam abuti militum sanguine neque rem publicam alterutro exercitu privare voluisse. ³ hac habita oratione, exposcentibus militibus et studio pugnae ardentibus tuba signum dedit.

88 ³ ab Afranio *Aldo* : ab aeranio *SMUT*, *om.* V

89 ¹ erat . . . attenuata *MU* : erant . . . adtenuatae (at- V) *STV*

² VII *Moehring* : II *Ω*

³ mediae aciei *Meusel* (cf. 89.5, 93.5) : media acie *Ω* : mediae acie *Klotz*

⁵ aciei *Novák* (cf. 94.1 *infra*) : aciei totique exercitui *Ω*

³ The centre of the line was taken by Scipio with the legions from Syria. The Cilician legion was positioned on the right wing together with the Spanish cohorts which Afranius, as we said, had brought with him. ⁴ These were the units which Pompey thought were his most reliable. He had inserted the rest of the cohorts between his centre and his wings, bringing the total to 110. ⁵ This made 45,000 men, plus about two thousand re-enlisted veterans, men of his personal entourage from his previous armies who had gathered to join him; these he had distributed over all parts of the line. The remaining seven cohorts he had stationed to guard his camp and the neighbouring forts. ⁶ A river with difficult banks protected his right wing; he had therefore put his whole body of cavalry and all his archers and slingers on his left wing.

89. Following his previous practice, Caesar had put the Tenth legion on the right wing; on the left he had put the Ninth, although it had been terribly weakened in the battles at Dyrrachium, and placed the Eighth next to it in such a way as to make virtually a single legion out of the two, and had instructed each to protect the other. ² He had 80 cohorts formed up in the line, 22,000 men in all, and had left seven cohorts to guard the camp. ³ In command of the left wing he had put Antony, of the right wing Publius Sulla, and of the centre Gnaeus Domitius. He himself took up a position opposite Pompey. ⁴ At the same time, because he had noticed the dispositions we have explained, and was afraid that his right wing might be outflanked by the mass of cavalry, he quickly withdrew individual cohorts from his third line and made a fourth from them, which he formed up opposite the cavalry; he made clear to them what he wanted, and impressed on them that victory on that day depended on those cohorts' courage. ⁵ At the same time he gave instructions to the third line that they were not to engage without orders from him; when he wanted them to, he would give a signal by flag.

90. In delivering his exhortation (following military custom) to the army to fight, and declaring his undying commitment to its interests, Caesar recalled above all that he was able to use his soldiers as witnesses to the enthusiasm with which he had sought peace, the initiatives he had taken through Vatinius in discussions and through Aulus Clodius with Scipio, and the ways in which he had struggled with Libo at Oricum to arrange the dispatch of an embassy. ² Nor had he ever wanted to waste soldiers' blood, or deprive the state of one or other army. ³ At the conclusion of this address, with the soldiers clamouring and burning with eagerness to fight, he gave the signal on the trumpet.

91. Erat Crastinus evocatus in exercitu Caesaris, qui superiore anno apud eum primum pilum in legione x. duxerat, vir singulari virtute. ² hic signo dato 'sequimini me', inquit, 'manipulares mei qui fuistis, et vestro imperatori quam constituistis operam date. unum hoc proelium superest; quo confecto et ille suam dignitatem et nos nostram libertatem recuperabimus.' ³ simul respiciens Caesarem 'faciam', inquit, 'hodie, imperator, ut aut vivo mihi aut mortuo gratias agas.' haec cum dixisset, primus ex dextro cornu procucurrit atque eum electi milites circiter cxx voluntarii sunt prosecuti.

92. Inter duas acies tantum erat relictum spatii, ut satis esset ad concursum utriusque exercitus. ² sed Pompeius suis praedixerat, ut Caesaris impetum exciperent neve se loco moverent aciemque eius distrahi paterentur; idque admonitu C. Triarii fecisse dicebatur, ut primus excursus visque militum infringeretur aciesque distenderetur, atque in suis ordinibus dispositi dispersos adorirentur; ³ leviusque casura pila sperabat in loco retentis militibus, quam si ipsi immissis telis occurrissent, simul fore ut duplicato cursu Caesaris milites exanimarentur et lassitudine conficerentur. ⁴ quod nobis quidem nulla ratione factum a Pompeio videtur, propterea quod est quaedam animi incitatio atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quae studio pugnae incenditur. ⁵ hanc non reprimere, sed augere imperatores debent; neque frustra antiquitus institutum est, ut signa undique concinerent clamoremque universi tollerent; quibus rebus et hostes terri et suos incitari existimaverunt.

93. Sed nostri milites dato signo cum infestis pilis procucurrissent atque animum advertissent non concurrere a Pompeianis, usu periti ac superioribus pugnis exercitati sua sponte cursum represserunt et ad medium fere spatium constiterunt, ne consumptis viribus appropinquarent, parvoque intermisso temporis spatio ac rursus renovato cursu pila miserunt celeriterque, ut erat praeceptum a Caesare, gladios strinxerunt. ² neque vero Pompeiani huic rei defuerunt. nam et tela missa exceperunt et impetum legionum tulerunt et ordines conservarunt pilisque missis ad gladios redierunt.

91 ¹ Crastinus Ω : C. Crastinus Meusel

³ voluntarii sunt Fröhlich (cui etiam voluntarii suspectum) : voluntarii eiusdem centuriae sunt Ω

92 ² dicebatur SMTV : videbatur U

³ exanimarentur Aldo : existimarentur Ω

⁴ quae ... incenditur B : qui ... incenduntur S

91. There was a re-enlisted veteran, Crastinus, in Caesar's army who in the previous year had served under him as leading centurion in the Tenth legion and was a man of extraordinary courage. ² When the signal was given, he said 'Follow me, you men who were in my company, and give your general the aid you have promised. This one battle remains; when it is over he will regain his position and we our freedom.' ³ And looking at Caesar he said 'I shall do things today, general, that you will thank me for, whether I live or die.' Having spoken these words, he was the first man to run forward from the right wing, followed by about 120 picked volunteers.

92. Between the two lines enough spare was left for the two armies to make their charge at each other. ² But Pompey had previously instructed his men to absorb Caesar's attack without moving from their positions, and to allow his line to be pulled apart; this he was said to have done on the advice of Gaius Triarius, so that the first vigorous charge of Caesar's troops should be blunted and their line stretched, and they themselves, with their formation intact, could attack men in disorder; ³ and he hoped that the throwing spears would fall with less effect on his troops if they stood their ground than if they threw their own weapons and advanced, and also that Caesar's men, because they had run twice the distance, would be out of breath and overcome by exhaustion. ⁴ At least in our view, Pompey was wrong to do this, because there is in all of us some naturally inborn quickness and ardour of soul, which is fired by the desire to fight. ⁵ This quality generals ought not to repress, but encourage; and not without reason did it become the custom a very long time ago for trumpet calls to be sounded on all sides and everyone to raise a shout; people thought that by these means the enemy were terrified and their own side urged on.

93. But when the signal was given and our soldiers ran forward with their spears ready to throw, they saw that the Pompeians were not running to meet them; being experienced and practised from previous battles, they spontaneously checked their charge and halted approximately half-way, to avoid being in a state of exhaustion when they came to close quarters; then after a short pause they renewed their charge, threw their spears, and quickly drew their swords, as had been ordered by Caesar. ² Not that the Pompeians were not up to the task. They withstood the hail of spears, took the shock of the legions, kept their formation, and after throwing their spears resorted to their

³ eodem tempore equites ab sinistro Pompei cornu, ut erat imperatum, universi procucurrerunt, omnisque multitudo sagittariorum se profudit. ⁴ quorum impetum noster equitatus non tulit, sed paulum loco motus cessit, equitesque Pompei hoc acrius instare et se turmatim explicare aciemque nostram a latere aperto circumire coeperunt. ⁵ quod ubi Caesar animum advertit, quartae aciei quam instituerat ex cohortium numero dedit signum. ⁶ illae celeriter procucurrerunt infestisque signis tanta vi in Pompei equites impetum fecerunt, ut eorum nemo consisteret omnesque conversi non solum loco excederent, sed protinus incitati fuga montes altissimos peterent. ⁷ quibus summotis omnes sagittarii funditoresque destituti inermes sine praesidio interfecti sunt. ⁸ eodem impetu cohortes sinistrum cornu, pugnantibus etiam tum ac resistentibus in acie Pompeianis, circumierunt eosque a tergo sunt adortae.

94. Eodem tempore tertiam aciem Caesar, quae quies fuerat et se ad id tempus loco tenuerat, procurrare iussit. ² ita cum recentes atque integri defessis successissent, alii autem a tergo adorirentur, sustinere Pompeiani non potuerunt atque universi terga verterunt. ³ neque vero Caesarem fefellit quin ab iis cohortibus quae contra equitatum in quarta acie collocatae essent, initium victoriae oriretur, ut ipse in cohortandis militibus pronuntiaverat. ⁴ ab his enim primum equitatus est pulsus, ab isdem factae caedes sagittariorum ac funditorum, ab isdem acies Pompeiana a sinistra parte circumita atque initium fugae factum. ⁵ sed Pompeius ut equitatum suum pulsum vidit atque eam partem cui maxime confidebat perterritam animadvertit, aliis quoque diffusus acie excessit protinusque se in castra equo contulit, et iis centurionibus quos in statione ad praetoriam portam posuerat clare, ut milites exaudirent, 'tuemini', inquit, 'castra et defendite diligenter, siquid durius acciderit. ego reliquas portas circumeo et castrorum praesidia confirmo.' ⁶ haec cum dixisset, se in praetorium contulit summae rei diffidens et tamen eventum expectans.

93 ⁴ paulum MUT²V : paula | m S : paulatim Σ

⁵ ex cohortium numero SMU : ex cohortibus TV : sex cohortium numero Orsini : sex cohortium Nipperdey : cohortibus Lange

⁸ adortae Meusel : adorti Ω

94 ¹ procurrare ed.pr. : prae- Ω

³⁻⁴ neque vero . . . fugae factum damn. Bentley, Meusel

⁴ circumita Vascosan : erat circumita Ω

⁵ aliis quoque Nipperdey : aliisque STV : aliisque quam maxime MU : sibi aliisque Klotz : aliis Manuzio

swords. ³ At the same time the cavalry on Pompey's left wing all charged forward, as they had been instructed, and the entire mass of archers streamed on behind. ⁴ Unable to withstand their attack, our cavalry were driven from their positions and retreated a little, and Pompey's cavalry pressed on all the more eagerly and began to operate in individual squadrons and go round behind our line on its open side. ⁵ When Caesar observed this, he gave the signal to the fourth line which he had formed by detachment from from the total number of his cohorts. ⁶ They rapidly ran forward and with colours flying made an attack of such force on Pompey's cavalry that none of them stood their ground; they all turned round and did not merely retreat, but galloped on immediately in flight towards some very high hills. ⁷ When they had gone, all the archers and slingers, left unarmed and defenceless, were killed. ⁸ Without pausing in their advance the cohorts outflanked the left wing of the Pompeians, who were still resisting in the set-piece fighting, and attacked them from behind.

94. At the same time Caesar gave orders to his third line, which had not been in action and had up to this point stayed where it was, to charge forward. ² So now that fresh, unwounded men had taken the place of those who were exhausted, and furthermore others were attacking them from the rear, Pompey's men were unable to hold out and all turned and fled. ³ Nor indeed did it escape Caesar that the origins of his victory lay with those cohorts which had been stationed in the fourth line opposite the cavalry, as he himself had predicted when encouraging his troops. ⁴ It was they who had first driven off the cavalry, it was they who had slaughtered the archers and slingers, it was they who had outflanked Pompey's line on the left and caused the start of the rout. ⁵ But when Pompey saw his cavalry beaten back and realised that the part of his force in which he placed most confidence was stricken with panic, he despaired of the others too; he left the line, hurried on horseback to his camp, and said in a loud voice to the centurions he had stationed at the principal gate, so that the soldiers could hear, 'Watch the camp and defend it well, if things go hard for us. I shall go round the other gates and give heart to the men guarding the camp.' ⁶ With these words, he went to his commander's tent, despairing of victory but still awaiting the result.

95. Caesar, Pompeianis ex fuga intra vallum compulsis, nullum spatium perterritis dari oportere existimans milites cohortatus est, ut beneficio fortunae uterentur castraque oppugnarent. ² qui etsi magno aestu fatigati (nam ad meridiem res erat perducta) tamen ad omnem laborem animo parati imperio paruerunt. ³ castra a cohortibus quae ibi praesidio erant relictæ industrie defendebantur, multo etiam acrius a Thracibus barbarisque auxiliis. ⁴ nam qui acie refugerant milites, et animo perterriti et lassitudine confecti, missis plerique armis signisque militaribus magis de reliqua fuga quam de castrorum defensione cogitabant. ⁵ neque vero diutius qui in vallo constiterant multitudinem telorum sustinere potuerunt, sed confecti vulneribus locum reliquerunt, protinusque omnes ducibus usi centurionibus tribunisque militum in altissimos montis qui ad castra pertinebant confugerunt.

96. In castris Pompei videre licuit trichilas structas, magnum argenti pondus expositum, recentibus caespitibus tabernacula constrata, Luci etiam Lentuli et nonnullorum tabernacula protecta hedera, multaque praeterea quae nimiam luxuriam et victoriae fiduciam designarent, ut facile existimari posset nihil eos de eventu eius diei timuisse, qui non necessarias conquirent voluptates. ² at hi miserrimo ac patientissimo exercitui Caesaris luxuriam obiciebant, cui semper omnia ad necessarium usum defuissent. ³ Pompeius, iam cum intra vallum nostri versarentur, equum nactus detractis insignibus imperatoriis decumana porta se ex castris eiecit protinusque equo citato Larisam contendit. ⁴ neque ibi constitit, sed eadem celeritate paucos suos ex fuga nactus nocturno itinere non intermisso comitatu equitum xxx ad mare pervenit navemque frumentariam conscendit, saepe, ut dicebatur, querens tantum se opinionem fefellisse, ut a quo genere hominum victoriam sperasset, ab eo initio fugae facto paene proditus videretur.

97. Caesar castris potitus a militibus contendit ne in praeda occupati reliqui negotii gerendi facultatem dimitterent. ² qua re

95. On fleeing, the Pompeians had been forced inside their fortifications, but Caesar felt they should be allowed no time to recover from panic, and encouraged his soldiers to take the gift offered them by fortune and attack the camp. ² Although they were exhausted from the intense heat (for the battle had lasted until midday) none the less they were mentally ready for any effort and obeyed his instructions. ³ The camp was busily defended by the cohorts which had been left there to guard it, and much more energetically by the Thracians and foreign auxiliaries. ⁴ As for the soldiers who had fled from the battle, their morale undermined by fear and their bodies overpowered by weariness, the greater number of them had thrown away their weapons and their military standards and were thinking more of further flight than of defending the camp. ⁵ Not that those who had made a stand at the fortifications were able to withstand the rain of missiles for very long; overcome by their injuries, they abandoned their position and immediately sought refuge in some very high hills which adjoined the camp, under the leadership of their centurions and military tribunes.

96. In Pompey's camp could be viewed artificial bowers, great quantities of silver laid out, tents floored with freshly cut turf, the tents of Lucius Lentulus and some others wreathed with ivy, and much else to indicate gross luxury and confidence of victory. It was easy to deduce from their pursuit of inessential pleasures that they had no misgivings about the outcome of the day. ² Yet these were men who accused Caesar's wretched and long-suffering army of luxury, when it had never enjoyed sufficiency in its everyday needs. ³ When our men were already inside the fortifications, Pompey seized a horse, tore off his general's insignia, and bursting out of the rear gate of the camp immediately made for Larisa at full gallop. ⁴ And he did not stop there, but after gathering a few of his associates who were in flight travelled on in the dark without a break, accompanied by thirty horsemen, to reach the sea and embark on a grain ship, complaining only that he had been mistaken in his judgment, because he thought he had been all but betrayed by a group of men whom he had expected to give him victory but who had in fact set the rout in train.

97. After gaining possession of the camp, Caesar pressed the soldiers not to become occupied in looting and miss the opportunity of completing the rest of their business. ² He obtained their

95 ¹ dari *Vascosan* : dare Ω

² fatigati *om.* STV

96 ¹ structas *Saumaise* : stratas Ω

² patientissimo *Aldo* : potentissimo Ω | exercitui *M²* : exercitu Ω

impetrata montem opere circummunire instituit. Pompeiani, quod is mons erat sine aqua, diffisi ei loco relicto monte universi iugis eius Larisam versus <se> recipere coeperunt. ³ qua re animadversa Caesar copias suas divisit partemque legionum in castris Pompei remanere iussit, partem in sua castra remisit, ⁱⁱⁱⁱ secum legiones duxit commodioreque itinere Pompeianis occurrere coepit et progressus milia passuum ^{vi} aciem instruxit. ⁴ qua re animadversa Pompeiani in quodam monte constiterunt. hunc montem flumen sublebat. Caesar milites cohortatus, etsi totius diei continenti labore erant confecti noxque iam suberat, tamen munitione flumen a monte secluserat, ne noctu aquari Pompeiani possent. ⁵ quo perfecto opere, illi de deditione missis legatis agere coeperunt. pauci ordinis senatorii, qui se cum iis coniunxerant, nocte fuga salutem petiverunt.

98. Caesar prima luce omnes eos qui in monte consederant ex superioribus locis in planitiem descendere atque arma proicere iussit. ² quod ubi sine recusatione fecerunt passisque palmis proiacti ad terram flentes ab eo salutem petiverunt, consolatus consurgere iussit et pauca apud eos de lenitate sua locutus, quo minore essent timore, omnes conservavit militibusque suis commendavit, ne qui eorum violaretur neu quid sui desiderarent. ³ hac adhibita diligentia ex castris sibi legiones alias occurrere et eas quas secum duxerat invicem requiescere atque in castra reverti iussit eodemque die Larisam pervenit.

99. In eo proelio non amplius ducentos milites desideravit, sed centuriones fortes viros circiter xxx amisit. ² interfectus est etiam fortissime pugnans Crastinus, cuius mentionem supra fecimus, gladio in os adversum coniecto. ³ neque id fuit falsum, quod ille in pugnam proficiscens dixerat. sic enim Caesar existimabat eo proelio excellentissimam virtutem Crastini fuisse optimeque eum de se meritum iudicabat. ⁴ ex Pompeiano exercitu circiter milia xv cecidisse videbantur, sed in deditionem venerunt amplius milia xxiiii (namque etiam cohortes quae praesidio in castellis fuerant sese Sullae dediderunt), multi praeterea in finitimas civitates refugerunt,

agreement and began to ring the hill with an earthwork. Since this hill had no water, the Pompeians had no confidence in their position and they left it and all began to withdraw along the adjoining ridge towards Larisa. ³ On observing this, Caesar split his forces: some of his legions he ordered to remain in Pompey's camp, some he sent back to his own camp, and four he took with him. By marching a less difficult route he began to converge on the Pompeians, and after six miles he drew up his battle line. ⁴ On observing this, the Pompeians halted on a hill, at whose foot ran a river. Caesar urged on his soldiers, and although they were exhausted from the unbroken exertions of a whole day, and night was starting to fall, he none the less cut off the hill from the river by a fortification, to stop the Pompeians getting water under cover of darkness. ⁵ When this work was complete, they sent a deputation and began to negotiate surrender. A few men of senatorial rank, who had joined them, fled by night to seek safety.

98. At dawn Caesar ordered all those who had occupied the hill to descend from higher ground to the level and throw down their weapons. ² They did this without protest, and cast themselves on the ground with hands outstretched, weeping and begging him to spare them. He offered them consolation and told them to stand up, said a few words about his mildness to them, to lessen their fear, and granted all of them their lives; he entrusted them to his soldiers, saying that none of them should suffer violence or be the recipient of demands from his men. ³ After this scrupulous action, he gave instructions for other legions to come from camp to join him and for those he had taken with him to have their spell of rest, and reached Larisa on the same day.

99. In the battle his casualties amounted to no more than two hundred soldiers, but he lost about thirty strong and brave centurions. ² Amongst the dead was also the above-mentioned Crastinus, who was killed, fighting heroically, by a sword-thrust full in the mouth. ³ And what he had said as he went out to combat was proved correct. For this was Caesar's opinion, that Crastinus' courage in the battle had been outstanding, and he considered himself most deeply in Crastinus' debt. ⁴ In the Pompeian army, it seemed as if about 15,000 had fallen, but more than 24,000 surrendered (the cohorts which were manning the forts having also surrendered, to Sulla), and in addition many of them took refuge in the neighbouring

97 ² iugis Wasse : iuris Ω | sc add. ed.pr.

³ qua re ed.pr. : qua spe Ω

⁴ cohortatus Vascosan : cohortatus est Ω

99 ²⁻³ -cimius . . . dixit- om. S

³ lacunam statui, cf. App. BC 2.82

signaque militaria ex proelio ad Caesarem sunt relata clxxx et aquilae viii. ⁵ L. Domitius ex castris in montem refugiens, cum vires eum lassitudine defecissent, ab equitibus est interfectus.

100. Eodem tempore D. Laelius cum classe ad Brundisium venit eademque ratione, qua factum a Libone antea demonstravimus, insulam obiectam portui Brundisino tenuit. ² similiter Vatinius, qui Brundisio praeerat, tectis instructisque scaphis elicit naves Laelianas atque ex his longius productam unam quinquerehem et minores duas in angustiis portus cepit, itemque per equites dispositos aqua prohibere classarios instituit. ³ sed Laelius tempore anni commodiore usus ad navigandum onerariis navibus Corcyra Dyrrachioque aquam suis supportabat neque a proposito deterrebat neque ante proelium in Thessalia factum cognitum aut ignominia amissarum navium aut necessariorum rerum inopia ex portu insulaque expelli potuit.

101. Isdem fere temporibus Cassius cum classe Syrorum et Phoenicum et Cilicum in Siciliam venit, et cum esset Caesaris classis divisa in duas partes, dimidia parti praeesset P. Sulpicius praetor <ad> Vibonem, dimidia M. Pomponius ad Messanam, prius Cassius ad Messanam navibus advolavit quam Pomponius de eius adventu cognosceret, ² perturbatumque eum nactus nullis custodiis neque ordinibus certis, magno vento et secundo completas onerarias naves taeda et pice et stuppa reliquisque rebus quae sunt ad incendia in Pomponianam classem immisit atque omnes naves incendit xxxv, e quibus erant xx constratae. ³ tantusque eo facto timor incessit ut, cum esset legio praesidio Messanae, vix oppidum defenderetur, et nisi eo ipso tempore quidam nuntii de Caesaris victoria per dispositos equites essent allati, existimabant plerique futurum fuisse uti amitteretur. ⁴ sed opportunissime nuntiis allatis oppidum fuit defensum; Cassiusque ad Sulpicianam inde classem profectus est Vibonem, applicatisque nostris ad terram navibus <circiter xl> propter eundem timorem, pari atque antea ratione secundum nactus ventum onerarias naves praeparatas ad incendium immisit, et flamma ab utroque cornu comprehensa naves sunt combustae quinque. ⁵ cumque ignis magnitudine venti latius serperet, milites qui ex

101 ¹ ad Vibonem *Forchhammer* : Vibonem ad fretum Ω

² ad STV : apta ad MU | Pomponianam *ed.pr.* : Pompcianam Ω

⁴ circiter XL, quae verba servant Ω post onerarias navis paulo infra, huc *transp. Nipperdey* | inter ratione et secundum *add. egerunt*; Cassius Ω, *del. Dinter* | comprehensa S : compressa B

communities; and 180 military standards and nine eagles were brought back to Caesar after the battle. ⁵ Lucius Domitius fled from the camp to the hills, but when he succumbed to exhaustion he was killed by the cavalry.

100. During the same period Decimus Laelius came to Brundisium with his fleet and seized the island lying opposite the port in the same way as we explained earlier had been done by Libo. ² Likewise Vatinius, who was in command at Brundisium, decked and equipped some small boats, enticed Laelius' ships out, and captured one quinquereme which had ventured too far and two smaller vessels in the narrow entrance of the port; he also arranged to prevent Laelius' crews from getting water by posting cavalry in different places. ³ But Laelius had an easier time of year for sailing, and brought his men water from Corcyra and Dyrrachium in merchant ships, and was not deterred from his plan. Nor could he be driven away from the port and the island either by the disgrace of losing the ships or by any shortage of essential supplies, until the news came of the battle that had taken place in Thessaly.

101. At about the same time Cassius came to Sicily with a fleet of Syrian, Phoenician, and Cilician ships. Caesar's fleet being divided - Publius Sulpicius, a praetor, commanding one half *at Vibo*, and Marcus Pomponius the other half at Messana - Cassius descended with his ships on Messana before Pomponius could hear of his arrival. ² He caught him in a state of confusion, without guards set or definite dispositions, and in a strong following wind let cargo vessels filled with resinous pine, pitch, tow and other inflammable material drift down on to Pomponius' fleet, and burnt all 35 of his ships, including 20 with an upper deck. ³ Such fear was created by this exploit that although there was a legion garrisoning Messana the town was scarcely being defended, and if the news of Caesar's victory had not been brought at that very moment by relays of horsemen, it was the general opinion that the result would have been its loss. ⁴ But the news arrived in the nick of time and the defence was successful, and Cassius departed for Vibo to attack Sulpicius' fleet. Affected by the same panic, our ships, *numbering about 40*, had been moored up to land, and Cassius, using the same tactic as before and getting a favourable breeze, let go cargo vessels previously made ready for firing, and five of our ships were burnt as the flames caught hold from either end of the line. ⁵ When the fire began to spread further

veteribus legionibus erant relictis praesidio navibus ex numero aegrorum ignominiam non tulerunt, ⁶sed sua sponte naves conscenderunt et a terra solverunt impetuque facto in Cassianam classem quinqueres duas, in quarum altera erat Cassius, ceperunt, sed Cassius exceptus scapha refugit; praeterea duae sunt deprehensae triremes. ⁷neque multo post de proelio facto in Thessalia cognitum est, ut ipsis Pompeianis fides fieret; nam ante id tempus fingi a legatis amicisque Caesaris arbitrabantur. quibus rebus cognitis ex his locis Cassius cum classe discessit.

102. Caesar omnibus rebus relictis persequendum sibi Pompeium existimavit, quascumque in partes se ex fuga recepisset, ne rursus copias comparare alias et bellum renovare posset, et quantumcumque itineris equitatu efficere poterat, cotidie progrediebatur legionemque unam minoribus itineribus subsequi iussit. ²erat edictum Pompei nomine Amphipoli propositum, uti omnes eius provinciae iuniores, Graeci civesque Romani, iurandi causa convenirent. ³sed utrum avertendae suspicionis causa Pompeius proposuisset, ut quam diutissime longioris fugae consilium occultaret, an novis dilectibus, si nemo premeret, Macedoniam tenere conaretur, existimari non poterat. ⁴ipse ad ancoram una nocte constitit et vocatis ad se Amphipoli hospitibus et pecunia ad necessarios sumptus corrogata cognitoque Caesaris adventu ex eo loco discessit et Mytilenas paucis diebus venit. ⁵biduum tempestate retentus navibusque aliis additis actuariis in Ciliciam atque inde Cyprum pervenit. ⁶ibi cognoscit consensu omnium Antiochensium civiumque Romanorum qui illic negotiarentur arma capta esse excludendi sui causa, nuntiosque dimissos ad eos qui se ex fuga in finitimas <civitates> recepisse dicerentur, ne Antiochiam adirent; id si fecissent, magno eorum capitis periculo futurum. ⁷idem hoc L. Lentulo, qui superiore anno consul fuerat, et P. Lentulo consulari ac nonnullis aliis acciderat Rhodi; qui cum ex fuga Pompeium sequerentur atque in insulam venissent, oppido ac portu recepti non erant, missisque ad eos nuntiis ut ex his locis discederent contra voluntatem suam naves solverunt. ⁸iamque de Caesaris adventu fama ad civitates perferebatur.

because of the strength of the wind, the soldiers from the group of sick who had been left behind from the old legions to guard the ships would not tolerate the disgrace, ⁶but of their own accord boarded the ships, cast them off from their moorings, and attacked Cassius' fleet. They captured two quinqueres, Cassius being on board one of them, but he was taken off in a small boat and made his escape; in addition two triremes were seized. ⁷Not long afterwards the result of the battle in Thessaly became known, so that even the Pompeians, who had previously thought it was invented by Caesar's officers and friends, came to believe it; and on learning the facts Cassius departed from the area with his fleet.

102. Caesar thought he ought to abandon everything else and pursue Pompey wherever he might have taken refuge after his escape, to prevent him from again being able to gather other forces and renew the war. He therefore covered as much ground as he could with his cavalry every day, and ordered one legion to follow him by shorter stages. ²An edict had been proclaimed at Amphipolis in Pompey's name, that everyone of military age in the province, whether Greeks or Roman citizens, should assemble for enlistment. ³But it was impossible to decide whether Pompey had made the proclamation as a bluff, to hide for as long as possible his plan of fleeing further afield, or whether, if no-one attacked him, he would attempt to hold Macedonia with fresh levies. ⁴Pompey himself stopped for one night, which he spent at anchor, summoning his contacts from Amphipolis and raising money from them for essential expenses, and when he heard of Caesar's arrival made his departure, arriving at Mytilene a few days later. ⁵He was kept there by a storm for two days and then went on, after collecting some light ships, to Cilicia and thence to Cyprus. ⁶There he discovered that the citizen body of Antioch and the Romans who were in business there had agreed they should arm to keep him out, and that messages had been sent to those who were reported to have taken refuge in neighbouring communities not to come to Antioch; if they did, they would be placing their lives at risk. ⁷Exactly this had happened at Rhodes to Lucius Lentulus, the consul of the previous year, and Publius Lentulus the ex-consul, and some others; having made their escape, they were following Pompey and had come to the island, but they were not admitted to the town or port, and when a message was sent telling them to go away, sailed off reluctantly. ⁸And already a rumour about Caesar's arrival was going round the cities.

⁶ deprehensae B : depraesentae T : depressae Vascosan

102 ⁴ una nocte SUV : unam nocte MT :

⁶ arma capta Forchhammer : aram captam SUTV : arccm aram captam M : arccm captam Uarg- | add. civitates ed.pr., regiones Fabre

⁷ qui cum M : quicumque SUTV

103. Quibus cognitis rebus Pompeius deposito adeundae Syriae consilio pecunia societatibus sublata et a quibusdam privatis sumpta et aeris magno pondere ad militarem usum in naves imposito duobusque milibus hominum armatis, partim quos ex familiis societatum delegerat, partim a negotiatoribus coegerat, quos ex suis quisque ad hanc rem idoneos existimabat, Pelusium pervenit. ² ibi casu rex erat Ptolomaeus, puer aetate, magnis copiis cum sorore Cleopatra bellum gerens, quam paucis ante mensibus per suos propinquos atque amicos regno expulerat; castraque Cleopatrae non longo spatio ab eius castris distabant. ³ ad eum Pompeius misit, ut pro hospitio atque amicitia patris Alexandria reciperetur atque illius opibus in calamitate tegeretur. ⁴ sed qui ab eo missi erant, confecto legationis officio liberius cum militibus regis colloqui coeperunt eosque hortari ut suum officium Pompeio praestarent neve eius fortunam despicerent. ⁵ in hoc erant numero complures Pompei milites, quos ex eius exercitu acceptos in Syria Gabinius Alexandriam traduxerat belloque confecto apud Ptolomaeum, patrem pueri, reliquerat.

104. His tum cognitis rebus amici regis, qui propter aetatem eius in procuratione erant regni, sive timore adducti, ut postea praedicabant, sollicitato exercitu regio, ne Pompeius Alexandriam Aegyptumque occuparet, sive despecta eius fortuna, ut plerumque in calamitate ex amicis inimici existunt, iis qui erant ab eo missi palam liberaliter responderunt eumque ad regem venire iusserunt; ² ipsi clam consilio inito Achillam, praefectum regium, singulari hominem audacia, et L. Septimium tribunum militum ad interficiendum Pompeium miserunt. ³ ab his liberaliter ipse appellatus et quadam notitia Septimi productus, quod bello praedonum apud eum ordinem duxerat, naviculam parvulam conscendit cum paucis suis; ibi ab Achilla et Septimio interficitur. item L. Lentulus comprehenditur ab rege et in custodia necatur.

105. Caesar cum in Asiam venisset, reperiebat T. Ampium conatum esse pecunias tollere Epheso ex fano Dianae eiusque rei causa senatores omnes ex provincia evocavisse, ut his testibus in summam pecuniae uteretur, sed interpellatum adventu Caesaris profugisse. ² ita duobus temporibus Ephesiae pecuniae Caesar

103. When he learnt these facts, Pompey abandoned his plan of going to Syria. He confiscated money from the tax companies, borrowed from certain private individuals, and put a great quantity of cash for military purposes aboard his ships. He armed two thousand men, partly chosen from the slaves of the tax companies, and partly forcibly recruited from the business community, by taking from each establishment whoever was thought suitable by its master for the task, and proceeded to Pelusium. ² As it happened, King Ptolemy, who was a boy, was there at the head of a large force, at war with his sister Cleopatra, whom he had ejected from the kingdom a few months beforehand through the agency of his relatives and friends; and Cleopatra's camp was no great distance from his. ³ Pompey sent him a request that for the sake of his ties of friendship and hospitality with the king's father he be given refuge at Alexandria and protected in his misfortune by the king's power. ⁴ But when their duty as emissaries had been performed, those who took the message began to talk rather too freely with the king's soldiers and urge them to support Pompey and not treat his present fortune with contempt. ⁵ Among this group were a considerable number of soldiers who, having served with Pompey, had been transferred from his army to the command of Gabinius, and he had taken them across to Alexandria and left them behind with Ptolemy, the boy's father, at the conclusion of the war.

104. When this became known, the king's friends, who because of his age were acting as regents, were led either, as they afterwards alleged, by the fear that Pompey, having made approaches to the royal army, would take possession of Alexandria and Egypt, or by their contempt for his present luck (friends very often turning into enemies in times of disaster), to make a friendly reply in public to Pompey's emissaries and tell him to come to the king; ² while they themselves formed a secret plan and sent Achillas, one of the king's officers and a man of remarkable nerve, together with Lucius Septimius, a military tribune, to kill Pompey. ³ On being greeted in a friendly manner by these men, and encouraged by some acquaintance with Septimius, because this man had served as a centurion under him in the war against the pirates, Pompey boarded their little boat with a few friends; there he was killed by Achillas and Septimius. Lucius Lentulus was also seized by the king and put to death in custody.

105. When Caesar reached the province of Asia, he discovered that Titus Ampius had attempted to remove treasures from the shrine of Diana at Ephesus and for that reason had summoned all senators from everywhere in the province to act as witnesses to the sum taken,

103 ¹ societatibus *Nipperdey* : societatis Ω | quos ex suis *Madvig* : quosque ex suis Ω

auxilium tulit. ³ item constabat Elide in templo Minervae repetitis atque enumeratis diebus, quo die proelium secundum Caesar fecisset, simulacrum Victoriae, quod ante ipsam Minervam collocatum esset et ante ad simulacrum Minervae spectavisset, ad valvas se templi limenque convertisse. ⁴ eodemque die Antiochiae in Syria bis tantus exercitus clamor et signorum sonus exauditus est, ut in muris armata civitas discurreret; hoc idem Ptolomaide accidit. ⁵ Pergamique in occultis ac reconditis templi, quo praeter sacerdotes adire fas non est, quae Graeci *adyta* appellant, tympana sonuerunt. ⁶ item Trallibus in templo Victoriae, ubi Caesaris statuem consecraverant, palma per eos dies in tecto inter coagmenta lapidum ex pavimento exstitisse ostendebatur.

106. Caesar paucos dies in Asia moratus, cum audisset Pompeium Cypri visum, coniectans eum <in> Aegyptum iter habere propter necessitudines regni reliquasque eius loci opportunitates, cum legione una, quam se ex Thessalia sequi iusserat, et altera, quam ex Achaia a Q. Fufio legato evocaverat, equitibusque dccc et navibus longis Rhodiis x et Asiaticis paucis Alexandriam pervenit. ² in his erant legionibus hominum milia iii cc; reliqui vulneribus ex proeliis et labore ac magnitudine itineris confecti consequi non potuerant. ³ sed Caesar confisus fama rerum gestarum infirmis auxiliis proficisci non dubitaverat, aequae omnem sibi locum tutum fore existimans. ⁴ Alexandriae de Pompei morte cognoscit atque ibi primum e navi egrediens clamorem militum audit, quos rex in oppido praesidii causa reliquerat, et concursum ad se fieri videt, quod fasces anteferebantur. in hoc omnis multitudo maiestatem regiam minui praedicabat. ⁵ hoc sedato tumultu crebrae continuis diebus ex concursu multitudinis concitationes fiebant compluresque milites in viis urbis omnibus partibus interficiebantur.

107. Quibus rebus animadversis legiones sibi alias ex Asia adduci iussit, quas ex Pompeianis militibus confecerat. ipse enim necessario etesiis tenebatur, qui navigantibus Alexandria flant adversissimi venti. ² interim controversias regum ad populum Romanum et ad se,

but on being interrupted by Caesar had fled. ² Thus on two occasions Caesar had saved the treasure of Ephesus. ³ Likewise it was agreed, after checking and counting the days, that on the day of Caesar's success in battle the image of Victory, which stood in the sanctuary of Minerva at Elis in front of the goddess herself, and had previously faced her statue, had turned towards the double doors and threshold of the sanctuary. ⁴ And on the same day, at Antioch in Syria, such a loud shout of an army and sound of trumpets had twice been heard that the citizens armed themselves and rushed to their posts on the walls; exactly the same thing occurred at Ptolemais. ⁵ And at Pergamum drums sounded in the secret hidden parts of the sanctuary, which the Greeks call *adyta*, and where none but the priests may go. ⁶ Also at Tralles, in the precinct of Victory, where they had dedicated a statue of Caesar, a palm-tree was pointed out as having come up at that time, within the building, between the joints of the paving-stones.

106. Caesar stayed a few days in the province of Asia, but when he heard that Pompey had been seen in Cyprus he guessed that he was making his way to Egypt because of his connections with the kingdom and the other possibilities of the place, and pressed on to Alexandria with one legion which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly, another which he had summoned from his lieutenant Quintus Fufius in Achaia, 800 cavalry, and ten warships from Rhodes along with a few from Asia. ² These legions contained 3,200 men; the rest of their men, incapacitated by battle injuries and by the difficulty and length of the marches, had been unable to join in the pursuit. ³ But Caesar, trusting in the reputation his achievements had earned him, had not hesitated to set out with weak support, in the belief that he would be equally safe anywhere. ⁴ At Alexandria, he learnt of Pompey's death, and there as soon as he disembarked he heard the shout raised by the soldiers the king had left to garrison the town, and saw them running to meet him, because the consul's rods were being carried in front of him. The body of the population all declared that this constituted treason against the king. ⁵ This disorder was brought under control, but for a period of days the crowd continued to assemble and provoke frequent disturbances, and a number of soldiers were killed in the streets in every quarter of the city.

107. In the light of this situation he ordered other legions, which he had formed from Pompey's soldiers, to be brought from Asia. He himself had no alternative to staying, because of the etesian winds, which blow absolutely directly against anyone sailing out of Alexandria. ² Meanwhile, thinking that the dispute between the

105 ² *lacunam susp. Glandorp*

⁵ *templi Σ : templis Ω*

106 ¹ *in add. ed. pr. (sed cf. Klotz praef. p. xvi)*

³ *aeque Nipperdey : atque Ω | existimans STV : existimabat MU*

⁵ *in viis Madvig : huius Ω*

107 ¹ *flant Paul : fiunt Ω*

quod esset consul, pertinere existimans, atque eo magis officio suo convenire, quod superiore consulatu cum patre Ptolomaeo ex lege et senatus consulto societas erat facta, ostendit sibi placere regem Ptolomaeum atque eius sororem Cleopatram exercitus quos haberent dimittere et de controversiis iure apud se potius quam inter se armis disceptare.

108. Erat in procuratione regni propter aetatem pueri nutricius eius, eunuchus nomine Pothinus. is primum inter suos queri atque indignari coepit regem ad causam dicendam evocari; ² deinde adiutores quosdam consilii sui nactus ex regis amicis exercitum a Pelusio clam Alexandriam evocavit atque eundem Achillam, cuius supra meminimus, omnibus copiis praefecit. ³ hunc incitatum suis et regis pollicitationibus quae fieri vellet litteris nuntiisque edocuit. ⁴ in testamento Ptolomaei patris heredes erant scripti ex duobus filiis maior et ex filiabus ea quae aetate antecederet. ⁵ haec uti fierent, per omnes deos perque foedera quae Romae fecisset eodem testamento Ptolomaeus populum Romanum obtestabatur. ⁶ tabulae testamenti unae per legatos eius Romam erant allatae, ut in aerario ponerentur (hae cum propter publicas occupationes poni non potuissent, apud Pompeium sunt depositae), alterae eodem exemplo relictae atque obsignatae Alexandriae proferebantur.

109. De his rebus cum ageretur apud Caesarem, isque maxime vellet pro communi amico atque arbitro controversias regum componere, subito exercitus regius equitatusque omnis venire Alexandriam nuntiatur. ² Caesaris copiae nequaquam erant tantae, ut eis, extra oppidum si esset dimicandum, confideret. relinquebatur ut se suis locis oppido teneret consiliumque Achillae cognosceret. ³ milites tamen omnes in armis esse iussit, regemque hortatus est ut ex suis necessariis, quos haberet maximae auctoritatis, legatos ad Achillam mitteret et quid esset suae voluntatis ostenderet. ⁴ a quo missi Dioscorides et Serapion, qui ambo legati Romae fuerant magnamque apud patrem Ptolomaeum auctoritatem habuerant, ad Achillam pervenerunt. ⁵ quos ille, cum in conspectum eius venissent, priusquam audiret, aut cuius rei causa missi essent cognosceret,

rulers was a matter of concern to the Roman people and himself, because he was consul, and that it had an even greater claim on his attention because it was in his previous consulship that an alliance had been made by law and by decree of the senate with Ptolemy (the father), he made it known that it was his decision that king Ptolemy and his sister Cleopatra should disband their armies and conduct their argument by judicial process before himself rather than by armed struggle between themselves.

108. On account of the boy's age, his guardian, a eunuch called Pothinus, was in charge of the kingdom. First he began to complain and express indignation to his intimates that the king had been summoned to a legal hearing; ² then he obtained from among the king's friends some helpers for his designs, and secretly called the army back to Alexandria from Pelusium and put the same Achilles we mentioned above in command of all the forces. ³ By messages both written and verbal he then explained his wishes to Achilles, who was urged on by promises from himself and from the king.

⁴ By the elder Ptolemy's will his heirs were named as the older of his two sons and the one of his daughters who had precedence of age. ⁵ In the same will Ptolemy, swearing by all the gods and by the treaties which he had made at Rome, called upon the Roman people to ensure that his wishes were put into effect. ⁶ One copy of the will had been brought to Rome by his representatives, to be deposited in the treasury (since this could not be done because of pressure of public affairs, it was deposited with Pompey), while the other identical copy, which had been left and witnessed at Alexandria, was now produced.

109. While these matters were being disputed before Caesar, and he himself was particularly anxious to play the part of friend and arbitrator to both parties and settle the quarrel between the rulers, there suddenly came the news that the king's army and all its cavalry was on its way to Alexandria. ² Caesar's forces were much too small for him to place any confidence in them if he had to fight outside the city. The only course open to him was to remain in his position in the town and find out Achilles' intentions. ³ None the less he ordered all his men to stay under arms, and pressed the king to send as ambassadors to Achilles those members of his entourage he considered had the most authority, and make plain what would be acceptable to him. ⁴ He sent Dioscorides and Serapion, who had both been at Rome as ambassadors and had possessed great influence with his father Ptolemy. They reached Achilles, but ⁵ when they came into his presence, he ordered them to be seized and killed before he could

108 ² consilii sui *Estienne* : consciis suis S : conscii suis TV : conscios sui MU | ex om. STV

³ regis *Forchhammer* : regis inflatum Ω, quo servato del. incitatum *Kraner*

⁴ ex filiabus *Herzog* : ex duabus SUTV (om. M) : ex duabus filiabus Σ

109 ⁵ audiret S : adiret B

corripit atque interfici iussit; quorum alter accepto vulnere occupatus per suos pro occiso sublatus, alter interfectus est. ⁶ quo facto, regem ut in sua potestate haberet Caesar effecit, magnam regium nomen apud suos auctoritatem habere existimans, et ut potius privato paucorum et latronum quam regio consilio susceptum bellum videretur.

110. Erant cum Achilla eae copiae, ut neque numero neque genere hominum neque usu rei militaris contemnendae viderentur. ² milia enim xx in armis habebat. haec constabant ex Gabinianis militibus, qui iam in consuetudinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et nomen disciplinamque populi Romani dediderant uxoresque duxerant, ex quibus plerique liberos habebant. ³ huc accedebant collecti ex praedonibus latronibusque Syriae Ciliciaeque provinciae finitimarumque regionum. multi praeterea capitis damnati exulesque convenerant. ⁴ fugitivis omnibus nostris certus erat Alexandriae receptus certaue vitae condicio, ut dato nomine militum essent numero; quorum si quis a domino prehenderetur, consensu militum eripiebatur, qui vim suorum, quod in simili culpa versabantur, ipsi pro suo periculo defendebant. ⁵ hi regum amicos ad mortem deposcere, hi bona locupletum diripere, stipendii augendi causa regis domum obsidere, regno expellere alios, alios arcessere vetere quodam Alexandrini exercitus instituto consueverant. erant praeterea equitum milia duo. ⁶ inveteraverant hi omnes compluribus Alexandriae bellis, Ptolomaeum patrem in regnum reduxerant, Bibuli filios duos interfecerant, bella cum Aegyptiis gesserant. hinc usum rei militaris habebant.

111. His copiis fidens Achilles paucitatemque militum Caesaris despiciens occupabat Alexandriam praeter eam oppidi partem, quam Caesar cum militibus tenebat, primo impetu domum eius irrumpere conatus; sed Caesar dispositis per vias cohortibus impetum eius sustinuit. ² eodemque tempore pugnatum est ad portum, ac longe maximam ea res adtulit dimicationem. ³ simul enim diductis copiis pluribus viis pugnabatur, et magna multitudine navis longas occupare

listen to them or find out why they had come; one of them was wounded but was rescued by his friends and carried away as dead, while the other was killed. ⁶ After this, Caesar saw to it that he kept the king in his power, because he considered that the royal name had great authority with his people, and to make it apparent that the war had been started not by design of the king but privately by a small faction of bandits.

110. Achilles was accompanied by forces of a sort not to be despised, either in number and type of troops or in military experience. ² He had 20,000 men under arms. These consisted of Gabinian soldiers, who had by now become habituated to the ill-disciplined ways of Alexandrian life and had unlearned the good name and orderly conduct of Romans and had taken wives by whom most of them had children. ³ In addition to these there were men gathered from among the pirates and brigands of Syria, the Cilician province, and adjoining regions. Also many exiles and men punished by loss of citizen rights had collected here. ⁴ All runaway slaves of ours had a guaranteed refuge and a guaranteed way of life at Alexandria, provided they enrolled and became soldiers; and if any of them was arrested by his master, he was snatched away by agreement among the soldiers, who protected their companions against violence as though they themselves were in danger, because they were tarred with the same brush. ⁵ By a long-established custom of the Alexandrian army, these men habitually demanded that friends of the king be put to death, plundered the property of the rich, laid siege to the king's residence to win higher pay, and removed some and appointed others to the throne. There were in addition two thousand cavalry. ⁶ All these men had done long service in the numerous wars at Alexandria, had put the elder Ptolemy back on the throne, had killed two sons of Bibulus, and had participated in campaigns against the Egyptians. This was the source of their military experience.

111. Confident in these forces and contemptuous of the small numbers of Caesar's men, Achilles occupied Alexandria except for the part of the town which Caesar held with his soldiers. He attempted with his first assault to break into Caesar's quarters, but Caesar had his cohorts spread about the streets and withstood the assault. ² At the same time there was fighting by the harbour, and that brought by far the most serious struggle. ³ Fighting was taking place between forces positioned at intervals over a considerable number of streets, and simultaneously the enemy were trying with a

⁶ effecit *ed.pr.* : efficit Ω

110 ¹ Achilla eae *Paul* : Achillae SUT¹V : Achilla MT²

² dediderant M² : didicerant Ω

⁵ regum M² : rerum Ω | alios alios Σ : alios Ω

⁶ hinc Σ : hunc Ω

111 ¹ praeter eam Σ : praeterea Ω

hostes conabantur; quarum erant 1 auxilio missae ad Pompeium proelioque in Thessalia facto domum redierant, quadriremes omnes et quinqueremes aptae instructaeque omnibus rebus ad navigandum, praeter has xxii, quae praesidii causa Alexandriae esse consueverant, constratae omnes. ⁴ quas si occupavissent, classe Caesari erepta portum ac mare totum in sua potestate haberent, commeatu auxiliisque Caesarem prohiberent. ⁵ itaque tanta est contentione actum quanta agi debuit, cum illi celerem in ea re victoriam, hi salutem suam consistere viderent. ⁶ sed rem obtinuit Caesar omnesque eas naves et reliquas quae erant in navalibus incendit, quod tam late tueri parva manu non poterat, confestimque ad Pharum navibus milites exposuit.

112. Pharos est in insula turris magna altitudine, mirificis operibus exstructa; quae nomen ab insula cepit. ² haec insula obiecta Alexandriae portum efficit; sed a superioribus regionibus in longitudinem passuum dcccc in mare iactis molibus angusto itinere et ponte cum oppido coniungitur. ³ in hac sunt insula domicilia Aegyptiorum et vicus oppidi magnitudine; quaeque ibi cumque naves imprudentia aut tempestate paulum suo cursu decesserunt, has more praedonum diripere consueverunt. ⁴ iis autem invitis, a quibus Pharos tenetur, non potest esse propter angustias navibus introitus in portum. ⁵ hoc tum veritus Caesar, hostibus in pugna occupatis, militibus expositis Pharumprehendit atque ibi praesidium posuit. ⁶ quibus est rebus effectum, ut tuto frumentum auxiliaque navibus ad eum supportari possent. dimisit enim circum omnes propinquas provincias atque inde auxilia evocavit. ⁷ reliquis oppidi partibus sic est pugnatum ut aequo proelio discederetur et neutri pellerentur (id efficiebant angustiae loci) paucisque utrimque interfectis Caesar loca maxime necessaria complexus noctu praemuniit ⁸(in eo tractu oppidi pars erat regiae exigua, in quam ipse habitandi causa initio erat inductus, et theatrum coniunctum domui, quod arcis tenebat locum aditusque habebat ad portum et ad regia navaliam). ⁹ has munitiones

large body of men to gain control of the warships; 50 of these had been sent to help Pompey and had returned after the battle in Thessaly, all of them quadriremes and quinqueremes ready and completely fitted out for sailing; and there were 22 besides, all with upper decks, which were normally kept at Alexandria to guard the port. ⁴ If the enemy got possession of them, they would have wrested the fleet from Caesar, and would have the port and the open sea entirely under their control and would stop supplies and reinforcements from reaching him. ⁵ And so the battle was fought with the determination to be expected when the one side realised that it would give them a quick victory, the other that their lives depended on it. ⁶ But Caesar carried the day; he burnt all these ships, together with the remainder which were in the dockyards, because he was unable to defend such a wide area with his small force, and hastily landed soldiers at the Pharos.

112. The Pharos is a tower of great height and of amazing architectural construction, standing on the island from which it takes its name. ² This island lies off Alexandria and creates its harbour; but from the higher ground an embankment nine hundred paces long has been pushed out into the water so that there is a connection to the town by a narrow track and bridge. ³ There are Egyptian dwellings on the island, forming a settlement the size of a town; and if ships go a little off course there, through carelessness or bad weather, the people are in the habit of behaving like pirates and plundering them. ⁴ Moreover, on account of the narrow channel, it is impossible for a ship to gain entrance to the harbour against the wishes of those who hold Pharos. ⁵ This was Caesar's immediate fear, and while the enemy were occupied with the fighting he landed soldiers, seized Pharos, and stationed a garrison there. ⁶ By these means he secured the safe delivery to him by ship of food and reinforcements (for he sent round to all the nearby provinces a summons to provide the latter). ⁷ In the other parts of the town the fighting ended with honours even and neither force was driven back (this was due to the confined space); and with a few men killed on each side, Caesar took possession of the most essential positions and under cover of night made fortifications in front of them ⁸(in that stretch of the town there was a small section of the palace, where he himself had been accommodated at the beginning, and also, attached to the living quarters, a theatre which served as a citadel and had access to the harbour and the royal dockyards). ⁹ These fortifications he enlarged

³ quadriremes [= IIII(ri)remes] *Paul* : ille(-ac UV) triremes Ω

⁴ Caesari *Lipse* : Caesaris Ω

112 ² regionibus Ω : regibus M^2

³ quaeque ibi cumque *Nipperdey* : quaeque ubique SM^1U : quaeque ibi M^2 : quae qui ubique TV :

⁵ militibus T : militibusque $SMUV$

⁶ dimisit *Scaliger* : deauxit $SUTV$: deduxit M : misit *Bücheler*

⁸ regia *Morus* : reliqua Ω

insequentibus auxit diebus, ut pro muro obiectas haberet neu dimicare invitus cogeretur. ¹⁰ interim filia minor Ptolomaei regis vacuum possessionem regni sperans ad Achillam sese ex regia traiecit unaque bellum administrare coepit. ¹¹ sed celeriter est inter eos de principatu controversia orta, quae res apud milites largitiones auxit; magnis enim iacturis sibi quisque eorum animos conciliabat. ¹² haec dum apud hostes geruntur, Pothinus, cum ad Achillam nuntios mitteret hortareturque ne negotio desisteret neve animo deficeret, indicatis deprehensisque internuntiis a Caesare est interfectus.

on the following days, in order to have a barrier which would serve as a city wall, and to avoid being forced to fight against his will. ¹⁰ Meanwhile, king Ptolemy's younger daughter, hoping to take unencumbered possession of the throne, went over from the palace to Achilles and began to direct the war in co-operation with him. ¹¹ But very soon they fell out over the leadership, and this brought an increase in bribes to the soldiers as they both threw away large sums in trying to win their support. ¹² While this was happening on the enemy side, Pothinus was sending messages to Achilles and encouraging him not to slacken his efforts or lose heart; but his go-betweens were betrayed and arrested, and he was put to death by Caesar.

112 ¹² Pothinus cum *Kraner* : Pothinus nutricius pueri et procurator regni in parte Caesaris cum Ω | haec initia belli Alexandri fuerunt *add. in fine operis omnes codices praeter M*, verba nimirum non Caesaris sed eius qui *Corpus Caesarianum confecit*.

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COMMENTARY

Within the commentary, references in the form 26.2 are to chapter and subsection of this book of the Civil War, and in the form I (or II).44.2 to chapter and subsection of previous books; n. after the reference denotes the corresponding section of the commentary. Abbreviations of ancient authors generally follow those of the Oxford Latin Dictionary, Lewis and Short's Latin Dictionary, and Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon. Most modern works are referred to by the author's plain surname, with year of publication following if necessary: please see the Select Bibliography at the end of the Introduction for titles and full details. For other abbreviations, see the last section of the Bibliography. Ancient dates, unless otherwise stated or obvious from the context, are B.C. and pre-Julian, i.e. a little over over two months ahead of true in 48 B.C.

COMMENTARY

BOOK III

1-40 Caesar takes the war to Pompey in Greece

1-2 Caesar relates very briefly the measures he took to deal with an incipient financial crisis in Rome and to allow the return of men exiled by Pompey, and sketches the immediate difficulties which faced him in taking an adequate force across to Greece.

- 1 1 as dictator Caesar held the elections: This probably occurred in the first half of December 49 (see 2.1n.). Caesar had been nominated dictator some weeks earlier, while still at Massilia on his way back from Spain. It was the duty of each pair of consuls to hold the elections for their successors; but since Lentulus and Marcellus, the consuls of 49, had fled with Pompey to Greece in the spring, they were unable to act. In such circumstances it was constitutionally proper for a dictator to be appointed for the express purpose of holding the elections. It is therefore probable, given Caesar's stance as a defender of the republican constitution, that his appointment was of this nature (see II.21.5). Like Sulla, the only other holder within living memory of this now archaic office, Caesar oversaw his own election; but unlike Sulla, whose mandate was to carry out constitutional reform, he shortly thereafter abdicated. Lucan (5.392-399) has some harsh things to say about the electoral procedure employed, damning it comprehensively as a sham. *Gaius Julius*: the MSS have 'Iulius Caesar', but neither Caesar himself, nor his contemporaries, ever use this name. In normal usage he is either 'Caesar' or 'C. Caesar', more officially 'C. Iulius Caesar' (*ILLRP* 407-9) or 'C. Iulius' (n.b. the consular datings found on *ILLRP* 1055-6, C. IVLIO P. SERVILIO, and 1059-60, C. IULIO M. AEMILIO - the pair better known as

Caesar and Lepidus). I assume that the short official form of *both* names, i.e. with *praenomen* and *nomen* but without *cognomen*, originally stood in Caesar's text, as appropriate to the legal context. If Caesar added his own *cognomen* it is hard to see why he did not do the same for his colleague Servilius Isauricus. 'C. Iulius' will inevitably have attracted the marginal annotation 'Caesar', which will equally inevitably have replaced the 'C.' in the text and been "correctly" repositioned. (Sauppe's suggestion, 'ipse Caesar', is equally satisfactory, but it is harder to see why the corruption should have occurred.)

Publius Servilius: P. Servilius Isauricus was the son of the man of the same name who had earned his last name (*cognomen*) by suppressing the Isaurian pirates of western Cilicia in the 70s B.C. It is an index of the shifting loyalties among the Roman upper class that the father had been a supporter of the Sullan aristocracy to which Caesar as a young man and later had always been strongly opposed.

legally permitted to become consul: the Lex Villia Annalis of 180 B.C., re-enacted by Sulla, laid down that a ten-year interval had to elapse between consulships. Having been consul in 59 Caesar was now, in 48, legally entitled to hold the office again. His observation here draws attention to the correctness of his own behaviour compared with that of Pompey, whose third consulship in 52 followed hard on the heels of his second in 55.

- 2 **since credit had become difficult:** in the absence of sophisticated financial institutions, the normal collateral for substantial loans in Roman society was landed property. A great deal of this was in the hands of the upper class, who were also required by the political system of the late Republic to have available from time to time very large amounts of cash, which they spent on the voters of the metropolis in the expectation of being able to recoup it later by plundering the provincials or the enemies of Rome. There was thus a permanent, if shifting, indebtedness among the politically active. In addition, wealthy non-senators, who were the only people who could take the great state contracts, such as that for the collection of the taxes of the province of Asia, gave security at least partly in land. A collapse in the price of land would have been disastrous for debtors, and if there had been many forced sales of large estates by creditors attempting to recover their loans the market would have become further depressed. Another factor which contributed to the crisis of credit was the tendency of people to hoard cash in times of great political uncertainty like the present (Dio 41.38.1, reporting Caesar's edict restricting cash holdings to 60,000 sesterces in silver or gold). Hence Caesar's scheme to force creditors to accept land and other property (such as urban rented housing, brick-pits, potteries, fisheries, and ships) in settlement at pre-war values. This appears to be a first attempt to deal with what proved to be a very

troublesome problem. Suetonius (*DJ* 42.2) says that Caesar allowed interest already paid on loans to be deducted from the principal, and Dio (42.51.1) that he remitted interest due from the date of the outbreak of the war, and also cancelled a year's rent up to 2,000 HS; but neither writer gives any very firm chronological context, and the information may apply to any period from 48 to 46 B.C. There was certainly a year's suspension of rents in 48 (*Fasti Ostienses*), well before Caesar's return from Alexandria. This looks like a belated acknowledgement that the problems which permitted the demagoguery of Caelius Rufus (below, 20-22) were serious. Frederiksen (1966, 133-5) argues that the remission of interest mentioned by Dio and Suetonius belongs to the end of 48, and that Dolabella's agitation when he took up office as tribune of the plebs in 47 was an attempt to outbid Caesar. This is plausible, but the exact sequence and relationship of the various measures for relief of debt in these three years remains unclear.

- 4 **legislation brought before the people by praetors and tribunes:** Caesar is again stressing the constitutionality of his behaviour in using the 'normal channels' for legislation in the late Republic. As dictator, he was entitled to put laws to the people, but he preferred not to extend his competence beyond the purpose for which he had been given the office (see §1n.), and he was careful to resign the dictatorship before assuming the consulship. He surely wished to avoid any parallel with Sulla, whose behaviour as victor in a civil war had become a byword for vengeful savagery (cf. the insulting depiction of the consul Lentulus as a would-be Sulla, I.4.2), and who had combined the offices of dictator and consul to impose on the state a political order which was anathema to Caesar and many Romans.

Pompey's law on electoral corruption: this law was passed in 52 B.C., in Pompey's third consulship. The existing laws against electoral bribery (the lex Calpurnia of 67 B.C., which fined the guilty and banned them from further office and the senate, and the lex Tullia of 63 B.C., which imposed a ten-year exile) had been insufficient to prevent flagrant misbehaviour by the consuls and consular candidates in 54 (see Cic. *Att.* 4.15.7, 4.17.2, *Q.F.* 3.2.3) and by the candidates in 53 (Asc. *in Milon.* 30C). Pompey's law, which took into account offences from as far back as 70 B.C., stiffened the penalty to exile for life, and set up a speedier judicial procedure (below). See also Dio 40.45-46, 51-56 (Appian *BC* 2.24-25 is unreliable). Plutarch (*Caes.* 37.1) says that Caesar gave back civil rights also to the children of men proscribed by Sulla. For a full discussion of Caesar's restoration of exiles, see Bruhns 1978, 64-70.

Pompey had legionary forces in the city: at the beginning of the period when he was sole consul, when it was necessary to restore order

after the rioting which followed the death of Clodius at the hands of Milo early in 52 (see Introduction to Books I-II, 8), Pompey took the step, probably unprecedented in time of peace, of deploying legionary soldiers within the city.

the trials being completed each in a single day . . . : Caesar distorts the facts, which are given by Asconius (*in Milon.* 39C): three days were allowed for the hearing of witnesses by a panel of 360 jurors, and a further day for certain formalities, before the delivery on the fifth day of the speeches for the prosecution and the defence to a lot-selected group of 81 of the jurors. These were then reduced by challenges to 51, who had to give a verdict on the same day. It is true that all 360 jurors were unlikely to have been present on the first three days, and therefore that some of the lot-selected 81 might indeed not have heard the arguments; but it is doubtful whether any such would have survived the challenges. The purpose of this machinery was to speed up court procedure and allow the settling of several old scores, though these were not all to the advantage of Pompey and his current political allies: he rescued his new father-in-law Q. Metellus Scipio, one of the tainted consular candidates in 53, by appointing him to the vacant consulship alongside himself, but felt he had to let the law take its course in the case of Scipio's partner in crime, P. Plautius Hypsaesus (Dio 40.53.1-2).

- 5 **nor arrogant in usurping the favour of the people:** Caesar's republican stance and ostensible respect for popular sovereignty is once more underlined: ostensible, because the restoration of these persons, with or without a law, was inevitable.
- 2 1 **eleven days:** since Caesar set sail from Brundisium on Jan. 4th (6.1), he cannot have arrived there later than Jan. 3rd. Allowing 7 or 8 days for the journey of c. 550 km. from Rome (he covered about 70 km. a day on a somewhat similar journey from Rome to Massilia in the spring, I.34.1n.), he must have abdicated about Dec. 24th (or correspondingly earlier if he spent more than a day or two at Brundisium, but see 6.1n.)

all the elections: Caesar had to see to the elections for the lesser magistrates, as well as those for the consuls.

the Latin Festival: this, the most solemn and ancient of the republican festivals, was celebrated annually by the consuls (at a variable date) over a period of four days at the sanctuary of Jupiter Latiaris on the Alban Mount south of Rome. The consuls of 49 had been engulfed in war and swept out of Italy before they could make arrangements for the celebration.

- 2 **twelve legions:** in the late summer of 49 Caesar had (a) 6 legions in Spain (I.39.2), of which 2 stayed there, joining the 2 taken from Varro to serve as the garrison of the province under Q. Cassius (II.21.4); (b) 3 besieging Massilia, of which 2 were left to hold Gaul (II.22.6); (c) 2 in

Sicily, left there by Curio (II.37.4, cf. I.30.2n.); (d) the 2 in Africa which Curio soon lost (II.42.5, 44.1-2); (e) 2 recruited during the Italian campaign early in the year and left to garrison Italy (I.32.1n.). Thus of the 9 legions (a + b above) which made up Caesar's Gallic army at the outbreak of the war and went on to fight at Massilia and in Spain, only 5 returned to Italy at the end of the year - one of these being the Ninth, which mutinied at Placentia in an episode passed over by Caesar but told by Suetonius (*Div. Iul.* 69); of Curio's 4 (c + d above), 1 of which had been formed of new recruits and 3 of deserters from Corfinium (I.30.2n.), only the 2 in Sicily were left; and in addition there were the 2 (e above) which had stayed in Italy after Pompey's flight from Brundisium. To reach, then, the total of 12 given here, Caesar must have recruited at least 3 new legions, and possibly as many as 5 if he did not want to denude Sicily (and Italy) of troops. These extra forces were presumably raised in Italy and from discharged soldiers of Petreius' Spanish army (I.86.4) during the summer and autumn of 49. The legions so formed were, however, considerably under strength (see next note). In the event, only eleven legions actually crossed to Greece to participate in the campaign of 48 B.C. (44.5n.).

twenty thousand legionaries: the MSS say 'fifteen thousand', which has been variously corrected because of Caesar's statement at 6.2 below that he embarked 7 legions, i.e. nominally at least 35,000 men. It is plain from this chapter that his legions were well below full strength (normally reckoned in this period at either 5,200 or 6,200 men, see Brunt (1971) 687-693), but is it likely that he allowed them to drop to less than half-strength? At Pharsalus, the 80 cohorts (eight legions) of the line still numbered 22,000 men (89.2), even after incurring severe losses in the fighting at Dyrrachium. It is barely credible that the 70 cohorts here embarked can have numbered many fewer. The correction here, then, of XV to XX (or even XXV?) seems necessary and is palaeographically simple. More drastic modification of the text (e.g. Chacon's *VII legiones*) is unwarranted.

This was the one resource. . . : i.e. ships (as an early annotator of the MS saw, see *app. crit.*). Pompey had had similar difficulties when wanting to transport his army across in March 49.

the Gauls: this refers to the cavalry, for which Caesar habitually made use of Gallic auxiliaries (cf. I.39.2, 51.1). The tribesmen, it appears, were willing to turn out on particular request, but drew the line at permanent service further and further from home. It is quite unnecessary to emend *Galli*, the unanimous reading of the five main MSS, to *Gallicis* or *Galliae*, or to delete it as a gloss.

the oppressive autumn: for the Romans, autumn was a disease-ridden and dangerous time of year. Horace writes of leaving Rome at this season to avoid the undertakers (*Sat.* I.6.16-20, *Epp.* I.7.1-9).

3-5 Caesar now lists Pompey's forces at great length, but attempts no analysis of his own or his enemy's strengths and weaknesses, nor of the strategic implications of the positions in which they now found themselves. His purpose is to portray Pompey as a Goliath to his own David.

3 1 **the space of a year:** although Pompey had not left Brundisium until March 17 (Cic. *Att.* 9.9.2), his planning and preparation for the war must have gone back, like Caesar's (L8.1n.), into 50 B.C.

had assembled a great fleet from Asia . . . : Asia is the Roman province of that name, not the continent. Cicero (*Att.* 9.9.2) lists the eastern fleets available to Pompey: 'from Alexandria, Colchis, Tyre, Sidon, Aradus, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Lesbos, Smyrna, Miletus, Cos...'. Many of these states or places, notably Egypt, were not in theory directly under Roman control. However, in practice allies of Rome (which they were) had no choice but to comply with Pompey's orders. Likewise the 'autonomy' of self-governing cities within the borders of Roman provinces was limited. Colchis, at the eastern end of the Black Sea, was a region famed for ship-building timber rather than for its naval strength.

2 **Syria, . . . all the kings . . . the free communities of Achaia:** like Asia, Syria was a formally constituted Roman province, but the other two groups should have been immune from any contribution, other than voluntary, to the finances of Rome. (a) The 'kings, dynasts, and tetrarchs' were minor rulers of states on the eastern borders of the empire who depended on the goodwill of those currently in power at Rome to retain their thrones, and so when asked for money had little option but to hand it over (cf. Lentulus' alleged schemes, L4.2). 'Dynast' seems to mean a petty ruler, especially of an Oriental people, while 'tetrarch', which strictly speaking denoted the ruler of quarter of a kingdom, had come to be used, as here, as one of a list of terms covering the various species of monarchy the Romans encountered (cf. Cic. *pro Balb.* 13, *pro Mil.* 28, Hor. *Sat.* 1.3.12). (b) Achaia (central and southern Greece, not to be confused with the smaller heartland of the former Achaean League) was not made into a separate province until 27 B.C.; before then it consisted partly of areas which were under the control of the Roman governor of Macedonia and partly of city-states and federations which were 'free', i.e. supposedly immune from Roman taxation and the jurisdiction of Roman magistrates but in practice unable to escape from either when circumstances became difficult. (Under the Empire freedom from the authority of the Roman governor became separable, as a privilege, from freedom from taxation). **tax companies of the provinces which he himself held:** These tax companies (in full, *societates publicanorum*, often simply *publicani*) were

the associations of rich non-senators who contracted (by public auction or otherwise) to collect the taxes due to Rome in the various provinces, which did not all have the same system of taxation. Since Pompey was the legally appointed governor of none but the two Spanish provinces, and the tax companies were of little importance there because the Spanish communities paid a fixed tribute (Cic. *II in Verr.* 3.12), it seems that Caesar is speaking loosely and simply recognising the fact that a number of the provinces were *de facto* in Pompey's control in 49. It is surely inconceivable that he is accepting the legitimacy of the overall authority recently granted to Pompey by his rump senate in Thessalonica (see 16.4). The provinces concerned were Macedonia (taken over from an unwilling T. Antistius, the quaestor left in charge by the departing governor, who was probably M. Nonius, see Shackleton Bailey [1968] on Cic. *Att.* 6.1.13), Cilicia (governor P. Sestius), Asia (C. Fannius), Syria (Metellus Scipio), Bithynia & Pontus (probably A. Plautius, Cic. *Fam.* 13.29.4), and Crete & Cyrene (Voconius, by elimination from the list given by Cic. *Att.* 8.15.3).

4 1 **nine legions:** for Pompey's transportation of the legions from Italy in March 49, see L25.2, 27.1; three of these were composed of untested recruits, while the other two, though veteran, had recently formed part of Caesar's Gallic army and were of questionable loyalty (see L2.3n., L6.1n.); the two Cilician legions now made into one by Pompey had been extremely weak in 50 B.C. (Cicero *Att.* 5.15.1, a passage which incidentally guarantees the correction *Cilicia* for *Sicilia* here). The number of Romans, whether ex-legionaries or others, recruited by Pompey in Crete, Macedonia, various parts of Greece, and the province of Asia, is testimony to the strength of individual Roman settlement in these parts even before the formal schemes of Caesar and Augustus.

2 **soldiers who had been serving with Antonius:** C. Antonius, a brother of Caesar's lieutenant M. Antonius, had been sent by Caesar to Illyria in 49 to hold it against the Pompeians, but was trapped and captured on the island of Curicta (modern Krk), at about the same time as Curio was defeated in Africa. Caesar alludes to this event below (10.5, 67.5), but the references would be enigmatic without the information given by Appian (*BC* 2.41 and 47), Dio (41.40), and Lucan (4.402-580), and are another indication of the unfinished or damaged nature of Book II (cf. 9, opening n.).

3 **Deiotarus. . . Ariobarzanes . . . Cotys . . . :** Deiotarus, having started his career in the 80s as tetrarch of one of the Galatian tribes, the Tolistobogii, had made himself useful over the years to a series of Roman commanders, including Sulla and Pompey, and had by this time become ruler of a large part of Galatia (*Bell. Alex.* 67, Strabo 12.5.1) and seen his son, like himself, recognised as a king by the Roman senate

(Cic. *Fam.* 15.2.2, *Att.* 5.17.3). He was later pardoned by Caesar for fighting against him at Pharsalus, and granted the title of king after some readjustment of territory (Dio 41.63.1-3; Cic. *Deiot.* 36). His neighbour Ariobarzanes III Eusebes Philorhomaioi (thus Cic. *Fam.* 15.2.4), King of Cappadocia 52 - 42 B.C., was the grandson of the first king of that name, who owed his throne to the same Roman opposition to Mithridates in the 90s and 80s B.C. as favoured the rise of Deiotarus. Cotys (or Cotus, or Cottus) was king of the Astae in eastern Thrace, towards the Bosphorus, and had like the other two kings kept on the right side of the Romans (Cic. *Pis.* 83). On all these eastern princes, see Sullivan.

- 4 **Rhaseypolis:** (or Rhaseyporis or Rhescyporis) another Thracian prince, ruler of the Sapaei in Western Thrace (App. *BC* 4.87).

Pompey's son: this is the elder, Gnaeus, who had been sent in company with Metellus Scipio to Syria early in 49 to raise a fleet (Plut. *Pomp.* 62).

Aulus Gabinius: Gabinius, while governor of Syria, had in 55 B.C. used a Roman army to restore the exiled Egyptian king Ptolemy Auletes to his throne. Auletes had bought his restoration at a massive price in Rome, but with borrowed money. The soldiers were needed to protect him from his subjects as he strove to wring from his kingdom the vast sums he owed to Roman moneylenders. See 103.2n.

- 5 **Tarcondarius Castor and Domnilaus:** of these two Galatian princes, Domnilaus was the one who came in person. Tarcondarius, son of Saocondarius, was killed not long after this by Deiotarus (§3 above), who was his father-in-law, thus provoking the feud which led Tarcondarius' son, also called Castor, to accuse his grandfather before Caesar in 45 B.C. of plotting to assassinate the dictator on a journey in 47 B.C. (Strabo 12.5.1-3, Cic. *Deiot.* 28). K-H-M unaccountably conflate Tarcondarius with Tarcondimotus, king in the Amanus mountains of eastern Cilicia; but the Amanus are 300 miles from Phrygia, and Tarcondimotus was notable for his *naval* support of Pompey (Dio 41.63.1, Lucan 9.219). See also Sullivan 1990, 187-192.

his slaves and his *body of shepherds*: these are the slaves and shepherds mentioned as having been given horses at I.24.2. Very probably they were from Apulia, given the prevalence of ranching in those parts and the fact that it was through that region that Pompey had retreated to Brundisium. The two categories overlap, as large numbers of shepherds were slaves – so much so that they were felt to represent a potential threat to safety. Caesar himself when he became dictator enacted that at least a third of shepherds employed by ranchers should be free adult males (Suet. *Div. Iul.* 42.1).

Antiochus of Commagene: Commagene was a small kingdom tucked in to the north-west of the great bend of the Euphrates north of

Zeugma, between the river and the Amanus and eastern Taurus ranges. Antiochus (on whom see further Sullivan 1990, 59-62, 193-8; Wagner 1983) counted both Seleucids and Ptolemies in his ancestry and had reigned since at least 69, when Lucullus had diplomatic relations with him, and in 64, after some resistance to Pompey, had been allowed to retain his kingdom when most of Syria became a Roman province, and to annex Seleucia and some parts of Mesopotamia (App. *Mithr.* 106, 114, Dio 36.2.5, Strabo 16.2.3). His reliability at this time was not above suspicion (Cic. *Fam.* 15.1.2), but in view of the threat to his kingdom from the Parthians he needed Roman goodwill. Mounted archers were of course a Parthian speciality, and their unfamiliarity in Roman armies of the time is indicated by Caesar's retention of their Greek name *hippotoxotai*, found in Latin only here and at *Bell. Afr.* 19.4 (possibly referring to the very same troops).

Dardani and Bessi: tribes to the north of Macedonia and north-west of Thrace.

- 5 2 **Dyrrachium, Apollonia:** See map 2 for the position of these two towns, both in modern Albania. Dyrrachium was the chief port of the area, and still survives as Durrës or Durazzo, but Apollonia, c. 70 km. further south, lies in ruins, strangled by changes since antiquity to the course and navigability of the river Aous, its lifeline to the sea (Strabo 7.5.8). They were important as the points of access from Italy (via Brundisium) to the Via Egnatia, which was the only good road from this coast through the mountains of the Balkan peninsula to Thessalonica, where Pompey's senate-in-exile had its seat, the Hellespont, and Asia.

to prevent Caesar from crossing the sea: by denying him any place to land, rather than by any sort of naval interception. How difficult the latter was is illustrated by the events narrated in chh. 6-8 below.

- 3 **Pompey's son:** see 4.4n.

Decimus Laelius and Gaius [Valerius] Triarius: the former had been tribune in 54 B.C. and had served as a special emissary from Pompey to the consuls at Capua in February 49, the latter is otherwise unknown though of senatorial family.

Gaius Cassius [Longinus]: the later tyrannicide. As quaestor to Crassus in Syria in 53 B.C., he had escaped from the disaster at Carrhae and organised a highly successful defence of the province against the Parthians in 52 and 51. Like his Caesarian cousin(?) Quintus (see I.2.7, II.19.1), he was a tribune in 49.

Gaius [Claudius] Marcellus . . . Gaius Coponius: Marcellus was one of the consuls of the previous year, Coponius one of the praetors. The Pompeian 'senate' in Thessalonica simply extended the *imperium* of the magistrates of 49 who were on its side (Dio 41.43.2-3). Extension

of the powers of existing magistrates was an act not only within the normal competence of the senate, but routine in the middle and late Republic, and could therefore be represented as legal. New magistrates, on the other hand, could only be created by the Roman popular assemblies.

Scribonius Libo and Marcus Octavius: [Lucius] Libo's fame lay in the future: his daughter married Pompey's younger son, Sextus, probably in the late forties B.C. (Syme 1986, 255 n.4), while his sister was briefly the wife of Octavius Caesar, the future Augustus, in 40-39 B.C., and he himself became consul in 34 B.C. as the price of deserting his son-in-law for Antony. In 56 he had supported Pompey's interests in the senate (Cic. *Fam.* 1.1.3). There is no evidence that by 49 he had held any office beyond the quaestorship, although Anderson 1963, 41, argues for a praetorship in 56 or 55. **Marcus Octavius**, son of the consul of 76 B.C., had held a curule aedileship in 50.

Marcus [Calpurnius] Bibulus: this is the first mention in the present work of Caesar's colleague in the consulship of 59 B.C. His political stance is clearly indicated by his marriage to Cato's daughter Porcia, and his courage (or obstinacy) by the resistance he attempted to put up to Caesar's actions when consul. He ranks with Domitius Ahenobarbus (husband of Cato's sister) as one of Caesar's bitterest and most determined enemies (cf. 16.3). He had recently been proconsul of Syria (51-50 B.C.), taking the province over from C. Cassius (see above) and relinquishing it to Metellus Scipio. His appointment as admiral-in-chief must owe more to his status as an opponent of Caesar than to any record of naval or military achievement (cf. Cic. *Att.* 7.2.6). His base was Corcyra (7.1).

6-19 *Having set the scene, Caesar now describes his surprise crossing with a little more than half of his army from Brundisium to a small harbour on the Illyrian coast opposite (6-8), followed by his successful seizure of Oricum and Apollonia (11-12), to gain control of the land between the river Apsus in the north (13) and Buthrotum, opposite Corcyra, in the south (16). But he could not break the Pompeian naval blockade and was cut off from the remainder of his army (14). Both sides were in difficulties with their commissariat, and there were attempts at negotiation (10-11, 15-19). The clarity of the general picture is not improved by the lacuna after 8, nor by Caesar's twin aims of denigrating his opponents' military and moral qualities and presenting himself as seeking to achieve a just peace.*

- 6 1 **When Caesar arrived at Brundisium:** probably not before Jan. 2nd or 3rd, since he set sail on the 4th (below) and his words here imply that he needed to do no more at Brundisium than encourage his men to make a swift final effort before he embarked them as quickly as possible.

slaves and personal belongings: the slaves are presumably those of the officers and perhaps the centurions. After the capture of Alesia in 52 B.C., Caesar gave a single captive to each of his soldiers (*BG* 7.89); but these were booty to be sold rather than body-servants to be taken on campaign, as Polybius confirms in his discussion of the ways a Roman commander of the second century might dispose of the proceeds of victory (10.17.6). According to the Roman lawyers (*Digest* 1.5.4.2-3) "the word for property in slaves [*mancipia*] is derived from the fact that they are captured from the enemy by force of arms [*manu capiantur*]."

They all shouted . . . that they would gladly do whatever he ordered: Plutarch (*Caes.* 37.2-4) reports discontent among some of Caesar's troops, and it is rather unlikely that they were quite so unanimously keen as he makes out to cross the Adriatic in winter and face an experienced commander who had had some months to prepare to receive them – as had not been the case in January 49. But the importance to Caesar of his pose as agent of the popular will prevents him admitting dissent, just as it led him to suppress any mention of the mutiny of the Ninth legion at Placentia earlier in the autumn (II.22.6n). **January 4th:** early November by the true calendar, see I.40.3n.

- 2 **Seven legions:** see 2.2n.

- 3 **Ceraunian range. . . Palaeste:** see Map 2. Both proper names depend on an emendation (see *app. crit.*), but are certain. The mountainous Ceraunian coast, of which the Acroceraunian promontory was the northern end, forming the seaward horn of the Gulf of Oricum, was both the nearest landfall to Italy (Virgil *Aen.* 3.507) and famous for its dangerous rocks (Hor. *Od.* 1.3.20). Note that the cove of Palaeste (modern Palasè) is north of and not to be confused with Panormus (modern Palermo) which possesses a good harbour (Strabo 7.7.5) and would certainly have been protected by the Pompeian forces. Of the 31-mile stretch on which Caesar had to make his landing the *Mediterranean Pilot* says "... the coast is precipitous and almost inaccessible. It is dreaded as a lee shore by small sailing craft, south-westerly gales blowing directly towards it: the current sets almost constantly north-westward. Along this coast there are only two or three small coves, which offer no shelter whatsoever."

[*Cerauniorum* is the genitive either of *Ceraunii* <montes>, the usual Latin designation, or of a neuter pl. *Ceraunia*, borrowed from the Greek and more at home in Latin verse than prose; the *people* called *Ceraunii* attested by Pliny *NH* 3.143 are not in question, as they lived inland and over 250 km. further north (Wilkes 172, 175). The postponement (anastrophe) of *inter* to follow its noun is noteworthy, being the sole example in Caesar of this usage other than with a relative (*BG* 6.36.2, 7.33.2), but it is hard to see why it is done here and perhaps there is textual corruption.]

7 1 **Lucretius Vespillo:** probably the same man who escaped from Sulmo the previous year by jumping from the wall (I.18.1). (Minucius Rufus is not otherwise known).

Decimus Laelius . . . Marcus Bibulus: see 5.3-4.

2 **an upper deck:** cf. I.56.1n.

his ships encumbered: i.e. not in immediate sea-going condition, Bibulus presumably not expecting Caesar to make a crossing in late autumn.

8 2 **Fufius Calenus:** on Calenus, see I.87.4n.

the night breeze: in settled weather, if there is any daytime warmth, the cooling of the land after dark produces along the coast a breeze which blows out to sea during the early part of the night, but then dies. The effect is more marked off a high and mountainous coast such as the Acroceraunian promontory.

3 **he vented on them the anger and resentment . . . :** *erumpere* used transitively is rare and generally poetic, but Faerno's emendation *iracundiam* is supported by Cicero's exactly parallel and contemporary *ne in me stomachum erumpant cum sint tibi irati* (Att. 16.3.1). Caesar here ascribes motive, and uses emotionally coloured language, in the same way as he did in describing the actions of others of his most detested foes in the first few chapters of Book I (see Introduction to Books I & II, p. 18). Yet he is prepared to give Bibulus credit (below) for courage and tenacity of purpose: this was no easy fight.

4 **Sason . . . to Oricum:** Sason or perhaps Saso (modern Sazan or Sázanit) is an island lying off the entrance to the Gulf of Valona (Vlone), at the head of which stood ancient Oricum. These landing-places, and particularly the sheltered port of Oricum, were the ones which Caesar would most want to use to reinforce and supply the forces he had now managed to land. The open beach at Palaeste was not suitable for other than emergency use, and the good harbour at nearby Panormus was further south than was desirable, since the crossing from Brundisium was longer and Pompey's land forces were concentrating for the winter at Dyrrachium and Apollonia, to the north. Panormus was also rather too close for comfort to the Pompeian fleet base at Corcyra.

[Mommsen thought that the readings of the manuscripts (see *app. crit.*) concealed the name, not of *Oricum*, but of *Curicum*, a town on the island of Curicta, and his correction has been accepted by some editors; but Curicta lies some 600 km. from Sason and it is fantastic to suppose that Bibulus had the resources to protect this enormous stretch of indented and island-studded shoreline in the way that Caesar describes, or that any useful kind of communication could have been maintained over this distance. It also appears (9.1 and nn.) that the Pompeian

commanders Libo and Octavius were being *withdrawn* from the northern area.]

9 There is obviously a gap in the text between this chapter and the last, but it is unlikely that very much has fallen out – perhaps no more than a few sentences rounding off the picture of Bibulus' activity and explaining the immediate background to M. Octavius' arrival off Salona. It is true that P. Dolabella and C. Antonius were defeated before this in the northernmost region of the Dalmatian coast by Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius (see 4.2n.), and that at 67.5 Caesar alludes to a description 'above' of the betrayal of Antonius' army, but the temptation to insert the missing account (possibly never in fact written) in this lacuna should be resisted. It is perfectly clear from Dio and Appian that these defeats took place in the previous year, 49, and given the manifestly incomplete state of Book II, it is far more probable that Caesar planned to preserve his usual chronological arrangement and incorporate them in that book. Also the reference at 4.2 implies that Caesar had dealt (or intended to deal) with the episode before the opening of Book III.

1 **Libo:** see 4.2n. and 5.3. I adopt Paul's conjecture because *discessus* is elsewhere used by Caesar only of persons or bodies constituted of persons (armies, cavalry). The conjecture also fits nicely with Libo's evident separation from Octavius at this point, and his unexplained appearance a little later to strengthen Bibulus' force in the southern sector of the coast, where Caesar was (15.6).

Salonar . . . Issa: Salona (or Salona), some 400 km. north of Apollonia, is modern Solin, on the outskirts of Split (Spalato); it was the chief port for Illyria (see Wilkes 1969). Issa is the island of Vis.

2 **the association of Roman citizens:** the context makes it plain that by *conventus* Caesar means *conventus civium Romanorum*, an association of Romans constituted in a non-Roman town. See II.19.3n.

inadequately protected: "Salona does not enjoy a well-defended position" (Wilkes 221). It is therefore necessary either to insert a negative into the transmitted text, which is the solution adopted here, or to delete the whole sentence as a gloss, as K.-H.-M. and others do.

3-7 **The siege of Salona:** the story, for all its brevity, contains some of the same themes as that of the siege of Massilia, told at length in II. 1-16, and Caesar could certainly have worked it up if he chose. But Salona lacked the strategic importance and symbolic value of Massilia, and no leader of consequence, still less himself, was involved on either side. Also a strongly emphasised minor episode at this point would have blurred the picture of Caesar and Pompey manoeuvring to come to grips with each other in the prelude to the decisive struggle.

- 3 **wooden towers:** the town had a wall (§6 below), but towers were an essential part of siege warfare (see II.1-2, 8-12 *passim*).
- hair . . . to make artillery:** the artillery of this period were devices for firing heavy arrows or spear-like bolts horizontally in the manner of a large cross bow, whose arms were wound back against the tension of some kind of elastic rope. Human hair has the necessary elasticity to make such a rope, provided the individual hairs are long enough to stay twisted together.
- 5 **a delegation to Caesar:** it is natural to suppose that Caesar had by this time landed in Epirus, i.e. that the date by the Roman calendar was Jan. 6th, or later. If this is so, the references in this chapter to the midday stand-down and to the approach of winter are confirmation that the official calendar was indeed at least two months, and possibly more, in advance of the true season (cf. I.40.3n.).
- 6 **the midday period:** the same siesta hour, and the same slackness, as the Massiliots had used to their advantage (II.14.1)
- 8 **winter was approaching:** the onset of winter occurs in November in this part of the world (snow reported in the Bosnian mountains on November 15, 1992). The end of the siege is therefore roughly contemporary with Caesar's crossing from Brundisium (§1 above).
- Pompey at Dyrrachium:** when Pompey makes his appearance in the narrative (11.2), he is in Candavia, hastening to reach Dyrrachium from Macedonia. It seems, then, that in completing his account of these early operations in the northern and central sectors of the Dalmatio-Illyrian coast, Caesar has moved on to a point in time from which, at the beginning of the following chapter, he has to backtrack to start the next chain of events. This is a characteristic of his narrative technique (see Introduction to Books I & II, p. 24).
- 10 1-2 **Vibullius Rufus:** for the first capture, see I.15.4n., I.34.1, but the second occasion is not in fact related by Caesar. This is one of many loose ends in *BC*. On the respect accorded to Vibullius' abilities by Pompey, see I.15.4n.
- 3 **not risk their luck any further:** this is the first sounding in this book of the motif of luck and its unpredictable operation. See 27.1n for other occurrences, and 73n. for discussion of Caesar's use of the theme. Note that here, as in his speech after the defeat at Dyrrachium (73) and his exhortation to his soldiers after the battle at Pharsalus (95.1), Caesar invokes luck, or Fortune, as an idea which he can use as a lever in persuading others.
- 5 **The losses so far :** this catalogue is, in effect, a list of the contents of Books I and II of *BC*, with two exceptions: Caesar omits to mention the siege and capture of Massilia (I.34-36, 56-58, II.1-16,22), and he

apparently never wrote up the defeat of C. Antonius (see 9, introductory n.).

- 8 **previously:** see I.8-11; 24.4-5 with 26.2-5; 32.8-33.2.

peace terms . . . from senate and people at Rome: this disingenuous proposal, alluding to the normal mechanisms for law-making, indicates clearly Caesar's lack of real desire for peace (cf. I.11.1n.). Although the senate had shown itself recalcitrant in acceding to his demands in April of the previous year (I.32-33), the fact remained that the subsequent decision (I.53.2) of a large number of senators to leave Rome and join those who were already with Pompey meant that the remainder were nearly all either neutral or pro-Caesarian and a settlement approved by this body was not likely to be impartial. The people, similarly invoked by Caesar with great constitutional resonance and show of propriety, had been assiduously and successfully courted by himself and his supporters for many years before the outbreak of war, and were extremely unlikely to be persuaded to ratify a settlement that was against his interests - even if Pompey or his agents were permitted to operate freely again in Rome.

[I adopt Madvig's punctuation of the passage. Others put a comma after *oportere* and end the sentence with *dimissurum*, so that it goes 'It was in the common interest, and was a course of action which they ought to approve, if each of them were to swear on oath in a public assembly that he would dismiss his army within the next three days. When they had laid aside their arms . . . (etc.)' This makes what is in the common interest to be the oath-swearing, whereas Madvig makes it to be the seeking of peace terms from senate and people. The latter is obviously a much more forceful and important statement. Furthermore, although both versions make sense, and Latin as a language will accommodate either, Caesar's usage supports Madvig. The alternative punctuation creates the sole example in either *BG* or *BC* of Caesar defining *id* (which is here an emendation, but *interea* can hardly be right) by a clause beginning with *si*, and this ought to be a decisive consideration.]

- 9 **a public assembly:** a *contio* was a meeting of Roman citizens convoked by a competent magistrate, and therefore legionaries (by definition Roman citizens) could constitute such a body.
- 11 **To make this proposal more acceptable . . . :** Caesar cannot possibly have written the Latin words (not translated) after the asterisk, because they starkly contradict what has been said in the previous two sections. Some editors delete the whole sentence, but the first few words make excellent sense; in view of the nature of these proposals, and the fate of all their predecessors, there was a real need to induce Pompey, somehow, to take them seriously.

- 11 2 **Candavia:** the Candavian mountains lay in inland Illyria on the Via Egnatia (5.2n.), around Lake Ohrid (site of ancient Lynchnidos).
Oricum: see 8.4n. Hammond 1967, 125, reports that it was a two-hour climb for him from Palaeste to the pass at the top of the ridge (1,055 m.), whence the route to Oricum lies less steeply downhill. Caesar's legionaries will have been capable of making the journey in a day.
- 3 **Lucius <Manlius> Torquatus:** active in Italy the previous year, L24.3.
Parthini: one of the major Illyrian peoples of the area (Strabo 7.7.8).
- 4 **legitimate authority:** Caesar is referring to the fact that he was now a duly elected consul, cf. 12.2.
townspeople: these seem here to be contrasted with 'the Greeks'; if so, these are the non-Greek-speaking local inhabitants, possibly not even full citizens of their community. For such distinctions elsewhere, cf. Utica (II.36.1)
unharmd by him: under the circumstances, there was nothing very remarkable about Caesar's treatment of Torquatus, but he liked to stress his clemency (perhaps a mistaken policy, as events turned out, but none the less deliberate, see L23.3n.).
- 12 1 **set out for Apollonia:** Caesar perhaps took Oricum on Jan. 6th. The distance from there to Apollonia is a level march of about 60 km., so he will have arrived there two, or at most three days later.
- 2 **against the judgment of all Italy and the Roman people:** 'all Italy' figured in a similar argument at Massilia (L35.1). Some editors delete 'and the Roman people' as an intrusive annotation; but Caesar could now claim, as he could not before Massilia, that his recent election as consul showed the constitutional approval of the Roman people. Of course the great majority of free, adult, male inhabitants of the Italian peninsula were Roman citizens, but in both practical and emotive terms there was a real difference between 'all Italy' and 'the Roman people'.
- 4 **Byllis and Amantia:** two towns near Apollonia, cf. 40.4, Cic. *Phil.* 11.26.
- 13 Dio (41.47) has a somewhat different, and possibly more objective, version of the events related in this chapter and in 18-19 below: *"Pompey, as soon as he heard of Caesar's arrival, did not delay, but hoping to crush him easily before he was reinforced by the others who were with Antony [sc. at Brundisium], hastily marched with a force towards Apollonia. Caesar advanced as far as the river [Apsus] to meet him, thinking that even in his present state he would be a match for the approaching troops; but when he learnt that he was far outnumbered, he halted. And so that it might not be thought that he was halting through fear, or that he was the aggressor, he put some proposals about a settlement to the other side*

and delayed on this pretext. Pompey, realising his motive, wanted to come to grips with him as soon as possible and for this reason set about crossing the river. But when the bridge collapsed under the weight and some of the advance guard were cut off and killed, he desisted, discouraged because he had failed after initiating the first engagement of the war."

- 1 **Pompey . . . marched by day and night:** when the news of Caesar's capture of Apollonia reached Pompey he was probably already well under 100 km. from Dyrrachium (cf. 11.2). Caesar, on the other hand, had about 100 km. to cover to reach it, and his march might not be unopposed.
- 2 **the march resembled a rout:** Caesar writes colourfully. The Epirot tribesmen who deserted can hardly have been an important part of Pompey's force, and perhaps they did not abscond on quite the scale Caesar would have us believe (cf. 61.2).
- 3 **Labienus . . . took an oath:** on Labienus, see Tyrrell 1972, and I.15.2n. The irony is patent of having such a man, celebrated for his desertion of Caesar at the outbreak of the war, take the lead in swearing an oath of loyalty. The episode also prepares the way for his bad faith at 19.5-7. (Labienus in fact remained true to his oath and finally fell fighting on the field of Munda in 45 B.C.). The oath is exactly like that administered by Petreius in the Iberia campaign (L76.2-3), and must have been taken seriously to have been used as a means of restoring morale. It was a reinforcement of the military oath (*sacramentum*) which all soldiers swore on enlistment, to obey their commander until discharged (Dion. Hal. 10.18.2, 11.43.2, Servius ad *Aen.* 8.614; on the difference between the *sacramentum* and other oaths of loyalty, like the present example, see Linderski 77-80), and it presages the more general oaths of loyalty sworn later in the civil war period and under the Empire to other leaders and to Octavian and his successors in the principate, by both soldiers and the civilian population (see Herrmann 62-3, Gruen 375-6).
- 5 **the river Apsus:** today the Semeni, which flows some 10 km. north of Apollonia. It and the Aous/Vijosë, about the same distance south of the town, are the major rivers of this region. The exact site of the two camps remains uncertain, not least because the river has changed its course since antiquity, but can hardly have been in the flood-plain. For detailed discussion, see Rice Holmes 1923, III.436 ff.
under canvas: literally, 'under skins', the material of which Roman tents were made.
- 14 1 **Calenus:** this strand of narrative resumes from 8.2
the number of ships he had: there were five legions left for Calenus to bring across, and probably the greater part of the cavalry, only 500

having been transported with Caesar and the seven legions now in Illyria (2.2, 6.2). Thus he probably needed about as many ships as were used for the first crossing, but was 30 short (8.3).

2 **managed privately:** perhaps this was a merchant vessel which had contracted to supply the army.

3 **Bibulus, who exacted retribution:** it may be legitimate to wonder if Bibulus' atrocities (cf. 8.3) were as frightful as Caesar makes out. Such tales are the common currency of war, difficult to check even with modern communications and the presence of genuinely neutral war reporters, and Caesar had a long-standing score to settle with Bibulus (see 5.3n).

a moment of time and a remarkable chance: i.e. if Calenus had been a little sooner on his way, and the vessel bearing Caesar's letter had not chanced to meet his ship, disaster could have followed. Caesar very rarely indulges in reflections of this sort, preferring to leave the reader to make them for himself, but note the stress on 'fortune' in the crisis at Ilerda the previous year (I.52.3, 59.1 and nn.).

15 1 **as mentioned above:** presumably in the lacuna between 8 and 9.

5 **abandon the ports:** that is, the blockade of the ports.

6 **as I have described:** this is the only instance in Caesar's works of the first person singular of this verb. The first person plural *demonstravimus*, which gives a greater impression of anonymity but is still more personal than the passive *demonstratum est*, occurs 32 times, all except 3 instances (2 in *BG* 2; 1 in *BC* I) concentrated in Books 5-7 of *BG* (17 instances) and Book III of *BC* (12 instances). *Demonstratum est* occurs twice in *BG* (once each in Books 2 and 4) and twelve times in *BC*, evenly distributed (4:3:5). It seems that as both works progressed Caesar found it increasingly difficult to maintain the detachment and pseudo-objectivity of his chosen style. This conclusion is given some support by the fact that the only other first person singular (other than in direct speech) in *BG* and *BC* occurs in this book (*credo*, 70.1), while the only first person use of *puto* is at 17.1 below (*putamus*). Generalising first person plurals, meaning "people normally believe", are also restricted to *BC*, being found at 2.4.4 (*confidamus*) and 2.27.2 (*credimus*). Of other first person verbs, the two in *BG* (the sole instance of *existimavimus*, at 7.25.1, and *reperiebamus* at 5.13.4) are both 'authorial'. *Reperiebamus* is found twice more, in *BC*, see 57.5n. Libo: see 8-9n. and 9.1.

Marcus Acilius and Staius Murcus: Orsini's correction of Acilius' *praenomen* to Manius (M') is erroneous, though accepted by all editors: Dio (42.12) reports 'Marcus Acilius' as still in command at Oricum after Pharsalus. This man may have had Caninus or Caninianus as his *cognomen*, see 39.1, or he may be the M. (not M') Acilius Glabrio who

held a suffect consulship in 33 B.C. See further Shackleton Bailey (1977) vol.2 p. 435 (on Cic. *Fam.* 13.50). As for Staius Murcus, the correct form of his *nomen* is guaranteed by *ILS* 885 = *ILLRP* 444, and even if that should refer to a different person, by the manuscripts of Velleius (2.69.2, 72.4, 77.3, wrongly emended by Orsini) and Appian. He was from the non-Latin central highlands of Italy, probably the Marsic territory or northern Samnium (Wiseman 1971, 263), of a family which had acquired its Roman citizenship a mere forty years previously. He is thus a representative of the new 'Italian', non-Roman political constituency produced by the Social War, a constituency which Caesar took pains to cultivate (Syme 1939, 82-94). He later took a prominent part in the wars that followed Caesar's murder, first going over to Brutus and Cassius and then to Sextus Pompey. **the town:** i.e. Oricum.

16 1 **Buthrotum:** modern Butrint(o) or Vutrinto, just across the strait from the northern tip of Corcyra.

4 **aedileship and praetorship:** in 65 and 62 B.C. respectively. Suetonius explains (*Div. Iul.* 10) that as aedile Caesar gave games and beast-hunts both together with his colleague Bibulus, and separately, but his own lavishness was such that he derived all the credit even for their common expenditure. Bibulus thus felt that his munificence had been wasted - perhaps wrongly, because the Roman people in due course elected him consul. What the dispute in the praetorship was we do not know, but it could have been connected with Caesar's attempt, on his first day of office, to have the popular assembly strip Q. Catulus (*cos.* 78) of his responsibility for the prestigious task of rebuilding the Capitoline Temple (Suet. *Div. Iul.* 15). Bibulus, being married to Cato's daughter, was a prominent member of those Suetonius calls the 'clique of *optimates*' who rushed to resist Caesar. (The *public* enmity of Caesar and Bibulus, dating from their consulship, needed no parading here). Schönberger (1984) suggests that Bibulus' non-appearance might in truth have more to do with sickness than anything else (cf. 18.1).

4 **Pompey ... had always wanted to reach an agreement:** although the conjectures of Kraner and Roscher (see *app. crit.*), which make Libo say that *he* (or *the Pompeians*) desire peace, *but* cannot do much about it themselves, are highly attractive and improve Libo's argument, they are not necessary, provided the less drastic correction of *sed* to *se* be accepted. It is perfectly understandable for Libo to make the initial point that he knows his leader wants a settlement, before offering to facilitate the process.

by resolution of council: this was the decision taken by Pompey's 'senate' at Thessalonica (cf. 5.3n., *Marcellus*). Caesar is constitutionally correct to term this body Pompey's *consilium*. Once

away from the senate, every senior Roman magistrate was expected to have a council, drawn from whomever he thought appropriate, and consult them before taking any major decision - though he did not have to follow their advice, only discover it. Precisely the same relationship existed between the consuls and senate in Rome, the senate being in origin the king's council, and later inherited by the annual chief magistrates of the republic. The senate of course possessed far more authority than any other *consilium*, but in essence it was no more than that - a body to advise the consuls, with no law-making powers of its own. A normal military *consilium* is seen in action at I.67.

- 17 1 these topics . . . : the matters mentioned by Libo at the end of the previous chapter are meant, presumably general points about the Pompeian negotiating position. This remark casts an interesting light on what Caesar considered admissible editorial additions - in this case the insertion of arguments not used at the time but possibly relevant.
- 5 Libo would neither receive . . . : Libo's vehemence is conveyed by the use of a sequence of no less than five historic infinitives. The use of the present infinitive instead of the perfect indicative is a device (much favoured a little later by Sallust) for giving vividness which is more literary than Caesar's usual cumulation of historic present tenses and is employed very sparingly by him (only 3 other instances in *BC*, at I.64.2, II.20.1, III.12.2, and 6-8 in *BG*).
- 6 the whole scheme: I correct *orationem* (speech) to *rationem* (scheme), on the grounds that Libo's manoeuvre embraces far more than a speech. Caesar is surely referring to the whole affair, starting at 15.6. *Rationem instituere* in this sense is common Latin, used by Caesar himself in two other places (I.42.1, *BG* 4.17.2; and for *omnem rationem*, cf. 73.1, 81.3). He does not, on the other hand, ever use *orationem instituere*.
- 18 3 Vibullius . . . summoned Libo and Lucius Lucceius and Theophanes: Libo's presence, and the information that this took place when things had settled down after Caesar's landing, indicates that we are in Pompey's camp on the Apsus (13.6). Lucceius had been praetor in 67 B.C., refused the governorship of Sardinia in the following year, prosecuted Catiline in 64, and was an unsuccessful candidate for the consulship in 59. He wrote history (of which none survives), and is famous as recipient of his friend Cicero's request (*Fam.* 5.12) to write a laudatory monograph on part of his (Cicero's) career. Cn. Pompeius Theophanes (to give him his full name at this time), a member of the ruling class of Mitylene, was a cultured and influential Greek who probably first met Pompey in 67 at the time of the campaign against the pirates, and became a member of his retinue during the subsequent war against Mithridates. He published a eulogistic and doubtless tendentious

account of his patron's deeds, was rewarded for this and other services with the Roman citizenship (Cic. *pro Archia* 24), and continued to advise Pompey until the latter's death. He was one of the most prominent of the Greek intellectuals attached in various ways to great Roman houses in the late Republic (on whom see Bowersock 1965 chh. 1-3; Rawson 1985, 66-83 and (on Theophanes) 108-9), and his grandson Q. Pompeius Macer actually became a Roman senator. On all three men, see further Anderson 1963, 28-44.

- 4 brought back to Italy . . . which I left . . . : some words have surely dropped out here, although the transmitted text can be made sense of by placing strong emphasis on the contrast between the active 'I left' and the passive 'I am brought back'; however, there is the difficulty that *reductus* can as easily mean 'escorted home with honour' as 'brought back from exile'. Something like 'if I am brought back humbled / by another's favour to Italy, which I left as a leader / of my own volition' is needed to clarify the contrast.
- 5 after the end of the war: by 'the war' must be meant the phase of civil war terminated by the death of Pompey (104). Note that Suet. *Div. Iul.* 36 speaks of 'all the civil wars' when referring to the various campaigns (as we should call them) of the period 49-45 B.C. This remark is a useful clue to Caesar's methods of composition. Since information on the fate of Vibullius' mission is an integral part of the whole narrative at this point, the present chapter is not likely to have been inserted later into a previously written account. Therefore this part of the book was written not earlier than the winter of 48/7 - and probably not much later either, see Introduction to Books I & II pp. 17-18, 21. [Some editors make the phrase part of Pompey's outburst, placing the full stop after *perfecto*, but this weakens the point of both sentences; cf. also 57.5.]
- negotiate about peace: see 57.2n.
- 19 2 Publius Vatinius: Vatinius had been of great service to Caesar politically as tribune in the year of Caesar's consulship, and had served as an officer in his army in Gaul in 51. He was rewarded with the consulship of 47 B.C.
- fugitives from the . . . Pyrenees and pirates : these are two categories of somewhat inglorious enemy over whom Pompey had won victories. The former probably refers to the remnants of Sertorius' rebel army (I.61.3n) in Spain, who made approaches to Pompey (Plut. *Sert.* 27.1) and were settled at Convenae or Lugdunum Convenarum in Aquitania (*RE* 4.1172, Strabo 4.2.1-2), and the latter to the Cilician pirates finally subdued in 67 B.C., some of whom after surrender were given homes elsewhere.
- 4 Aulus Varro: on record as a friend of Cicero (*Fam.* 3.7.4, with Shackleton Bailey's note; 16.12.6; 13.22.1), and curule aedile in 44 B.C.

(*ILLRP* 704). He was probably the father of the brothers Aulus Varro Murena, who failed to become consul in 23 B.C., and Lucius Varro Murena, who was accused in that year of plotting against Augustus (Swan 1966, Treggiari 1973, 253ff., Sumner 1978).

- 6 **Titus Labienus came forward:** given his history, Labienus was likely to sustain a hard line in negotiations (cf. 13.3n.).

without raising his voice: it is not clear whether Caesar means to imply that Labienus was negotiating seriously, simply addressing himself to Vatinius, and that their 'dispute' was reasoned, or that he never intended to be properly heard and the dispute was bad-tempered and unproductive.

- 7 **Cornelius Balbus, Marcus Plotius, Lucius Tiburtius;** Balbus is Lucius Cornelius Balbus the younger. Both he and his identically named uncle were citizens of Gades in Spain and received Roman citizenship at the end of the Sertorian war. The uncle was one of Caesar's most influential and trusted agents, but took no part in public life, or in the fighting of 49-48 B.C., remaining an *eques* until his remarkable elevation by Caesar's heir to a suffect consulship in 40 B.C.; the nephew became quaestor in 44, so cannot at this point have been a senator. About the other two men here named nothing else is known, but given Caesar's strong sense of status when listing individuals (cf. 1.23.1-2nn.), it is almost certain that all three were, at least at this time in their careers, *equites*.

- 8 **'Well then, stop talking about peace ...':** if Labienus really said this, it may have been prompted by anger at what he regarded as a treacherous attempt to kill him. It is quite unclear what really happened. A possibility is that the hail of weapons was spontaneous and expressed the frustration of the soldiery on both sides at the intransigence of their leaders, which became obvious when Labienus and Vatinius started to argue. On the genuineness of Caesar's desire for a settlement, and hence to make concessions, see Introduction pp. 16-17: throughout the *BC* he casts doubt on the Pompeians' sincerity, yet in truth his own looks more in doubt.

20-22 *Caesar now compresses into three chapters the serious disturbances which took place in Italy in the early months of 48 B.C. They arose from the collapse of credit brought about by the civil war and the attempts of Caelius Rufus and Milo to capitalise on the resulting discontent while Caesar himself was occupied elsewhere with other problems. Dio (42.22-25) has a fuller and less partisan account.*

- 20 1 **Caelius Rufus:** see 1.2.5n. His praetorship, held five years before the legal age, is an indication of Caesar's regard for him (he was born on May 28, 82 B.C., see Plin. *NH* 7.165, Austin 1960 appendix I).

Ambitious, clever, eloquent, and impulsive, he was undone by his inability to see when the opposition was too much for him. There survives a letter of his to Cicero (*Fam.* 8.17, well analysed by Gelzer 1968, 228 n.1), which was apparently written in January 48, lamenting his decision to throw in his lot with Caesar, reporting that the sympathies of the urban population were now with Pompey, and hinting at some dramatic but unspecified action on his own part. Whether his intention from the beginning was to start a revolution against Caesar, or whether it was rather a case of one thing leading to another, is not clear. On the history of his adherence to Caesar, see Rosivach 1980.

the debtors: see 1.2n.

his tribunal . . . official seat of Gaius Trebonius, the urban praetor: a Roman magistrate with power of judgment, such as a praetor, would set his official seat (*sella curulis*) on a portable platform (*tribunal*) to indicate, so to speak, that his office was open. The urban praetor, the most senior of the college, dealt with civil cases between Roman citizens and therefore with all applications for recovery of debt. He had his seat in the open forum, so that his proceedings, and Caelius' attempted challenge, were completely public. On Trebonius himself, see 1.36.5 and n.

- 2 **initiate an appeal:** the principle of equality between all members of a college of Roman magistrates meant that appeal lay not only to a more powerful authority, but also to another magistrate of the same rank.

- 3 **what sort of temperament does that require?:** the author's mask of impersonality slips here, betraying his irritation. He does not try to probe the basis for the support that Caelius must have had in order to propose his law (below). Caelius' crimes, in Caesar's eyes, must have been his disloyalty (see §1n.), his questioning of Caesar's judgment, and his refusal to accept that metropolitan politics were dead.

- 4 **people whose interests were at stake:** i.e. the creditors.

- 5 **on its fifth(?) anniversary:** all modern editions accept Manutius' emendation (see *app. crit.*), of which this is the translation, but doubts must remain: five full years, even under the circumstances obtaining, seems an extraordinarily long time to grant interest-free credit. (I take it that the Roman habit of counting inclusively means that a loan taken out on e.g. Jan. 14th 53, and repayable on Jan. 14th 48, would be described as being due on the sixth Jan. 14th; whereas modern English prefers to call Jan. 14th 48 the *fifth anniversary* of such a loan).

- 21 1 **a year's remission of rent to tenants:** Caesar himself had to grant this towards the end of the year (*Fasti Ostienses*, after 28 Sept.), up to a maximum of 2,000 sesterces (Suet. *Div. Iul.* 38.2; Dio 42.51.1; see Frederiksen 1966 133-4). The great majority of the inhabitants of the

city lived in rented housing owned by the rich (so Yavetz 1958; but Kühnert 1991, 57-60, argues that the *plebs urbana* was not heavily indebted through rent).

- 3 **Servilius** . . . referred the episode to the senate: this was the normal procedure when public order was threatened. Armed with the moral authority of a senatorial resolution (which had no force in law, but created a *prima facie* case that action taken in accordance with it was reasonable and necessary) the magistrates could then act firmly without being exposed to accusations of acting high-handedly. The debate after which Opimius, the consul of 121 B.C., took action against C. Gracchus and his followers is a good example (Plut. *C. Gracchus* 14). On the present occasion, according to Dio (42.23.2), the tribunes vetoed the motion which backed the measures proposed by the consul, whereupon the senate "entrusted to Servilius the protection of the city, a procedure of which I have often spoken previously." This can only be a description of the decree which Opimius was the first to obtain. It later became known as the *senatus consultum ultimum* ('the last decree of the senate'), and its terms were "to see that the state took no harm". It was passed in several civil emergencies between 121 and the present (see I.5.3n.). The irony of the present situation was that the developments in the senate took almost exactly the same course as they had in the first few days of 49, similarly culminating in a tribunician veto which provoked the *s.c.u.* (I. 1-5); but now Caesar's man Servilius was in the position of Lentulus on that occasion, and the tribunes who opposed him took the parts previously played by Antony and Cassius. It is, then, hardly surprising that Caesar, who had made the earlier events a *casus belli*, glosses over these.

the Rostra: 'the Rams' was a long, elevated, speakers' platform at the north-west end of the forum, adorned with ships' rams which had been taken as spoils of war from the people of Antium in the fourth century.

- 4 **Milo:** T. Annius Milo was a notable political figure of the stormy decade of the fifties. As tribune in 57 he determined to resist the organised violence of P. Clodius by taking a leaf from the same book. Their mutual opposition continued until Jan. 18th 52, when attended by their retinues of slaves and bodyguards they met accidentally at Bovillae on the road from Rome to Lanuvium. A brawl ensued, which led to Clodius' death, followed by more disturbances in Rome and Pompey's appointment as sole consul - no magistrates having yet been elected because of the political violence and obstruction being practised by some of the candidates, among whom were both Milo and Clodius. The level of public disorder was such that Pompey determined to take firm action, and a show trial ensued in which Milo, feebly defended by Cicero, was condemned for the murder. (For a detailed and authoritative account, see Asconius in *Milon*. 30-41C; note that Cicero's

extant speech is not the one he actually delivered). Milo, who had gone into exile in Massilia, was uniquely discriminated against by Caesar, who would not permit him to return when he allowed all other exiles to do so - at least, so say Velleius (2.68.2) and Dio (41.36.2, 42.24.2); but Bruhns 1978 notes also Sex. Cloelius (Cic. *Att.* 14.13A.2) and C. Sempronius Rufus (scholiast on Hor. *Sat.* 2.2.49).

the great public shows he had put on: at least twice, in 55 as praetor and in 53 privately, to win support for his consular candidacy (Cic. *Q.F.* 3.6(8).6).

a troop of gladiators . . . : in the late Republic gladiatorial shows (*munera*) did not form part of the regular programme of the great public 'games' (*ludi*, better translated 'entertainments'). They were put on by individuals, generally when they were in office, on the pretext of commemorating some person (e.g. the giver's father) or event (e.g. Pompey's dedication of his theatre in 55, Cic. *Fam.* 7.1.2-3). Because such shows were hugely popular with the Roman voters, their frequency increased greatly in the final decades of the Republic, and it became worthwhile to own a troop of gladiators and hire it out (Cic. *Fam.* 4.4a.2), or use it to provide bodyguards (Cic. *Q.F.* 2.5.3) or create mayhem when required. Caesar himself owned gladiators who were in barracks at Capua when the war broke out (I.14.4).

shepherds: notoriously independent, tough, well-armed, and likely to be disaffected, cf. 4.5n. and Bradley 1989, 53-55.

- 5 **Casilinum:** a town a few km. north of Capua, on the road from Rome.

the association of Roman citizens: the *conventus* is the collective body of Romans in Capua, cf. 9.2n; for the peculiar status of Capua, a city within Italy which had no Roman municipal identity, see I.14.5n.

- 22 1 **Vibullius:** perhaps Vibullius is supposed to have conveyed these instructions when he was on his way to Spain in the spring of the previous year (I.34.1), because it would appear from Caesar's narrative that Vibullius left Italy on his current negotiating mission (10.1-2) before Milo was summoned from Massilia by Caelius.

- 2 **slave quarters:** *ergastula* (sometimes translated 'slave barracks') on great estates were akin to prison camps where the gangs of farm slaves (who often worked chained) were accommodated. In Roman comedy, urban and domestic slaves are represented as being in terror of being sent to the country. (See Bradley 1989, 52-3, on slave quarters in the late Republic).

Quintus Pedius: a nephew of Caesar's, and later a beneficiary of his will.

- 4 **the concerns of the magistrates:** this seems to mean the extent to which the magistrates were distracted from their normal duties by the seriousness of the rising. Caesar uses the same discreet word (*occupatio*) of the troubles which prevented Ptolemy Auletes' will being deposited in the treasury in 59 or 58 (108.6).

23-30 *The narrative now picks up the thread of the military operations, which was interrupted by the account of the various attempts at negotiation, and by the sketch of the abortive challenge of Caelius and Milo in Italy. Caesar's most pressing need was to have the half of his army which was still left at Brundisium join him in Epirus, while conversely his enemies spared no effort to prevent his fleet from crossing the Adriatic. He offers no general strategic appreciation, but the truth was that if Scipio should arrive from Syria with his two legions, thus bringing Pompey's total strength up to eleven legions, before he himself was reinforced, he would find himself seriously outnumbered. There was for the moment stalemate at the Apsus; but he lacked any means of re-crossing the Adriatic, and in face of superior forces might be starved into surrender if Pompey's admirals could maintain the naval blockade. There is no reference to what (if anything) was happening at the Apsus, or to the state of morale in either army. This little of the tension of the situation appears in the narrative, in contrast to Caesar's presentation of the course of events at Ilterda in Book I (48-60).*

- 23 1 **Libo set out from Oricum:** Appian, not the most reliable of sources for this campaign, reports that after his arrival in Dyrrachium Pompey sent a fleet which retook Oricum (BC 2.56), but it is hard to see how he can be right in the light of the fact that Caesar kept a legion there all winter (34.1), and three cohorts thereafter (39.1). Libo's base at 'Oricum' might then be the island of Sason.
- 24 1 **Antonius:** namely Marcus Antonius, who had been left in command of the second part of the invasion force.
- two triremes:** on triremes, see II.6.4.
- 2 **four quadriremes:** the quadrireme, which had two banks of oars worked each by a pair of men, was larger and heavier than a trireme and was the smallest 'ship of the line' in the Hellenistic navies. Cf. 101.6n.
- 4 **driven by necessity and disgrace:** Caesar makes much of the disgrace, but it is very improbable that Libo was much perturbed by the loss of a single quadrireme. Inability to obtain water was a much more serious matter, and doubtless decisive. Caesar, as ever, is keen to portray the superior fighting qualities of his soldiers.

- 25 1 **Many months had now elapsed and winter was far advanced:** winter draws to an end on the Dalmatian coast about the beginning of March, and Caesar had crossed from Brundisium before the middle of November by the true calendar (I.40.3n.). In the strategic context, this period was indeed 'many months'.
- steady winds:** the winds of winter, even if sometimes unpleasantly strong, were at least fairly reliable in direction and duration, and afforded the chance of a fast crossing in weather which was unfavourable for the blockading squadrons. In summer the winds in the Adriatic tend to be light and uncertain in direction. According to Appian (BC 2.54,56) the bulk of Caesar's transports were merchant ships, which would have been slower than Pompey's warships but also better able to cope with rough weather.
- 3 **Caesar wrote . . . to his officers in Brundisium:** Lucan (5.497ff.) would have it that in order to reinforce his apparently ineffectual messages, and to scotch any incipient disloyalty, Caesar attempted to cross the Adriatic *incognito* in a small boat, but was foiled by a tremendous storm. This incredible tale is repeated by Appian (BC 2.57) and Dio (41.46).
- the coast of the territory of Apollonia:** in complete contrast to the Acroceraunian coast where Caesar had come ashore, the Apollonian shore is low and marshy, formed by alluvial deposit brought down by the two rivers, the Apsus and the Aous, between which the town lay. It would therefore be quite safe and easy to beach transports there.
- 26 1 **Marcus Antonius and Fufius Calenus:** the former was in command of the troops, the latter of the ships (8.1-2).
- The ordinary soldiers themselves . . . :** once again Caesar takes the opportunity to underline his special value to his troops, and their qualities of loyalty and courage. Cf. 6.1. and Introduction to Books I & II, pp.19-20.
- 2 **Coponius:** mentioned at 5.3 above. The important difference between his ships and those of Calenus was that his were warships, depending chiefly on oars for propulsion and smooth water for effective fighting, while Calenus' were mostly merchantmen, dependent on sail but safer and easier to handle in bad weather than warships.
- 4 **Nymphaeum . . . Lissus:** see Map 1. Lissus is modern Ljes/Lezhë.
- 27 1 **a sudden change of fortune:** Caesar is fond of underlining the operation of luck, cf. 10.3, 14.3, 68.1; 73.3-5, 95.1, I.52.3, I.59.1. The stories of his religious scepticism are doubtless well-founded.
- 2 **sixteen vessels with an upper deck:** Appian (BC 2.59) says the Pompeian fleet numbered 20 ships in all, and also that two of Antony's ships were captured when they ran aground on a shoal.

28 3 **a legion of recruits . . . a veteran legion:** for the composition of the twelve legions which Caesar mustered at Brundisium to take across the Adriatic, see 2.2n. Only five (or possibly six if one makes the improbable assumption that both the legions Curio took to Africa were recruits) were truly veteran and had served with Caesar in Gaul, though some of the others had participated in the largely bloodless operations in Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily in the early months of 49.

4 **here one may recognise . . . :** the story is told partly for the remarkable nature of the veterans' escape, and partly for the qualities they exhibited - courage, resourcefulness, toughness, determination, and competence. It reflects credit on Caesar both that such self-evidently admirable men wish to have him as their leader, and that these qualities are ones developed by service with him. Occasional short, self-contained episodes (*Einzelszenen*) like this also serve to give a more personal, dramatic note to the narrative and bring the austerity of Caesar's presentation nearer to the type of history more in fashion at the time and well exemplified by the kind of thing Cicero wanted from Lucceius (Cic. *Fam.* 5.12.4-5) and by the work of Livy (see Gabba 1981; Wiseman 1979, ch.1; Richter 1977; Mutschler 1975).

brutally put to death: in obvious contrast to Caesar's own humanity, stressed at the end of the previous chapter. Whether such tales of his opponents' atrocity can be believed is another matter.

6 **withdrew . . . to join our forces:** these forces must be Antony's, which as the next chapter makes clear disembarked at nearby Nymphaeum.

29 1 **Lissus:** "The place had great strategic value, controlling the main north-south route from the lake of Scodra down to the hills behind Dyrrachium" (Wilkes 1969, 338 and pls. 7 & 8).

a town which Caesar had earlier assigned to them and fortified Caesar had been governor of Illyria as well as of the two Gauls from 59 B.C. The action mentioned here is most plausibly to be connected with the disturbances involving the local tribe of the Pirustae, which necessitated Caesar's presence in person at the beginning of 54 (BG 5.1.5-9). According to Wilkes (1969, 363) Caesar probably refurbished defences first built in the previous century. For the nature of the *conventus civium Romanorum* (association of Roman citizens) see II.19.3n. It seems that in this case the Roman group were placed in charge of the town's affairs.

2 **the remaining infantry and cavalry:** only one legion was now left at Brundisium out of the original twelve (2.2, 6.2). Caesar does not state his total cavalry strength.

3 **'pontoon':** *pontones* are said to be a kind of rowed barge, used *inter alia* for river ferries (Paul, *Digest* 8.3.38; Isidor. *Or.* 19.1.24). Quite how

such vessels could sail in a gale from Brundisium to Lissus is mysterious, and it may be that in Caesar's day the word was used to denote a more obviously seaworthy type of craft, with a sail.

30 1 **They had themselves seen the ships passing:** the lowest possible point where the two camps on the Apsus can have been located is several km. from the sea, even in antiquity when the coastline had not advanced so far. Presumably Caesar means that the intelligence, though indeed immediate, was brought by lookouts nearer the shore, rather than that the two generals, neither of whom had the benefit of a telescope, actually saw the ships themselves.

6 **the Greeks:** Dyrrachium was a Greek city, founded under the name of Epidamnus as a colony of Corinth and Corcyra in the late seventh century B.C. If the subsequent manoeuvres, particularly Pompey's march to Asparagium (see next n.), are to make any sense, the meeting of Antony with Caesar must have been south and inland of Dyrrachium, and most probably south of the river Genusus. It is tantalising that Caesar gives so little detail about this whole episode, whose outcome was of crucial importance for him - though he chooses not to make this point (contrast his description of how he outflanked Afranius' army in Spain, I.63-70).

7 **Asparagium:** a place no longer certainly identifiable, lying on the north bank of the river Genusus (now Shkumbin), to the west of modern Pegin. It was probably the spot where the Apollonian and Dyrrachian arms of the Via Egnatia diverged. See Map 2 and the detailed topographical discussion in Rice Holmes 1923, 443-4. Cf. also 76.1-2.

31-33 *Caesar now turns to paint the picture of the Pompeian mobilisation of the resources of Syria and Asia Minor, as a prelude to the arrival of Scipio's army in Macedonia in ch. 36. The depth of Caesar's antipathy towards the current governor of Syria, Metellus Scipio, an aristocrat's aristocrat who in 52 B.C. became both Pompey's consular colleague and his father-in-law, can be judged from the sarcasm, contempt, and indignation which pervade these chapters (cf. I.4.3). The malevolence has even gone so far as to interfere with Caesar's normal clarity of exposition: it is far from clear whether the exactions detailed in ch. 32 took place in Asia or in Syria, or both, and if in Asia, on whose authority. The iniquities and malpractices of provincial officials are well documented in the late Republic, particularly in Cicero's letters and speeches, and many ex-magistrates were prosecuted for extortion on their return to Rome, some successfully. Caesar himself in his consulship of 59 B.C. attempted to check abuses by passing a comprehensive new consolidating law (lex Iulia repetundarum). The numerous devices for extracting money from the provincials would have been very*

well known to him and his contemporaries, and many speeches must have been made both attacking and defending men accused of extortion. There still survives a whole literature of complaint on behalf of the oppressed of the ancient world. It is hardly surprising, then, that the rhetoric is so obvious here, displaying word-order and rhythms unusual in Caesar's Commentaries (31.4n.), unsupported generalisations (32.1: "many new categories were thought up...; 32.2: "if a name could be found...), catalogues (32.2), paradox (32.5), and repetition (31.2 with 32.6).

- 31 1 at this time: the Latin expression is very vague: Scipio was appointed governor of Syria in January 49 B.C. (I.6.5), and doubtless proceeded to his campaigns and exactions without much delay.
- the Amanus ranges: these lay on the border between Cilicia and Syria, and the peoples who lived there were squeezed uncomfortably between Rome and Parthia (see 4.5n. on Antiochus). Even the unwarlike Cicero, as governor of Cilicia, had campaigned there in 51 and duly been saluted 'Imperator' (Victorious General), on which title see I.13.1n.
- 2 payment owed for a two-year period...sum due for the following year: if the tax contractors (3.2n.) had not paid up for 50 B.C., the two years were 50 and 49; but there is no evidence that this was the case and it is equally probable that the tax Scipio demanded was for 49 and 48, with a forced loan of what was due in 47. His exactions are a particular instance of the money-gathering activities summarised at 3.2 above.
- 3 the Parthian enemy: the Parthians, a people originally inhabiting the area south-east of the Caspian, had become powerful and expanded into Mesopotamia (Iraq) with the collapse of the Seleucid empire in the course of the second century B.C. The conversion of Syria into a Roman province by Pompey in the sixties brought the two powers into direct contact along the line of the Euphrates. Relations between them were uneasy but no worse until Crassus attempted a major expedition against them in 53 in pursuit of wealth and glory, and fell at the battle of Carrhae, in the Syrian desert, where the Parthian mounted archers proved too much for the Roman legionaries. Subsequent Parthian attacks on the province were resisted successfully in 53 and 52 by Crassus' erstwhile quaestor C. Cassius Longinus, but evidently less successfully by Bibulus when he took over as governor in 51. No other source mentions a siege, but Cicero mocks the honour of a supplication which was granted Bibulus by the senate with the allegation that he "did not stir a foot outside the town gate so long as there was a Parthian this side of the Euphrates" (*Att.* 7.2.6).
- 4 Rhetorical features: Rhetorical cadences (...cum venisset, ...cum audirentur, ...ducerentur ituros, ...non laturos), and other features of

the grand style such as alliteration (*summamque in sollicitudinem, contra civem et consulem, locupletissimas... legionibus... largitiones*), postponed *cum*, and careful balancing of clauses are particularly apparent in this sentence. Note also the three superlatives (*summam, locupletissimas, maximas*) and three doublets (*sollicitudinem ac timorem, civem et consulem, Pergamum atque locupletissimas urbes*).

although the province was deeply worried and... the soldiers said that they... would not take up arms against a fellow-Roman and a consul: the first point is legitimate (though we do not know what garrison, if any, Scipio left behind). But the second is the purest propaganda, and even granted that Caesar's information about what was being said in distant Syria was accurate, it is more than likely that there were those among his own men prepared to make almost exactly the same point against himself. Furthermore, his election as consul, though technically constitutional, had been achieved in a blatantly abnormal way (1.1, II.21.5n., Lucan 5.392-399).

Pergamum and the wealthiest cities: we are now in Asia (although 'province' just above can only refer to Syria), which was the richest and most comfortable of all provinces. At this period Pergamum, seat of the wealthy Attalid dynasty in the third and second centuries, and magnificently endowed by its rulers with public buildings and monuments, was rivalled only by Ephesus, the seat of the Roman governor, as the most splendid city of the province.

plunder: the mere act of quartering any substantial number of soldiers for the winter months on a rich town was tantamount to giving it over to them to plunder, because they could in practice ask for what they liked in the way of food and other goods, and simply take it by force if it was not forthcoming. Cf. *Cic. Att.* 5.21.7: "the richer communities used to give large sums [to the governor] to avoid having troops quartered on them in winter".

- 32 1 the province: the belief that this chapter refers to Asia depends chiefly on the long-accepted but surely mistaken correction of the primary MSS' *in sorte* (§6 below, see *app. crit.* and n.) to *in Syria*. It is true that the context here, at the opening of the chapter, seems to indicate Asia. But the initial 'meanwhile' points back to Syria: Scipio has started his troops on their way to Greece, and *while* he is doing this the whirl of exaction he has already set in motion in his province gathers speed. Nor is he on record as having authority over Asia, unless this chapter be taken as the evidence. It may well be that Caesar, carried away by his own rhetoric, has simply slipped into a generalised description of what was happening in all the eastern provinces: it is, after all, improbable that these money-raising devices were restricted to a single province.

- 2 **a poll tax:** the references in the New Testament (Matth. 22.17ff. Mark 12.14), where *census* is the exact equivalent of *laographia*, the word used for the Egyptian poll-tax (Wallace 1938, 116), show that a poll-tax was normal in Syria under Tiberius. Since Tiberius inherited the Augustan system, and Augustus himself as a general rule kept in being existing methods of provincial taxation, however diverse, it is virtually certain that this tax was regularly imposed on the inhabitants of Syria under the Republic, and was therefore no innovation of Scipio's. Province-wide poll taxes were not normal elsewhere in the Roman empire, being imposed only as a special measure (cf. Cic. *Att.* 5.16.2; *IG* V.1.1432-3, an 8-obol poll-tax at Messene).
- imposts . . . on columns and doors:** again, hardly a new invention of Scipio's: Appius Claudius, Cicero's predecessor as governor of Cilicia, had imposed a door-tax (*Fam.* 3.8.5), and Lucullus taxed "slaves and houses" in 70 (App. *Mithr.* 83).
- 3 **Officials were appointed to take charge . . . :** the transmitted text reads "Persons invested with full military authority (*cum imperio*) were appointed to take charge", but this raises a considerable difficulty, in that *imperium* was possessed only by magistrates and promagistrates of the rank of praetor and above, and exceptionally by others on whom one of these high-ranking magistrates was empowered by a specific law or decree to confer it. Unless the senate had granted Scipio the right to confer *imperium* on (say) ten or twenty persons of his choice - and there is no suggestion in any of the sources that it had - the situation described here by Caesar is impossible. The only way of defending the integrity of the text is to argue that Caesar was (most uncharacteristically) using the term *imperium* in an extremely inaccurate way. A better solution, adopted here, is to identify *cum imperio* as a mistaken marginal annotation on *singuli* which was absorbed into the text at a time when *apparitorum*, just below, had already been corrupted to *imperatorum* (see following note). The persons Caesar refers to are surely *praefecti*, who will have existed in fair numbers under the circumstances. They were officers who were appointed by a magistrate with *imperium* and possessed a power of command that was more limited than his, but was still effective enough to control soldiers and cow local populations (cf. Cic. *Att.* 6.1.6, mentioning a prefecture conferred by Appius Claudius on one Scaptius, a Roman moneylender, so that the latter could use cavalry to terrify the town council of Salamis into paying up).
- 4 **official attendants:** the reading of the MSS, *imperatorum*, must mean, not 'orders', but 'holders of *imperium*', since some word indicating persons is required by the run of the sentence (so K.-H.-M., rightly). We then have "the province was full of lictors and persons holding *imperium*". This comes straight up against the difficulty raised by the

technically incorrect use of *imperium* discussed in the previous note. Forchhammer's correction *apparitorum* neatly solves the problem. *Apparitores* were public servants, such as clerks, lictors, assistants at religious ceremonies, and so forth, who formed part of the official train of a magistrate, and their presence here is exactly appropriate.

- 6 **Roman citizens:** although Romans in the provinces were not immune from all taxation, they tended to be privileged. In this case it appears that they were exempt from the poll-tax as individuals, but had to pay a contribution by groups. For 'associations' (*conventus*) see 29.1 and II.19.3n. What Caesar could mean by 'communities' (*civitates*) is puzzling: no provincial *municipia* or *coloniae* existed in the eastern provinces at this time (Brunt 1971, 600-601, 607), and there was no officially recognised category of settlement between these and a *conventus*. Again, the rhetoric seems to have taken over at the expense of fact.

inasmuch as they had accumulated capital: the 'capital' in question will be the sum collected as tax revenue during the course of the year, which the contractors were able to lend in order to make more profit for themselves before handing over the original, and except in cases of miscalculation smaller, sum which they had agreed to pay the treasury. [The correction *ut ii sortem fecerant* (instead of the old *ut in Syria fecerant*) has been accepted by all editors since Constans proposed it to Fabre with the sense here given ('capital' being a well attested meaning of *sortes* in financial contexts). Schönberger's recent translation however has "wie sie gelost haben" ("according as they had drawn lots"), which is surely mistaken: not only would the Latin be *sortitione facta*, but such a procedure would have been very odd under the circumstances, seeing that Scipio wanted all the money he could raise from all possible sources.]

the sum due for the next year: repeating the point made at 31.2.

- 33 1 **Scipio was in the process of giving orders:** as commander of an army passing through a province of which he was not governor, Scipio had the power to commandeer necessary supplies, and this episode does not necessarily locate the tax-raising activities of the previous chapter in the province of Asia.

the shrine of Diana: this was the most famous temple of the ancient world, numbered among its Seven Wonders. Caesar correctly calls it a 'shrine' (*fanum*) not a 'temple' (*aedes*) because of its unusual architectural form. The apparently normal, if grandiose, colonnades of the exterior (with sculptured and ornamented column drums and bases) in fact surrounded an open courtyard in which was the shrine proper and the celebrated image of the many-breasted Artemis (Diana). The cult went back to the eighth century or earlier. The first great temple (burnt

down on the night of Alexander the Great's birth in 356) was erected in the middle of the sixth century. The rebuilt temple, substantially complete early in the third century, was even larger and finer than its archaic predecessor. As for the wealth of the shrine, the goddess had attracted rich offerings from at least the seventh century, though few of the earlier period will have survived the fire of 356 (cf. Strabo 14.1.22, C640).

a number of senators: these were to serve as official witnesses to the 'loan' of the treasure, cf. 105.1.

This saved the treasures of Ephesus: this is extremely unlikely to be true, however much Caesar fancied his role as protector of sacred goods against his impious enemies (cf. 105.1, I.6.8). Pompey's orders cannot have been so urgent as to make the saving of an hour or two worth more than the looting of the temple. A much more probable cause is the alienation of support among all classes which the sacrilege would have brought about.

34-40 We return to Greece, and to Caesar's attempt to widen the theatre of operations now that he had at last been reunited with the delayed portion of his army. Caesar himself is not involved in any of the events narrated here, which fall into two sections: (a) 34-38, the inconclusive manoeuvres of Scipio, now arrived from Asia, and Domitius Calvinus against each other on the borders of Thessaly and Macedonia, prefaced by some minor operations in Thessaly and Aetolia of Caesarian detachments led by L. Cassius Longinus and C. Calvisius Sabinus; (b) 39-40, successful naval attacks on Oricum and Lissus by Pompey's son.

- 34 2 **Lucius Cassius Longinus:** elder(?) brother (Appian *BC* 4.135, 5.7) of the future murderer of Caesar, Gaius Cassius Longinus, who was currently commanding the Syrian fleet on Pompey's side (5.3); and probably cousin of Quintus (*tr. pl.* 49), who had been left to command troops in Spain for Caesar. He did not become tribune until 44 B.C., and by the present time can have held at most a quaestorship. The inscription on Mt. Ossa to a L. Cassius Longinus, proconsul, who made up a road through Tempe (*ILLRP* 400, *ILS* 39: L CASSIVS LONGIN PROCOS TEMPE MVNIVIT), should therefore be divorced from him. Particularly in this 'Republican' phase of his career Caesar cannot possibly have allowed such a man to term himself 'proconsul' (*pace MRR* 2.275): Caesar's subordinate commanders are, if senior, *legati*, if junior, *praefecti*. The inscription should belong to the man who was suffect consul in A.D. 11.

Gaius Calvisius Sabinus: later praetor (46 B.C.?) and consul (39) and a pillar of Octavian's regime during the Triumviral period. This is his first appearance in history.

- 3 **Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus:** a much more senior man than the two foregoing. He was one of a number of ex-consuls who had been convicted and exiled on criminal charges, and were restored by Caesar (cf. 1.4; Shackleton Bailey 1977, II.482, on *Fam.* 12.2.5, *reliques*; not noticed by Bruhns 1978, 39-40). As tribune in 59 he had supported Bibulus against Caesar, and he attained his praetorship in 56 with optimate support. In 54 he was a candidate for the consulship, and appears to have been approved, although not actually backed, by Caesar; Pompey, on the other hand, preferred a rival candidate (on the imbroglio, see Gelzer 1968, 146). Domitius voted, along with a majority of the allegedly venal jury, for the acquittal of Gabinius at his trial for *maiestas* at the end of 54 and this confirms suspicions of a change of political colour. His condemnation on unknown charges (perhaps electoral corruption, *ambitus*) should belong to 52 or 51. After Caesar's death he remained a person of importance and military consequence and indeed profited from his Caesarian connection to the extent of becoming consul a second time, in 40 B.C.

- 4 **the area of this province known as 'free':** "the regions about Lyncus, Pelagonia, Orestias, and Elimeia, used to be called Upper Macedonia, though later on they were also called by some Free Macedonia" (Strabo 7.7.8, discussing the area of Macedonia inland from the coast of Epirus).

Menedemus: Caesar rewarded this local notable, and also Petraeus (35.2), with the Roman citizenship, but Brutus executed both of them in 44-43 B.C. (Cic. *Phil.* 13.33).

- 35 1 **Calydon and Naupactus:** Naupactus lay on the north side of the narrows of the Gulf of Corinth, Calydon some 40 km. further west. They guarded the route from Western Greece (Epirus and Acarnania) to the Peloponnese, via the Rhion-Antirrhion crossing, and to Central Greece, via Amphissa.
- 2 **Petraeus:** see 34.4n. (on Menedemus). Note how Caesar carefully chooses his language to present Hegesaretos as old and corrupt (*potentia* implying the kind of power one should not have), Petraeus as young and noble. An inscription of this year from Delphi shows that Caesar used diplomatic as well as military pressure to try and win over Greek communities (56.4n.).

36 1 **Domitius entered Macedonia:** Caesar gives infuriatingly little detail both here and throughout this chapter. Domitius *may* have used the Via Egnatia, once he had skirted Pompey's position at Asparagium (30.7, 41.1), but in the absence of any indications of time, or any topographical detail except that Favonius' camp was on the Haliacmon (in the neighbourhood of modern Kozani?) it is difficult to form any very clear picture of exactly what occurred.

3 **the river Haliacmon:** the middle course of the Haliacmon runs northeast along the flanks of the Olympus range, and its valley provides the easiest route, apart from the defile of Tempe, from Thessaly into Macedonia.

eight cohorts: Scipio had two legions (4.3), and it was usual to leave only one, or sometimes two, cohorts from a legion to guard the baggage and equipment (e.g. L41.2, six cohorts from six legions). But the number may none the less be correct, because Domitius also had two legions (34.3) and Scipio may well have foreseen that he might choose to attack Favonius instead of, or as well as, following himself into Thessaly.

4 **Cotys:** see 4.3.

5 **mountains which ring Thessaly:** from the sequel, these appear to be the Pindus; for Cassius' route, see 80.1n. Ambracia is the region adjoining the great gulf of that name on the west coast of Greece, between Corcyra and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf.

37-38 The minute detail that follows contrasts strongly with the immediately preceding chapter, where operations of potentially great strategic importance are disposed of in a very summary way. The military significance of the events recounted here was, in the wider context, almost zero. The two sides were sparring, but there was no result. This pair of chapters read like an extract from a much fuller narrative, and might perhaps represent a beginning, which remained a mere fragment, of a worked-up treatment of this part of the campaign. However, it is very noticeable that Caesar tells the story of these inconsequential operations in a way that advertises, once again, the superior moral and military qualities of his soldiers. The right conclusion may therefore be that the odd balance of the narrative at this point in Book III is indeed as Caesar wanted it to be, and that his concern was not with either strategic analysis or military detail *per se*, but with the ultimate fitness of himself and those who supported him to be considered true to Rome and to the values enshrined in late-Republican versions of Roman history and institutions - which is of course the underlying message of the whole work.

37 1 **three? miles of level ground:** it is impossible to identify the site. Fabre, adopting the correction *III* (see *app. crit.*), remarks in his edition

"The MSS have 6 miles, about 9 km. Stoffel notes that there is no plain of this size in the valley of the Haliacmon and corrects VI to II. Loriti proposes to read III, which explains the mistake more easily. As to other considerations, Caesar had not seen the ground; no more have I."

4 **Scipio . . . achieved a discreditable result:** Caesar's relentless blackening of Scipio continues. As it turned out, it had not been a good idea for Scipio to advance his camp. But he had lost nothing, and evidently a prudent withdrawal was called for. Caesar chooses to see cowardice, where a less partisan historian might see good sense, in Scipio's refusal to draw attention to his manoeuvre by having the signal to move shouted in the usual way (this was a cry of '*vasa*', short for *vasa colligite*, 'pack up your kit').

5 **Quintus Varus:** probably the same man as the Q. At(t)ius Varus found serving as a cavalry commander in Gaul in 51 B.C. (*BG* 8.28.2).

38 4 **of whom only a handful managed to flee:** the immediately following remark about M. Opimius indicates that some words of this sort have dropped out of the text. Some editors resolve the difficulty by altering 'amongst whom was M. Opimius' to 'M. Opimius alone fled', but the corruption of *unus fugit* into *in his fuit* does not seem very probable.

39 1 **as mentioned above:** 34.1.

the warships he had brought across from Italy: twelve in all (7.2), and no match for Pompey's squadrons.

<Marcus Acilius> Caninianus: editors generally emend *Caninianus* to *Caninus*, pointing to *II.LRP* 435 (M ACILIO M F CANINO Q VRB NEGOTIATORES EX AREA SATURNI), but there is no proof that the two men are the same. More comprehensively, they add or substitute *Acilius* or *M'*. (correctly *M.*, 15.6n.) *Acilius*. In favour of this more drastic action is the fact that this man is given that name in the following chapter, and Caesar is not in the habit of introducing minor characters by employing bare and hitherto unmentioned *cognomina*. I keep the MS reading of the *cognomen* as we do not know what *Acilius'* *cognomen* was, see 15.6n., and Caninianus would be the expected *cognomen* for a Caninius adopted by an Acilius. Adoption was common among the Roman aristocracy, and there existed at least two suitable families of Caninii (note C. Caninius Rebilus, *cos. suff.* 45 and L. Caninius Gallus, *tr. pl.* 56).

40 1 **Gnaeus Pompeius . . . the Egyptian fleet:** see 4.4 and 5.3.

towers to the same level: the Latin expression *ad libram* is strange in this context, usually being used with reference to a water level or surveyor's level (Vitr. 8.6.6, Frontin. *de Aqu.* 19.5, 36.1-2, 124.3, *CIL* 5.8146). On the basis of these passages Panciera (1958) argues that the term means 'to the same level as'. The alternative hypothesis, of

Stoffel, that some kind of counterweighted swinging platforms are meant, which would stay level when the ship beneath them was rolling, seems somewhat fantastic (though not absolutely impossible) and receives no support from any other ancient evidence.

he attacked the town walls . . . from shipboard: Oricum stood at the end of its narrow sandy spit (or natural mole, as Caesar calls it below), so that it was surrounded by water on three sides - the sea to the north, the channel into the inner harbour on the west, and the inner harbour itself on the south. Thus direct attack on the walls from ships was possible.

- 4 **Byllis and Amantia:** mentioned above, at 12.4, as two of the Epirot communities which had come over to Caesar.
- 5 **Lissus . . . Marcus Antonius:** see 26.4, 29.

41-72 Caesar besieges Pompey at Dyrrachium

41-55 Caesar, outnumbered in troops and at a disadvantage in supplies, but believing himself superior in terms of the fighting quality of his men, after an attempt to bring Pompey to battle, cuts him off from his main base at Dyrrachium, and then succeeds in encircling him. Sporadic engagements occur, including an unsuccessful night attack on Dyrrachium by Caesar, but Pompey refuses to be drawn into a pitched battle, and this part of the siege ends in stalemate - Caesar's army short of food, Pompey's unhealthy and short of water. Even allowing for the loss (between 50 and 51) of the narrative of Caesar's attempt to take Dyrrachium, we find an unusually high proportion of reflection and generalisation about the nature of this confrontation. Caesar thus creates a unifying context for the specific but virtually independent and ultimately inconclusive episodes embedded in it. The somewhat impressionistic treatment obscures the chronology, but it seems likely that the siege lasted some two months or a little more, from the beginning of March to some time in the first fortnight of May, or from May to July by the pre-Julian calendar (see Introduction p. 15).

- 41 1 **Pompey was near Asparagium:** the narrative resumes from the end of 30.
Parthini: see 11.3n.
he made camp close to him: Caesar's camp was definitely on the south side of the Genusus, but Pompey's was probably on the north in order to block the route to Dyrrachium (see 76.1-2 and nn.).
- 2 **when he realised that the latter was going to stay put:** Pompey had good reasons for refusing battle (quite apart from the fact that his men would have to start by fording the river), though characteristically Caesar does not explain them, preferring the imputation of cowardice. Caesar was having increasing difficulty in finding provisions and it

would be some three months before the new harvest was available, while Pompey himself, thanks to his control of the sea, had access to the virtually unlimited resources of the eastern provinces as well as being able to prevent reinforcements or supplies reaching Caesar from Italy. He also had superiority in cavalry (43.3), making the task of Caesar's commissariat even more difficult. He could expect Scipio's force to cause Caesar further problems and prevent him exploiting the resources of Thessaly and Macedonia. And in any case the fighting quality of his men did not match that of Caesar's.

- 3 **difficult, narrow, and very roundabout route:** Caesar must have taken his men first some little distance upriver, giving the impression that he was withdrawing inland in search of supplies, and then northwards by mountain paths over the heights dividing the Genusus valley from that of the Hebrus (modern Arzën) and its tributaries, which flow north-westwards in the direction of Dyrrachium. K.-H.-M. estimate the distance as about 70 km., just possible in such country in the 36-40 hours actual marching time available (assuming a night stop of 4-6 hours, see next n.). For a similar outflanking march on a rather smaller scale, also involving a deceptive start apparently in the wrong direction, see the dramatic narrative of I.68-70.
- 5 **a small part of the night:** two nights were involved, as Caesar had a day's start on Pompey, who took at least one, but surely only one, 24-hour period to cover his much shorter and easier road (the Egnatia itself) from Asparagium to Dyrrachium.
- 42 1 **Petra:** the name simply means 'Rock' in Greek. It lies on the bay about 8 km. southeast of Dyrrachium. The anchorage is unprotected between south and north-west, the quarter from which the worst weather is liable to come.
- 3 **Quintus Tillius and Lucius Canuleius:** these two men are otherwise unknown, but Tillius was probably a relation of L. Tillius Cimber, who held a praetorship in 45 and took part in the assassination of Caesar in 44. Four of the five primary MSS make only Canuleius a *legatus*, but it would be against Caesar's usual practice to name the more junior man first and I therefore accept the reading of V, *legatos*.
- 5 **Pompey . . . had plundered the Parthini . . . :** doubtless the activities of Caesar's grain collectors were equally unlovely, especially as Pompey's men had got there first; **dug out** is probably literal, referring to the storage of grain in pits.
- 43 2 **he began to wall Pompey in:** Caesar's veterans were well used to this tactic. Spectacular examples of their labours were the circumvallations at Alesia in 52 B.C. (BC 7.69.6, 74.1: 25 miles in all)

and at Corfinium (I.18.6) in 49. The finished length here at Dyrrachium was 17 miles (63.3).

2 **his object was this:** one object which such operations usually had in view, namely starvation of the encircled, was not attainable in this case, as Pompey (except in bad weather, see 42.1n.) could be supplied indefinitely by sea.

3 **Pompey's strength lay in the number of his cavalry:** Pompey had 7,000 cavalry in all (4.3), though they cannot all have been at Dyrrachium, while Caesar had a mere 1,300 (2.2, 29.2).

authority . . . with foreign nations: Pompey had built up an enormous reputation, and a lasting network of patronage, as a result of his brilliantly successful campaigns and subsequent redrawing of the political map of the eastern Mediterranean and adjoining lands in the sixties B.C. (cf. the list of rulers and their military contributions in ch. 4). The view that a siege would be a psychological blow to Pompey's prestige is confirmed by a letter of Cicero's son-in-law Dolabella, who was in Caesar's camp; he wrote at some point during the siege to his father-in-law, who was with Pompey, trying to persuade him to change sides: "*You see Cn. Pompeius' situation. Neither the glory of his name and past nor yet the kings and nations of whose dependence he used so often to boast can protect him. Even the door of an honourable retreat, which humble folk find open, is closed to him. Driven out of Italy, Spain lost, his veteran army taken prisoner, he is now to crown all blockaded in his camp, a humiliation which I fancy has never previously befallen a Roman general.*" (Fam. 9.9.2, tr. Shackleton Bailey).

Observe how this passage of analysis, written as a single periodic sentence, closes with a pair of parallel clauses which each end with the hammer-blow cadence of the double trochee (long-short-long-short [or long]): *obsideri* and *dimicare* (cf. Cic. *Orator* 214 on the effectiveness of this rhythm). The oratorical note is unmistakable, cf. 72.4, where the content of the message, also spread by *fama per orbem terrarum*, is reversed.

44 5 **they . . . possessed more men:** Pompey had nine legions, which at least to start with, before winter, disease, and desertion took their toll, appear to have been well up to strength (4.1-2); say, then, 40-45,000 men, excluding auxiliaries and cavalry. At Pharsalus these nine legions, together with two of Scipio's, mustered 45,000 men in 110 cohorts, plus seven cohorts, say another 3,000 (88.5). Caesar had brought across seven legions himself (6.2), and had been joined by Antonius with four more (29.2); but from them had been detached the forces sent into Macedonia and Thessaly under Domitius Calvinus, L. Cassius, and Calvisius Sabinus, which totalled three and a half legions (34.2). In addition, three cohorts were holding Oricum (39.1) and there must

have been garrisons at Apollonia and Lissus (cf. 78.4). So about seven legions were left at Dyrrachium, though the likelihood is that these were on average under strength, perhaps markedly so (2.2n.). By the time of Pharsalus these seven legions, even reinforced by two of Domitius', numbered only 24,000 (89.2 and n.). Caesar therefore probably had at Dyrrachium no more than 25,000 legionaries, perhaps fewer (Gelzer 1968, 229, estimates his total force in Greece at 34,000 infantry and 1,400 cavalry). He was also inferior in cavalry and auxiliaries.

6 **whatever spots Caesar had to occupy:** all recent editors make the strange decision to keep the MS reading *Quae cum erant*, but some emendation is necessary to save Caesar from grammatical solecism. If he wrote *cum*, he must also have written *essent*, since the expression is patently causal: it was *because* Caesar was trying to occupy hills that Pompey sent his archers out. But the mere correction of *erant* to *essent* is no help, as Caesar was apparently not trying to capture the places just referred to that had already been fortified by the Pompeians and therefore *Quae loca* is itself an illogical connection of thought. Either Bentley's conjecture, adopted here, or Krafft's (see *app. crit.*), will restore sense.

45 6 **Pompey, boasting in front of his associates:** this prefigures Pompey's over-confidence and lack of sound judgement before Pharsalus (86.2-4).

Caesar's legions: it is over-literal to amend the text to read 'legion'. Whether or not the remark is apocryphal, and whether or not Pompey knew that only one legion was involved, the rhetorical plural is perfectly acceptable.

46 1 **wicker bundles:** these were a standard item of military equipment, often used to protect soldiers from enemy fire, as here. They could also be used for strengthening, retaining, or filling purposes in connection with earthworks and ditches.

the soldiers: that is, those digging the trench.

3 **more insolently and boldly:** Caesar writes as though his opponents had no right to be fighting him, and no moral worth. Had he been describing the same action by his own men, the adverbs would have been 'spiritedly and bravely', or something similar.

4 **a worse reverse:** presumably because of the potentially bad effect on the morale of the rest of the troops, rather than because Pompey's troops, who included no legionaries and were hardly likely to be able to follow up effectively, might turn the result into a serious defeat for Caesar.

about midway: this seems to mean midway down the hillside, but the expression is unclear.

satisfied to retreat without harm: this observation is something of a whitewash. It may be legitimate in the context to regard the loss of five men as insignificant, but the effect of this reverse was to force Caesar to extend the line of his circumvallation even further, thus stretching his own ability to man it adequately and allowing Pompey more room inside it.

47 2 **For whenever . . . :** Caesar chooses to give us a strategic analysis of the situation in a way that is characteristic of ancient rhetorical procedures, by generalisation, contrast, and paradox.

3 **an inferior number of troops:** 44.5n.

5 **in Spain they had endured similar privations:** see I.48-52.

Alesia . . . Avaricum: the siege of Alesia in 52 B.C. is told at BG 7.68-90, but without any specific references to shortage of food. At Avaricum earlier in the same year grain was so short that there, as here, the soldiers were driven to eat meat and their patriotism was such that they did not complain (BG 7.17.2-3). At Ilerda, they would have been given meat (described by Caesar as "a subsidiary source of support in a shortage") if the cattle not been driven away (I.48.6). It is absolutely clear from these passages that meat formed no part of the normal diet of the ordinary Italian of Republican times.

6 **barley . . . pulses . . . meat:** barley was the diet of slaves and animals; for troops it was punishment rations (Suet. *Div. Aug.* 24.2). Pulses here may mean wild varieties not usually eaten, since beans and peas at least were a normal food. On meat, see preceding n.

Caesar's praise for his soldiers is emphasised by the rhetorical repetitions "*maximum bellum . . . magnam inopiam . . . multo etiam maiorem . . . maximarum gentium*" in the preceding sentence and "*non . . . non*" in this. At Avaricum, Caesar ascribes the endurance of his men to their professional pride and, more importantly, their desire to avenge the deaths of Roman citizens. Here, in a civil war, facing not Gauls but other Romans, he prefers to remain silent about their motivation.

48 1 **chara:** this episode is mentioned by Pliny (*NH* 19.144, 20.96), who calls the plant *lapsana* and describes it as being about a foot high, with hairy leaves, and resembling white mustard (*sinapis*). It has been identified as a sort of cabbage with edible roots, sometimes used as a food in Russia (Peskett *ad loc.*), and as a bitter-tasting tuber, perhaps *arum esculentum* (K.-H.-M. *ad loc.* reporting Heuzey) or *arum italicum* (as eaten in desperation by Austrian soldiers in World War I, Schönberger 1984, 338). Versions of the story are told by Suetonius

(*Div. Iul.* 68.2), Plutarch (*Caes.* 39.2) and Appian (*BC* 2.61), all of whom make Pompey observe, on seeing the 'loaves', that he and his men were up against wild beasts.

49 1 **the crops were beginning to ripen:** the time must now be May by the true calendar (Rice Holmes 1923, 480 n.1; and cf. the very similar situation in which Caesar's forces found themselves at Ilerda at the same season in the previous year, I.48.5). This would mean that the siege had been in progress for several weeks, since it probably began some time in March (the precision of dating found in some of the older treatments, e.g. Stoffel's, is a fantasy, as the last certain indication before this of the time of year is the very vague "winter was far advanced" of 25.1, shortly(?) before Antony and Calenus made their crossing with four more legions).

2 **the remainder, the draught animals:** the Latin idiom *equos . . . reliqua iumenta* does not class horses as draught animals.

labours to which they were unused: Caesar imputes softness to his opponents, with partial justification: only three of Pompey's nine legions had seen recent service (if one discounts the Italian campaign of the previous year), namely the two which had served with Caesar in Gaul until 50 (I.2.3) and the Cilician legion (4.1).

50 It is apparent that there is a gap of some size in our text after the unfinished sentence which ends this chapter. However, a few clues exist as to its contents. Appian (*BC* 2.60) and Dio (41.50.3) mention a night attack on Dyrrachium, which was mounted by Caesar in the expectation that the town would be betrayed to him, and nearly ended disastrously. It is very probable that this was related here, and if so it might account for the reference at 53.1 to 'three engagements at Dyrrachium'. We also discover at 58.1, without explanation, that Pompey's cavalry (apparently all of it) is at Dyrrachium. What seems to be lost, then, is some quite substantial and detailed narrative of unsuccessful attempts by both commanders to break the deadlock. It is also very likely that the arrival of Afranius with a certain number of veteran cohorts by sea from Spain was noted here (88.3n.).

51 (*The situation at the beginning of this chapter, when the narrative resumes, is that substantial Pompeian forces were causing difficulty to a Caesarian cohort which was garrisoning one of the forts which punctuated Caesar's circumvallation.*)

1 **Publius [Cornelius] Sulla:** nephew of the dictator, this man had profited from his uncle's proscriptions and eventually won election to the consulship of 65 B.C. However he and his fellow consul-designate P. Autronius were prosecuted by one of their defeated rivals for electoral corruption (*ambitus*) and never entered office. Suspected of

being a participant in the Catilinarian conspiracy of 63, he was successfully defended in the following year by Cicero (whose speech is extant) against a charge of public violence (*vis*), and became a subsidiary figure in the complicated, corrupt, and violent politics of the fifties. Where one can discern his loyalties, they are anti-Pompeian and it is little surprise to find this somewhat dubious character in Caesar's camp, whereas his first cousin Faustus Sulla, the dictator's son, was a staunch Pompeian.

3-4 **the war could have been ended that day:** it is interesting to find Caesar both reporting the criticism of Sulla, and taking such pains to defend him. The criticism may have been made later, in the light of the way in which Caesar was finally forced to abandon the siege (64 ff.).

52 2 **Volcarius Tullus:** a C. Volcarius Tullus is on record as a junior officer (*adulescens*, BG 6.29.4) under Caesar in Gaul in 53 B.C. This man then disappears from history (*pace* MRR 2.239,253), to be replaced by a L. Volcarius Tullus, who became urban praetor in 46, consul in 33, and governor of the province of Asia at some time between 30 and 25 B.C. He was the son of the similarly named consul of 66 B.C. Gaius' *praenomen* is attested only by the MSS of Caesar in a single place, and it is tempting to hypothesise that L. became corrupted to C., and reduce the two men to one. However, the poet Propertius had a friend (Volcarius) Tullus, who was the nephew of the consul of 33 (Prop. 1.6.19), who therefore undeniably had a brother. Which of the two is referred to here it is impossible to guess. [The MSS of Cicero and Caesar oscillate in spelling between *Vulcatius*, *Volcatius*, and *Volcarius*: that the last is correct is shown by *ILLRP* 211 (M LEPID(o) L VO[LC]AC(io) COS) and several other Republican inscriptions, and supported by the Greek transliteration in the Augustan calendar decree from Asia (*OGIS* 458, Ehrenberg & Jones 98, line 42).]

some Germans: for Caesar's German light-armed, cf. I.83.5. The tone of the sentence, and its relationship to what precedes, rule out the possibility that these are Pompey's German cavalry mentioned at 4.4.

53 1 **three at Dyrrachium and three at the . . . fortification:** see 50n. Of the latter three, we still have the account of two and a half (51-52). **re-enlisted men:** these were sometimes ex-centurions (cf. Crastinus, 91.1, and Fulginius, I.46.4) and were in any case highly prized by recruiting officers.

a Valerius Flaccus: the father was praetor in 63, governed Asia in the following year, and stood trial in 59 for extortion in his province, being successfully defended by Cicero (*pro Flacco*, extant). The fact that the son, who must by definition have been an *eques Romanus*, served as a centurion shows the very high status of the centurionate. In the early

Empire there are cases (e.g. Ehrenberg & Jones nos. 242-246) of *equites* who begin their military careers as *primipili* (see §5n.).

2 **no more than twenty were missing:** it is very difficult to believe this figure, especially in view of what follows.

3 **four centurions from a single cohort:** there were six centurions in a cohort (except the first, which had five).

4 **a hundred and twenty holes:** the MSS have added an extra hundred holes, probably in error. The story was famous and is repeated in several other accounts, with broad agreement on the number of holes. See Valerius Maximus 3.2.23 (120 holes, name given as M. Caesius Scaeva); Plutarch *Caes.* 16.2 (130 holes); Suetonius *Div. Iul.* 68.4 (120 holes); Appian *BC* 2.60 (120 holes, name given as Minucius); Florus 2.13.40 (120 weapons lodged in it, name given as Scaevola). For all these the present passage must surely be the ultimate, if indirect, source. Lucan's overblown treatment of Scaeva's heroism (6.140-262) is uncomfortable testimony to the literary taste of his time.

5 **200,000 sesterces:** a vast reward. This was over two hundred times the annual pay of an ordinary legionary, and amounted to half the capital required to qualify for the status of an *eques* at the Roman census.

promoting him . . . to leading centurion: The senior centurion of the first cohort, and therefore of the whole legion, was called *primus pilus* or *primipilus*, occasionally is *qui primum pilum ducit*. The post was prestigious, and lucrative: under Augustus, probably continuing the practice of the late Republic, an ordinary centurion received 15 times the pay of an ordinary legionary, a centurion of the first cohort 30 times, and a *primus pilus* 60 times (Speidel 1992, 101ff.). The title itself was a survival from the older, 'manipular' organisation of the legion. The centurions collectively are often referred to as *ordines*, as here. (See further I.46.4n. and bibliography there cited).

double pay, grain, clothing, and rations: Caesar was following well-established practice (cf. Polyb. 6.39). Livy, doubtless anachronistically but in accordance with the practice of his own day, mentions a doubling of rations and clothing in the First Samnite War (7.37.2). More historically, an inscription (*ILS* 8888, *ILLRP* 515) records that Pompeius Strabo, Pompey's father, as consul in 89 B.C., rewarded a squadron of Spanish horse with Roman citizenship and in addition gave them double rations as well as decorations. It is possible, therefore, that *duplici* qualifies all four of the nouns which follow it, and not simply *stipendio*.

military decorations: as to the nature of the decorations, Pompeius Strabo (see preceding n.) presented his Spanish cavalry with what was probably a typical list: *cornuculum* (also known as *hasta pura*, a small spear, originally of wood but later of metal), *patella* (= *patera*, a silver

cup), *torques* (a twisted precious-metal necklace), *armilla* (bracelet), and *p(h)alera* (silver horse-boss). The *cornuculum* (or *corniculum*) was of high antiquity, the others of more recent origin and of greater intrinsic value (Polyb. 6.39.3). Crowns (*coronae*) could also be given, of different materials and appearance to denote different achievements such as scaling a wall or saving the life of a fellow-citizen (Gell. 5.6, Polyb. 6.39.5). A Campanian gravestone (CIL 10.3886), thought by Mommsen to be of the Caesarian epoch, commemorates one Q. Canuleius, a veteran of the seventh legion who had won *torques*, *armilla*, *phalera*, and *corona*. (On all these decorations, see Maxfield ch.4).

54 1 **Pompey added . . . fortifications:** we return to Pompey, marooned by nightfall on a small hill uncomfortably near Caesar's lines (51.7).

2 **another somewhat overcast night:** the first overcast night was presumably the one on which Pompey added to his fortifications. **old fortifications:** Petra.

55(56) Nipperdey inverted the order, as found in the MSS, of this chapter and the next. Not all editors have been convinced by the transposition. But it has the merit of uniting and completing the sub-narrative of Pompey's first attempts to break out and Caesar's to bring him to battle, before we pass to two chapters, which would otherwise be separated, relating to developments elsewhere in Greece. This is very much in Caesar's manner (Introduction to Books I & II, p.24).

2 **to preserve his public reputation:** another case of false imputation of motive. Pompey's tactics were dictated, not by what people thought of him, but by the need (a) to avoid a pitched battle with an army whose experience and sheer fighting ability was almost certainly superior to that of his own, and (b) to prevent Caesar being able to mount an attack on his camp or wall him in more closely. **third line:** the rear line.

56-57 *Caesar inserts here two chapters relating to military operations in central Greece and to negotiations with Scipio. Neither appears to stand in a precise chronological relationship to any part of the siege, but they usefully demarcate the first, inconclusive phase of the siege from the emphatic resolution which follows.*

56(55) 1 **Aetolia, Acarnania, Amphiloichi:** see 34.2, 36.5 for the earlier activities of Cassius and Sabinus. The former had been sent to Thessaly, but had had to retreat to these areas of the west coast, which had already been secured by Sabinus. Acarnania and Amphiloichi(a) lie respectively south and east of the Ambracian Gulf.

Achaia: the Peloponnese.

2 **Quintus Fufius Calenus:** it is surely impossible that Caesar could have been responsible for the extraordinary sequence of names given to this man within a few lines by the MSS: first 'Q. Calenus', then 'Fufius', then 'Calenus', then 'Fufius' again. Previously he has appeared as 'Q. Fufius Calenus' (I.87.4) and 'Fufius Calenus' (8.2, 26.1), and will appear again as 'Q. Fufius' (106.1). I have therefore attempted to restore something more probable in this chapter. The second 'Calenus' here I take to be an annotation which has, as often, replaced the word which it was intended to elucidate.

their cohorts: Cassius had a whole legion (of recruits), Sabinus five cohorts. Since Caesar was already outnumbered at Dyrrachium, it is most probable that he sent Fufius with only a few troops to take command of these fifteen cohorts. However, Plutarch (Caes. 43.1) says that on the eve of Pharsalus Caesar told his troops that apart from the fifteen cohorts under Calenus stationed at Athens and Megara (obviously the ones mentioned here), a certain 'Corfinius' was on his way to them with two more legions. Both 'Corfinius' (a name unknown to Republican prosopography) and his legions are a mystery, but if there is any truth in the report he must really be Calvisius, and his legions new recruits grafted on to a core of men sent with Fufius, as Caesar cannot possibly have spared two whole legions from Dyrrachium. In any case they were not needed, as Pompey appears to have had no considerable forces in central and southern Greece.

3 **Rutilius Lupus:** praetor in 49 B.C., see I.24.3.

4 **Delphi:** evidence survives of Calenus' presence at Delphi, the inscription SIG 761 (= *Fouilles de Delphes* III. 1.318), A3, B4,8 (cf. Raubitschek 74-75, Bowersock 9). This inscription also records the diplomatic activity of Callistus of Cnidos on behalf of Caesar in Greece (cf. 35.2n., 106.1n.).

Thebes and Orchomenus: the two are linked in Caesar's enumeration because, unlike Delphi, they were both members of the Boeotian confederacy. All three towns lie in central Greece, so probably Fufius did not feel he was strong enough to try an assault on Lupus at the Isthmus. As a result of these operations Caesar controlled western and most of central Greece, Pompey the Peloponnese and (through Scipio) northern Greece.

57 1 **While . . . when . . . :** the chronology is far from clear. Scipio was well and truly in Macedonia in ch. 36 above, but since his confrontation with Domitius Calvinus on the Haliacmon occurred almost as soon as he had arrived in the area, the news may have taken a little while to reach Caesar. And although the events to date at Dyrrachium have narrative bulk, they need not have occupied much time. Clodius'

mission probably began after the siege had commenced and overlapped with Fufius Calenus' foray into central Greece. Of Clodius himself, nothing else is known.

his original policy: that is, of negotiating for peace. Brunt 1988, 491, believes that at this point Caesar's overtures "were made from a position of apparent strength", but we must beware of accepting at face value Caesar's own presentation of his position at Dyrrachium. At the very least, his soldiers were weak and starving (58-72, introductory note); and he must also have been aware that they were so thinly spread along the enormously lengthy lines of circumvallation that he would find it difficult (as events were to prove) to block a well-planned Pompeian effort to break the siege.

2 **afraid of delivering his message to Pompey at an inopportune time:** this cannot refer to any of the envoys whom Caesar has so far mentioned (Sex. Roscius and L. Caesar, I.10.1; Numerius Magius, I.24.4-5, 26.2n.; Libo, I.26.5, Vibullius Rufus, 18.3-5). Nor can it apply to the dangerous mission of the younger Cornelius Balbus to Lentulus during the siege at Dyrrachium (Vell. 2.51.5, Cic. *Fam.* 10.32.3), an approach not mentioned by Caesar. If true, the remark ought to refer to the attempts at negotiation mentioned at 18.5, of which no record survives in our existing text. Caesar may, on the other hand, be indulging in a diplomatic falsehood.

3 **commanded an army in his own right:** Scipio had been appointed proconsul of Syria by the senate in January 49 B.C. and therefore had full independent authority. Although Caesar criticises the illegality of the appointment in Book I (6.5n.), it suits him here to accept it.

5 **as we found out when the war was over:** this is put more personally than the equivalent remark at 18.5 (see n. there on the meaning of 'when the war was over'). *Reperiebamus* occurs only twice elsewhere in Caesar's works: at 51.1 just above, where it is truly personal ('we, the Caesarian side') and at BG 5.13.4 in the description of Britain, where it is authorial ('we, the investigator').

58-72 *The narrative now returns to the campaign at Dyrrachium, to trace the chain of events which led from Pompey's shortage of fodder for his horses (58), and the opportune desertion to him of the Gallic princes Roucillus and Egus (59-61), to his successful attempt to break out from encirclement (62-65) and subsequent winning of a significant victory over Caesar (66-70). It seems unlikely that the information brought by Roucillus and Egus (61.3, 63.5) was of itself the decisive factor, since the incomplete state of Caesar's last fortifications at the southern end must have been a matter of simple observation; it is also probable that the strength of Caesar's forces at that point could have been fairly accurately deduced by an experienced soldier; on the other hand the knowledge that the only missiles available to Caesar's men were stones*

(63.7) was valuable and could not have been guessed. None the less one has the impression that the whole tale of the Gallic princes' desertion (characteristically ascribed to their own defects of character) is something of a smokescreen to divert attention from the fact that Caesar had overstretched himself and failed to take adequate precautions against a manoeuvre the possibility of which he foresaw (63.2). It also seems that his men (whom he is always extremely reluctant to blame) did not on this occasion give a good account of themselves in battle - perhaps in truth because they were weak from navvying on a starvation diet (48, 63.3), a state of affairs arising directly from the tactics which their commander had chosen to adopt. Caesar protests (too much?) about the large consequences in war of apparently insignificant things (68.1, 70.2, 72.4), which suggests an attempt to ward off criticism of his own role in the debacle. But there is a larger point. At the end of this section his fortunes stood at an even lower point than they had at the nadir of the Iberia campaign the previous year (I.48-53), and as in that narrative, so in this, he alludes to the over-optimism and lack of judgement of his opponents. He thus manages to 'trail' his ultimate success and suggest his own superior understanding and abilities.

58 1 **the Pompeian cavalry at Dyrrachium . . . :** the transport of the cavalry to Dyrrachium was described in the portion of text lost between 50 and 51. The town of Dyrrachium lay at the southern end of what must once have been an island but was now connected to the mainland by two narrow isthmuses to the north and south of the resulting lagoon.

2 **inside his fortifications:** at Petra.

3 **the crops which had been planted . . . :** see 44.3

59 1 **the Allobroges:** this tribe lived immediately to the west of the Alps. Their territory, south and east of the Rhone and north of the Isère, formed the northernmost part of the Roman province (later called Narbonensis) which had been established after their defeat in 121 B.C. Half a century later they had become intimately enough involved with their victors for the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 B.C. to think it worthwhile to approach them for support, and Caesar's campaigns in the fifties had still further increased the presence and influence of Rome.

over many years: Caesar appears to use the ablative here to denote extent of time, a significance normally expressed in republican Latin by the accusative. It may be, then, that he wishes to indicate that Adbucillus had held the headship of his people for a large number of years, but not necessarily continuously. Wilkins in his commentary (1881, 1892, *ad. loc.*) argues with considerable plausibility that the similar ablatives at Cic. *de Or.* 2.76 (*Hannibali, qui tot annis de imperio . . . certasset*) and 3.138 (*Pericles . . . quadraginta annis praefuit Athenis*) signify "at various times within so many years". A problem is that all the instances cited of this use of the ablative by Caesar (in *BC*,

I.7.7 *VIII annis*; I.46.1, 47.3, *horis quinque*; I.85.8 *tot annis TV tot annos SMU*) can be corrected to the accusative by the change of a single letter, and it is worth remembering that our MSS date from a period when the ablative would have seemed quite natural to a scribe. On the other hand Caesar himself evidently stood at a point of change. He was capable of using accusative or ablative indifferently to express the same idea. For example, he employs only *nocte*, never *noctem*, to mean 'through the night', except in the phrase *diem noctemque*, which occurs three times in his work (*BG* 7.42.6, 7.77.11, *BC* I.62.1); and yet there is one ablative occurrence of the same pairing with the same meaning, but with its formulaic quality destroyed by reversing the order of the two nouns and using *et* instead of *-que* to connect them (*continuato nocte et die itinere*, III.11.1). From the time of Livy the ablative became more frequent in this sense, finally ousting the accusative altogether (n.b. Livy 21.2.1: *ita se Africo bello . . . per quinque annos, ita deinde novem annis in Hispania . . . gessit*).

- 60 1 to expect everything of his friendship: as we might put it, "the sky's the limit if you stick by me".
 2 highest offices . . . appointed to their senate . . . : Caesar applies the terminology and categories of Roman institutions to those of the Gauls, as though he were speaking of an Italian municipality. We should not be misled into taking this as evidence for Gallic political organisation.
 4 Gaius Volusenus: in *BG* Caesar records that this man served with him as military tribune (a junior officer of senatorial or equestrian family) in 56 and 55 (being described at *BG* 3.5.2 as 'a man of great resource and coinage') and as a cavalry commander in 53 and 51. He may well have been with the Gallic army continuously from 56 onwards. The elimination of such an experienced and able officer would indeed have been welcome to Pompey.
 4 at the end of the war: 18.5n.
 61 2 the soldiers conscripted in Epirus . . . : these men will be those pressed into service by Pompey in 49, and used to strengthen his existing legions (4.2). Not many of them can have been left to desert by now, if we are to believe what Caesar says at 13.2.
 62 1 as has been mentioned: at the end of 58.
 wicker coverings: for the point of this, see 63.7.
 filling material: earth and stones, the raw material of a heap (which is all a siege *agger* really was, 2.1.4n.).
 2 sixty cohorts: the equivalent of six legions, but not fighting as such.

fortifications . . . furthest distance away from Caesar's main camp: this must be the southern end, since Caesar's camp stood between Petra and Dyrrachium (41.5).

- 4 Lentulus Marcellinus: presumably a son (or nephew, see Syme 1986, 252, 287) of Gnaeus, the consul of 56 B.C., who had served under Pompey against the pirates in the sixties and seems to have owed his consulship to Pompey's support. The father, being last heard of in the summer of 54 B.C., is reasonably believed to have been no longer alive when the civil war broke out; the son's appearance on Caesar's side is a reminder of how unreliable interpretations of Roman history based on notions of inherited political loyalty or kinship can be (cf. Shackleton Bailey 1960, Brunt 1988, ch.9, esp. 493ff.).
 63 1 bank and palisade: *vallus* (masc.) commonly signifies a single stake, but occasionally, as here, it is the equivalent of *vallum*. This, the normal defence of a legionary camp, was a compound structure consisting of a ditch in front, a bank behind formed of the spoil from the ditch, and a palisade of sharpened stakes on top of the bank. Of the other words used to indicate fortifications, *munio* is a more general term meaning something like 'lines of fortification', while *opus* or *opera* (pl.), 'earthworks', seems to be used in contexts where it is the physical size of the defences or the labour required to create them that is the leading notion. All three words in most cases refer to the same thing, though complex works, such as those at Alesia (*BG* 7.72-73), used a *vallum* as merely one element in the whole.
 6 the legionaries: these formed the force which was to attack from the inside.
 7 wicker coverings: Pompey must have known in advance that Caesar's men, at least at this point, had no missiles more sophisticated than stones (once they had thrown their pair of *pila*?). The source of this valuable intelligence was presumably Roucillus and Egus.
 64 1 Marcellinus sent . . . cohorts: a number must be missing, as Meusel saw (perhaps three, if one assumes that five cohorts were on duty and five in camp when Pompey launched his attack, and that Marcellinus left only the minimum of two guaranteed by the plural at 65.1). Since Marcellinus was in command of what was merely a subsidiary camp, it is not surprising that he lacked the forces to turn back this full-scale assault. If Caesar's figures are correct, his men were massively outnumbered by the attackers, though he does not adduce this as an explanation for their defeat.
 3 the legionary standard-bearer: the man who bore the eagle, who would not only defend it himself, but could rely on his comrades also to defend it to the death. It is strange that Caesar does not name the man

concerned, as is his usual practice in citations *honoris causa* (cf. 91.1, II.35.1). The vignette serves to relieve the uncomfortable picture of rout by stressing the loyalty and devotion of Caesar's men, even *in extremis*, and his own record as a commander who can keep safe the talismans of Roman military might (cf 26.1).

military disgrace: the loss of the eagle.

- 4 ***princeps prior*:** this was the title borne by the second most senior of the five (only) centurions of the first cohort. The eagle was always with this cohort.

- 65 1 **remaining cohorts:** those (probably, in view of the emergency, only two) which had remained behind in Marcellinus' camp to defend it.
the neighbouring guard-station: Antony will have commanded, like Marcellinus, a subsidiary camp behind the line of forts.

- 2 **smoke signal . . . previously been the practice:** BG 2.33.3.

Caesar arrived . . . with some cohorts: since the total force came to 35 cohorts (67.2) in all, and Antony had already brought 12 cohorts to reinforce Marcellinus' legion (10 cohorts), Caesar should have brought 13.

- 66 2 **as we have explained:** 63.1-3.

- 4 **Caesar moved his camp:** this was before Pompey's assault. Caesar means that he decided it would be better if the Ninth legion were encamped in a different spot, i.e. where Marcellinus was at the time of the attack. The abandoned camp then proved very handy as a temporary site for Pompey after he had broken through the line of Caesar's fortifications.

after a few days' interval: that is, immediately after the successful attack.

- 6 **left-hand corner:** as emerges from the subsequent narrative (68), this means Pompey's left as he faced the enemy. It appears, therefore, that the stream ran to the north of the camp, between it and Caesar's works of circumvallation.

- 7 **he too . . . had left the place:** the extra fortification, the construction of protected access to water, the abandoning of it, and the fortification of the new camp some 500 yards away (67.1) all took place on the same day as the initial break out, and still left time for the second battle told in 67-70. This seems barely credible, but Caesar is emphatic, see 67.2 (*ei^{us} diei detrimentum*) and 71.1 (*duobus his unius diei proeliis*).

reasons which are unnecessary to detail: Caesar is not normally reluctant to indicate, however concisely, reasons for things which turn out to be important. It is highly likely that the Ninth legion's abandoned camp lay close to the lines of fortification, as it would itself have constituted a quasi-barrier before these were complete. If Pompey

stayed there, it would be fairly easy for Caesar to shut him in again by a relatively modest extension of his lines of circumvallation. So he was probably trying to move further south to ensure that if Caesar did succeed in shutting him in again these lines would have become so enormously long that they could not be effectively manned. Perhaps Caesar is reluctant to draw attention to the strategic fact that Pompey had actually broken from his grip.

- 67 1 **the higher forts:** that is, not taller, but standing on higher ground or on the isolated small hills described in 43-44.

- 3 **in double formation:** the normal formation when fighting was expected was triple (see I.41.2n.). Caesar may have adopted the weaker double formation here because he hoped to surprise an enemy not in battle order and wanted extra length and flexibility of line.

- 5 **"hedgehog":** a massive baulk of timber studded with iron spikes.

Titus Pullienus, by whose agency, as we have shown . . . : another reference to the missing account of the defeat of C. Antonius in 49 (4.2n.). I have restored *Pullienus* as the proper name. No *cognomen* Puleio, Pulio, or Pullio is elsewhere attested for the Republic, so far as I know. Pullo occurs in the empire (CIL 9.4024, Alba Fucens) and apparently at BG 5.44; but the latter case is suspicious, since there are in BG no other exceptions to the rule that only grandees of famous family are referred to on first occurrence by *praenomen* and *cognomen* (e.g. L. Sulla, 1.21). Even in BC, where Caesar is less strict, his practice is normally, when he gives only two of a man's names, to give *praenomen* and *nomen*, or *nomen* and *cognomen* (n.b. 15.6, *M. Acilio et Statio Murco legatis*), but (as in BG) not *praenomen* and *cognomen*, except in the case of well-known persons, e.g. L. Torquatus (11.3), or M. Crassus and M. Bibulus (31.3). (However it is undeniable that there are in BC loosenesses not found in BG, e.g. the oddity of the plain *cognomina* Scaeva and Crastinus at 53.4 and 91.1, and Q. Varus (Varius?) at 37.5). If, then, the *Puleione* or *Pulione* of the MSS conceals a *nomen*, the candidates are *Pulla(i)en(i)us* (20 occurrences in CIL 6 of the four possible forms of the name), *Pullienus* (1 occurrence [= ILS 8888] in ILLRP, 7 in CIL 6), or *Pull(e)ius* (7 occurrences in CIL 6), of which the second seems the most likely (*Pullieno* → *Pulieno* → *Pulione*). Names in -ienus (see Syme 1939, 93 n.4) are characteristic of the south-central highlands of Italy, a great recruiting area for the legions.

- 68 1 **luck, powerful in all things but particularly in war:** on luck, cf. 27.1n., I.52.3n. Caesar here most strikingly uses a reflective generalisation about the sometimes large consequences of little things both to introduce and (at 70.2) to round off this episode, which thus attains a kind of paradeigmatic value and gains the extra literary weight

to make it a satisfying climax and catalyst of the long-drawn-out siege. But in terms of the apologetic nature of the *BC*, the reflection serves to prepare and excuse the forthcoming defeat. It is an example of a technique which Rambaudo 1966, 151-176 (esp. 165 ff.) has called *narration pré-explicative* and has shown to be a persistent feature of Caesar's writing, from single sentences up to much larger structures: causes are identified before results are stated. Thus any analysis or judgment which the reader might independently make is pre-empted, and the narrative acquires an aura of logical inevitability.

2 as we explained above: 66.6.

69 The text of this chapter is in a peculiarly bad state, even by the standards of the *BC*, and in spite of the near-unanimity of the standard modern editions there are still some difficulties, commented on below. Luckily the narrative remains quite comprehensible.

1 having received the news of this event after a somewhat long delay: the text as transmitted (see *app. crit.*) is nonsensical, talking of "this somewhat long delay being interposed" when no delay has been mentioned or implied. "This" (*hac*) must surely belong with "event" (*re*), and I have corrected the text accordingly. [I surmise that *nuntiata* became by carelessness *renuntiata*, which then turned into *re nuntiata*, and led to the deletion of the original *re*, now redundant; finally *et* was inserted to convert the two ablative absolutes into parallel instead of interlocked clauses.]

their work of fortification: Pompey's men, like Caesar's, were engaged in making a new camp (66.7).

3 jumped down into the ditches of the fortification: the transmitted text makes the fortification ten feet high, when the point surely is that the ditches (as Caesar's readers did not need to be told) were too deep for men to get out except by standing on something, in this case the bodies of their comrades. The measurement "ten feet" found in the MSS must have originated as a marginal note applying to the ditches, which was then absorbed into the text, but in the wrong place. If this hypothesis is correct, there is no need to emend *munitionis*, the reading of all the MSS except the first hand in T.

4 the enemy both inside and outside them: Caesar's men were inside the inner camp but had not succeeded in driving the Pompeians from it, when they were threatened by the arrival of Pompey's much larger relieving force in the area of the outer camp. Without a more precise description of the relationship of the two camps, in particular what fortifications, if any, they had in common, it is impossible to form more than a general impression of what was happening.

abandoned their horses... same direction: the number of emendations (of which a small sample appears in the *app. crit.*) proposed for this passage is proof of its unsatisfactory state. There were no cavalry on the left wing (cf. 68.3), and even if there were (or if, as K.-H.-M. suppose, there is a lacuna in which Caesar betook himself to the other wing) why would they have let their horses go in order to run (more slowly) on their own feet in the same direction? And if the horses have to disappear from the text, what does "the same direction" refer to? Being unable to suggest any sensible remedy, I translate the text as it stands; but it surely cannot be what Caesar wrote.

70 1 I think because . . . : this is the sole occurrence in Caesar's works of the first person singular *credo* (direct speech excepted). His otherwise invariable practice is not to qualify such assertions of motive (cf. e.g. 44.1), so that he carries his readers along on a tide of certainty produced by his apparent omniscience. See 15.6n. on the use of first person verbs in *BC* (all plural except for this and one other example).

the fortifications: it is not clear whether these are the fortifications of Caesar's own camp, or the outer fortifications of the double camp where the fighting had been. The latter is perhaps more likely.

2 And so a trivial matter tipped the balance: picking up 68.1.

71 1 the military tribunes *Titus*? *Tuticanus Gallus* . . . : some of the MSS insert the impossible figure *L* (erroneously amended to *V* by Klotz) after *tribunos militum*, and thus distinguish these four from military tribunes (however many). There can, however, be little doubt that they are the military tribunes. This was a rank associated with equestrian status, whether that was acquired by birth or service (cf. Horace *Epod.* 4, Ovid *Amores* 3.15.6, Suolahti 174-184). In particular, the senator's son *Tuticanus Gallus* (whose *praenomen* has gone missing, and was therefore most probably 'T.', as K.-H.-M. observe) can hardly have been anything other than a military tribune: not many years later, Augustus, when systematising the senatorial career, "gave to senators' sons who were embarking on their military service not only military tribunes, but also prefectships of cavalry" (Suet. *Divus Augustus* 38.2). As Augustus preferred to build on existing practice, it is highly probable that in the late Republic it was already normal for senators' sons (who were by definition *equites Romani*, see I.23.1n.) to be appointed to military tribunes. Suetonius' expression "not only military tribunes" in any case implies that the practice was one which Augustus inherited. By this stage of the Republic *equites Romani* had ceased to serve as common cavalrymen, a function now discharged by non-Roman auxiliaries (cf. 2.3n. and the list of Pompey's cavalry at 4.3-5, as well as Caesar's Gauls).

- 1 The family of **Tuticanus**, a name of Etruscan origin (Schulze 1904, 113), *may* have been from Verona, hence the *cognomen* Gallus, but the evidence is inconclusive. If the father really was from Cisalpine Gaul, he is one of the very first Roman senators to come from non-peninsular Italy (Wiseman 1971, 20, 268). Young Tuticanus' presence in Caesar's train is consistent with Transpadane origin, as Caesar had recently (March 48 B.C.) made a spectacular gesture of patronage to the region by conferring on its Latin inhabitants the Roman citizenship denied them after the Social War. (If the suggestion made below, at 87.4n., is correct, this gift retrospectively legalised his earlier recruiting activities in the region.)

Aulus Granius: the Granii were a prominent family of Puteoli, owing their rise at the end of the second century B.C. to their involvement with the trade from Delos to Italy (Syme 1939, 90n.7, Gabba 1976, 58 and 223n.56). Distant kinship existed, through Marius, between Caesar and the Granii (Plut. *Marius* 35.6), and they had been firm in their opposition to Sulla (App. *BC* 1.60).

Sacrativir and **Felginas/Fleginas** are names unknown outside this passage, and there must be a strong suspicion that both are corrupt. More plausible forms, attested in the inscriptions, are *Sacratorius*, a name actually found at Capua (*CIL* 10.4322), and *Fulginas* (*CIL* 3.3777, 3780) - though Schulze 1904, 528, observes that such formations from place-names, in this case *Fulginiae* in Umbria, tend to be characteristic of slaves.

- 2 but a large proportion of these perished in the ditches...: Caesar tries to minimise the Pompeian victory by pointing out that it was not in fair fight that his casualties were chiefly sustained. His opponents are presented as lucky victors whose success arose, not from their own merits, but from factors over which they had no control (cf. 70.2).
- 3 a salutation as 'Victorious General'...: for the meaning of this, see L13.1n. (and cf. the ironical 31.1); Combès 1966 is a full treatment. An example of a 'letterhead' embodying the title can be found in Cicero's letters from Cilicia in late 51 and 50, after he had been so saluted for his campaign in the Amanus (*Fam.* 2.10.3): M. CICERO IMP(ERATOR) S(ALUTEM) D(AT) M. CAELIO AEDILI CURULI DESIGNATO (it is characteristic of the irreverent Caelius that he declined to reply in the same pompous vein). After salutation a commander was entitled to place laurel around his *fascēs* (these being the bundles of rods and axes which denoted a holder of *imperium* and symbolised his power to punish and put to death), and keep them so adorned until he returned to Rome and the senate took a decision whether or not to award him a triumph, for which a salutation as *Imperator* constituted a *prima facie* claim. By telling the reader that Pompey was prepared to accept the

salutation, Caesar places him in the wrong, because a triumph could be granted only for a victory over the enemies of Rome, not over one's fellow-citizens; but at the same time he uses Pompey's relatively tactful behaviour to contrast sharply with the totally unworthy and vindictive behaviour of Labienus (for whom see 13.3n., 19.8, I.15.2n.).

- 72 1 the Pompeians ... considered themselves to have won already: a tragic motif, which gives shape to the narrative through its more powerful restatement at the end of this chapter and its recapitulation at 82-83, before the *peripeteia* (reversal of fortune) at Pharsalus.
- 2-4 This catalogue of all the chance factors which aided the Pompeians smacks of special pleading on the part of the defeated general, but the point of it is clear enough: it is to deny that Caesar's opponents possessed *virtus* enough to defeat him on their own merits, but needed a large share of luck. Once again Caesar is claiming moral superiority for his side, and therefore by implication justifying his own actions.
- 4 they made that day's victory famous: the ringing *concelebrant* (a verb found nowhere else in Caesar) closes this spirited denunciation of the folly of the Pompeians with a striking example of Cicero's favourite closing rhythm or *clausula*: a cretic (long-short-long) followed by a spondee (long-long) or trochee (long-short). This is the climax to a periodic sentence of a style noticeably more elevated than Caesar's matter-of-fact norm, and packed with other, intermediate, *clausulae*: *recordabantur, intulissent, esset offensum, virtute vicissent, and posset accidere* - (on these, see Cicero's discussion at *Orator* 210ff.). Note also the tricolon *suspicionis ... terroris ... religionis ...*, the balance of *quam* and *quotiens*, the antithesis of *virtute* and *commutatio rerum*, and the grandiloquent *per orbem terrarum*.

73-99 Caesar's escape from Dyrrachium and the campaign of Pharsalus

73-77 Caesar marks a new beginning here with the very first sentence of 73, and paves the way for the third and ultimately decisive part of his campaign in Greece with the longest speech of the book, offering encouragement to his soldiers and preparing his readers for the turn of fortune. He then goes on to narrate how he managed to shake off Pompey's pursuit, which was potentially a very difficult task in view of the latter's superiority in cavalry (cf. his own merciless harrying of the retreating army of Afranius and Petreius in Spain the previous year, I.78.4 - 80.5).

- 73 The main content of this chapter is Caesar's speech to his soldiers. Fabre (in a note *ad loc.*) asserts that it is aimed at Caesar's readers, not his troops. This is partly true, because it serves more than one purpose in the narrative.

It clarifies the pattern of events by signing-off, so to speak, the whole episode at Dyrrachium; it also serves as a demonstration of the way in which Caesar (a famously effective orator of his day) was able to exercise leadership and put heart into his men (see Gelzer 1968, 235-6, accepting its historicity); and it shifts responsibility for the failure away from himself by restating more forcefully the idea already suggested in 68 and 72 that the defeat was due more to bad luck than bad judgement. Yet the vivid and personalised way in which luck (*fortuna*) is invoked suggests that these literary purposes have not distorted the gist of what Caesar actually said.

He undoubtedly believed in the operation of luck (see 27.1n. for refs.), and in this respect was fully in tune with the thinking of his age. Tyche, the Greek equivalent of Fortuna, had long been elevated to numinous status in the Hellenistic world (the famous statue of the Tyche of Antioch dates from c.300 B.C.); the ethics of the Stoic school of philosophy were developed in part to deal with the element of unpredictability in human existence; and the historian Polybius, while banishing the traditional gods, had allowed Tyche to remain on his sober stage as a randomly causative force.

But equally certainly Caesar cannot really have believed that he could rely on luck to defeat Pompey, or that educated readers would share that belief. Also, to make luck responsible for his success would undercut his presentation of himself as omniscient (see Introduction to Books I & II, 19-20), and lay himself open to the charges just brought in the preceding chapter against his opponents. His actual narrative of the capture of Italy, Sardinia, and Sicily admits no debt to luck, in spite of what he says here, and only once in the Spanish campaign does he ascribe the lady any role (I.52.3, 59.1).

On the other hand it must have suited him to claim that luck in a general way was on his side. At BG 1.40.12 he identifies two particular qualities of a commander: *innocentia* and *felicitas*, and his use of the word *felicitas* (translated 'happy chance') in §3 here recalls Sulla the dictator, who took the name *Felix* as a sort of permanent advertisement of the fact that good luck favoured him. The cult of Fortune was widespread at Rome, and acknowledged by the state. In the second century B.C. she acquired at least three temples, the most celebrated being that of *Fortuna Huiusce Diei* ('This Day's Fortune') dedicated in thanksgiving for the victory of Vercellae on July 30, 101 B.C. At the other end of the scale, Octavian thought it worth attempting to win support against Antony in the late thirties B.C. by circulating stories illustrating his own superior luck. In such an intellectual climate, a claim that luck was on your side was likely to be an effective ploy, particularly when addressed to men as ignorant and unsophisticated as most Roman legionaries must have been. The marked emphasis on *fortuna* in this speech is therefore entirely in keeping with the circumstances of its delivery, but is not intended to persuade educated readers or to reflect Caesar's personal attitude. [On Caesar and Fortuna see Warde Fowler 1903,

Ramnaud 1966, 256-264, Kajanto 1981, esp. 537-538 : 'in his (Caesar's) writings *fortuna* mostly denotes the incalculable element in war which may upset a general's plans'. As a propaganda symbol, Fortuna first appears on the coinage of the Republic in 49 B.C. in the shape of a bust of Fortuna Populi Romani, expressing the hopes of the Pompeian side for victory, but then not until after Caesar's death in 44 (RRC 1. nos.440, 480/25)].

- 2 **his garrisons:** that is, the troops manning the various forts, strongpoints, and outposts of his circumvallation; the forces holding Apollonia, Lissus, and Oricum are not meant (cf. 78.4).
- 3 **highly experienced and practised generals:** Afranius and Petreius (I.38.1n.).
- the nearby provinces and their supplies of grain:** Sicily and Sardinia. The former was the major provider of imported grain to Rome during the Republic, the latter is described by Strabo (5.2.7) as being generally fruitful, but particularly so in grain.
- 5 **offered level ground for a battle:** 55.1.
- taken possession of an enemy camp . . . :** 67ff.
- 6 **as had happened at Gergovia:** in 52 B.C. Caesar suffered a serious reverse at Gergovia, with the loss of 46 centurions (BG 7.43-51), but recovered to defeat Vercingetorix decisively at Alesia (7.69-88). As here, Caesar closes the episode with an address to his troops (7.52), laying the blame squarely on them for their excessive eagerness to advance. In both cases, the speech serves, *inter alia*, to exonerate himself.
- their opponents . . . would offer battle of their own accord:** this was surely written after Pharsalus, which was the single occasion in the whole campaign on which Pompey (against his better judgement) gave battle when he had the option of declining. Caesar is again indulging in the literary technique of dramatic prefiguring, pointing the reader forward and thus giving shape and an illusion of inevitability to the otherwise formless unfolding of events (cf. 72.1,4). This is not to say that Caesar could not in fact have made such a prophecy. The interesting point is that it appears here.
- 74 1 **standard-bearers:** each cohort had a *signifer*, though only the standard-bearer of the first (the *aquilifer*) carried the eagle.
- 2 **not without reason:** these words clearly imply that the ordinary soldiery were irrational in their eagerness to fight - an implication confirmed by Caesar's own characterisation of them in the following sentence as frightened and unreliable - but the fact that he could awaken this eagerness is itself a mark of Caesar's worthiness to be a commander (cf. 92.5). The logical reasons occurring to their thinking superiors for staying and seeking an immediate battle may have been the difficulty of

disengagement while retreating (illustrated by the stratagems of 75-77), and the problem with supplies that Caesar mentions.

- 75 1 **Apollonia:** some 75 km. distant, perhaps therefore reachable in 24-30 hours if no more than brief stops were taken.
- 2 **before dawn:** literally 'in the fourth watch', which is the last of the night.
 the remainder . . . by a number of gates: four legions were involved, probably by now only 12-14,000 men. Even so, to bring them out through one gate would take a very long time, and speed was vital. It is quite possible that Caesar had improvised an extension to Marcellinus' one-legion camp (62.4, 64.1) and that its shape and number of gates were not standard.
 military routine . . . the signal for breaking camp: cf. 37.4n.
- 3 **the same considerations:** the difficulties that could face a Roman army in these circumstances are well illustrated by Caesar's description of his enemies' retreat from Ilerda the previous year (I.63-67). Pompey still had a large superiority in cavalry, but the siege had taken its toll (58) as the sequel was to show (§5 below).
- 5 **light-armed front-line troops:** I accept the view of Veith (Kromayer-Veith 391) that *antesignani* here and elsewhere in Caesar (I.43.3, 44.3, 57.1 - where my translation 'guards of the standards' should be amended - ; III.84.3; not in BG) are the men who fought in the first line of the legion, namely its first four cohorts. They were not normally light-armed, except under special circumstances like the present: there existed no standard category of troops called *antesignani expediti*.
- 76 1 **river Genusus . . . Asparagium** 30.7n.
- 2 **Pompey halted in his old camp at Asparagium:** previous manoeuvres at Asparagium (41) suggest that Pompey's camp was on the north bank of the river. Note that Caesar says nothing here of a crossing by the pursuing army, an operation which he surely would have contested, given its difficulty (75.4). Also the casual attitude (below) of the Pompeian troops after they had occupied their camp suggests that they felt themselves to be in some way protected from a sudden attack.
- 4 **as Caesar had foreseen would be the case:** presumably what Caesar foresaw was the absence of men on foraging duties, not the additional factor of a return by some of them to the previous camp.
 repeating the day's march proceeded eight miles further: these words cannot mean that the morning's march was only eight Roman miles (c.11 km.): what Caesar repeated was the march, not the distance. The military commentators (Stoffel, Veith, Rice Holmes) agree that the distance from the southern end of the siege fortifications to Asparagium

was about 15 Roman miles (20 km.). However, this was a long way for Pompey's men to go back to fetch their things (whether this was an undisciplined personal initiative, as Caesar insinuates, or an organised party, as is surely more likely). It may be, then, that the camps made by Pompey and Caesar after the breakout were not, as is generally assumed, hard by the lines of fortification, but a mile or two further south.

- 77 1 **baggage and equipment:** evidently the baggage train had been overtaken by the rest of the army, and its orders to make with all speed for Apollonia countermanded. Caesar perhaps did not expect to give Pompey the slip so easily and anticipated that his main force would be slowed by enemy harassment.
- 2 **although the rivers were very deep:** there were only two substantial rivers, the Genusus and the Apsus, between Dyrrachium and Apollonia, and one of those Caesar had already crossed. 'Rivers', then, is either a 'rhetorical' generalisation, used to emphasise Caesar's achievement, or, if the case argued in the next note is sound, an indication that Caesar may initially have proceeded inland, crossing either the Genusus or the Apsus more than once in his attempt to shake off the pursuit.
- 3 **on the fourth day:** if Caesar made straight for Apollonia, and Pompey used forced marches, as we are told he did, they would both have reached it on the third evening. It lies only about 50 km. or 36 Roman miles from the presumed site of Asparagium; and 25 km. a day (20 km. for Caesar's army, already 11 km. beyond the Genusus on the first evening) was easily within the compass of legionaries when necessary (cf. I.8.1n.). Given that Caesar does not mention his approach to Apollonia until after Pompey had abandoned the chase, and that he alleges that the going was 'very obstructed' (which was surely not true of the level road to Apollonia), the answer is probably that he followed a difficult and roundabout route in order to confuse Pompey and make a fast pursuit, especially for cavalry, impossible. Other solutions to the problem suppose a corrupt text (Stoffel) or a failure of Caesar's memory (K.-H.-M.), while Rice Holmes uncharacteristically ignores it.
 judged that he ought to adopt a different plan: Caesar uses exactly the same phrase at 41.2, but it occurs nowhere else in his works.

78-81 Having solved the immediate problem of escaping from Pompey, Caesar reflects on the strategic options open to him. He chooses to move to central Greece in order to unite his forces with those of Domitius Calvinus and threaten Scipio, and proceeds as quickly as he can over the Pindus range to western Thessaly. Domitius narrowly avoids an accidental meeting with Pompey, who is also making for Thessaly by the

faster but more northerly route of the *Via Egnatia*, and manages to join Caesar safely as he descends into Thessaly. By taking and sacking the town of Gomphi Caesar serves notice that his army is still to be feared, and soon takes up a position near Pharsalus (which he does not name) in the plain of the Enipeus, in country where he can feed his men after the privations of Dyrrachium and the march over the mountains.

- 78 1 put garrisons in the towns: see §4 below. It is probable that Lissus, Oricum, and Apollonia had been left without much more than token forces while Pompey was bottled up at Dyrrachium, as Caesar needed all the troops he could muster for the siege.
- 2 Domitius: Domitius Calvinus with his two legions facing Scipio in northern Thessaly, 34.3, 36-38.
- 3 go to the help of Italy by way of Illyricum: Caesar had insufficient naval transport to follow Pompey by sea. Although it would have been a long march round the head of the Adriatic, Caesar would have benefited from moving southwards into Italy, as he had in the previous year, from Cisalpine Gaul, an area in which he had much support.
- 4 Athamania: a necessary correction for Acarnania (*vel. sim.*) of the MSS, see Map 2. Because Pompey had a start on him along the *Via Egnatia* (79.2), Caesar was forced to go by way of the Zygos (Metsovon) pass, which gives access to Thessaly by the upper Peneios valley and is used by the modern road from Ioannina to Trikkala. His ascent on the western side is likely to have been up the Vjosë/Aous valley until the confluence of the Drin, and then either by the Drin valley or the middle Vjosë/Aous and Konitsa (the gorge of the Aous above Konitsa being impracticable) to the lake of Ioannina, before turning east to climb over into the Arakhthos valley: "the best route from Epirus to Thessaly ... follows the north side of the Arakhthos valley to Metsovon, climbs the central knot of Pindus and follows the valley of the Peneios to Kalabaka (*Aeginium*)" (Hammond 1967, 259). Although the pass gave more direct access than the *Egnatia* to western Thessaly, that was not where Domitius was when Caesar had last heard from him. There was also the possibility that, in May (Julian), it could still be blocked by snow: it rises to over 1500m. whereas the highest point on the *Egnatia* was only 1200m.
- 5 Pompey ... was of the view that he ought to hurry to Scipio: Plutarch (*Pomp.* 66.4-5) reports Pompey's decision to pursue Caesar rather than return to take possession of Italy, and with it all the western provinces, as Afranius proposed, as a moral one: it would be disgraceful to turn his back on Caesar a second time, and it would be better for Rome if things were fought out as far as possible from the city. But if Pompey wanted victory, there can have been no real alternative to pursuing his opponent's weakened and demoralised army, and not allowing it to recover.

- 79 2 the direct route ... Candavia: the *Via Egnatia* (see Map 1) was the obvious and easy route into Macedonia and northern Thessaly. According to Strabo (7.7.4) the first part of the *Via Egnatia* was called the Candavian Road (for the whole route see Hammond 1972, 19-58).
- 3 Heraclia: Heraclia Lynkestis, so called to distinguish it from numerous other towns of the same name (one of which was wrongly picked by the person who annotated the archetype of our MSS, see *app. crit.*), lay on the *Via Egnatia*, about 2 km. south of modern Bitola (Monastir). It was the last place of any consequence in Macedonia before the traveller crossed into Illyrian country a few km. further west.
- 4 provinces and communities: by 'communities' (*civitates*) Caesar means any self-governing entities which were in some way within the Roman orbit, and were not under the authority of a provincial governor. Such entities included small kingdoms, tribal groups, confederations, and independent city-states both inside and outside Roman provinces.
- a wildly exaggerated rumour: the same words occur at II.17.3 (*latius atque inflatus*), likewise of an unjustified report unfriendly to Caesar.
- 6 as we explained above: 59-60.
- Allobroges ... Domitius' scouts: Domitius had 500 of Caesar's cavalry (34.3), who appear to have been entirely Gallic (2.3n.).
- 7 Aeginium: modern Kalabaka, hard by the famous Meteora monasteries. Lying where the Peneios valley narrows, but before the real climb to the pass starts, Aeginium could indeed 'block off' Thessaly by that route. And although by the logic of communications and economic geography it should form part of Thessaly, at this period of history it was deemed rather to belong with the tribal areas of Epirus and Illyria (Strabo 7.7.9) - hence Caesar's description of it as 'facing' (*oppositum*) Thessaly.
- 80 1 Gomphi: (modern Palaeo Episkopi) one of a quadrilateral of four fortified towns which at one time were the key to western Thessaly, the others being Trikke, Metropolis, and Pellinaion to the E. Lying some 30 km. south of Aeginium, it secured the route (probably the one taken by Cassius earlier, 36.5) over the Pindus to southern Epirus and the Gulf of Ambracia; Caesar does not mean that it commanded the *only* way in from Epirus, for he himself had come by an alternative.
- the people ... had sent a delegation: cf. 12.4
- 3 the chief magistrate of Thessaly: under the Roman settlement after the defeat of Philip V of Macedon at Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C., the reconstituted federal state of Thessaly was presided over by an annually elected *strategos* (praetor) who was also the chief commander in time of

war. Divisions among the Thessalian leaders are referred to above, 35.2.

- 4 **Larisa:** the Thessalian capital, still known by the same name, about 70 km. east of Gomphi.

Pompey was not yet near Thessaly: this may seem surprising, in view of what we have been told in 79; but Pompey had a weary army and once Domitius had slipped away (at speed) he evidently did not bother to pursue him. From Heraclia to the northern borders of Thessaly is over 100 km.

- 5 **ladders and mantlets:** standard gear for attacking and scaling walls. A *musculus* ('mantlet') was a long, narrow, moveable shed with a strong roof, under which men could shelter while undermining fortifications or preparing other forms of attack. A notable example of the type is described in detail at II.10.

- 7 **remarkable efforts of his soldiers:** these efforts are astonishing, the more so as the men must have been both tired and undernourished. They had struck camp, marched the 25 km. or so from Aeginium to Gomphi, dug another camp, and prepared the assault equipment, before attacking and taking the town in a space of not more than three and a half hours. The explanation must lie not simply in the extraordinary physical toughness of Roman legionaries, but also in their desperate desire on this occasion for the food and supplies which they had been denied so long and were now at last within their grasp. Note how Caesar makes these efforts a consequence of his exhortation, underlining his effectiveness as a commander.

came to Metropolis: this must be on the next day. Not even Caesar's men would have been capable of a night march of another 20-25 km. on top of what they had already done. None the less, it is odd that some report of the fate of Gomphi did not reach Metropolis before Caesar did; maybe the news travelled first in other directions. As to style, Caesar here conveys the amazing swiftness of his operations by the headlong sequence of actions (exhorting his troops, attacking, taking, and sacking Gomphi, moving camp, and reaching Metropolis) packed, *accelerando*, into a single sentence (cf. 96.3-4).

- 81 1 **Metropolis:** see 80.1n. and Map 2. This place, the centre of a group of settlements, stood at the beginning of the third, and most southerly, practicable way over the Pindus from Thessaly. This route led into the upper valley of the Achelous and so down through Aetolia into Acarnania.

the same rumours: 80.2.

- 3 **convenient for securing supplies of corn, now nearly ripe:** early June, by our calendar, in the plain of Thessaly. and cf. 49.1n. [Some supplement to the text is required, but its content is not controversial.

Bentley proposed ... *nactus, qua prope iam matura erant <frumenta> ...*]

make this the centre of his whole campaign: this site, so laconically introduced and never named by Caesar, is where the decisive encounter that we call the battle of Pharsalus took place (see Maps 2 & 3). There is much modern controversy over its exact location, in particular whether the battle took place north or south of the river Enipeus, but it is clear from two cardinal pieces of evidence that it must have been north: (i) after the battle the Pompeians fled for six miles along a ridge towards Larisa, which lay practically due north of the town of Pharsalus and approximately 35 km. distant from the river (97.2); (ii) according to Plutarch, who seems to have good and detailed information (probably from Pollio, cf. 99.4n.), on the morning of the battle Caesar was preparing to withdraw towards Scotussa (*Caes.* 43, *Pomp.* 68), which lies some 10 km. to the northeast; but there is no reference in either Plutarch's or Caesar's accounts to the danger of crossing the river in front of Pompey's army, which was already drawn up outside its camp (85). To these items can be added (iii) Lucan's testimony (7.214-217, see Rambaud 1954) that Pompey's troops had the sun in their faces when they were drawn up for battle first thing in the morning; if this is taken with Caesar's statement that Pompey's right rested on "a river with difficult banks" (88.6), and Frontinus' identification (*Strategemata* 2.3.22) of this river as the Enipeus accepted, Pompey's battle-line can be nowhere but on the north bank of the Enipeus, facing east. Against this conclusion stands only the isolated assertion of Appian (*BC* II.75) that the battle was fought between Pharsalus (which lies about 5 km. south of the river) and the Enipeus. Appian's reliability in matters of this sort is notoriously fragile, and the only reason modern authors have trusted him is the belief that he used Pollio as a principal source, and that Pollio, who fought in the battle, cannot have made a mistake. The second of these propositions is probably true, but the first is not. As Pelling (1973) says, after alluding to this author's notorious muddle over Saguntum (*Iber.* 7), "Appian's version of *this* battle does not inspire confidence ... (he) has several sources before him, and combines them to produce an inept result."

First Pelling, and more recently Morgan (1983), have refined the work of Lucas (1919/21) to show that the previously widely-accepted view of Béquignon (1960, 1970, 1974), who places the battle on the south bank of the Enipeus a little east of Pharsalus, must be mistaken. The strategic arguments, discussed by Pelling (pp. 253-5) and Rice Holmes (pp. 457-9), are rather less decisive; but if the two armies were where Béquignon puts them, it would appear that Pompey had opted for a position which allowed Caesar complete freedom to withdraw by excellent routes south, west, or north, but makes his intended

withdrawal northeast to Scotussa incomprehensible. (One should note, incidentally, that arguments turning on 'lines of communication' or 'lines of supply' are not relevant in the case of a highly mobile Roman army which lived off the land and was a self-contained instrument). In short, everything points to the correctness of the view which places the battle on the north bank; and Pelling and Morgan, whom I follow, make a good case for choosing a spot rather further east than that proposed by Lucas. The statement by some of our sources (Hirtius *Bell. Alex.* 48.1; Strabo 17.1.11, C796; Frontinus *Strat.* 2.3.22; Eutropius 6.20; and Orosius 6.15.27) that the battle occurred at Palae(o)pharsalus ('Old Pharsalus') is no help, as we cannot identify this place with any certainty - though Morgan's case for a site at the southern foot of the hill of Driskoli is very attractive, and saves Appian's credit if we allow him to have written 'Pharsalus' for 'Palaeopharsalus').

82-87 Caesar's narration of the preliminaries to the battle lays the emphasis less on strategic or tactical considerations than on the moral fitness (or otherwise) of either side to win. Of the six chapters, two (82-83) are concerned with the squabbling among Pompey's followers over the anticipated spoils of victory, and two (86-87) with the poor judgment displayed by Pompey and his council of war, who adopted a 'soft-option' battle plan based on false estimates of the quality of the troops on the two sides. Sandwiched between this negative material are two chapters (84-85) which make a very strong contrast; they advertise Caesar's positive qualities - his willingness to fight, his resourcefulness in attempting to improve his army's effectiveness, and his quickness and decisiveness in accepting battle when the chance is at last offered. By the end of this section, the reader has been conditioned to accept Caesar as the only worthy winner of the contest about to take place, and the final sentence of ch. 87 registers as rich in irony.

82 1 Addressing the whole army: probably at Larisa (80.4), as there would have been no sense in Scipio going to meet Pompey and leaving the town undefended.

shared the honours with Scipio: although Pompey had been given the overall direction of the war against Caesar (16.4), his formal status was equal to that of his current father-in-law: he was proconsul of the two Spains, while Scipio was proconsul of Syria. It was therefore 'republican' to share at least the trappings of command with him. (On the double bugle calls, cf. Livy's story (27.47.5) of how before the battle of the Metaurus in 207 B.C. Hasdrubal's suspicions that the army facing him had been reinforced were confirmed by hearing the calls repeated in the consular camp).

3 priesthoods: Caesar refers particularly to the *Pontifices*, *Augures*, and *Quindecimviri sacris faciundis*, all established in the regal period (the fourth 'great' college, that of the *Septemviri epulonum*, was not founded

until 196 B.C. and seems to owe its status to Augustus). The members of these priestly colleges were secular persons prominent in public life, and they performed the function of standing committees charged with the oversight and regulation of the religious life of the state, in whose ceremonies they also played the leading part. The colleges had some political importance in the late Republic, since they could on occasion delay or expedite business by manipulation of the religious aspects of public life (especially the calendar), but in the fiercely competitive status-seeking world of the Roman senator their true appeal was social. An official priesthood in classical antiquity was an honour, not a calling; a fair comparison might be elevation to the House of Lords in our society. And since these ancient and prestigious Roman bodies had a strictly limited membership (in this period 16, 15 and 15 respectively, membership being for life) and tended to be the preserve of the high aristocracy, their priesthoods were much coveted. Before 104 B.C. vacancies in the colleges were filled by co-optation, but in that year the tribune Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (father of Caesar's bitter enemy), piqued because the college of augurs had failed to co-opt him in his father's place, instituted a modified form of popular election. The allocation of priesthoods to themselves by the Pompeians was thus an infringement of popular sovereignty, as well as an indication of their own self-seeking.

allocating consulships for years ahead: another and more cutting jibe at the un-Republican attitudes of men who claimed to be defending the Republic: only the Roman people had the power to give the consulship, and that for only a year ahead. There is historical irony here, for Caesar later did exactly what he here accuses his opponents of doing. The irony moreover is double: one of the consular pairs he designated (for 41 B.C.) consisted of his future murderers Brutus and Cassius.

asking for the houses ... of those ... in Caesar's camp: Sulla's victory in the civil war of the eighties had been followed by the proscription of his opponents and the confiscation and sale of their property to his own supporters at extremely favourable prices. Caesar is voicing the common belief that a Pompeian victory would bring back the terror of proscriptions, a course of action he had himself renounced (cf. *Cic. Att.* 9.10.6, 11.6.6).

4 Lucilius Hirrus: this man was a cousin of Pompey and a distant relative (greatnephew?) of the famous satirist. As tribune in 53 B.C. he had tried to engineer Pompey's appointment as dictator. He then failed to defeat Cicero in an election to the augurate, and lost to Caelius (20.1n.) in the aedilician elections of August 51 (*Cic. Fam.* 2.9-10, revealing a very low opinion of him; see also Shackleton Bailey 1965, 202). As a legate of Pompey in 49 he managed to extricate himself, but

not his five cohorts, from Corfinium before Domitius became trapped there (Cic. *Att.* 8.11A, 12A.1 with I.23.2). His mission to the Parthians was unsuccessful: if Dio 42.2.5 refers to him, as seems probable, he was imprisoned by his would-be allies. He survived this, and the rest of the war, only to have to flee from proscription in 43-42 B.C.

83 1 **Lentulus Spinther:** consul in 57 B.C. and one of Pompey's senior officers (*legati*) in Italy in 49 B.C. (I.15.3n.).

Caesar's priesthood: 82.3n. Caesar was *pontifex maximus*, the most important and most desired priesthood.

2 **Acutius Rufus:** otherwise unknown, but surely a senator (not listed in *MRR*).

Lucius Afranius . . . in Spain: I.38-87; for his arrival here, 88.3n.

3 **a capital sentence:** not necessarily death, but loss of citizen rights, entailing exile.

84 1 **interval . . . since the battles at Dyrrachium:** Caesar reached Apollonia on the fourth, or perhaps fifth day after leaving Dyrrachium (77.3). Between Apollonia and Aeginium, where he met Domitius Calvinus (79.7), lay some 300 mountainous km. which his army can hardly have traversed in less than 15 days. There followed the march from Aeginium to Gomphi (c. 30 km.), the two one-day attacks on Gomphi and Metropolis and a another two days' march (c. 50 km.) to reach Pharsalus - making a minimum total of 24 days. The various guesses as to the date of Caesar's discomfiture at Dyrrachium range from July 5 (Veith), to July 6 (Stoffel, followed by Schönberger and Will), July 9 (Holmes), and even July 17 (Gröbe, followed by Gelzer). The last depends on an inferred date of July 15 for a cryptic letter written by Cicero from Pompey's camp at a time when it seems that Caesar cannot have yet been defeated (*Att.* 11.4: Schmidt's date accepted by Shackleton Bailey 1966, 269, *contra* Rice Holmes 478-80), but it is surely an impossibility.

2 **the hills occupied by the Pompeians:** these will be the hills flanking the northern side of the plain of the Enipeus just to the west of the road from Pharsalus to Larisa. There are convenient springs in places here - note the modern village names Zoodochos Pighi and Krini (formerly Tatar and Driskoli).

3 **his previous practice . . . with the cavalry:** see 75.5. Caesar does not appear to have used this technique when it came to the actual battle, cf. 93.3-4, though Frontinus (perhaps on the evidence of this passage) says he did (*Strat.* 2.3.22). Caesar's purpose in mentioning it here is to underline his competence and conscientiousness as a commander and sharpen the contrast with the over-confidence, selfishness, and tactical ineptitude of his opponents.

5 **one of the two Allobroges:** either Roucillus or Egus, see 59.1.

85 1 **the disadvantage of the ground:** there was an element of the rugby scrum about a Roman battle (cf. 93.1). Sheer weight of numbers pushing from the rear ranks could break the enemy line, so a slope was worth a lot.

2 **Pompey's army, which was unused to hard work:** this touch of denigration is at best a half-truth, bearing in mind the Pompeian efforts during the siege at Dyrrachium. Caesar's army was certainly more hardened to perpetual movement: since the end of 50 B.C. many of his men had marched several thousand kilometres.

3 **the signal for departure had . . . been given:** at or before dawn.

4 **Caesar's speech:** These few sentences, along with those uttered by the centurion-hero Crastinus (91), and the formal address of encouragement delivered by Caesar in indirect speech (90.1), together perform the function of the longer oration which more literary historians, following the example of Thucydides, liked to put into the mouth of a general before an important battle. The purpose is the same: to increase the vividness of the narrative, to characterise the speaker, to present a point of view, and to underline the significance of the occasion. It is no accident that this is the only occasion in either *BC* or *BG* on which Caesar allows himself direct speech. (The usual set-piece speech has additional functions, such as analysis of motive, exposition of strategic and political factors, and display of the author's rhetorical virtuosity). See II.31-2, introductory n., on the dramatic use of direct speech by Caesar (add to the four references there given for Pharsalus a fifth, Labienus' speech in 86); and Miller 1975, on both direct and indirect speech.

86 2-4 **Pompey's speech:** this, with Labienus' response in the following chapter, corresponds in literary function to the utterances of Caesar and Crastinus commented on above (85.4). Unlike those, this pair are self-deceiving, relatively long-winded, and lack the sense of urgency and personal commitment so strikingly communicated on Caesar's side. The dramatic irony here is palpable, especially in Pompey's opening words and in Labienus' claims to reliable knowledge.

2 **'I know I am promising something almost incredible . . .':** Pompey's promise will indeed turn out to be incredible, and he and his council are thereby presented as men capable of an astonishing degree of self-delusion, victims of their own misplaced confidence. It may be doubted whether Pompey actually *said* these words, and Caesar may also have chosen to subtly misrepresent the plan itself. Here, Pompey says that the cavalry will attack *before* the legionary lines engage. In the battle, this order of events was reversed (93.3-4), as a moment's thought

will show it had to be, because to be effective the cavalry attack required Caesar's legionaries to be otherwise occupied. By misrepresenting the plan, Caesar draws a picture of his enemies as men unwilling to commit themselves to honest fight, even when they have (at last) decided to offer battle.

- 3 **I have convinced our cavalry of this:** surely another clever piece of misrepresentation: did Pompey really not *order* (as Caesar always does), but have to *persuade* his subordinates? And moreover in the context of a battle plan?
on its open flank: i.e. the right, the side not protected by the shield (cf. I.44.3). An alternative view is that Caesar's right was 'open', because unlike his left, which rested on the river, it was not protected by any natural feature.
- 4 **so strong in cavalry:** all the sources, including Caesar himself (84.4), speak of 7,000 Pompeian to 1,000 Caesarian cavalry.
- 5 **as they had often repeatedly asked:** Caesar does not explain Pompey's strategy in Greece, which he was here induced to abandon, but there is no reason to doubt Plutarch: "He was determined to avoid battle and planned instead to follow closely in Caesar's tracks, cutting his lines of communication and weakening him by depriving him of supplies" (*Pomp.* 67.1).
- 87 1 **having a low opinion of Caesar's forces:** Caesar's readers might remember that Curio too was introduced (II.23.1) as a man overconfidently looking down on (*despiciens*) his opponent's forces.
- 2 **I took part in all the battles:** this is manifest exaggeration. Labienus often operated quite separately from his commander in Gaul (for example, he was left behind when Caesar crossed to Britain in 54, and he had no part in the fighting at Gergovia in 52), and Caesar surely expected his readers to know this. The effect is to destroy the credibility of everything he goes on to say and emphasise the self-delusion of the Pompeian council, who believe it.
A very small fraction of that army remains: the factors mentioned by Labienus in support of this assertion are all real, but impossible to quantify. Caesar nominally had nine legions at Pharsalus (seven brought from Dyrrachium and two by Domitius) of which at most five were 'Gallic' (2.2n.)
disease in the autumn ... gone home ... left behind: these three points are repeated from 2.2-3.
- 3 **cohorts were put together ... from men who ... were sick:** this was true, see 101.5, but is misinterpreted by Labienus, who appears to think these cohorts were part of Caesar's force at Pharsalus.
- 4 **reconstituted from the levies of recent years in Cisalpine Gaul:** three of Caesar's Gallic legions, one of which he had returned to

Pompey at the end of 50, had been hastily recruited in Cisalpine Gaul at the beginning of 53 (*BG* 6.1, 8.54), and there was another levy in the province a year later (*BG* 7.1.1). See Brunt 1971, 467-8.

Transpadane settlers: other editors prefer the reading of V, *coloniis* ('colonies') to that of all the other primary MSS, *colonis*, (which covers a spectrum of meanings from 'tillers of the soil, tenant-farmers' to 'settlers' to 'citizens of a colony'), but for no very compelling reason. The situation in the Transpadana (Cisalpine Gaul between the Po and the Alps) was a little complicated. Before the Social War there were only three, possibly four, places in the region which could call themselves colonies: one Roman, namely Eporedia, founded c. 100 B.C., and two or three Latin, namely Cremona, 218 B.C., Aquileia, 181 B.C., and perhaps Comum, 89(?) B.C. (see Brunt 1971, 166-72, 198-203). As a result of the Social War, these Latin colonies gained the Roman citizenship, but also lost their designations as *coloniae* to become simply Roman *municipia*; however, the formerly non-Latin towns such as Verona, Patavium, Brixia, and Mantua appear to have acquired not only the rights of a Latin colony (most importantly the chance for members of their élites to acquire Roman citizenship through holding a local magistracy), but also the title (Ascon. *in Pison.* 3C; *Panegy.* 12.8.1). So whether we take account of the people (*coloni*) or the legal bodies (*coloniae*), it is clear that Labienus is accusing Caesar (probably rightly, see preceding note) of having recruited from Latins - who were technically ineligible for the legions. But Caesar could expect his readers to know two things: first, that these despised recruits had been good enough in the event to defeat Labienus and his friends; and second, that by a law of March 48 B.C., which made the Transpadanes full Roman citizens, Caesar had retrospectively justified his willingness to recruit them to fight for Rome. Labienus' contempt for the Transpadanes is thus revealed as not only polemical but also ill-judged, like the rest of what he says.

- 5 **he swore not to return to camp:** it cannot be an accident that Caesar twice casts Labienus, notorious for his desertion of Caesar (see Tyrrell) and therefore for his tainted honour, as the initiator of an enemy oath (cf. 13.3). Labienus' other exploits are much less creditable, see 19.8, 71.4.
- 7 **a general of such experience:** it seems to be Labienus, not Pompey, who is the target of Caesar's irony.

88-94 *The battle itself now follows, given very full treatment, and enlivened with dramatic speech (91, 94) and psychological reflection (92.3-5). It is clearly described, with battle dispositions and names of commanders given on both sides, although there is little detail apart from that necessary for understanding the course of events. Nor is*

mention made of the actions of any individual apart from those of the re-enlisted veteran Crastinus (91). Pompey's strategy (explained at 83.3 above) was to hold back from infantry engagement while his massed cavalry turned Caesar's right wing, but they failed to press home their attack and were routed. This allowed the extra troops, whom Caesar had stationed there to resist them, to outflank Pompey's left. At this point Caesar ordered his third line, which he had been holding in reserve, to join the fray. Pompey's army was routed, and Pompey himself withdrew to his camp.

The principal surviving ancient accounts of the battle, other than Caesar's own, are (in chronological order) those of Lucan, Book 10 (preserving the occasional apparently accurate fact embedded in the exaggeration and fantasy); Frontinus, *Strategemata* 2.3.22 (brief and sober); Plutarch, Pompey 68-72 and Caesar 44-46 (using at least Pollio's eyewitness account as well as that of Caesar); Appian, BC 2.68-82 (very full but unreliable); Dio 41.53-60 (worthless); and Eutropius, 6.20-21, and Orosius, 6.15.22-27 (brief, but based on Livy's lost account; the *Epitome* itself (111) is uninformative).

88 *Pompey's order of battle.* The other sources we have mostly derive from what follows, with a greater or lesser degree of distortion. Frontinus (*Strat.* 2.3.22) says that Pompey drew up his lines ten deep (instead of the usual six), and stationed 600 of his cavalry on his right wing, which rested on the Enipeus. Livy's *Epitome* itself has no information, but the Livian tradition is represented by Orosius and Eutropius, who agree that Pompey stationed a few hundred cavalry on his right wing, but shrink the 6,000 or so there must have been on his left wing by a factor of ten (for the other figures given by these writers see below, §4).

2 *the two legions handed over by Caesar . . .* : I.2.3n. These were battle-hardened, but possibly unreliable in view of their previous service with Caesar (Cic. *Att.* 7.20.1). The one now called III (or possibly IV, Lucan 7.219) had been numbered XV in Caesar's army (Hirt. *BG* 8.54.3). Command of this wing is given by Lucan (7.217) to Lentulus, but by Appian (BC 2.76) and Plutarch (*Pomp.* 69) to Domitius.

This was where Pompey placed himself: No doubt in overall command, not as commander of that wing. Plutarch says he was on the right, but Caesar is unlikely to have been mistaken.

3 *legions from Syria:* two (4.3). These had seen battle against the Parthians.

the Cilician legion: 4.1n. This wing was commanded according to Lucan by Domitius, according to Appian by Lentulus, and according to Plutarch by Pompey!

the Spanish cohorts, which Afranius, as we said . . . : 'we' do not in fact say this at any point in the preserved text, but the most likely place for the missing information is in the lacuna between 50 and 51. Plutarch says, in the context of the present campaign in Thessaly, that Afranius had 'recently' arrived from Spain (*Caes.* 41.2). Also, these

Spanish cohorts are omitted from the tally of Pompey's forces in 4, which suggests that they were not available to him until after the start of the campaign of 48. As to their number, that tally lists eleven legions, i.e. 110 cohorts; but by now Pompey had (if Caesar is right) 117 cohorts here at Pharsalus, plus a further 15 left behind with Cato to garrison Dyrrachium (Plut. *Cato min.* 55.1). Some, but surely not all, of the Dyrrachium garrison may have been local troops (cf. 11.3, Parthini garrisoning Oricum - though this particular people were by now unreliable, Dio 42.10.1). We can therefore deduce that Afranius brought with him a minimum of seven and a maximum of twenty-two cohorts. Since Caesar describes them in the next sentence as being Pompey's most reliable troops, Afranius must have recruited them from veterans of the army which had been disbanded after the Ilerda campaign the previous year (cf. I.85.12, 86.3).

4 *45,000 men, plus about two thousand re-enlisted veterans:* was Caesar really outnumbered by more than two to one, 47,000 to 22,000? There seems no good reason to doubt the figures he gives for his own strength, which are confirmed, or not seriously contradicted, by the other sources (App. *BC* 2.70; Plut. *Caes.* 42.2, *Pomp.* 69.5; Eutropius 6.20; Orosius 6.15.23-24), and are consistent with the losses he had suffered in the war so far. As to Pompey's strength, Appian and Plutarch again concur almost exactly with Caesar, and Dio (41.55.4) more loosely speaks of Pompey's 'great superiority in numbers'. Eutropius and Orosius, whose versions stem from Livy, give Pompey 40,000 foot (a figure which is not so far out and could perhaps legitimately be read as the nearest round number). Orosius indeed speaks of 88 instead of 110 cohorts, but it is impossible to show that this number goes back to a good source such as Pollio (see 99.4n.) and is not just as likely to be derived from some later calculation which took a cohort to comprise 500 men (88 x 500 = 44,000). Rice Holmes, concluding his very full discussion of the question (472-476), points out that the accuracy of Caesar's estimate of the size of Pompey's army depends on the reliability of the information on which it was based (perhaps captured documents, perhaps prisoners' reports). It is nonetheless unlikely (and it is certainly not demonstrable) that Caesar's figures are seriously wrong. They are consistent both with his enumeration of Pompey's forces at 4.1-3, together with their later accretions (see preceding note), and with the fact that far fewer inroads had been made into his enemy's military strength by disease, battle casualties, starvation, and hardship. But it does remain a little odd, in view of the credit he and particularly his soldiers could derive from it, that he makes no allusion whatsoever (except in the case of the cavalry) to Pompey's great numerical superiority.

- 5 **men of his personal entourage:** *beneficarii* were soldiers granted the favour (*beneficium*) of exemption from camp fatigues in order to take on special duties of a more personal nature for their commander, such as staffing headquarters, gathering intelligence, and serving as his bodyguard.
- 6 **A river with difficult banks:** Lucan (7.224) and Frontinus (*Strategemata* 2.3.22) identify the river as the Enipeus, and this is surely confirmed by the detail of the 'difficult banks'. In the region west (downstream) of the town of Pharsalus the banks of the Enipeus become progressively more of an obstacle (Rice Holmes 453, quoting a private communication from Lucas - though the latter's publication (at p.39) is less emphatic; photograph, Morgan pl.11 fig.9). Commentators have felt a difficulty in allowing Caesar to call the Enipeus a *rivus* and the much less considerable stream of 97.4 (the modern Kapakli on the theory adopted here) a *flumen*, but Pelling (1973, 256) has shown that *flumen* is used when stress is laid on *flowing water*, and *rivus* when the idea of the river as a *natural barrier* is uppermost in the writer's mind. In the present case, *rivus* is clearly more appropriate.
- 89 1 **Ninth ... terribly weakened ... at Dyrrachium:** 45-46, 62.4-65, 67.3.
- 2 **80 cohorts ... 22,000 men:** at full strength, 80 cohorts would have numbered slightly more than 40,000 men, but even at the beginning of the campaign Caesar's legions were not up to complement (2.2n.).
- seven cohorts to guard the camp:** the manuscripts say two cohorts, but the figure is far too low for a camp containing nine nominal legions. Usually one cohort per legion was left on guard duty. The corrected figure of seven is arrived at by deducting from Caesar's total force, after Antony's arrival, of 11 legions (110 cohorts) the 80 cohorts that went out to do battle, the 15 cohorts in southern Greece under the command of Q. Calenus (34.2-3. 56.2-4), and the 8 cohorts left to garrison Apollonia, Oricum, and Lissus (78.4).
- 3 **Publius Sulla:** 51.1n.
- 4 **individual cohorts:** these (six, according to Plutarch, *Pomp.* 69.2, and Frontinus, *Strat.* 2.3.22; cf. also 93.5n.) must have been drawn up in a line approximately at right angles to the three main battle lines and extending to the rear of the right wing. Rice Holmes, 469, argued that there must have been *eight* cohorts in the fourth line, since (a) Plutarch's statement that this line contained 3,000 men is not compatible with a strength of six cohorts when these averaged only 275 men each, and (b) Caesar's *singulas* implies that he took one cohort from each legion. But as to (a), $8 \times 275 = 2,200$, still a long way short of 3,000, and as to (b), even accepting the alleged implication of *singulas*, Caesar had nine legions (44.5n., 89.2n.), not eight as Rice Holmes states, even if the

Eighth and Ninth on this occasion amounted to virtually (*paene*) a single unit.

- 90 1 **initiatives ... through Vatinius ... Aulus Clodius ... Libo:** 19.2-7, 57, 16-17 respectively. This raking up of abortive negotiations does not sound like the stuff to fire up Caesar's soldiers, outnumbered two to one, and one may doubt whether on the day the theme had quite the prominence Caesar gives it here.
- 3 **the soldiers ... burning with eagerness to fight:** it is the mark of a good commander that he can both arouse and control this emotion in his men, cf. 74.2, 92.5, *BG* 1.41.1, 7.45.8. The contrast with Pompey in this respect is explicitly dwelt on in 92.
- 91 1 **Crastinus:** called Crassin(i)us or Crassianus by the Greek authors, but the MSS of Lucan confirm Crastinus (7.471). On the post of *primipilus* held by him previously, see 53.5n., and on the formal function of his speech in the battle narrative, 85.4n. [His *praenomen* was Gaius (Plut. *Pomp.* 71.1, *Caes.* 44.5), and it is possible, as Meusel thought, that 'C.' has dropped out of the text before 'Crastinus'; but see 67.5n.]
- 2 **he will regain his position and we our freedom:** Caesar had made his 'position' (*dignitas*) along with the infringement of the rights of the tribunes, who in theory protected the 'freedom' (*libertas*) of the Roman people, his whole *casus belli* (1.7). That Crastinus really uttered such extraordinarily apposite words may be doubted, but the author's ring-composition can hardly be faulted: on the very brink of the climactic battle, the notions which set the whole struggle in motion, three books back, reappear.
- 3 **'whether I live or die':** although Crastinus stops short of saying he *intends* to die, there are echoes here of the action (*devotio*) of two earlier heroes of the Republic. These were the Decii, father and son, who each as consul (in 340 and 295 respectively) in a critical battle vowed himself to the gods of the underworld and then plunged suicidally and fanatically into the midst of the enemy - thus sacrificing himself and so securing victory for the Romans (Livy 8.9-10, 10.28). We do not learn any more about Crastinus, except that he did (of course) die and was honoured by Caesar (99.2-3, App. *BC* 2.82).
- 120 picked volunteers:** the fact that Crastinus was followed by 120 volunteers indicates that his act of bravery was planned. I follow the view of Fröhlich (see Rice Holmes 470) who believes that *electi*, here translated as 'picked', means 'of choice quality'. *Manipulares* is evidently common parlance for the soldiers in the unit of a particular centurion (cf. *BG* 7.47.7, 50.4.), the term having survived the abolition in the second century B.C. of the old maniple (a fighting unit double the size of the century).

- 92 2 **on the advice of Gaius Triarius:** for Triarius, see 5.3n. The reported reasons for his advice are inadequate, as they would apply to most battles. The factors not mentioned by Caesar are presumably that Pompey's men, in spite of what is said in 85.1-3, still had a slight advantage of the slope (otherwise why did not all armies attempt to allow the other side to exhaust themselves in the charge?) and that his own numerical inferiority meant that his line was more liable to become stretched and lose formation. One might think that on both counts the better plan for the Pompeians would have been to charge.
- 3 **throwing spears:** I so translate *pila*, often rendered 'javelins'. The *pilum*, of which each legionary carried two for hurling before the lines met, was a light spear with a special head, of which the neck was designed to bend or break off on impact so that it could not be picked up and thrown back.
- 5 **This quality generals ought not to repress:** in this reflection on the psychology of battle, Caesar depicts himself (probably truthfully) as a better manager of men than his opponent (cf. 74.2n.). It is striking that he makes no comment anywhere (except when speaking of the cavalry) on his vast inferiority in numbers (88.4n.), which to judge from his own account seems not to have affected his tactics.
- 93 3 **archers:** including slingers, see §7 below.
- 4 **our cavalry:** clearly these were on Caesar's right, though he has not mentioned them previously.
- open side:** 86.3n.
- 5 **the fourth line which he had formed by detachment from the total number of his cohorts:** Orsini emended the text here to produce the six cohorts of Plutarch and Frontinus (89.4n.), but though tempting the correction is unnecessary. The MSS readings (which differ amongst themselves, but mean the same) make a perfectly valid point, namely that Caesar had formed this fourth line not (as might have been expected) from auxiliaries of some description, but from units that would normally have been used in the regular three battle lines.
- 6 **with colours flying:** literally 'with standards threatening attack', a phrase often used in Roman battle descriptions and presumably referring to a particular position of the unit's standard, adopted when an attack was being launched.
- some very high hills:** forming part of the ridge which bounded the northern edge of the battlefield. See Map 3.
- 94 1 **Caesar gave orders to his third line . . . :** see 89.5.
- 3-4 **And indeed it did not escape Caesar . . . :** it is very unlike Caesar to interpose a reflection of this sort in the middle of the action, and also uncharacteristic of him to draw attention so unsubtly and so

rhetorically (*ab his . . . ab isdem . . . ab isdem*) to his own foresight and grasp of the situation (contrast his treatment in 92.4-5). On the other hand this is not the stuff of which interpolations are made, and the passage certainly *could* have been written by Caesar though it sits uncomfortably in its present place. It might even be a quotation from another account, such as Pollio's or Livy's, copied into the margin of the archetype, or a more distant ancestor still, of our MSS. With some misgiving, I print it.

- 5 **Pompey's speech :** with this further fragment of direct speech Caesar keeps up the drama of his account, and also characterises Pompey as devious, a man who says one thing and does another - just as on the larger scale he claimed to be defending the Republic but did not behave as though he believed in it.

95-99 *Caesar takes Pompey's camp and immediately pursues the half of his army that was still in some sort of fighting shape and was attempting to retreat along a ridge of high ground towards Larisa. That night, he cuts them off from water and they surrender the next morning. The detail of this section concerns the luxury of Pompey's camp, which was found all decked out for victory celebrations, the speed and nature of Pompey's flight, and the casualties sustained by the two sides.*

- 95 1 **the gift offered by fortune:** cf. 73, introductory n., final para.
- 2 **the intense heat:** 9 August, the official date of the battle, corresponds to a true (Julian) date of 7 June, but the inland plains of Greece can get extremely hot under the summer sun, even relatively early in the season.
- 5 **some very high hills which adjoined the camp:** the same phrase is used to define the cavalry's flight, but one cannot be certain that both groups in fact occupied the same heights: the ridge is long, and has several peaks.
- under the leadership of their centurions and military tribunes:** that is, they had been abandoned by their higher commanders - or so Caesar wishes us to understand. However, Domitius at least was with them (99.5).
- 96 1 **artificial bowers . . . turf . . . ivy:** these were in preparation for the banquets that were to follow the expected Pompeian victory; Plutarch (*Pomp.* 72.4) mentions dining-couches, boughs of myrtle (probably Caesar's 'bowers'), flowers, and bowls of wine. Ivy was the plant of Bacchus, god of wine, who would doubtless have been much in evidence, and *al fresco* coolness and greenness were naturally prized as surroundings for such a celebration in the heat of a Mediterranean summer.

- 3 **his general's insignia:** most notably his *paludamentum*, a distinctive cloak of purple colour; he probably also had a highly worked helmet and shield.
made for Larisa: about 30 km. Note the recurrence in this sentence and the next of words expressing frantic haste, which make Pompey's headlong exit from Greece and from the immediate narrative not only suitably dramatic but also psychologically effective.
- 4 **a few of his associates:** according to Plutarch (*Pomp.* 73.6) these included Favonius and the two Lentuli (Spinther and Crus). Plutarch has a much fuller account of Pompey's flight, including the detail that on emerging from the vale of Tempe he first took a river boat along the coast before sighting the merchantman, the captain of which (one Peticius) knew him.
- 97 1-2 **Caesar pressed the soldiers not to become occupied in looting ... obtained their agreement:** plundering an enemy camp was one of the few bonuses ill-paid and hard-working legionaries could expect, particularly in a civil war. The soldiers, remarkably represented as being persuaded rather than (as normal) given orders by their commander, are thereby shown as rational agents who had the ability to give up immediate profit for long-term advantage. One can only guess what the relation of this idealised picture may be to what actually happened when Caesar insisted on pursuing the Pompeians.
- 2 **this hill had no water:** the implication of the Latin is that other hills in the area did have water, a state of affairs that obtains along the high ground north of the Enipeus. Cf. 84.2n.
along the adjoining ridge towards Larisa: not directly towards Larisa, for the town lies due north and the run of the ridge is north-westerly; but the route was as direct as was possible under the circumstances. [The plural *iugis* need only denote a single undulating ridge, cf. I.70.4, where my translation is in error in rendering as 'ridges' what is in fact only a single ridge (cf. Morgan 26)].
- 3 **a less difficult route ... six miles:** presumably Caesar kept to the lower ground to the north of the ridge. The fact that he mentions no river crossing, either by the Pompeians or himself, would appear to be fatal to theories which follow Appian and place the battle south of the Enipeus.
- 4 **a river:** the indications suit the Kapakli, which flows at the foot of hills in the area between the modern villages of Aghios Georgios and Doxaras, and is the right distance from the heights near Pompey's camp where his army first took refuge; Morgan 43 prefers a stream near Soulets.
- 5 **a few men of senatorial rank:** presumably more senior men than the military tribunes mentioned at 95.5. Caesar's picture of the men of his

own class who opposed him continues to be relentlessly negative. Pollio (*ap. Suet. Div. Iul.* 30.4) reported that he said, as he surveyed the Pompeian dead on the battlefield of Pharsalus, *Hoc voluerunt* ('they wanted this'), and went on: *tantis rebus gestis Gaius Caesar condemnatus essem, nisi ab exercitu auxilium petissem* ('I, Gaius Caesar, with all my splendid achievements, would have been condemned in the courts if I had not turned to my army for help'). It is hard to believe, though, that all the senators who had opted to support Pompey were as quarrelsome, selfish, incompetent, vindictive, and pusillanimous as he represents them.

- 98 2 **with hands outstretched:** literally 'with palms outstretched'; the palms of the outstretched hands were turned upwards or outwards in a gesture which signified worship or supplication (cf. *Lucr.* 5.1200, *nec procumbere humi prostratum et pandere palmas / ante deum delubra* 'Nor to fall prostrate on the ground and spread the hands / Before the altars of the gods').
- granted all of them their lives:** soldiers *en masse* had little to fear, provided they survived, from being on the losing side in a civil war, since their goodwill could be valuable to the victor and they might become recruits for his army (as these did, 107.1, *Dio* 41.62.1) or his supporters in civil life. Executing them was out of the question, enslavement was not a fate visited by one Roman upon another, and simply turning them loose as destitutes invited them to become brigands or join other surviving leaders of disaffection. As to his treatment of upper-class prisoners (senators and *equites*), Caesar himself says nothing, but we can gather his policy from other sources. He was still prepared to pardon those who, although they had chosen to support Pompey in the conflict, had fought against him for the first time; but his patience had run out with people such as Domitius (released at Corfinium) or Afranius (released at Ilerda), whom he considered to have abused his trust (*Dio* 41.62.2-4). Suetonius (*Div. Iul.* 75.2-3) confirms Dio's statement that Caesar permitted each of his friends (*nemini non suorum*) to ask for the lives of one of the other side, and adds that the only opponents whom he put to death other than in battle were Afranius, Faustus Sulla (I.6.3n.), and young Lucius Caesar (I.8.2n.), who all three met their ends after the Pompeian defeat at Thapsus in 46 B.C. - though other sources (App. *BC* 2.100; *Plut. Caes.* 53.3; [Caesar] *Bell. Afr.* 85.9, 95; *Dio* 43.12.2) disagree as to the extent both of Caesar's vindictiveness in general and of his responsibility for these particular deaths. Caesar's 'mildness' (*lenitas*), which as *clementia* was to become one of the canonical imperial virtues (*Res Gestae* 34.2), was a policy adopted for the civil war (contrast 11.4, 27.2, the present passage, and his letter to Oppius [*Cic. Att.* 9.7C] with 8.3, 14.3, 28.4

and 71.4) and not a trait of character, if one may judge from the wholesale slaughter he carried out in Gaul (Will, 96-98). See also Rambaud 1966, 283-293, and I.23.3n.

- 3 **reached Larisa on the same day:** Larisa lies about 20 km. away, over easy ground, from the hill where the surrender took place, and between 30 and 35 km. from Caesar's camp. The latter distance is already near the limit for a day's march after a delayed start. 'South-bank' theories of the battle substantially increase these distances and ask an amazing speed of movement from Caesar and his weary men.

- 99 1 **two hundred soldiers . . . thirty centurions:** Caesar seems to distinguish between ordinary legionaries (*militi*es) and centurions, so that his total losses were 230, and this is how Appian (*BC* 2.82) understood him. The latter reproduces Caesar's figures, but also reports that some authorities put his losses at 1200. The proportion of centurions killed is very high, particularly as Caesar won; contrast I.46.4-5, 5 centurions killed to 270 legionaries on the two sides in a long and hard-fought drawn engagement, and even in the disaster at Gergovia (*BG* 7.51) the proportions, at 46 to 700, are still a long way from those of Pharsalus. This may suggest that Appian's larger figure is more likely to be correct.

- 2 **Crastinus:** 91.

- 3 **For this was Caesar's opinion, that Crastinus' courage . . . :** a strange *non-sequitur*. Beginning as it does *sic enim*, it ought to explain the statement which immediately precedes it, namely Caesar's assertion that Crastinus' prediction (that Caesar would be grateful to him) proved correct. But this it conspicuously fails to do: there is no word here of gratitude, whether in word or deed, on Caesar's part. A sentence or more must be missing. If the gap contained a mention of Crastinus' separate burial with special honours (attested by Appian *BC* 2.82 *fin.*), that would satisfactorily supply the necessary connection of thought.

- 4 **about 15,000 appeared to have fallen** ancient casualty figures are notoriously unreliable, since they generally emanated from the victors, who had a vested interest in exaggerating them on the one side and minimising them on the other. In the present case Caesar's estimate must be modified by testimony from a good source, his own officer Asinius Pollio (*ap. App. BC* 2.82, *Plut. Caes.* 46.2), who said that the majority of the dead were slaves killed when the Pompeian camp was taken, and put the number of Pompeian soldiers killed in combat at only 6,000, which seems a rather more plausible number. Brunt (1971, 696), in the course of a discussion of casualty figures in general, prefers Pollio to Caesar. There is clearly a discrepancy between the 47,000 men Pompey is said to have formed up for battle and the sum given by adding the 24,000 who surrendered to the 6,000 (or even 15,000) who

were killed. But Caesar accounts neither for wounded, many of whom cannot have made any formal surrender, nor for fugitives, of whom some reached Cato at Dyrrachium (*Dio* 42.10.2); and others, perhaps a very large number, will have melted back into civilian life. It is conceivable that Caesar overstated the strength of Pompey's army, an obvious propaganda ploy, but see 88.4n.

180 military standards and nine eagles: thus only two (or perhaps only one, if the fifteen cohorts still at Dyrrachium had a legion as their core, v. 88.3n.) of Pompey's legionary standards remained uncaptured. The large number of other standards is explained by the fact that each century had one (a silver-plated pole bearing ornamented discs attached to its upper part and surmounted by a flag flying from a horizontal crossbar; good examples can be seen on the reliefs of Trajan's column; and see Webster, 133-137).

- 5 **Lucius Domitius (Ahenobarbus):** according to Cicero (*Phil.* 2.71) it was Antony who killed Caesar's great enemy.

100-112 The consequences of Pharsalus, the death of Pompey, and the beginning of the Alexandrian War

100-102 *The Pompeian admirals D. Laelius, blockading Brundisium, and C. Cassius, harrying Caesar's navy around the toe of Italy, are forced, in spite of successes, to withdraw when they hear the news of Pharsalus.*

- 100 1 **Decimus Laelius:** Laelius originally held the command, with C. Triarius (5.3), of the fleet which Cassius now led. He had subsequently been put in charge of an attempt to blockade Oricum by land (40.5).

Libo: 23.

- 2 **Likewise:** that is, Vatinius responded by using the same trick as Antony (24).

- 3 **by the disgrace of losing the ships or by any shortage . . . :** these are the reasons, according to Caesar, for Libo's withdrawal on the previous occasion.

- 101 1 **Cilician:** this contingent, not mentioned separately at 5.3, will have formed part of the Asiatic fleet originally commanded by Laelius and Triarius.

- 2 **with an upper deck:** I.56.1n.

- 4 **our ships, about 40 in number:** the MSS place the words 'about 40 in number' after 'cargo vessels', but the number is grotesque for fireships and cannot be right. The parallel with the account of the preceding

attack on Messana suggests that these words, which give a figure which is roughly correct for half Caesar's fleet, ought (if they are not simply to be deleted as an annotation which has crept into the text) to be attached rather to Caesar's ships, and I therefore accept Dinter's transposition. (This is not the only damage suffered by the text of this sentence, see *app. crit.*).

5 **sick who had been left behind:** 2.3, 87.3.

6 **quinqueremes . . . triremes:** quinqueres appear to have been the standard 'ships of the line' of the period. They were propelled by two banks of oars, of which the upper was rowed by three men per oar, the lower by two (hence the name, a 'five', from the number of men per vertical rowing unit). Quadriremes ('fours') were also common (cf. 24.2, 111.3), being similar but smaller, with only two men on the upper oar. Larger versions existed, with more men per oar - e.g. Antony's flagship at the battle of Actium was a 'ten', but there is no reason to believe that any of them had more than two banks of oars. Triremes of the classical type, though smaller, undeniably had three banks of oars, with one man per oar (Morrison and Williams), but it is possible that by this time the word may have been used in some navies of a double-banked ship with one man on each lower oar and two on each upper. (On the ships of the period see Casson 1959, 143-150).

102-104 Pompey sails to Amphipolis and then by way of Lesbos to Cilicia and Cyprus. Realising that his support in these districts is evaporating, he decides to go to Egypt and ask for the help of the young king Ptolemy XIII, whose father was greatly in his debt. But Ptolemy's advisers judge that Pompey is too dangerous to receive, and murder him as he comes ashore. Caesar's account is neither dramatic nor sympathetic, nor yet is it exultant or vindictive; Pompey's character has already been sufficiently illuminated, and his end is little more than a postscript to the battle. A more practical consideration is that when Caesar wrote this, Pompey's friends (notably Cato and Scipio) were far from crushed and the outcome of the civil war was by no means settled. So any acknowledgement, however dispassionate, of Pompey's greatness on Caesar's part would have been politically unwise.

102 1 **again being able to gather other forces:** the army Pompey had lost at Pharsalus was already a somewhat makeshift substitute for his original, seasoned, force of legions which had surrendered the previous year in Spain.

2 **Amphipolis:** the chief town of eastern Macedonia, lying at the mouth of the river Strymon, some 80 km. east of Thessalonica.
whether Greeks or Roman citizens: it was a sign of desperation to recruit other than Roman citizens.

4 **contacts:** *hospites* were simply people one knew, however distantly, as in theory social equals, on the basis that it was possible for either side to perform personal services or favours for the other. The original and most fundamental of these services was of course that of offering hospitality. In the unequal world of the Roman grandee, a man such as Pompey could claim *hospites* wherever he went and to translate the term by 'friends' is misleading (unless the inverted commas are kept).

Mytilene: the chief town of the island of Lesbos. Here Pompey picked up some friends and his wife Cornelia (Plut. *Pomp.* 75-76.1), a detail which Caesar, in keeping with his consistently unsympathetic presentation of his adversary, even at the nadir of his fortunes, does not see fit to mention.

5 **Cilicia:** according to Plutarch, Pompey first put in at Attaleia in Pamphylia, and then sailed to some of the Cilician cities (i.e. further along the coast to the east) in search of money and men (*Pomp.* 76.1).

6 **the Romans who were in business there:** because of the contacts of such people (who were often Roman *equites* or their associates) with the Roman governing élite, they were, although not citizens, very important members of any non-Roman community in which they happened to be resident. They usually possessed their own formal 'expatriate' association, cf. II.19.3n. Antioch on the Orontes, in northern Syria, was one of the most important cities of the region and its decision to exclude Pompey was very significant, particularly since Pompey, as creator of the province of Syria in 64 B.C., had a special claim to the loyalty of its inhabitants.

7 **Publius Lentulus:** i.e. Spinther, who had been consul in 57 B.C.

103 1 **his plan of going to Syria:** if Caesar is right, this will have been Pompey's initial plan, formed before it became apparent that he could no longer count on general support in this area. According to Plutarch (*Pomp.* 76.4-6), after it was agreed among Pompey's followers that no Roman province was safe for them, Pompey himself was at first in favour of seeking refuge with the Parthian king, but was persuaded by Theophanes (18.3n.) that Egypt was a better bet.

tax companies: 3.2n.

Pelusium: at the mouth of the most eastern branch of the Nile delta.

2 **the boy King Ptolemy . . . Cleopatra:** the father of these two was Ptolemy XII Auletes ('the oboist'), officially Ptolemaios Theos Philopator Philadelphos Neos Dionysos, who had died in 51 B.C.. As his claim to the throne was contentious and Rome was showing an interest in annexation, in 59 B.C. he had paid 6,000 talents (equivalent to 36 million denarii, probably half or more of the annual revenue of his kingdom) to have Caesar, as consul, secure his recognition by Rome. Expelled or encouraged to leave (the matter is obscure) by his

Alexandrian subjects in the autumn of the following year, he had gone to Rome and bought the support of Pompey for his restoration, which was eventually carried out in 55 B.C. by Pompey's associate Gabinius, in his capacity as proconsul of Syria, for a further 10,000 talents. Caesar also appears to have had a tangential involvement in the latter affair, since he underwrote loans made by C. Rabirius Postumus and others to Auletes (Cic. *Rab. Post.* 41f.) to enable him to pay this exorbitant sum. Pompey and Caesar were thus, between them, responsible for the fact that it was Auletes' children who were now contending for the throne. On Auletes' death, the kingdom had passed to his elder son (Ptolemy XIII), the 'boy' of the present passage, who was born in 61, and his sister-wife Cleopatra (VII, the famous one), who was eight or nine years older. The true combatants in the present dispute were not so much the young principals (especially the thirteen-year-old king) as the court factions ('relatives and friends' in Caesar's terminology) which manipulated them. Cleopatra had fled to Syria and was attempting to return by land, hence the presence of Ptolemy at the eastern gateway to his country. See Sullivan 229-258, Fraser 1.124-126.

- 3 **ties of friendship and hospitality with the king's father:** Auletes had spent some time in Rome as Pompey's guest at his Alban villa, which he had been allowed to use as a base from which to raise the loan he needed to buy his restoration (Cic. *Rab. Post.* 6). It was even alleged that Pompey abetted the massacre, which the king organised, of most of an Alexandrian delegation on its way to put its case to the senate, and there is little doubt that he protected him from the consequences of the subsequent murder of the leader of the delegation, the philosopher Dio, who had survived (Dio 39.13-14, Strabo 17.1.11, 796C).

- 5 **soldiers who had served with Pompey:** Pompey had campaigned in Asia Minor, Syria, and Judaea, from 66 to 62 B.C., and some of his troops had been left behind to garrison the newly annexed province of Syria.

the war: i.e. the reimposition of Auletes on his unwilling subjects, cf. 4.4n.

- 104 1 **the king's friends:** these were led by Achilles, mentioned below, the royal guardian and regent Pothinus, and the king's tutor Theodotus of Chios, a Greek intellectual of the type of Pompey's adviser Theophanes of Mitylene (18.3n.). According to Plutarch, it was Theodotus' analysis of the situation which was decisive: if they received Pompey, he would become their master and Caesar their enemy; if they rejected him, he would be offended, and so would Caesar, because he would be forced to go on pursuing Pompey; therefore the only safe course was to kill Pompey and earn Caesar's gratitude (Plut. *Pomp.* 77.2-4).

- 2 **Achillas, one of the king's officers:** although *praefectus regius* can mean the commander of the royal army (cf. e.g. Livy 31.46.8), Achilles had not yet been appointed to the post (108.2). It is of course possible that Caesar is anticipating that appointment, or that Achilles was acting as commander of the king's forces at Pelusium. Dio (42.4.1) calls him *stratiarchos*, 'army commander'.

Lucius Septimius, a military tribune: evidently some of the Roman troops were with Ptolemy's army. Since military tribunes ranked immediately below a legionary commander, Septimius may well have been the most senior Roman officer present.

- 3 **the war against the pirates:** 67-66 B.C. Septimius had subsequently stayed on in Syria and been one of those who were left behind by Gabinius in Alexandria in 55 (Dio 42.3.3). He is one of the few clear examples of the 'professional officer' in the armies of the late Republic (for this phenomenon, see Gabba 1976, Smith 1958 ch. 4; on his unusual promotion, Suolahti 104, 123).

their little boat: the double diminutive (*naviculam parvulam*) is striking, perhaps a concession by Caesar to the pathos of his rival's death, underlining its indignity.

with a few of his party: four in all: two centurions, an ex-slave called Philip, and a slave called Scythes (Plut. *Pomp.* 78.4).

there he was killed by Achilles and Septimius: Plutarch, who gives two whole chapters to the final moments of Pompey's life, disposed of by Caesar in four lines, says that there was a third assassin, a centurion by the name of Salvius (*Pomp.* 78.1, 79.3). The date was Sept. 28th (Vell. 2.53.3 with Plin. *NH* 37.13). Caesar's refusal to give a detailed account of the death of his opponent, or even a passing acknowledgement of his past greatness, contributes to a feeling his narrative has already evoked - that Pompey is a man whose flight is pointless, fate inevitable, and life now valueless. Something of the same feeling comes across, more surprisingly, from Cicero's curt little obituary notice (*Att.* 11.6.5). It is now of more concern to Caesar to emphasise a different feature of the story, namely the duplicity of the Egyptians; this is a characteristic which will soon have consequences for himself, and he actually gives fuller details than Plutarch of this aspect of the murder.

Lucius Lentulus [Crus]: the consul of the previous year, one of Pompey's most senior and most committed partisans. See 4.1, 102.7, I.1.1-6.

105-112 These chapters, after a preamble (105-106.3) devoted to matters connected with Caesar's brief stay in Asia while he awaited information about Pompey's movements, begin, but do not finish, the story of Caesar's eventful visit to Egypt. The

Alexandrian population resented his presence and his behaviour, and in spite of his efforts to reconcile the two warring rulers, the boy Ptolemy XIII and his sister Cleopatra VII, he fell foul of the intrigues of their agents and supporters and found himself at war, attacked and besieged in the palace quarter of Alexandria by the king's army. His account of the events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities is unclear and becomes intelligible (109.1n.) only in the light of information given by other authors - Lucan (Book 10), Plutarch (Caes. 48.3 - 49.2), and Dio (42.34ff.). In particular he says nothing at all about the clandestine but highly relevant arrival of Cleopatra in the palace (whether indeed delivered inside a tied-up bedding-sack, as Plutarch has it, or simply brought by boat); he places the summoning of Achilles and the army from Pelusium before the event which led to it, namely the direction being taken by his process of adjudication in the dispute between the consort-monarchs; he conceals the fact that Cleopatra's presence played a critical part in this change of attitude towards her brother; and he presents Achilles' murder of the ambassadors Dioscorides and Serapion in a way which makes it appear a senseless act of gratuitous barbarity. Whether this loss of clarity arises from an attempt to misrepresent the situation in his own favour, or from a lack of revision, or from impending loss of interest in going on with the story, we cannot tell, but it is certain that Lucan, Plutarch, and Dio had a superior account of these events available to them. The narrative breaks off without ceremony at the end of 112, after Caesar has repulsed the initial attack of Achilles' forces, burnt both his and his opponents' ships, and seized the strategically vital island of Pharos. We can be sure that no text has been lost, and that Caesar simply left off writing at this point, intending to continue, because the sequel, the Alexandrian War (by another hand, perhaps Aulus Hirtius, cf. BG 8.praef.2), joins smoothly on to the end of what we have.

105.1 When Caesar reached the province of Asia: Caesar came by land, at least from Amphipolis. As he was crossing the Hellespont with his force in a makeshift collection of small boats, he fell in with a fleet of ten warships under the fleeing Pompeian L. Cassius (otherwise unknown, and not to be confused with the Caesarian of 34.2), who could have destroyed him but chose to surrender (Suetonius *Div. Iul.* 63, Dio 42.6.2, garbled by Appian *BC* 2.88).

Titus Ampius (Balbus): this man had held a praetorship in 59 B.C., and been governor of Asia in the following year. He had recruited troops for Pompey around Capua in the early days of 49, but was then sent to Asia to serve as *legatus pro praetore*, the most senior assistant to the governor Fannius.

2 on two occasions: for the other, see 33.1-2.

3-6 Omens of victory. Caesar's well-known religious scepticism does not prevent him from producing proofs of divine favour. In justifying his actions he was perfectly ready to harness the willingness of his public to believe in signs and omens. At Rome, the reporting, recognition, and (where necessary) expiation of these was a part of the official activity of

the state, so much so that Livy will sometimes provide lists of prodigies for a particular year even when they have no particular dramatic purpose to serve in his narrative. Thus the presence of such material in Caesar's austere commentaries need cause no surprise. Further, where omens did have a reference to calamitous or striking events, they had naturally been exploited (and doubtless improved and even invented) for literary purposes by historians for a long time past. Here, Caesar, given the excuse by Roman official practice to take note of omens, turns them to literary advantage. Their message stands in sharp contrast to the all too mundane end of Pompey and closes the whole long struggle between the two men by firmly advertising the approval of heaven for the victor. Caesar now goes forward with the gods on his side.

3 Likewise . . . : some words providing a transition from the services which Caesar rendered the gods to the signs by which they signified their approval of him are required before this sentence (Klotz defends the integrity of the text, believing that Caesar himself was responsible for the *non-sequitur*).

sanctuary of Minerva . . . her statue: the fact that this prodigy occurred in Elis has some significance, because the western Peloponnese was territory still held by the Pompeians (106.1n). The Eleians claimed their statue was by Pheidias (Paus. 6.26.3), but Pliny (*NH* 35.54) ascribes it to Pheidias' pupil Kolotes. Pausanias, like Caesar, refers to the spot as a 'sacred place' (*hieron*), but Caesar's mention of the double doors (*valvae*) makes it certain that here *templum* means the building, 'temple' in our sense (note that most of the instances cited for this meaning in the *OLD* are ambiguous).

4 Ptolemais: left unidentified, at it was of no importance to Caesar or his readers which of the several cities of this name was the site of the miracle, though all of them were in 'Pompeian' territory; Ptolemais-Ake on the Phoenician coast, Ptolemais of Cyrene, and Ptolemais on the Pamphylian coast are the most likely candidates.

5 secret hidden parts of the sanctuary: this appears to be the sole example in Caesar of the neuter plural of an adjective followed by a genitive, a Greek construction borrowed by the Republican poets which spread into prose in the post-Ciceronian period (e.g. *extrema agri Romani*, 'the extremities of Roman territory', Livy 4.1.4).

6 a palm-tree: the palm-frond as a token of victory is well attested in the Greek world from the fourth century, and according to Livy (10.47.3) was introduced to Rome in that capacity in 293 B.C. In a similar vein, Suetonius reports that in 45 B.C., before the battle of Munda, Caesar ordered a palm-tree that had been discovered during the clearing of a wood to be preserved, and that Augustus transplanted and took great care of a palm that had sprang up in the joints of the paving

in front of his house (*Div. Aug.* 94.11, 92.1). Tralles was, like Pergamum, an important city of the province of Asia. It lay in the Maeander valley, inland from Ephesus.

- 106 1 **Caesar stayed a few days in the province of Asia:** Caesar exacted immediate contributions of money, but reformed the system of tax collection in favour of the provincials (the effect being to reduce their taxes by a third), and granted the people of Cnidos their freedom (*Plut. Caes.* 48.1, *Dio* 42.6.3). It is possible that a similar gift by him to Ilium, recorded by Strabo (13.1.27, C595), was made at this time, if indeed there is any historical basis for Lucan's tale of his visit to the site of Homer's Troy (9.961-999). The Greeks of Asia reacted by honouring Caesar as "god made manifest" in the fulsome manner of Hellenistic ruler-worship (*SIG* 760 = *Sherk* no. 79D, cf. *Raubitschek* 72-75), but mention of such matters would have been embarrassing in an account whose purpose was to portray him as a defender of the true Republic.

connections with the kingdom: 103.3n.

the other possibilities of the place: Egypt was rich in resources, independent, and capable of being easily defended.

Quintus Fufius in Achaia: 56.2-4. After Pharsalus, Fufius managed to drive the opposition, now headed by Cato and including Cassius and his fleet, from the Peloponnese; he had previously been unsuccessful in establishing control even north of the Isthmus, Athens and Megara holding out against him (*Dio* 42.13-14).

- 2 **These legions contained 3,200 men:** i.e. 1,600 men each (as against a nominal strength of 5,200 or 6,200); the legions which fought on his side at Pharsalus averaged only 2,750 men (89.2).

- 4 **At Alexandria:** Alexandria was the capital and principal port of Egypt. Unfortunately Caesar does not tell us whether he knew before he arrived that either Pompey or the king and his army had gone to the other side of the Nile delta. So we do not know whether his militarily uncontested occupation of Alexandria was a deliberate plan or a happy accident. The latter is perhaps more likely in view of his silence on the topic and the fact that he did not hear of Pompey's death until he reached Alexandria.

the soldiers the king had left: in view of their reaction to the sight of the consul's rods of office (the *fascēs*), these can only be Roman soldiers (103.5).

running to gather round him: it is quite unclear whether the action was friendly, and if not, how Caesar dealt with it. This is one of many ellipses in the Alexandrian narrative. These were troops who had been firmly attached to Pompey; but now that Pompey was dead, their loyalties might well be to a Roman consul rather than a dubiously secure Egyptian king.

- 5 **frequent disturbances:** it appears that the real reason for the disturbances was not the slight to the royal majesty, but Caesar's demand for money for the upkeep of his army - 10 million denarii according to *Plutarch* (*Caes.* 48.4, cf. *Dio* 42.34.1). This was still owed by the late king for his restoration (103.2n.), even though part of the debt had been remitted to his children on his death. The Alexandrian mob was notably unruly in the first century B.C. and often showed its dissatisfaction with individual members of the royal family (see *Fraser* 1.127-131).

- 107 1 **etesian winds:** these are the northerly winds which blow, often very strongly, in the summer months in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean. According to *Livy* (*Epit.* 112) Caesar reached Alexandria three days after Pompey's death, i.e. on October 2nd (cf. 104.3n.; pre-Julian September had 29 days). By the Julian calendar, this is the end of July, when these winds are at their most persistent. In an ancient sailing-ship it would have been impossible in a northerly gale to leave the harbour of Alexandria.

- 2 **the dispute between the rulers was a matter of concern . . . :** the Romans were not troubled by doubts about the propriety of interfering in what we would call the internal affairs of other states if they perceived an interest or an obligation, real or invented. Egypt was at this time a sovereign and independent kingdom. Yet the power of Rome had been so great for the past century and more that her wishes could not be ignored, and in 59, in Caesar's first consulship, it had been a decision of the Roman state, through its constitutional organs (see following n.), to confirm the claim of Ptolemy Auletes to the Egyptian throne. Admittedly, Rome had a more than usually direct interest in this case, since the doubt about Auletes' right to the throne arose from the uncertain status of the will of his predecessor, Ptolemy XI Alexander II, which purported to leave the kingdom to Rome. But the Romans had never attempted to take up their inheritance, and it is unclear to what extent the will was regarded as genuine. However, the parallel with Rome's part in the disputes over the throne of Numidia after the death of Micipsa, son of Masinissa who had been placed on the throne by Roman decision at the conclusion of the Second Punic War, and with their dealings with the kings of Asia Minor at the same period, shows that once the Romans had become involved in establishing the legitimacy of a dynasty, they regarded themselves as retaining a permanent interest in its subsequent fortunes. As for what may seem to us Caesar's breathtaking arrogance in wishing to summon the king and his sister-queen before him so that he could give judgment on their dispute, this reflects no more than the fact of overwhelming Roman power and the precedent of previous Roman behaviour, along with the

application to international relations of Roman principles of clientship - which regarded any heirs of Ptolemy Auletes as owing the same debt of obligation, and duty to conform with Rome's wishes, as Auletes himself (but see 108.5n.).

by law and by decree of the senate: the senate normally dealt with foreign affairs, in which the Roman people had little direct interest. Only when the matter was politically controversial, or had consequences such as the likelihood of war, did the approval of the popular assembly need to be obtained by means of a law. In the present case, the doubts surrounding Auletes' legitimacy and fitness to hold the throne, together with the well-justified suspicion that large sums of money had changed hands in consideration of his recognition (103.2n.), meant that it was politic for Caesar to adopt a belt-and-braces approach. The law declared Ptolemy to be an 'ally and friend of the Roman people'.

108.2 the same Achilles: 104.2.

4-6 *Ptolemy's will:* the transition to this topic is very abrupt, almost obscure, and the matters here explained have nothing to do with the plan of Pothinus. They relate solely to the legal case that was being argued before Caesar, as we learn at the beginning of 109.

4 **the older . . . and the one of his daughters who had precedence of age:** the two sons of Auletes were the present king, Ptolemy XIII Philopator Philadelphos and his brother, two years younger, who was soon to succeed to the throne as Ptolemy XIV Philopator. But why should Caesar, having described the elder son as *maior*, uncharacteristically go on to use a different and clumsier expression, which appears to have exactly the same significance, to designate the elder daughter? Repetition of a word, provided it be the *mot juste*, is not something he normally avoids. The explanation lies in the existence of a third daughter. The currently surviving pair (both illegitimate, Strabo 17.1.11) were Cleopatra and Arsinoe, but there had once been an elder, legitimate sister, Berenice. She had been installed by the Alexandrians as ruler in 57 when her father fled to Rome, but was put to death by him when he was restored by Gabinius two years later (Dio 39.58.3). Sullivan dates the will to the period after 55 ("probably closer to 55 than to 51", 246) because of the reference to the treaties which Auletes had made at Rome. But these rather date the will to 59-58, when it would in any case be natural for the recently recognised monarch to make a fresh will invoking the protection of his new-found friends and allies. Also one of the more notorious points about Gabinius' restoration of Auletes was that it was *not* in accordance with a decree of the senate or people. The careful phraseology employed by Caesar seems to support the view that the will was drawn

up when all three girls were still alive (perhaps not long before Auletes' flight to Rome), and the comparative 'elder' could therefore not be used to distinguish between them. By not naming, but simply describing his heirs, Auletes guarded against the need to rewrite his will if a child died, and against its invalidation by multiple assassination (not a far-fetched idea at the Ptolemaic court). *Duabus* in the MSS should, then, be corrected not to *duabus* <*filiabus*>, but to *filiabus*, as Herzog proposed.

As to the sharing of the inheritance, this reflects the Ptolemaic practice, inherited from the Pharaohs, whereby brother-sister marriage was normal for the ruling couple - e.g. on the death of her present consort, Cleopatra immediately married his (and her) younger brother (with no better results). Thus it was wise, in the interests of an uncontested succession, for Auletes to specify which of his daughters he wished to become queen and therefore be married to his male heir; cf. Lucan 10.93-94 (Cleopatra speaks) *verba patris, qui iura mihi communia regni | et thalamos cum patre dedit* - "the words of my father, who gave me the right to share the throne and be my brother's consort".

5 **called upon the Roman people:** in view of Auletes' unpopularity with the Alexandrians, and the fact that he owed his throne to Roman power, it was prudent of him to protect his wishes for the succession by invoking the Roman people and thus giving them a legitimate reason for interference in the politics of the kingdom after his death. (For other royal wills giving the Roman people an interest in the succession, and therefore offering the will-maker protection against assassination by a rival, see Braund 129-139, Sherwin-White 1984, 80-82). It is uncertain whether Caesar knew of this clause before the will was produced. If he did, his behaviour in summoning the boy king and his sister is less arrogant than painted in 107.2n.; on the other hand, it does not figure among the reasons he there gives for acting as he did.

6 **pressure of public affairs:** this is probably a euphemism for one of the periods of turbulence that characterised the whole decade of the 50s in Rome.

109.1 **While these matters were being disputed before Caesar . . . suddenly there came the news . . . :** in this single sentence Caesar slides quickly over a complicated sequence of events. In fact, what seems to have happened is this: on Caesar's arrival in Alexandria, the young king and his regent Pothinus returned to Alexandria, leaving the army under Achilles at Pelusium to watch Cleopatra. Caesar was accommodated in the palace (112.8), but instead of showing his unwilling hosts the gratitude that they expected for their elimination of Pompey, he asked for the settlement of Ptolemy's huge debt (106.5n.) and claimed the role of judge in the dispute with Cleopatra (107.2). Ptolemy and Pothinus, being present in person, had (one infers) the

better of the argument until Cleopatra, who can hitherto have taken part in the judicial proceedings only through representatives, decided to take the risk of attempting to slip past her enemies' guards in order to see what she could achieve face to face with Caesar. The results of the meeting were immediate, causing Pothinus to summon Achilles and the army (108.2), while he himself remained in the palace and pretended to co-operate with Caesar. It was at this point that Caesar suddenly heard of the approach of the royal army. What his motives were in suppressing all mention of Cleopatra's part in the imbroglio apart from his initial statement that he had summoned her and her brother (107.2) can only be guessed; but it is quite clear that the opposition he succeeded in stirring up was due in no small measure to his favouritism of Cleopatra, who was not only at odds with her brother and Pothinus, but was also unpopular with the Alexandrians (Dio 42.34.2).

3 **what would be acceptable to him:** that is, to the king, cf. Dio 42.37.1, though doubtless the king was coached by Caesar. [The reflexive *suae* (*voluntatis*) must refer to the nearer subject, like *suis* (*necessariis*) a few words previously].

5 **Achillas . . . without listening to them or finding out why they had come:** this makes no sense and is a palpable fabrication. Dio's version (42.37.1-2) is much to be preferred. According to this, Serapion and Dioscorides did indeed deliver their message, that Achilles should keep the peace; but he, realising that the command actually emanated from Caesar and judging it to be a sign of weakness, roused the anger of his troops against Caesar and Cleopatra to such an extent that they committed the sacrilege of attacking the ambassadors.

6 **Caesar . . . kept the king in his power:** that is to say, Caesar prevented him leaving the palace to join Achilles at the head of his army.

1102 **Gabinus' soldiers: 103.5**

ill-disciplined ways of Alexandrian life: the Alexandrian citizen-body was Greek (§6 below), and Caesar makes play here with the conventional Roman prejudice against the Greeks as soft, licentious, and undisciplined (the catalogue of moral deficiency went on to include, among other failings, over-cleverness, cowardice, homosexuality, lack of principle, and an interest in philosophy).

had taken wives . . . had children : the exact status of the *Gabiniani*, the Roman soldiers left behind in Alexandria in 55 B.C. is uncertain. Soldiers in the Roman army were not allowed to marry while in service, but unofficial liaisons, and children, could of course occur, especially if a man was on permanent garrison duty in a place like Alexandria. However the *Gabiniani* may have had veterans' privileges, including the right to a family life, or they may have been re-

enlisted in the Ptolemaic army under whatever conditions of service obtained. In any case the 'wives' cannot be legal wives in Roman law (as Cleopatra could not be Antony's wife later, since no right of intermarriage (*conubium*) existed between Roman and Egyptian citizens), and Caesar is thus scoring something of a debating point.

4 **All runaway slaves of ours:** i.e. slaves belonging to Roman masters; the master's only remedy was to track down the runaway and physically arrest him.

5 **these men habitually demanded . . . :** if the Alexandrian army did these things (and it probably did) it will have been, with the possible exception of the demand for more pay, as a tool in the hands of individuals competing for power in the hotbed of intrigue and violence which first-century B.C. Alexandria had become. An enemy of Caesar could equally well have accused his army of indulging in genocide and plunder on a massive scale, abetting civil war, and forgetting their loyalty to Rome.

6 **had killed two sons of Bibulus:** Bibulus, when proconsul of Syria in 51 B.C. (31.3n.), had sent two of his sons to Alexandria, where they were mocked and killed by the army (Val. Max. 4.1.15, Seneca *Dial.* 6.14.2). K.-H.-M. plausibly conjecture that the purpose of their visit was to request help against the Parthians, and (less certainly) that they were killed in revenge for their father's opposition, when consul, to the recognition of Auletes as king (107.2nn.).

the Egyptians: i.e. the native Egyptian people. They were in political and economic subjection to the Greco-Syrian dynasty of the Ptolemies and to the privileged citizen class of Alexandria, who were of Greek descent, spoke Greek, and alone in Egypt possessed the institutions of a Greek city (see Fraser, *passim*).

111 1 **that part of the town which Caesar held:** it appears from 112.8 that this was the part to the east and southeast of the main harbour, where the royal palace extended. Strabo, writing only a few years later, describes the site: "In the Great Harbour, as you sail into the entrance, on the right are the island and the tower Pharos, and on the other side are the reefs and the promontory called Lochias, where there is a royal palace; and on sailing into the harbour you come, on the left, to the inner palaces, which are continuous with the buildings on Lochias and have gardens and numerous lodges of all descriptions. Below these lies the artificially created secret harbour which is private to the royal family." (17.1.9). Strabo also says that the palaces occupied a quarter or even a third of the area of the city (17.1.8).

3 **a considerable number of streets:** it appears that the street layout of Alexandria was of the 'Hippodamian' checkerboard type, popular in deliberately planned Greek cities in the Classical and Hellenistic

periods. This would make separate fighting on a number of parallel streets inevitable.

sent to help Pompey: see 4.4.

quadriremes and quinqueremes: see 101.6n.

- 6 **the dockyards:** these were in the western part of the Great Harbour and adjoined the Heptastadium, the causeway which divided the Great Harbour from its companions to the west (the Eunostos and the artificial harbour known as the 'Box' - to be distinguished from the secret royal harbour mentioned in the extract from Strabo above).

- 9 **landed soldiers at the Pharos:** because of the lack of a definite article in Latin, it is impossible to tell whether Caesar means he landed soldiers *at the Pharos* or *on (the island of) Pharos*. For him, both meanings are simultaneously present, but in view of the way he starts the next chapter, and in the light of *Bell. Alex.* 17.3-5 (where he takes the rest of the island), I have chosen the former.

- 112 1 **The Pharos:** this tower was the first real lighthouse in the world and ranked as one of the Seven Wonders of the World. According to Pliny (*NH* 36.83) it was built for 800 talents (say £10 million) in the first half of the third century B.C. by the architect Sostratus of Cnidus for one of the Ptolemies (probably II Philadelphos, Eusebius *Chron. ad Olymp.* 124.1, though Suidas puts it in the time of Ptolemy I Soter). It was destroyed by earthquake in the fourteenth century, but an Arab description and coins of the Roman period give an idea of its appearance. It was at least 300 feet in height, and its three sections, respectively square, octagonal, and round, were each set in from the one below and had tapering sides to give greater stability. Part of the wonder of the structure consisted in the ramps and passageways constructed within the different levels to bring fuel up to the continuously burning fire.

- 2 **from the higher ground an embankment nine hundred paces long:** this is the causeway known as the Heptastadium from its length, seven stadia or just over 1400 yards. Caesar's '900 paces' is the equivalent of 1350 yards. [Most recent editors adopt the correction found in M and read *a superioribus regibus* ('by the earlier kings'), for *a superioribus regionibus* ('from the higher ground'), but the latter makes perfect sense and Caesar is not writing a history of the development of the harbour at Alexandria, but a description of its present state.]

narrow track and bridge: Strabo's detailed account says there were two bridges in the Heptastadium, but it hardly seems necessary to correct Caesar's text.

- 5 **seized Pharos:** or perhaps 'seized the Pharos' (i.e. only the lighthouse). In favour of this interpretation are the small number of troops Caesar can have been able to spare for this task, and the large


number of natives living on the island. The lighthouse stood at the north-east end of the island, next to the channel into the harbour.

- 8 **a theatre which served as a citadel:** later Hellenistic and Roman theatres had high external walls, to support the semi-circle of stepped spectator seating and to make possible the elaborate three-storey architectural stage-backs which developed in the period.


- 10 **king Ptolemy's younger daughter:** this was Arsinoe, nearer to Cleopatra than to Ptolemy in age. It is odd that Caesar refers to Auletes, now three years dead, as 'king Ptolemy', almost as though he could not bring himself to admit that the 'boy Ptolemy' was in fact the king.

unencumbered possession of the throne: since both current claimants were now, voluntarily or involuntarily, detained in the palace and tainted by their dealings with Caesar, and Caesar's defeat must have appeared imminent, the way was open for Arsinoe to put herself at the head of the forces of national resistance.

[Caesar's narrative stops here, in mid-course. A final sentence 'This was the start of the Alexandrian War' was later added by an editor. The story was continued by the author of the *Bellum Alexandrinum*, possibly Caesar's officer Aulus Hirtius. To this were added the accounts by unknown authors of the last two campaigns of the civil war, in Africa (47-46 B.C.) and Spain (46-45 B.C.), the *Bellum Africum* and the *Bellum Hispaniense*, to make up, with the *BG* and *BC*, the so-called *Corpus Caesarianum*.]







MAP 3 Pharsalus Region

Heights in metres

- Lines of Battle
- ⊞ Site of Pompey's Camp
- Ⓢ Place of surrender

according to:

- L Lucas
 - M Morgan
 - P Pelling
 - B Béquignon
- (see Bibliography)

Modern villages are in this type

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